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To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least 
recognized need of the human soul. It is one of the hardest to 
define. A human being has roots by virtue of his real, active 
and natural participation in the life of a community which 
preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the 
past and certain particular expectations for the future. 
 
Simone Weil “The Need for Roots”, 1987: 41. 
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“The Tree of Hope” and “the Monument of Arirang”. 
Located on a site of a former Korean “comfort women” station in Miyako-jima Island, Okinawa. 
 
(Taken by Takahashi Toshio, May 2013) 
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Abstract 
 
My PhD thesis examines the diverse concepts and manifestations of Okinawan identity that 
underlie the Okinawan anti-base movement or the so-called Okinawa struggle (or Okinawa 
tōsō in Japanese). Located between the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea, Japan’s 
southern-most prefecture, Okinawa, was once a stepping stone for Japan’s colonial expansion 
to Taiwan in the late 19th century. After the Battle of Okinawa from March to June 1945, 
Okinawa became a crucial defense line in the north-western Pacific for the United States and 
Japan in the latter half of the 20th century. The Okinawan anti-base movement, which started 
in the late 1940s, still continues today, almost seventy years on. Although its core demands 
are for the removal of US bases from Okinawan soil, many local residents see it in wider 
terms as a demand for the liberation of Okinawa from its subordinated status under the US-
Japan security system. Explicit or implicit notions of “Okinawan identity” are therefore 
crucial to this movement. 
While the notion of “Okinawan identity” appears to be a self-evident and 
homogenous concept based on culture, ethnicity, and historical experience, this 
understanding of identity obscures the complexity and dynamism of identity and community 
within the anti-base movement. Okinawan identity is not a fixed entity, and to understand its 
creation and evolution it is not sufficient to focus simply on the administrative territory 
labelled Okinawa. Through case studies of two recent strands in the anti-base movement, this 
thesis highlights the vital role of place in formation of discourses and practices of Okinawan 
identity. The case of the Takae Residents’ Society illuminates the importance of a localized 
sense of place, while the case of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity shows an emerging 
regionalized sense of place across the national boundaries. Applying recent theories on space, 
place and identity to these case studies, this thesis explores multi-leveled forms of identity—
local, archipelagic and regional which the Okinawa struggle has created. This thesis thus 
15 
seeks to challenge our understanding of the long and ongoing Okinawa struggle, and 
contributes to wider debates about identity and protest movements in the contemporary 
world. 
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A Map of the Okinawa Island1 
 
 
                                                 
1 Download from http://3mafband.lapoint.net/okinawa/images/Okinawa_Relief_90.jpg, 21.7.2015. 
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A Map of the Ryūkyū Islands in East Asia2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
2 Download from http://okinawa.com.pl/mapa/images/Okinawa-Ryukyu_Islands.GIF, 21.7.2015. 
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Notes on Romanization and Name Conventions 
 
 
In this thesis, the names of Japanese and Koreans are written in East Asian order except in 
the case of scholars writing mainly in English. Therefore, in the text of the thesis, surname 
comes first followed by given name. (Given name is followed by surname in the footnotes.) 
 
For Romanization of Korean characters, this thesis uses Revised Romanization.  
 
For Romanization of Japanaese and Okinawan pronunciation, this thesis generally uses 
macrons when necessary. (e.g. uchinānchu) 
 
This thesis generally uses “Okinawa”, but Ryūkyū or Ryukyu is also used to describe 
particular names of institutions (e.g. the University of the Ryukyus), places (the Arc of 
Ryūkyū), and the cultural and social movements. (e.g. Association of Indigenous People in 
the Ryūkyūs) 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The photo was taken by the author at Henoko Beach in November 2011. 
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1.1. Introduction 
Mornings in Takae are rather quiet.3 Located in the northern highlands of Okinawa Island—
the main island of Japan’s southern-most prefecture Okinawa—Takae is one of the smallest 
hamlets in Okinawa with about 160 residents. Around this small hamlet, there is a massive 
rainforest, which the local islanders call Yanbaru Forest (or Yanbaru no mori), embracing the 
village and its people. In the midst of this forest, there is Arakawa Creek, which provides 
approximately 60 percent of the water supply on Okinawa Island. Here, with luck, one may 
see a listed endangered local species, Okinawa rail (or yanbaru kuina). Usually, the day 
begins with the sounds of cars driving on the only paved road. The sound of engines is the 
sign which informs the local residents of the beginning of the day for this farm village. In the 
Yanbaru region, the majority of the local population has historically made their livelihoods 
through agriculture and forestry.4 Takae is not exceptional in this regard. Therefore, after the 
busy hours in the daytime, the village goes quiet before the whole sky is filled with the 
numerous stars, which are rarely seen in the highly industrialized south of the island. 
 However, in this remote end of Okinawa, there is a place that becomes very crowded 
on weekends. Villagers gather at a meeting place called tūtan-ya. This prefabricated blue tin 
building has been used by the locals as a place for social events and is the only guest house in 
this area. Even when there are no events at tūtan-ya, both young and old community 
members appear without any particular reason. Sometimes someone brings a guitar, and 
someone sings. Someone comes with a bottle of local spirit, maruta, and shares this with 
                                                 
3 Takae (高江) is one of six communities in Higashi Village in the north-eastern part of Okinawa Island. 
4 Yanbaru (山原) is the unofficial, yet commonly used, name given to the northern half of Okinawa Island, the 
main island of Okinawa prefecture, the southernmost prefecture of Japan. In Chinese characters, it consists of 
two words, “mountain” and “field”. As these words suggest, the area is covered by abundant rainforest. 
Yanbaru region is made up of nine official administration units—six villages, two towns, and one city. The mas-
sive rainforest spreading over the region provides great natural and cultural benefits to the rest of Okinawa. 
Because of its distinctive natural habitat, it became a candidate to be registered as a world heritage site in 
2003 by the Examination Committee Concerning the Proposed Places for the World Heritage. Also, Arakawa 
dam is one of the major sources of water for the rest of the island. 
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other people. The locals discuss various issues, from everyday topics, including farming and 
family, to serious issues such as politics, often with humor, sometimes with more seriousness. 
Rumpling their suntanned faces, their conversation often continues until midnight. This is 
one of the scenes that I saw in Takae’s “protest community”. Having been conducting a sit-in 
against the military helipad construction site in their village since 2007, these villagers are 
often described as “local protesters” (or jimoto hantai jūmin) in the nation-wide mass media, 
as though they were dissidents egoistically opposing their government’s decisions.  
 This thesis examines the various forms of Okinawan identity that underlie the 
Okinawan anti-base movement. While the notion of “Okinawan identity” tends to be 
understood as a homogenous concept, I argue that this understanding of identity as a fixed 
entity obscures the complexity, creativity and dynamism of identity and community within 
the anti-base movement. By examining two case studies of two recent anti-base movements, 
this thesis shows how concepts of place can add a new dimension to existing discourses and 
practices of Okinawan identity. One case study illuminates the importance of a localized 
sense of place, while the other draws attention to an emerging regionalized sense of place 
across national boundaries. Applying recent theories on space, place and identity to my case 
studies, this thesis thus highlights the need to recognize multi-leveled forms of identity—
local, archipelagic and regional—which interact within the Okinawa struggle. This thesis 
seeks to deepen our understanding of the Okinawa struggle from historical and contemporary 
perspectives, and it eventually aims to contribute to the wider debate about identity and 
protest movements in the contemporary world. 
Located next to Taiwan and mainland China, Okinawa is one of forty-seven Japanese 
prefectures. Made up of about 300 inhabited and uninhabited islands, which are scattered in 
the southern fringe of the East China Sea, Okinawa is the only prefecture in Japan whose 
climate belongs to a subtropical area. Okinawa’s unique characteristics are not limited to the 
24 
local climate; it also has a history distinct from the rest of Japan. Before Okinawa Prefecture 
was established in 1879, there was an independent Ryukyu Kingdom (Ryūkyū ōkoku)5, which 
was an important hub of the regional trade within the Chinese tributary system prior to the 
late nineteenth century.6 The Ryukyu Kingdom was incorporated by modern Japan after the 
“Ryukyu Disposal” (Ryūkyū shobun) in 1872.7 Treated discriminatorily compared to other 
Japanese prefectures8, Okinawa’s modern experiences under the Japanese Empire ended with 
                                                 
5 In 1609, the House of Shimazu based in Satsuma Domain in Kyūshū Island invaded the Ryūkyūs to govern it as 
their vassal state. It was then that the Ryūkyū Kingdom was incorporated under Satsuma’s influence and as-
signed a duty of offering tribute to the Shogun in Edo. Yet, in that period, the Ryukyu Kingdom could still main-
tain its status, autonomous rule of its territory and the traditional relationship with the Chinese Dynasty. In 
1854, the Ryukyu Kingdom signed the Friendship Treaty with the United States as a sovereign state (琉米修好
条約: Ryū-bei Shūko Jōyaku). (Takeshi Araskaki, "Michishirube o Motomete," Ryūkyū Shimpōo, 1 May-11 June 
2014.) 
6 For example, Takara Kurayoshi, a notable historian of pre-modern Okinawa, demonstrates the rich maritime 
connection of Ryukyu Kingdom and its neighbors including south-east Asian kingdoms such as Malacca during 
the 15th and 16th centuries.   (See, for example, Kurayoshi Takara, Ryūkyū Ōkoku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1993).) 
7 The Ryukyu Kingdom as a sovereign state came to an end when the territory was annexed to Japan after the 
Meiji Restoration in the late nineteenth century. In order to incorporate the Ryukyu Kingdom as its own terri-
tory, the first step that the Japanese political leaders conducted was to recognize the Ryukyu Kingdom as a re-
gional domain (han). King Shō Tai (1843-1901) was forced to live in the new capital city of Japan, Tokyo, where 
he was placed under Japanese Imperial authority and added as one of the noblemen of the Japanese Imperial 
court, bestowed with the rank of the Earl. Also, the Meiji government demanded that Ryukyu Domain end its 
conventional tributary relationship with the Ching Dynasty in China. Although the local leaderships (the three 
councils) refused Japan’s demand to abandon their diplomatic relationship with China, this dispute ended with 
the arrival of the military and police forces from Japan in order to “punish” the leaders of the Ryukyu Kingdom 
for their disobedience. In March 1879, the Meiji Government declared the abolition of the Ryūkyū Domain. 
The annexation was a crucial historical event not only in its own right but also because of the contexts in which 
it occurred, amid the change of the regional power-balance between Japan and China. As the first modernized 
empire in East Asia, Japan was eager to extend its territory to other parts of the region. Prior to Okinawa’s an-
nexation to Japan, the Meiji Government in Tokyo decided to send the military troops to Taiwan in May 1874 
(the Japanese Invasion of Taiwan or Taiwan Shuppei). It was Japan’s first attempt after the Meiji Restoration in 
1868 to occupy foreign territory. This invasion was conducted to punish indigenous Taiwanese who killed over 
sixty residents from Miyako and Yaeyama Islanders (Mudan Incident or Botansha Jiken). Although both Miyako 
and Yaeyama Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom in that period, Japan demanded compensation from 
the Ching dynasty, insisting that the victims were Japanese nationals. As China denied Japan’s demand, Japan 
sent troops to occupy the southern part of Taiwan. This initial Japanese invasion of Taiwan failed, with soldiers 
affected by endemic disease such as malaria, in June 1874. Nevertheless, this event triggered regional tension 
between the Ching Dynasty and the Meiji government (明治政府), which eventually led to the first Sino-Japa-
nese War in late 1894. As a result of this war, Japan annexed Taiwan as its external territory. This also affected 
Okinawa. After this incident, Okinawa was forced to end its historical relations with China. Therefore, the polit-
ical turmoil between Okinawa and Japan was not only a problem specific to those two countries, it was also 
the very first step for Japan to achieve its territorial ambitions in other countries. The Ryukyu Kingdom as a 
hub of the regional trade system became a key site of conflict in the modern regional geopolitics. 
8 Okinawa was not treated equally with the rest of Japan, either politically and culturally. Although social activists 
such as Jahana Noboru (1865-1908) had conducted political campaigns since the late 1890s, Okinawans were 
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the atrocities of the Battle of Okinawa, when Okinawa was treated as “a sacrificial stone” to 
delay the advance of American forces into mainland Japan.9 After the end of World War II in 
1945, Okinawa was governed by a US military regime until May 1972. This was the 
beginning of Okinawa’s seventy-year history of anti-base movements (or so-called Okinawa 
tōsō, which means Okinawa struggle). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
not given the political rights to send their delegates to the National Diet until 1912. In everyday life, the local 
language was strongly discouraged and even banned in public places such as public schools. Traditional customs 
were categorized as uncivilized native culture, as were other indigenous cultures in Japan. In 1903, at the Japan 
Industrial Expo in Osaka, a few selected Okinawan locals were “displayed” at one pavilion called the Museum of 
Mankind, as native tribes in traditional costume, together with people from other Japanese colonies such as 
Taiwan, Korea and Hokkaido. In mainland Japan, the Okinawan migrant community which lived in the major 
industrial cities such as Tokyo and Osaka were segregated from other ‘ordinary’ Japanese. In terms of adminis-
trative category, Okinawa was not a colony. However, the people and their culture were not treated on an equal 
standard with the rest of naichi (mainland Japan). This ambiguous status embedded a unique identity among 
the Okinawan people. On the one hand, they were treated as mainland Japanese who were different from co-
lonial subjects. However, on the other hand, they were different Japanese from the rest of the mainland Japa-
nese. This complexity was reflected in a self-recognition which Higa Shunchō (1883-1977) describes as the “eld-
est son of Japanese colonization” followed by Taiwanese as the second and Korean. (Kirsten L. Ziomek, "The 
1903 Human Pavilion: Colonial Realities and Subaltern Subjectivities in Twentieth-Century Japan," The Journal 
of Asian Studies (2014): 493-516; Richard Siddle, "Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa before 1945," Japanese 
Studies 18 (1998): 117-133; Higa Shunchō, "Furui Jida no Omoide," in Higa Shuchō Zenshū (1971): 182, cited in 
Osamu Yakabi, "Kindai Okinawa ni okeru Mainoritī Ninshiki no Hensen," Bessatsu Kan 6(2003). 
9 Okinawa’s ambiguous status in Japan was regarded as a “problem” again towards the end of the Asia and the 
Pacific War in early 1945. The land was distinctively regarded as the Emperor’s holy ground as part of Japan’s 
internal territory, and accordingly, there was discussion in Tokyo as to whether to use the islands as a ‘sacrifi-
cial stone’. The decision of Japan’s military leaders was to block the Allied Forces in Okinawa in order to earn 
some time for Tokyo. This decision directly caused the loss of a quarter of the local population in Okinawa in 
the battles in Okinawa between US and Japanese troops from March until June 1945. 
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Image 1-1: Kadena Airbase in Kadena Town, one of the largest American airbases in Japan. The photo was 
taken by the author in July 2010. 
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Map 1-1: The map of the US military bases and other facilities in Okinawa Island. The map is retrieved 
from the website run by the Okinawa Prefectural Government (http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chi-
jiko/kichitai/images/map_en.gif, accessed October 27, 2014). 
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Chart 1-1: Proportion of the US military facilities in the local areas on Okinawa Island as of 2010. The 
number on the left side shows the proportion of the occupied area by the US facilities. The chart is made 
by the author based on the data provided by the Cabinet Office of Japan 
(http://www.ogb.go.jp/gaikyou/h250401shichouson/13_shichosonmenseki.pdf, 27/10/2014). 
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How do Okinawans conduct the local anti-base movements? What kind of people 
participate in the activism? What are the important identities for those participants? These 
three questions provide the basic framework of this thesis. To address these questions, first I 
will discuss the historical background of the Okinawa anti-base movement (or Okinawa 
struggle) after the end of World War II in two phases: from the late 1940s until the early 
1970s; and from 1970s until the 1980s. Next, I will examine the local anti-base movement 
since the late 1990s, focusing particularly on people’s mobilization of place in making their 
communal identities. While discussing contemporary characteristics of the formation of 
protest identities in Okinawa, this thesis highlights two grassroots anti-US base activist 
groups which started in the last two decades: the “Takae Residents’ Society to Protest against 
the Helipad Construction” (Helipaddo Kensetsu ni Hantai suru Jūmin no Kai, or the Takae 
Residents’ Society); and “Okinawa-Korea People’s Solidarity” (Okinawa-Kankoku Minshū 
Rentai, or OKPS).  
 “The Okinawa struggle” (Okinawa tōsō) is a generic term which encapsulates all 
kinds of local social, cultural and political movements against the US military bases, which 
have continued over the last seventy years. The Okinawa struggle was started spontaneously 
in different parts of Okinawa Island by those who felt their livelihood spaces to be threatened 
by the American base construction. The first mass collective action occurred in 1956 against 
the decision made by the US Government over land compensation for the local Okinawans. 
The campaign was joined by farmers, students, politicians and local communities regardless 
of political ideology. As the protest was organized in many different parts of Okinawa Island, 
the event is called “the island-wide struggle” (shimagurumi tōsō). The experience of the first 
island-wide struggle became the point of origin in the historical narrative of the Okinawa 
struggle, highlighting its characteristics of pacifism. This spirit of the Okinawa struggle was 
reinforced through further events such as the reversion movement to Japan (sokoku fukki 
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undō) during the latter half of the 1950s and the 1960s, led by the local social and political 
leaders from Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Union (Okinawa kyōshokuin kumiai), and 
the so-called anti-reversion movement by students and workers during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, opposing the immediate return of Okinawa to Japan.10 From the late 1970s 
onwards, the peace movement in Okinawa was infused with the grassroots environmental 
movement or so-called residents’ movements in various places such as Kin and Shiraho. 
While the residents’ movements did not create mass campaigns, their legacy is essential to 
consider the contemporary Okinawa struggle in Henoko, Takae and elsewhere.11 Okinawa’s 
pacifism is also influenced by other new types of social movements such as the local 
feminism movements, which became a vocal group in the anti-base campaign from the mid-
1990s, and political campaigns for the rights of indigenous Ryūkyūan people. 
 The movements that form the case studies in this thesis, OKPS and the Takae 
Residents’ Society, which started in 1997 and 2007 respectively, play crucial roles in 
developing the anti-base movements in contemporary Okinawa. However, both Takae 
                                                 
10 Participants in the anti-reversion movement were well-informed and aware of Okinawa’s role and responsi-
bility in the Vietnam War. Raising the banner of solidarity with North Vietnam, it was a remarkable moment 
when people sought a unique meaning of Okinawan identity not just as Japanese but as people in the op-
pressed world under the American and Japanese supremacy in the Asia and the Pacific region. The movement 
questioned the existing local histories by referring to the colonization of Okinawa by Japan, and the American 
imperialism over the region. Therefore, the emergence of pacifism in that period contained multiple ideologi-
cal strands – war experience and anti-imperialism. It was also expressed in the solidarity movement with Black 
GIs in Okinawa. (Yuichiro Onishi, “The Presence of (Black) Liberation in Okinawan Freedom : Transnational Mo-
ments, 1968-1972,” in Extending Diaspora: New Histories of Black People, ed. Dwane Y. Curry et al. (University 
of Illinois Press, 2009): 178-202; Yuichiro Onishi, “Occupied Okinawa on the Edge: On Being Okinawan in Ha-
wai’i and US Colonialism toward Okinawa,” American Quarterly 64 (2012): 741-65.) 
11 In the mid-1970s and 1980s, Okinawan citizens undertook protest campaigns against the destruction of the 
natural environment in places such as Kin in the central coastal district of Okinawa Island and Shiraho in Ishi-
gaki Island. These places were designated as construction sites for a petrol storage plant and a new airport. 
Also, in places in northern Yanbaru region, local residents conducted protest movements against excessive 
land development, which caused various kinds of environmental damage including draining of red clay into 
neighboring coastal waters. Although these environmental movements were not directly related to the anti-
base movement, they were regarded as part of the problems underlying Okinawa’s weak economy, which was 
largely dependent upon the base-related industries in major cities (kichi keizai : 基地経済). In order to fill in 
the economic gap between Okinawa and mainland Japan, both Okinawa prefectural government and the Japa-
nese government promoted investment—particularly in the construction industry—from mainland Japan to 
Okinawa. 
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Residents’ Society and OKPS are less visible than some other local activist groups in 
Okinawa such as Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence (Kichi Guntai o Yurusanai 
Kōdōsuru Onnatachi no Kai, hearafter OWAAMV), and the local struggle against the off-
shore base construction in Henoko. This probably reflects the fact that OWAAMV and the 
anti-offshore base construction campaign in Henoko are unprecedented social struggles 
which have had a significant impact on local, national and international politics in the last 
two decades. Feminism and environmental activism have taken the central role in activism in 
the Okinawa struggle since they first emerged in the Okinawa struggle in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the local struggles in Takae Village and OKPS are also crucial activism 
because these two examples of civic activism highlight some aspects of the local activism 
identities which have been little discussed within the existing studies. 
 While the researchers on Okinawa’s anti-base movements such as Akibayashi Kozue 
and Kumamoto Hiroyuki have highlighted the roles of OWAAMV and Henoko in discussing 
the emergence of new social identities such as women and citizens, the Takae Residents’ 
Society and OKPS introduce us to the significance of place to frame the concept of identity 
for Okinawa’s anti-base movements.12 Founded in 2007, the Takae Residents’ Society has 
been conducting a protest campaign in Takae in their north-eastern village on Okinawa 
Island. The purpose of their local activism is to prevent construction of five helipad landing 
zones deep in the local forest.13 One of the unique characteristics of the Takae Residents’ 
Society is a strong attachment to the land they live in, particularly to the rich natural 
environment of the Yanbaru Forest. This attachment is widely shared by the local protesters, 
                                                 
12 Hiroshi Hatakeyama and Hiroyuki Kumamoto et al. Okinawa No Datsugunjika to Chiikiteki Shutaisei: Fukkigo-
Sedai No Okinawa (Meiji Daigaku Gunshuku Heiwa Kenkyujo, 2006); Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato, 
“Okinawa: women’s struggle for demilitarization,” in The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Mil-
itary Posts, ed. Catherine Lutz and Cynthia Enloe (NYU Press, 2009): 243-269. 
13 Construction of Takae’s helipad was decided by the Japanese government as one of the conditions for clo-
sure of Futenma Airbase located in Futenma City, the central part of Okinawa. For more detail, see Chapter 
Five. 
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and thus protection of the local forest became one of the most important agendas for the local 
community.  
While the case of Takae implies localization of identity based on a distinctive natural 
environment within Okinawa, the case study of OKPS helps us to understand a type of civic 
activism in Okinawa that introduced a cross-border regional perspective to the anti-base 
movement. Working with various activist groups in South Korea, OKPS is one of the earliest 
groups in Okinawa which works to create a cross-border anti-US base solidarity campaign. 
Although the group was started in the late 1990s, its origins go back to the late 1980s. The 
group was started by some experienced activists, but it was joined by other individuals who 
did not have any experience as activists. By organizing cultural and social events between the 
two countries, OKPS largely contributed to creating a basis for a transnational anti-base 
movement in both Korea and Okinawa (and Japan).  
Focusing particularly on historical contexts and current social and cultural practices, I 
shall examine the social process through which these new forms of local identities were 
developed. This thesis aims to deepen and reshape our understanding of the contemporary 
Okinawan anti-base struggle in the local, national and regional contexts. 
 
1.2.  Literature Review: Debates on the Formation of “Okinawan Identity” 
The earliest writings on the Okinawan people’s anti-base struggle date from the late 1950s. 
Senaga Kamejirō (1907-2001), a founder of Okinawa People’s Party (Okinawa Jinmintō, 
which was later incorporated by the Japanese Communist Party), wrote some of the first 
works on the Okinawa struggle: “The Tragedy of the Okinawan People” (Minzoku no 
Higeki), and “Report from Okinawa” (Okinawa kara no Hōkoku) in 1959. A decade later, in 
the late 1960s, there was a period when some young intellectuals emerged and became 
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prominent writers on the Okinawa struggle. Ōta Masahide, Hiyane Teruo, Arakawa Akira, 
and Arasaki Moriteru were among those who wrote seminal works, discussing the Okinawa 
struggle extensively from historical and philosophical perspectives. As they spent their 
formative years in war-time imperialistic education (kōkoku kyōiku) and post-World War II 
democratic education (sengo minshushugi kyōiku), these intellectuals who were born in the 
1920s and 1930s were called “the wartime generation” (senchūha). Although their individual 
approaches vary, these intellectuals from the war-time generation similarly focus on 
Okinawan identity as a key concept to understand the meanings of the Okinawa struggle. 
Building upon the legacy of earlier generations of scholars who had founded Okinawa studies 
(Okinawa-gaku) in the pre-war period, scholars from the war-war time generation such as 
Hiyane reinterpreted the meaning of the local cultural identity as a concept to discuss 
Okinawa’s distinctive political culture by arguing that Okinawan identity exists in essence 
prior to political opinions and ideologies.14  
However, there are some major differences between the pre-war and the war-time 
generations in their understandings of Okinawan identity. The pre-war Okinawan experts 
such as Iha Fūyū (1876-1947) were influenced mainly by early Japanese ethnologists such as 
Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962). Their primary aim was to study their local culture, and to 
establish Okinawan studies as a modern academic subject. By studying classical texts such as 
poems, they promoted the institutionalization of knowledge related to Okinawa. Yet, this was 
also reflection of their concern about their homeland as “backward” compared to mainland 
Japan. In other words, Okinawan studies as an intellectual project in the pre-war period was 
the product of an ambiguous self oscillating between “uncivilized Okinawa” and “civilized 
Japan”. For the war-time generation scholars, Okinawan identity was not only built on 
traditional culture. Other historical experiences such as memory of the Battle of Okinawa, 
                                                 
14 Ken’yu Uchima, "Hiyane Teruo Shi Ni Kiku", Ryūkyū Shimpō, October 9, 2012, 3. 
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violence under the US military administration were the major elements in their expression 
and discussion of their local identity, which they linked to the idea of pacifism.In their critical 
articulation, Okinawa identity became an essential concept that explained the spirit of the 
local anti-base struggle not only against the US military bases per se but also in the broader 
political and social context of issues relating to post-WWII Okinawa.15 
 While the war-time generation contributed greatly to shaping the historical 
consciousness and narrative of the Okinawa struggle, their works were criticized and 
developed by the following generations, the so-called “postwar generation” (or sengo sedai) 
and also “the post-reversion generation” (or fukkigo sedai). The approaches to Okinawan 
identity utilized by those following generations vary depending on the individual scholar. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to generalize their different approaches in three ways.  
The first approach helps develop the existing narratives by studying the details of 
socio-economic aspects of Okinawan society early in the US occupation period. Most 
notably, Arasaki Moriteru’s historical view on the early occupation period as “Okinawa’s 
dark age” (Okinawa no ankoku jidai)16 was further developed by scholars including Toriyama 
Atsushi, Wakabayashi Chiyo, and Tobe Hideaki.17 Although they do not constitute a 
particular school or group of researchers, these scholars take a similar approach in exploring 
people’s reaction to the US military government in the early occupation period in the 1940s 
and 1950s. For example, Toriyama describes diverse currents of political movements by local 
                                                 
15 Cf. Teruo Hiyane, Sengo Okinawa No Seishin to Shiso (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2009), 7-14 and Chapter Four. 
16 Arasaki’s historical narrative of the Okinawa struggle regards the early occupation period from the late 
1940s until the early 1950s as “the Dark Age” (ankokujidai) because it was the period when the US military 
control became complete and Okinawan society could not conduct effective resistance against the local US 
authority. (Moriteru Arasaki and Yoshio Nakano, Okinawa Mondai Nijū-nen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), 
50-70. 
17 Cf. Atsushi Toriyama, Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956 (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2013); 
Hideaki Tobe, “‘Sengo Okinawa ni Okeru Fukki Undō no Shuppatsu: Kyōinsō Kara Miru Senjyōgo/senryōka no 
Shakai to Undō),” Journal of Japanese History 547 (2007): 102-124; Chiyo Wakabayashi, “Jīpu to Sajin: Senryō 
Shoki Okinawa-shakai no ‘henyō’ to ‘hen’i’,” Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū 29 (2003): 239–240. 
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leaders, and their relationship with the US military government in the late 1940s. Tobe 
discusses the role that local school teachers played around the same period, giving us a sense 
of the way that local civil society responded to the military occupation. These researchers 
provide new insights into the political and social dynamics which set the stage for the further 
progressive movements in later periods. 
A second approach is motivated by the sense of self-critique among the younger 
generations. This approach raised methodological questions regarding “how to study postwar 
Okinawa”. In particular, scholars highlighted issues such as how to learn the history of the 
war, and how to pass on the memories, experiences and histories of the older generation. 
Whereas people of the war-time generation created Okinawan identity based on their 
experiences of the war, poverty and the military violence of the early US occupation period 
(including forced eviction) those who were born after World War II learnt about those events 
and experiences by hearing the stories of the previous generation. With this motivation, 
Yakabi Osamu, an influential historian of the postwar generation, discusses the importance of 
positionality in learning experiences and histories that he did not directly experience.18 
Yakabi’s contribution widened the scope of debate on Okinawan identity by questioning the 
presupposed ideas that delineate “Okinawans”. His perspective towards Okinawan identity 
became influential particularly when the discourse was appropriated by local historical 
revisionists such as Takara Kurayoshi.19 Takara insists upon the separation of the Okinawa 
struggle and Okinawan identity because, Takara argues, Okinawan history should not be 
studied from the perspective of a particular political ideology. For Takara, Okinawa’s local 
history has been biased because of the narratives of Okinawa struggle and discourses by the 
                                                 
18 Yakabi discusses the issue of positionality for the postwar generation in various places. For example, see: 
Osamu Yakabi et al. Okinawa ni Mukiau: Manazashi to Hōhō (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōron-sha, 2008). 
19 Osamu Yakabi, “Okinawa no Aidentitī wo Kataru-koto soshite Katarinaosu-koto,” Moriteru Arasaki, et al ed. 
Chiiki no Jiritsu, Shima no Chikara (Tokyo: Komonzu, 2006). 
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war-time generation. This was a left-leaning “emotional” (kanjōteki) historical view that 
needs to be overcome by a “rational” (gōriteki) mind.20 In defence of Okinawan identity as 
the ground of Okinawa’s unique political culture, Yakabi criticises Takara’s approach to 
Okinawan history, particularly Takara’s notion of “rationality”. Yakabi argues that this 
rationality is a guise that conceals a particular political intention.21 However, Yakabi does not 
simply repeat the views of the war-time generation scholars. He tries to reframe the notion of 
Okinawan identity by adding a new meaning to the concept. Together with an influential 
senior Okinawan scholar, Okamoto Keitoku, Yakabi discusses Okinawan identity as 
something that even the postwar generations can acquire through learning history and 
participation in the Okinawa struggle. This insertion of an additional layer to delineate 
Okinawan identity does not aim to introduce a new condition that narrows the definition of 
Okinawans. On the contrary, Yakabi’s methodological criticism of Okinawan identity creates 
a social space in Okinawa where so-called Okinawans and non-Okinawans can come together 
in the collaborative work of making Okinawa’s local political culture.22 
Although less widely discussed than the other two approaches, a third approach, 
which I call “the constructivist approach”, also provides insights into the development of 
Okinawan struggle study. There is no particular academic group which adopts the 
constructivist approach. Nonetheless I used this term to refer to an intellectual trend 
concurring in different places around the globe around 2000. Particularly, this approach is 
often seen amongst overseas researchers on the Okinawan struggle. People such as Miyume 
Tanji, Julia Yonetani, Masamichi Inoue, Kelly Dietz, Tada Osamu, Nomura Kōya and 
                                                 
20 Kurayoshi Takara, Tsuneo Oshiro, and Morisada Maeshiro, Okinawa Inishiatibu (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 
2000). 
21 Osamu Yakabi, Okinawa-sen, Beigun-senryō-shi wo Manabinaosu (Yokohama: Seori Shobō, 2009). 
22 Abe Kosuzu calls Yakabi’s reconstruction of Okinawan identity “dislocating’ Okinawan identity” (Okinawa 
identitī wo dakkyū saseru). Kosuzu Abe, “Radikaru na Okinawa no ‘Tōjisha’: Kussetsu suru Integiritī to Okinawa 
Sengo-shi Purojekuto,” Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū, 28 (2012), 291-317. 
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Mathew Allen discuss the Okinawa struggle by focusing on participants and their diverse 
social and cultural identities.23 Based on ethnography, their works help unveil social actors 
who had previously been regarded as marginal to the struggle, including feminists, ordinary 
citizens, independence activists, and people from the outer lying Okinawan islands within the 
Okinawan anti-base movement. However, these scholars do not simply highlight the diversity 
of identities. They also challenge the existing mainstream representation of Okinawans and 
the discourse of Okinawan identity by showing certain limitations of these discourses in 
interpreting recent dynamic aspects of Okinawa’s political culture. Their works cast light on 
issues such as gender, regional problems within Okinawa, and marginalized cultures in the 
popular narrative of the anti-base movement.  
One of the most crucial issues for the constructivist approach is the significance of 
“community” as the basic unit of analysis. While much previous research had defined 
“Okinawan” based on the written texts, constructivists conduct ethnography to elucidate 
diverse communities and the complex identities of the people who join the local anti-base 
struggle. For example, one of the key scholars of this topic, Miyume Tanji, uses the concept 
of “protest community” (or community of protest) in order to address the “myth” and 
“reality” of the Okinawa struggle. She argues: 
 
Perhaps, the Okinawan community of protest has slowly built a kind of solidarity not 
grounded on anything as a single or overarching principle—whether “reversion 
                                                 
23 Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa (Routledge, 2006); Julia Yonetani (2004), “Appropria-
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in Okinawa, Japan”, in Philip MacMichael (eds.) Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change 
(Routledge, 2010); Osamu Tada, Okinawa Imēji no Tanjō: Aoi Umi no Karuchuraru Sutadīzu (Tōyōkeizaishin-
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nationalism” or a faith in democratic processes. …Nevertheless, as I have endeavored to 
argue throughout this book, the community of protest is loosely but powerfully a myth of 
an “Okinawan struggle”, which survives in an informal repertoire of protest strategy and 
telling and retelling shared common history of suffering and struggle.24 
 
The concept of protest community widened the collectivity of the Okinawa struggle by 
introducing a variety of local identities. Especially, when we consider the development of 
Okinawa’s anti-base movement in the mid and late 1990s, the constructivist approach 
provides useful perspectives from which diverse protest communities and new kinds of social 
identities such as feminism, environmental activism and the indigenous rights movement can 
be included in the analysis. Scholars such as Tanji discuss the emergence of a new identity by 
referring to New Social Movements theory, particularly Alberto Melucci’s use of 
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identity.25262728 In this sense, the diversification of approaches to Okinawan identity was also a 
theorization of the Okinawa struggle in order to discuss it in the broader context where 
Okinawa’s local experiences can be examined not as an isolated struggle but as one crucial 
case in the global struggle against US military bases. In this way, the constructivism approach 
enables us to consider the micro-politics in which the Okinawan identity is constructed by 
many different social actors. 
  
                                                 
25 In October 1995, nearly 90,000 local citizens gathered to protest the US and Japanese governments’ re-
sponses to the rape incident of a local female student by three American military personnel. A year later, then 
Governor of Okinawa, Ōta Masahide (大田昌秀), also refused to sign the land lease contract with the Japanese 
authority. The protest movement became the island-wide campaign. It was Okinawan feminists from Okinawa 
Women Act Against Military Violence who took an initiative to create the mass protest campaign in that pe-
riod. Their campaign affected the governmental policy between Tokyo and Washington. In response to this 
revolt against Japan and the US, two national leaders—the former Japanese Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hash-
imoto (橋本龍太郎) and the US President Bill Clinton—decided to establish the Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa in 1996 to review the Japan-US Security Guideline and also to discuss gradual reduction of the exist-
ing US military facilities in Okinawa. For more detail, see Chapter Four. 
26 Environmental activism gradually became a crucial movement in the Okinawa struggle. In the northern fish-
ing village of Henoko (辺野古), the base installation plan was proposed by the Japanese government in 1996. 
It coincided with the closure of Futenma Airbase, which has been regarded as one of the most dangerous US 
bases in the world. In order to protect the rich nature near the Ōura Bay in Henoko, which is known as the 
northern-most habitation zone for dugong and some other endangered species, Japanese and local Okinawan 
citizens have started organising a sit-in. This is a crucial protest campaign against the destruction of the local 
environment in contemporary Okinawan history. For more detail see Chapter Four. 
27 The indigenous rights movement was started in the late 1990s by a small group of local anti-base activists 
such as Matsushima Yasukatsu and Miyazato Gosamaru. They started an NGO called Association of Indigenous 
Peoples in Ryūkyūs aiming to promote the idea of Ryūkyūans as indigenous people in Japan. They have been 
participating in the international conferences including the UN as well as domestic activities in Japan and Oki-
nawa. In 2012, AIPR was granted Special Consultative Status from the UN Economic and Social Council, which 
allows them to be involved in consultative work with the council. See more detail in Chapter Four. 
28 Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggles in Okinawa (New York: Routledge, 2006). For basic references to 
New Social Movements, see e.g. Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eyes: An Analysis of Social Movements 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Alain Touraine (1969), “Towards Actionalist Sociology”, Social 
Science Information, 8(5): 147-166; and Alberto Melucci, “New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach”, 
Social Science Information, 19: 199-226. For further reading on recent theoretical development, see, e.g. Al-
berto Melucci, Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
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1.3. Geography, Human and Identity 
While drawing on these previous studies, this thesis also addresses questions raised by recent 
theoretical debates about social and cultural movements. One of the problems for much of the 
existing literature within the constructivist approach is that it pays relatively little attention to 
the significance of space and place in making communal identities in the contemporary 
Okinawa struggle. This problem is derived primarily from a theoretical setting in which 
social position (as woman, local resident etc.) is the central focus for discussing identities. 
But alongside actor-based analyses, place-based analysis can also provide a useful 
perspective to understand agencies that are involved in making communal culture and 
identity. The eminent geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan is one of those who has contributed to the 
theoretical development of place in relation to the issue of identity. Discussing affective and 
cultural factors such as emotion, experiences, and sensation in considering geographical 
space, Tuan emphasizes the significance of the role that those aesthetic elements play in 
making sense of space.29 What he terms “humanistic geography” sees space not only based on 
geographical demarcation on a map but also compels us to take subjective elements into 
consideration so as to understand the meaning of a locale as perceived by those who 
encounter or inhabit it. 
In relation to the visual perspective, some geographers and anthropologists such as 
Tim Ingold have also developed theories to understand what place is in terms of identity. 
Ingold challenges the way in which we see images of a locale or landscape as if they were 
“given-ready-made”.30 Referring to the art of Australian indigenous people, for example, 
Ingold discusses how a view of place can be different depending on the influence of cultures 
which are represented by signs, symbols or texts. In this sense, what he calls “cultural 
                                                 
29 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ of Minnesota Press, 
2001). 
30 Tim Ingold, "The Temporality of the Landscape," World Archaeology 25 (1993): 162. 
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landscape” is an important approach to understand how a locale is related to one’s identity. 
Ingold’s concept of cultural landscape also indicates two crucial elements: the “temporality” 
and “internality” of the landscape. He observes that the landscape contains many symbolic 
and cultural elements, and he clarifies the significance of the process within which the 
landscape is produced by action (e.g. painting as an action of producing the landscape). In 
this sense, the landscape is a temporary and performative product, the images of which vary 
depending on who, when, where, and how action takes place.  
To counter Ingold’s landscape approach, Tim Cresswell differentiates landscape from 
place in terms of the historical origins of these two concepts. According to Cresswell, the 
concept of the landscape originated from the expansion of mercantile capitalism. From this 
perspective, he argues that the landscape was motivated by concerns to illustrate objects 
based on the scientific gaze, whereas the concept of place is meant to discuss space in terms 
of lived-experience.31 He also separates landscape from place by arguing that landscape is an 
“intensely visual idea” of a portion of the land, while the concept of place focuses on “very 
much things to be inside of”.32 This indicates that place is the concept that analyzes inner 
affinity to a locale, whereas landscape has been regarded as being the perspective of outsiders 
who share little of the lived experiences. Yet the recent theoretical development in geography 
obscures the distinction between two concepts. Although Cresswell is critical of the direct 
application of landscape to the discussion of place, he also admits that an external gaze is a 
crucial element in the creation process of “the inside” socio-cultural space.33 Using the 
concept of “transgression”, Cresswell also thinks that enactment of the internality of place (a 
concept which defines material and immaterial attachment to geographical space as social 
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33 Ibid., 102. 
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order) requires agency which crosses a line between “the inside” and “the outside”.34 
Criticizing Cresswell’s separation of place and landscape, Brian Wattchow tries to 
formulate a constructive relation between those two concepts. He argues that both landscape 
and sense of place are crucial elements by which the attachment to a particular locality is 
produced.35 Antonia Noussia discusses not only constructive relations of landscape and place 
but the creative role that landscape plays in order to make a specific sense of locality. 
Highlighting various museums in England and their specific use of space, Noussia examines 
how the open-air art projects in those museums are designed to not only to exhibit but also to 
deliver a particular narrative and representation of local life36 What is important here is how 
the relationship between landscape—which is material and relies on an external view—and 
place—which is seen as emerging from intimate experiences of a particular locale—
represents geographical heritage. While the museum space contains objects or artifacts 
arranged to represent the landscape and the ways of local life, it is also designed so that 
visitors to experience the narrative of a certain locale. Therefore Noussia shows how both 
landscape and place are constituted within the same space. 
In order to overcome a dualistic understanding of experience and gaze, John Wylie 
discusses “dwelling” as a perspective within which a gaze is embodied through “relational 
contexts of involvement” with its environment.37 According to Wylie, this perspective enables 
us to understand that the environment or nature is not detached from the self but it is 
embedded within one’s mind. Therefore, the dwelling perspective is close to ecological 
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35 Brian Wattchow, “The Landscape and a Sense of Place: Creative Tension,” in The Routledge Companion to 
Landscape Studies, ed. Peter Howard et al.  (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 87-96. 
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thought on the self and environment in the sense that it argues that the self comes to be 
realized in complex relationships within nature.38 Contrary to Creswell’s explanation on 
landscape as something detached from place, these recent studies suggest that landscape is an 
indispensable concept in order to understand the production of place. Above theorists 
emphasise interactive relations of landscape and place from various viewpoints. This 
theoretical development is noteworthy because they not only demonstrate the 
interconnectedness of two previously conflicting concepts but also enables us to understand 
the nature of our social space and how it is created by the external gaze and by a sense of 
attachment to place.  
Other approaches to place and identity delve into these issues in terms of cultural 
representation. For example, anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson discuss place 
as a useful methodological concept to examine process and power-relations in making 
identities. Although place and identity tend to be merged in notions such as “home”, the 
“local”, “homeland” and so forth, Gupta and Ferguson separate these two concepts by 
arguing that place is a site within which social process takes place, and identities are created 
as a product of this social process.39 Another notable anthropologist, Arturo Escobar, too, 
discusses the nature of place as a site upon which local and extra-local factors create 
“multiple social relations”.40 These cultural theorists discuss place not merely as a meaningful 
concept that leads us to understand the political economy of identity making, but rather, their 
perspectives similarly emphasize the usefulness of place as a frame for seeing the polyphonic 
state of identities. In this sense, as Arif Dirlik argues, the concept of place can offer us two 
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different types of social activism: one that is exercised under the rubric of identity politics or 
identity-based politics, and one that is exercised over the meanings of an identity in a certain 
locale or what he calls “place-based politics”.41  
By introducing cultural aspects, these analyses similarly widen our view of place not 
only as a geographic entity but also as including social relations and human activity. In this 
sense, place is a result of physical and cultural interaction as much as it is the product of the 
natural environment. These perspectives provide some hints for developing a concept of 
place that goes beyond positivistic or “objective” understandings: it leads us to consider place 
as a matter of cultural representation. In other words, these perspectives question how people 
view and participate and bring their own experiences to bear on the process of “making sense 
of place”. Drawing on these approaches, I consider human agency, visions and experiences 
that are involved in the actual place-making process. In order to highlight the characteristics 
of place, I discuss two frameworks: locality and region. These frameworks help us clarify 
spatial settings in which the sense of place is located. 
 
1.4. Locality 
The concept of locality illuminates a crucial aspect of the concept of place. Most often, 
locality evokes some connotations associated with identity such as home, groundedness, 
fixity, and origin contrasted with globality. However, in the context of modern Japanese 
society, locality has been discussed as something unsettled under the influence of 
globalization. For example, by focusing on the urbanization of Japanese rural communities 
and the predicament of traditional social capital, sociologist Yoshiwara Naoki is one of those 
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who has led the discussion on the predicament of locality since the 1970s.42 Highlighting 
conflicts between the major economic capitals and the local community over the issues such 
as security, he analyzes how the local agents create public spheres like neighborhood 
associations to govern their communities.43 In the similar vein, Kawabata Kōhei also focuses 
on the social impact of rural gentrification on the senses of community and on marginalized 
social actors. His research demonstrates two contested aspects of the predicament of local 
identities in rural communities: the enactment or creation of new hometown identities and the 
erasure of memories of the marginalized social actors such as ethnic Koreans in Japan.44 
Contrary to an interpretation by which locality is considered to have relatively fixed and 
homogeneous identities, recent research offers a notion in which even the identities of 
Japanese rural communities are created through diverse kinds of social actors and their labor. 
What it means to be “local” can no longer be reduced to the rubric of a single, homogeneous 
cultural setting but needs to be considered as a product of conflict, negotiation and action of 
different social and cultural backgrounds such as ethnicity, gender, generation and so forth.  
Highlighting diverse social actors within the locality allows us not only to examine 
micro-politics among these actors but also it enables us to understand the current cultural and 
social settings of locality which indispensably involve the social links to the global level. In 
this sense, Arjun Appadurai’s conceptualization of the local/global relationship is important 
to understand the current nature of locality. Appadurai conceptualizes locality as a product of 
various different global cultural flows.45 In doing so, however, Appadurai regards locality not 
only as something produced by globalization but also as an active participant which 
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contributes to shaping globalization by its contexts, experiences and knowledge.46 For 
example, referring to local civic movements in Mumbai, Appadurai explicates the 
significance of human activity as an agency which formulates entangled social spaces 
between local and global as much as other material and immaterial flows do.47 From a 
different perspective, John Brown-Childs also theorizes what it is to be local in relation to 
global social relations. His understanding of locality does not stem from a rigid identity 
discourse but is the locus upon which politics surrounding the meanings of identities are 
contested between global capitalism and resistance. His notion of resistance is thus not the 
same as identity politics on the basis of ethnicity or nationalism. Rather, it is a concept that 
characterizes forms of resistance or counter-politics against global capitalism on the basis of 
a coalition in which a range of different social and cultural actors and groups participate.48  
 
1.5. Region 
While discussion around locality provides some useful theoretical references on place as a 
politically contested site, the concept of region offers different perspectives. Like locality, 
region, too, spatializes place in terms of the web of diverse social relations. Yet region 
spatializes place differently from locality, in that it highlights social relations in a broader 
frame where multiple locales create a social space, and it often crosses national boundaries. 
The notion of region has been discussed primarily within the field of Area Studies. In the 
classical sense, regional demarcation was considered based on civilizational difference. In the 
case of Okinawa, its location has been regarded as part of East Asia in which Chinese cultural 
influence has been regarded as dominant. However, during the Cold War period Okinawa’s 
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regional location was considered to be the Northern or Northwestern Pacific as much as East 
Asia. This demarcation was made largely as a result of the American regional strategy in Asia 
and the Pacific region. Since the middle of Cold War era, and particularly around the 1990s, 
scholars within Area Studies have started questioning the dominant idea of region. By 
pointing out aspects of Area Studies complicit with American Cold War policy, they have 
criticized Area Studies as “the largest institutional epistemology” created by governmental 
sponsorship. This criticism of Area Studies contributed substantially to the creation of new 
critical trends of Area Studies, which compelled area specialists to understand area or region 
as a dynamic socio-cultural space rather than a mere cartographical entity.49 Scholars such as 
Willem Van Schendel and Tessa Morris-Suzuki as well as Appadurai and Dirlik are among 
many others who discuss visions for new ways to look into region.50 
Among them, Arjun Appadurai is one of earliest theorists to seek to find new 
directions on the notion of “area” in the context of globalization. He criticizes Cold War Area 
Studies by arguing that the idea of area was conceived based on “conceptions of 
geographical, civilizational, and cultural coherence that rely on some sort of trait list”. In his 
understanding, therefore, Area Studies tends to see area as “relatively immobile aggregates of 
traits, with more or less durable historical boundaries and with unity composed of more or 
less enduring properties.” In order to discuss new Area Studies, Appadurai stresses the 
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importance of process in making our understanding of a region. To highlight “significant 
areas of human organization as precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction, and 
motion” instead of featuring commonality of locality in terms of geographical setting, 
Appadurai proposes the notion of “process geography” in which area is determined based on 
the fluid nature of flow including human activity as agency.51 
An historian of Southeast Asia, Willem Van Schendel, also examines region in terms 
of process. While conventionally region was considered based on civilizations and the nation-
state, he looks into the process within which the understanding of region is produced. He 
explicates the issue in terms of three different social spaces: physical space, symbolic space 
and institutional space. In area studies, geographical space has played a crucial role in 
understanding the unique characteristics of the society and culture. However, as a Southeast 
Asianist, Van Schendel argues that the conventional notion of geographical space has its 
limits in addressing that uniqueness because Southeast Asia has distinctive geographical 
characteristics: it is made up of thousands of islands, whereas often continents have been 
regarded as the basic entity of demarcation. Therefore, he says, Southeast Asianists look at 
another “physical” aspect to discuss region as social space, which is flow of human activity. 
This notion of physical space needs to be seen in connection with symbolic space, “a site of 
theoretical knowledge production rather than a mere object of specialist knowledge”52, and 
institutional space, “as the name of transnational scholarly lineage, circles of referencing, 
structures of authority and patronage”.53 By clarifying conceptual tools that invent region, 
Van Schendel discusses possibilities for envisioning regions that are not illustrated on the 
map, such as Zomia—a highland area of continental Southeast Asia which spans national 
borders.  Although Zomia is by no means a country or a territory officially recognized by 
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some international authority, it is a region to the extent that the land is populated by the locals 
who share linguistic and other cultural elements.  
Historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki also discusses region as an artifact created through the 
historical process of material and immaterial flows. As in the works of Appadurai and Van 
Schendel, Morris-Suzuki discusses the importance of human activity as a creative agency in 
making a region. “Through interacting with one and other over relatively large distances”, 
she states, “people discover or create commonalities of life-style or understanding.”54 One of 
the distinctive aspects of her understanding of region is her focus on fluidity or liquidity as a 
key concept to examine region and social and cultural interaction as creative practices. In 
what she conceptualizes as “Liquid Area Studies”, Morris-Suzuki discusses some hints to 
reinterpret the meaning of area. Firstly, the concept of liquidity offers a perspective by which 
we understand possible radical changes of shape or even disappearance of region, depending 
on how and in which direction movement occurs. It also means that there are “no grounds for 
assuming that the cultural cohesion and integration of any area will survive unchanged over 
long periods of time” because the area “may be very fluid, undergoing repeated and dramatic 
metamorphoses over time”.55 Secondly, through the lens of liquidity, we will be able to 
understand different regions overlapping in one locale. “Within the same town or rural area”, 
she says, “it is possible to have different groups of people who live in different social spaces 
and thus participate in different areas.”56  
 The Critical Area Studies scholars introduced some useful perspectives from which to 
interpret the meanings of place and place-based identity. As in the discussions of locality, 
region, too, is also a form of social space that has been created through processes within 
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which material and immaterial interactions take place. In this sense, as Van Schendel 
elaborates, physical space becomes a crucial vehicle by which material and immaterial 
interactions are made possible. This enables us to consider two relationships of region and 
place. First, if we situate human activity as the significant driver of the region making, we 
can imagine regions that emerge through the interaction of diverse locales. In this sense, 
region not only contains places but it is born out of connection and fusion of different places. 
At the same time, as Morris-Suzuki argues, regional boundaries can be considered as 
phenomena that create place. Okinawa, as a borderland where diverse contexts of differences 
meet climatically, historically, culturally, and politically, is thus a crucial site to investigate 
two different yet indispensable processes of place making—regionalization of locality and 
localization of region.  
 
1.6. Research Questions 
Building upon those theoretical debates on place, identity and social activism, this thesis 
investigates the following points: 
(1) How do different levels of place (i.e. local, archipelagic and transnational) interact in the 
formation of visions of “Okinawan identity”? 
(2) What resources and political agents are mobilized and involved in making the distinctive 
characteristics of the place-based identities in Okinawa? 
(3) Following from the above two questions, how can we reconsider the meaning of 
“Okinawa struggle”? 
By considering these questions, this thesis intends to demonstrate how the notion of place 
functions to make inclusive, interactive and diverse forms of the Okinawa struggle. 
Eventually, the main aim of this thesis is to contribute to enriching our understanding of the 
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local anti-base struggle. 
 
1.7. Case Study and Research Method 
As I briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter, I explore place-based identity in the Okinawan 
struggle through an in-depth examination of two apparently contrasting case studies: the 
Takae Residents’ Society in the northern Yanbaru region; and the Okinawa Korea People’s 
Solidarity (OKPS) based in southern Naha City.  
The Takae Residents’ Society is a protest community based in a small rural hamlet in 
north-eastern Okinawa Island. It was founded in 2007 in order to protect the residents’ 
existing local livelihood space from destruction caused by the construction of a helipad 
landing zone for US military helicopters. OKPS was founded in the late 1980s by local 
residents from the industrial southern cities of the island. It was started to create international 
networks between the anti-base movements in Okinawa and overseas countries. While both 
have attracted less attention compared with some other well publicized local anti-base 
campaigns such as in Henoko, these two cases are also important examples to understand 
some aspects of the relationships between the Okinawan anti-base movement and local 
identities. They both reveal the role of place as the distinctive source which provides 
identities for the protest communities.  
On the one hand, in the case of the Takae Residents’ Society, place consciousness is 
directed to the abundant natural environment of the region. Inspired by this nature, local 
residents who participate in the anti-helipad movement consider that their communal identity 
is based not only upon Okinawan identity but also their more localized identity as residents in 
Takae who are struggling for environmental conservation. On the other hand, OKPS was 
started by a group of activists who aimed to build regional solidarity with Asian neighbors. 
Their sense of identity is strongly built upon Okinawa and its historical relationships with 
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Korea. Their historical consciousness can be understood when closely examining the 
members’ motivation and concerns, and we can also see their critical reflection on Okinawa’s 
historical position not only as victim of war but also as part of Japanese colonial expansion, 
especially towards Japan’s Asian neighbors, including Korea and Southeast Asian countries. 
Their social activity is largely based on Okinawa’s embedded ambiguous historical position 
within East Asia. While many studies of the anti-base movement focus on a relatively unitary 
“Okinawan identity” as the source of activism, these two cases are of interest because they 
illustrate the power of two other forms of “local/regional identity”—one at a smaller 
localized level and one at a broader regional level—which coexist and interrelate with 
“Okinawan identity” in the anti-base study.  
 This study is based on a combination of archival and interview research. My 
fieldwork was conducted in two different periods: from October 2011 until June 2012; and 
from June to July 2013, in Naha in Okinawa and in Tokyo. I conducted my archival research 
mainly at the Library and the Area Research Institute (Chiiki Kenkyūjo) of Okinawa 
University. Among local institutes and archives, Okinawa University has been one of the 
most active research centers in relation to Okinawa’s social movements including the anti-
base movements. Founded by a notable Japanese environmental activist and pioneer of 
environmental pollution study, Professor Ui Jun, the Area Research Institute is particularly 
known as the core research unit of the university. Its archives contain extensive historical 
materials including locally circulated journals such as Keishi Kaji and hand-written 
unpublished newsletters from the early days of Okinawa’s ecological movements during the 
1970s. In Tokyo, I conducted archival research at the National Diet Library, Waseda 
University Library and Hosei University Library. Waseda and Hosei Universities are known 
for the largest collections on Okinawa studies outside Okinawa Prefecture. In particular, 
Hosei University succeeded to the collection from the Okinawa Resource Center, one of the 
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few Tokyo-based research institutes on Okinawa during the occupation period, when it was 
closed in the early 1970s.  
During my fieldwork period, I also conducted participatory observation in places 
including Takae and Naha. By joining various community activities of the Takae Residents’ 
Society, including sit-in, and of OKPS, I could learn from within the ways in which these 
“protest” communities have been run and experienced by various types of people. In order to 
understand the members’ personal experiences and contexts, I conducted interviews with 
fifteen people from the two communities. In both cases, I obtained the interview 
appointments through the “snowball sampling” method. These interviews were conducted 
under an ethics protocol approved by the Australian National Univesity. For a researcher like 
myself who had no relationship with those communities prior to my fieldwork, this was an 
effective method to understand the personal networks of the community members.  
 
1.8. Chapter Outline 
This thesis consists of nine chapters including this Introduction (Chapter One) and the 
Conclusion (Chapter Nine). In Chapters Two and Three, I will discuss the historical 
background of Okinawa’s anti-base movement. The aim of these two chapters is to introduce 
the basic issues and events of the local anti-base struggle based on three different phases: the 
1950s as the origin of the Okinawa struggle; the 1960s when the second climax of the anti-
base movement appeared widely in Okinawa; and the anti-base movement post-reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan, especially around the 1990s when the so-called third island-wide struggle 
took place. The importance of this chapter is not only to introduce the historical development 
of the Okinawa struggle but also to discuss the formation of “Okinawan identity”, which is 
seen as a shared historical consciousness in Okinawa, particularly in the anti-base movement.  
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Chapter Four discusses how this Okinawa struggle has been analyzed internationally 
with a focus on three scholars’ works; Masamichi S. Inoue, Miyume Tanji, and Kelly Dietz. 
These researchers simultaneously sought ways to integrate the Okinawa struggle and its local 
identity into the context of global social movements such as feminism, indigenous land rights 
and civil society. Their challenge was how to make distance from Okinawan identity 
discourses in order to bring attention to the local military base problems as everyday 
concerns for the local life rather than an abstract issue of identity. In order to reconcile the 
Okinawa struggle and everyday life, these researchers conducted ethnographic research 
across academic disciplinary boundaries. Their research is also distinguished by their self-
reflexivity and examination of their positionality as researcher. By struggling with the 
complex entanglement of locality, globality and researcher’s positionality, their works carve 
out alternative understandings of the Okinawa struggle in terms of socio-cultural practices as 
well as identity discourses. Nevertheless I shall problematize the need for further analyses on 
place consciousness and place-based identity in the existing works, in order to overcome 
limitations in our understanding of social practices occurring in the local protest movements. 
Based on the methodology discussed in earlier chapters, I will examine the two case 
studies in the following Chapters Five to Eight. In Chapters Five and Six I will discuss the 
case of Takae Residents’ Society. Chapter Five introduces the local history and general 
socio-economic structure of the region and the contexts in which the Takae Residents’ 
Society was founded, including the core members’ brief biographies and life experiences. I 
will also discuss the general characteristics of Takae’s protest community, which highlights 
how the identity of the community is based not only upon the self-recognition as Okinawan 
but upon identification as “Takae residents”. In Chapter Six, I examine the political aspects 
of the communal identity of the Takae Residents’ Society. This issue will be examined by 
looking into the situation in which their community interacts with larger powers such as 
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Okinawa Prefecture, the major construction company workers, the Japanese Ministry of 
Defense and other stakeholders.  
In Chapters Seven and Eight, I will analyze the case of the group called OKPS. 
Chapter Seven examines the general historical background of OKPS and its social activities 
in order to highlight their unique collective identity and their consciousness about the 
position of Okinawa in the region. By doing so, this chapter aims to reveal the process 
through which the Okinawa struggle could develop a regional solidarity network with South 
Korean counterparts. In Chapter Eight, I will delve into the origin of OKPS by investigating 
the life histories of three prominent members. This will elucidate the complex relationships 
that make the collective identity and place consciousness of an Okinawan protest community 
in a regional context. 
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Chapter Two 
Making “The Okinawa Struggle” under the US Occupation 
 
 
              
Ōhama Nobumoto (right), the chief political advisor of the Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku’s pri-
vate committee on Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, with a delegate (left) from the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, October 1963. Born in Ishigaki Island in Okinawa, Ōhama became the President of Waseda Uni-
versity in 1954. He was also one of the leaders in Okinawan community in Tokyo. He became a mem-
ber of the brain trust for PM Satō over Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, and played a crucial role between 
Japan and the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s. The image was preserved byWaseda Uni-
versity in January 2012. 
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2.1. Introduction 
Okinawa’s anti-base movement has lasted for nearly seventy years, and it is sometimes 
depicted as a movement with a single continuous identity. The term “Okinawa struggle” 
(Okinawa tōsō or 沖縄闘争 in Chinese character) reinforces this image, as though the 
movement has always shared the same concerns about the problems caused by the US 
military bases. The “Okinawa struggle” provides a useful historical framework, particularly 
when we consider the historical continuities characterizing the Okinawa struggle up to the 
present day. This concept is also meaningful because it makes the people’s struggle an 
important historical subject in Okinawan history since World War II, but at the same time, 
the notion of a single “Okinawa struggle” can obscure the diversity and dynamism of the 
historical process.  
Okinawan intellectuals such as Ōta Masahide, Hiyane Teruo, and Arasaki Moriteru 
are the pioneering public intellectuals whose works greatly influenced the making of the 
narrative of the “Okinawa struggle” as a unified collective movement. By highlighting the 
significance of people’s historical consciousness in Okinawan history in fields such as 
history, journalism, poetry and cultural criticism, these local intellectuals contributed to 
shaping Okinawa’s distinctive postwar cultural and political identity. Their works redefined 
what it means “to be an Okinawan” not merely in terms of cultural uniqueness but in terms of 
critical approaches to historical and social problems of Japanese imperialism, war, and 
American occupation. 
 Historian Arasaki Moriteru is one of the prominent scholars whose works have 
contributed to developing the notion of the Okinawa struggle as an historical perspective. His 
famous theory of “the three waves” became an important concept for examining continuity 
and change in the Okinawa struggle in the latter half of the twentieth century. By exploring 
the political and social dynamics related to Okinawa’s US bases, Arasaki analyzed the mass 
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anti-base protest campaign that involved the whole Okinawa Prefecture (the so-called 
“ island-wide struggle” or shimagurumi tōsō), highlighting three different periods: the 1950s, 
the 1960s and early 1970s, and the 1990s. The three wave approach enables us to examine 
the historical characteristics of non-state actors including farmers, students, unions, other 
community leaders and members as the subjects of historical consideration in Okinawa. In 
this respect, Arasaki argues that the Okinawa struggle is a history of popular (or, civic in his 
later works) movements against the “structurally discriminated situation” of Okinawa under 
the Japan-US alliance.57 
 However, while Arasaki’s pioneering works carved out an alternative perspective on 
historical and social understandings of Okinawa, there were also limits in his approach.  
From the mid-1990s, the narrative of the Okinawa struggle has been challenged by the 
scholars from a new generation such as Julia Yonetani, Wakabayashi Chiyo, Abe Kosuzu, 
Miyume Tanji, Masamichi Inoue, Matthew Allen, and Kelly Dietz. Despite their disciplinary 
differences, their shared interests revolve around the marginalized stories of the Okinawa 
struggle. With this motivation, these scholars focus on the significant roles played by social 
actors who are excluded on the basis of gender, nationality, ethnicity, and residence. These 
scholars’ works not only complicate the representation of the Okinawa struggle but also 
demonstrate how marginalized perspectives contribute to diversifying the meanings of the 
Okinawa struggle by articulating more localized social and communal identities. In doing so, 
they revealed the active roles that local protest communities played and the “social 
densities”58 that were created through formal and informal channels of connectivity and 
interaction across different communities. 
                                                 
57 For more detail on the concept of “structural discrimination”, see, for example, Moriteru Arasaki, Arasaki 
Moriteru Ga Toku Kōzōteki Okinawa Sabetsu (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2012). 
58 I use social density as a key concept in understanding the historical development of the Okinawa struggle. 
For example, Alain Touraine uses this term to define “a new mode of production” in the post-industrial period, 
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 Focusing on individual actors and their roles, this chapter aims to introduce the 
dynamic history and political culture of the Okinawa struggle from the 1950s until 1972. By 
highlighting the unity and diversity of collective identity, I shall discuss the historical 
development of the Okinawa struggle as a product of historical and social relationships 
among different communities, events and ideas. Particularly, I shall underline the ideas and 
social actors who contributed to building the “Okinawa struggle”, including the farmers of Ie 
Island, students from the University of the Ryukyus, the Okinawa Teachers and Staff Union, 
political parties, regional communities, cultural autonomists, and feminists. This chapter 
examines the origins and historical conditions from which “Okinawan identity” was formed 
in different periods and the diverse motivations which shaped the Okinawan anti-base 
movement before Okinawa’s return to Japan. 
 
2.2. The Military Occupation 
In April 1945, the Allied Forces, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, landed in Yomitan, a village located in the western part of 
Okinawa Island. Based on Proclamation Number One under the Commander in Chief of the 
US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Allied Forces established the Military 
Government of the Ryūkyū Islands.59 From that moment Okinawa was occupied by the 
United States military government regime until May 1972.  
                                                 
replacing the hegemony of industrial society. He implies that social density is a distinctive rationale of social 
change in the contemporary era, created through communication and networks. In this regard, Loise Maheu 
explains that Touraine’s idea of social density is a basis where modern institutional settings of ‘the body, 
education, and the autonomy of the global setting’ are created. Based on Tourainian understanding, I used this 
concept so as to highlight interactive aspects of different local communities as a driver for the historical 
development of the movement. (cf. Alain Touraine, “Social Movements: Participation and Protest,” 
Scandinavian Political Studies 10 (1987): 212; Jon Clark, Marco Diani, eds., Alain Touraine (London ; 
Washington, D.C: Routledge, 1996), 105. 
59 See Image 2-2. 
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When the US committed itself to a long-term occupation of Okinawa in December 
1950, the US Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands was transformed into the US Civil 
Administration of the Ryukyu Islands or USCAR. Although USCAR was the “civil 
administration”, it was still a military regime, as USCAR was run by US Army officers until 
Okinawa’s return to Japan.60 In the early period, USCAR was represented by the Governor. 
But the position of Governor was held by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) based in Tokyo. Therefore, it was the Deputy Governor who was responsible for the 
local administration of Okinawa. The Deputy Governor was chosen from officers with the 
rank of General in the US Army. This system was maintained until the strategic 
transformation in 1957, when the US Far East Command was integrated into the Pacific 
Command based in Hawaii. After that, USCAR became directly affiliated to the US 
Department of Defense. The Deputy Governor was replaced by the High Commissioner, who 
had greater responsibility and authority than the previous appointment. Having a strong 
administrative influence over the Ryukyu Islands, USCAR was responsible not only for the 
local US military troops but also for the civil administration for the local residents of the 
region.61 With mixed feelings of awe and hostility, the local Okinawans called him “the 
Emperor of Okinawa”.62 
                                                 
60 Therefore, in this thesis, I use the term “the US military government” to describe USCAR as well as the US 
Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands. 
61 The civil administration under military control was possible for two reasons. First, Okinawa was considered 
to be a key area for America’s defense line of the western Pacific. However, there was no legal basis to claim 
Okinawa be a part of the US. Therefore, as the long-term control was determined, the US Military Government 
transformed itself to the civil administration which not only aimed to possess Okinawa for the strategic pur-
pose but also to establish a democratic political system in Okinawa under the supervision of the US. USCAR 
was the local authority delegated by the Far East Command until 1957, and by the US Department of Defence 
until 1972. 
62 Historian Ōta Masahide investigates the difference between the Deputy Governor and the High Commis-
sioner and discusses the superiority of the High Commissioner to the Deputy Governor in terms of the power 
they were given. As one example, he mentioned that while the Deputy Governor was the local delegate of 
SCAP in Tokyo, the High Commissioner was placed directly under the US Department of Army. He states that 
the High Commissioner was wearing ‘the four hats’, which represent the Heads of (1) the US Ryukyu Com-
mands, (2) the Coordinator of the US Army, Navy, Air-force and Marines in Okinawa as the representative of 
the Command of the US Pacific Command, (3) the Commander of the Nine Division of the US troops, and (4) 
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“Imperialism without colonialism” is a good description of the history of the US role 
in Okinawa. The military government (gunsei) in Okinawa did not intend to build a colony.63 
According to the Executive Order signed in June 1957 by US President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, one of the nominal missions of the military government was “to encourage the 
development of an effective and responsible Ryukyuan government based on democratic 
principles”.64 The US military government began to practice this principle immediately after 
its occupation of Okinawa began. Bringing together former local senior politicians, the 
Okinawa Advisory Council (Okinawa shijun-kai) was established in a displaced persons’ 
camp in 1945, and was transformed into the Okinawa Civilian Government (Okinawa 
Minseifu) to implement local administration of Okinawa Island in 1946. The same kind of 
administration was created to rule other places in the Ryukyu Islands such as Miyako Islands 
region, Yaeyama Islands region and Amami Islands region. These administrative groups 
formed the four regional governments (Guntō Seifu) in 1950, where the Governors and the 
members of the assembly for each region were elected by local residents.  
However, according to the US Military Government Special Proclamation Number 
37, the resolutions by the local assembly were inferior to the decisions made by the US 
military government. Therefore, the US military government was able to invalidate the local 
decisions made by the regional governments. As the movements for Okinawa’s return to 
Japan were heightened among local leaders, particularly led by the Governor of the Okinawa 
Island Government, Taira Tatsuo, the US authorities decided to dissolve the existing system 
and integrated the regional governments into the Government of Ryukyu Islands or GRI 
                                                 
the US High Commissioner of USCAR. For more detail, see, for example, Masahide Ōta, Okinawa no Teiō Koto-
benmukan (Tokyo: Kume Shobō, 1984). 
63 Prasenjit Duara, “The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in Compara-
tive Perspective,” Japan Focus (January 30, 2006), accessed 15 November 2013. http://www.japanfocus.org/-
Prasenjit-Duara/1715/article.html. 
64 “Dwight D. Eisenhower. Executive Order 10713 - Providing for the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands,” 
accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=106354. 
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(Ryūkyū Seifu) in 1952. This new local authority consisted of three apparatuses: the 
Legislature, the Government and the Court.65 Nevertheless, the superior power of USCAR 
was not changed. As Historian Ōta Masahide states, local autonomy was tolerated as long as 
it did not threaten the authority of USCAR.66 
 One of the crucial reasons why SCAP and the US Department of Defense granted 
USCAR such strong authority to interfere in Okinawan local politics was to establish 
America’s influence not only in Okinawa but also in East Asia and the northern Pacific. 
Prolongation of America’s governance over the Ryūkyū Islands was already regarded as 
necessary for postwar US strategy in the region, due to the emergence of communist powers 
in the region. According to a recently declassified document from the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) titled “The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance”, dated August 1948, the 
location of the Ryūkyū Islands was considered to be “one of the most controversial issues in 
any settlement of Far Eastern problems.” Following this statement, the document reports that 
control of this region would enable the occupying country to gain the benefit in both 
“offensive and defensive operations” in Asia and the Pacific regions, which would also be 
effective “to discourage any revival of military aggression on the part of the Japanese.”67 The 
document also reports the potential risk if the US withdrew from the Ryukyu Islands that 
Chinese communist forces would take over the region. One year later, this concern had 
become more serious for the US when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established 
in 1949. 
                                                 
65 However, the Amami Islands region was returned to Japan in December 1953 because of the rise of strong 
local demand for reversion to Japan. Cf. Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion 
Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004.) 
66 Masahide Ōta, Okinawa No Teiō: Kōtōbenmukan (Tokyo: Kume Shobō, 1984). 
67 The United States Central Intelligence Agency, “The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance," accessed 
November 28, 2014. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conver-
ions/89801/DOC_0000259203.pdf. 
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 The facilities that had already been constructed by the Japanese Imperial Army also 
attracted America’s attention. The CIA report mentions that there are overall “twenty-two 
airplane bases and sea plane bases, eleven of which were constructed on Okinawa during the 
war”. Also, the report says that six of the eleven airbases on Okinawa Islands were capable of 
accommodating the heavy bomber B-29s “Superfortress”. Furthermore, the document reports 
that other surrounding islands “would present an excellent base from which heavy bombers 
could bring within range of the interior of China, any part of Japan and Korea, portions of 
eastern Siberia including Vladivostok, the whole Philippine Islands, Guam and Marinas, and 
portions of Southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies.”68 Considering these strategic 
purposes, it was evident that Okinawa was useful as a “keystone” for the US to win the 
potential regional conflict with communists and to monitor any emergence of the re-
militarization of Japan. 
However, the problem for the US occupation authority was how to justify their 
occupation of Okinawa. While Okinawa had experienced six years of US occupation under 
SCAP as a former “enemy territory”, the issue of Okinawa’s sovereignty had not yet been 
clarified. This was because there was no statement in either the Cairo Communique or the 
Potsdam Declaration which defined Okinawa’s position. Okinawa’s status was not decided 
until the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951. When the Peace Treaty became 
effective in April 1952 Japan recovered its territorial sovereignty accordingly. However, 
Okinawa was incorporated under America’s direct administration. While the Peace Treaty 
recognized Japan’s “residual sovereignty” in Okinawa, it also “authorized exclusive 
authority” over the Okinawa Islands together with three other regions in Okinawa Islands 
(i.e. Miyako Islands, Yaeyama Islands, and Amami Islands) and Bonin Islands to the US for 
                                                 
68 ibid. 
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an “indefinite” period.69 Thus Okinawa’s position as the borderland of America’s defense 
line in the north-western Pacific was determined. 
 
2.3. People’s Lives under the Occupation 
The war and occupation also had significant impacts on civic life. One fourth of the local 
residents died during the Battle of Okinawa, and those who were captured by the US troops 
were kept in the camps created around the islands during the war. There were sixteen camps 
in the Ryukyu Islands, eleven of which were established on Okinawa Island. The eleven 
camps on Okinawa Island were built in villages located in the middle and northern parts of 
the Island. Camps in places such as Ishikawa, Kin, Kushi, Taira and Ginoza were allocated to 
civilians, whereas former military soldiers, officers and personnel, including mainland 
Japanese, Okinawans and Koreans, were kept in camps in villages such as Yomitan, Chatan, 
Urazoe and Yaka as Prisoners of War (PoW). The largest camp for civilians was in Ginoza. 
The area used for the camp occupied almost the whole village. At one point this camp 
contained over 200,000 Okinawan residents. This number was nearly one-third of the entire 
local population in that period.70 Although there were camps in the southern part of Okinawa 
Island, such as Ōnoyama in Naha City, most of them were later closed because the US 
military government had already planned to construct military bases in that region.71  
 After the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration in August 1945, the 
local civilians and Okinawan PoWs were allowed to return to their homes. In the same 
                                                 
69 See, for example, Pedro Iacobelli, “The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Okinawan Migrants in Bolivia,” 
Japan Focus 25 August 2013, accessed October 3, 2013, http://japanfocus.org/-Pedro-Iacobelli/3989/arti-
cle.html. 
70 According to the survey, the population per camp in the northern region was as follows: 10,000 for the camp 
in Ogimi Village, 57,000 for Haneji and Taira, 30,000 for Nakagawa and Kanwa, 30,000 for Kushi and Henoko, 
and Sedake 30,000. (See, for example, Masa’aki Aniya, “The Pacific War,” in Yomitan-son Shi Vol. 5 (Yomitan-
son, Okinawa: Yomitanson-shi Henshū-iinkai, 2002.).  
71 Ibid. 
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period, from 1945 to 46, Korean and mainland Japanese PoWs as citizens of a “defeated 
nation” were also returned to their homelands.72 However, it was not easy for Okinawan 
people to “return” to their home. While many returned to their local land, as Wakabayashi 
Chiyo points out, it was not uncommon for the Okinawans to remain in or around the camps 
in the middle and northern regions rather than going back to the devastated south.73 The 
southern areas were the sites of the fiercest battles during the war. This meant that it was not 
easy to identify one’s former home. An even more important factor that hindered the locals 
from returning to their homes was the construction of the military facilities in the former 
residential areas. In Naha City, for example, places such as Ōnoyama were already closed to 
the former local residents in the late 1940s in order for the US military to construct the bases. 
The US military had also confiscated lands and ports to build facilities including residential 
areas for the US military families (in Mawashi village, which is currently part of Naha City), 
storage and power plants (Urazoe City), and the military hospital (Ginowan City).74 This also 
happened in the central region of Okinawa Island, such as Futenma, in which over two 
thousand meters of aircraft landing zone was built by the US military amid the Battle of 
Okinawa. In most of these cases, the original owners had no choice but to give up their 
lands.75 
 These radical changes in postwar Okinawa caused not only displacement but also the 
transformation of the local economy and society after the war. Prior to the 1945 battles, the 
main industry in Okinawa was agriculture, which accounted for more than sixty percent of its 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Chiyo Wakabayashi, “Jīpu to Sajin: Senryō Shoki Okinawa Shakai No ‘Henyō’ to ‘Hen’I’,” Okinawa Bunka 
Kenkyū, 2003: 242-243. 
74 Atsushi Toriyama, Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956 (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2013), 106. 
75 The number of the former local residents who could not return to their homelands in 1949 is as follows: 
over 30,000 people for Naha City, 7450 for Yomitan, 7700 for Chatan, 4980 for Kadena. (Toriyama. Okinawa: 
Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956), 106. 
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entire economy. This situation did not change after the war until around 1947.76 However, 
towards the late 1940s, farmers were increasingly leaving their jobs. This was triggered by 
multiple causes such as the fall in price for agricultural products and the prohibition on using 
land around the bases for farming, as well as the loss of private property.77 These factors 
made it difficult for an industry like agriculture to recover because it requires high intensity 
of labor and long times to produce. Furthermore, there was another factor that changed 
Okinawa’s industrial structure. In the late 1940s, the US military bases suffered from a lack 
of labourers. After 1945, the number of the US military personnel radically declined as they 
were sent to other bases in mainland Japan. In August 1945, the US military had more than 
two hundred fifty thousand personnel in Okinawa. However the number declined by twenty 
thousand in 1946, and ten thousand in 1948.78 This radical decrease in military personnel 
inevitably created labor demand in Okinawa as the US military government planned to fill in 
the insufficiency of base workers with local Okinawans. This is how the interdependent 
economic relationships between the locals and the bases emerged. In many cities of the 
middle and southern parts of Okinawa the base-dependent economy (or kichi keizai) was 
created. In such circumstances, how did the Okinawan people start the anti-base struggle and 
what were their motivations? In the following section, I shall describe the formation and 
development of the Okinawa struggle under the US occupation. 
 
 
                                                 
76 Chiyo Wakabayashi, "Jīpu to Sajin: Senryō Shoki Okinawa Shakai No Henyō to Hen’i": 252. 
77 Particularly, some districts of the south and middle lost large portions of the private land including farmland 
due to high concentration of the US military bases and facilities by the beginning of the 1950s. In the case of 
Chatan Village, the loss of the farmland was ninety-six percent. 
78 Atsushi, Toriyama, Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956, 42. 
67 
 
Image 2-1: A beach in Aka-jima Island, Kerama Islands. The fleet of the Allied Forces approached the 
Okinawa Islands from Kerama Islands. In March 1945, the Allied Forces attacked this island with over 
50,000 shells. The photo was taken by the author in April 2012. 
   
 
Image 2-2: A hand written copy of the US Proclamation Number 1 or “Nimitz Proclamation”, translated 
into Japanese. The photo was taken by the author in April 2012 at the Museum of Kerama Marine 
Culture, Zamami Island. 
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2.4. Farmers 
In July 1955, a group of men and women, both young and elderly, walked along Kokusai 
Dōri, one of the main streets running in the middle of the capital city of Okinawa, Naha. 
Starting from the building of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), they headed 
slowly in the direction of Cape Hedo, which is about a hundred kilometers north of Naha on 
Okinawa Island. Some of them were carrying placards with messages addressed to the rest of 
the islanders. One of the placards read, “We have no homes, no jobs and no food. What 
should we farmers from Ie Island do?” This was the start of what was later called, “the march 
of the beggars” (kojiki kōshin). This march was organized by farmers and their families from 
Maja Village, Ie-jima Island. In his memoir, one of the group leaders, Ahagon Shōkō, recalls 
that participants in the march thought that becoming beggars was shameful not just for 
themselves but also for other community members. “Nevertheless”, he describes “what is 
really shameful is the Government and its inhumane behavior in forcibly appropriating 
people’s land, making them jobless, starving, and eventually turning them into beggars.”79 
During this long march, some of the participants composed a song about their reasons for 
carrying out this march. 
 
This is such a disgraceful world. Please listen to us, everyone in Okinawa. We will tell 
you from our heart. Please listen… Please listen, chief executive. It’s unusual that we 
farmers come in front of you. We could survive thanks to the farm land from our 
ancestors. Please give our land back immediately…80 
 
                                                 
79 Shōkō Ahagon, Beigun to Nōmin: Okinawaken Iejima (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973), 127. 
80 Ibid., 128-129. 
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This long march attracted attention from other Okinawans. Many of those who witnessed it 
sympathized with the farmers. Ahagon writes “some women were shedding tears while 
listening to us. Those who didn’t have wallets went back to their homes to grab money for us. 
Sympathetic police officers hesitated about giving us donations but instead asked some 
women to pass these on to us.”81 The march by the farmers from Ie Island was a unique event, 
but people already had an idea of the reasons why the farmers had to walk. 
In April 1953, USCAR announced the commencement of land acquisition under 
Ordinance Number 109.82 This ordinance allowed the US military government to confiscate 
privately owned lands in order to build various kinds of US military facilities. It was the 
beginning of “the military-use land policy” (gunyōchi seisaku), which was conducted with 
“bayonets and bulldozers”. Justifying the legitimacy of the land acquisition by saying “the 
United States has certain requirements concerning the use and possession of land in the 
Ryukyu Islands” in which “there are no provisions of Ryukyuan law whereby such 
requirements may be satisfied”, they argued that it is “appropriate and necessary” to 
introduce a decent procedure for the land acquisition including “just compensation” in the 
Ryukyu Islands.83 However, in many cases, the process of acquisition was exercised forcibly 
upon the Okinawan villagers without their consent.84 Furthermore, farmers not only lost their 
land but also could not receive even a decent amount of financial compensation.  
Land acquisition by the US military government took place not only in Ie Island but 
also in many places on Okinawa Island in that period. In villages such as Maja on Ie Island 
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and Aja, Mekaru and Oroku in Naha City, the local villagers were evicted between 1953 and 
1955. Yet there were some small episodes of resistance against the US military. In Oroku and 
Isahama, the villagers and their supporters, such as students from the University of the 
Ryukyus and school teachers, conducted a sit-in to protest against America’s unjust land 
policy. However, facing armed soldiers, it was difficult for the locals to win in such an 
extremely unequal relationship. For example, in the case of Maja, about three hundred armed 
soldiers arrived on 11 March 1955. They were supplied with tear gas in order to evict 
protesters, and also stretchers in preparation for potential injuries. Many of those who refused 
to hand over their land were beaten and arrested and even chased by trained military dogs. 
Houses were burnt or crushed by bulldozers, and residents were forced to move to tents 
which were designated as “the shelters for evacuees”. Some villagers were forced to receive a 
bag of money as “compensation” before their houses were demolished. This is one example 
of how the US military gained “consent” from the locals.85 This experience was remembered 
as a day of humiliation for many residents.86 
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2.5. Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Association 
The struggle of the farmers illuminates one aspect of the social impact of the American 
military government in Okinawa. There is another story which highlights a different kind of 
social reaction in the early occupation period. The history of various local societies such as 
Okinawa Youth Association (OYA), Okinawa Women’s Association (OWA), and Okinawa 
Teachers and School Staff Association (OTSA) shows how the local communities became 
involved with the Okinawa struggle. The OTSA in particular played a very crucial role in 
mobilizing the local communities to join the Okinawa struggle. OTSA was established in 
1947. It was initially called the Okinawa Education Consortium (Okinawa Kyōiku Rengō-kai 
or Kyōren), and was started under the initiative of the Department of Education of the 
Okinawa Civilian Government. Its primary mission was to set up a basic schooling system in 
each local district including supplying textbooks and building schools. In April 1952, the 
Okinawa Education Consortium became the Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Association. 
This organization played a significant role as the hub of the local communities. 
 OTSA, which consisted of school teachers and other staff members including school 
principals, had different organizational characteristics from the Okinawa Education 
Consortium. While the Okinawa Education Consortium was primarily involved with the 
establishment of educational infrastructure, OTSA was more politically engaged than its 
predecessor organization. As I shall explain later in this chapter, OTSA was to become one of 
the main social forces which led the so-called reversion-to-Japan movement or Okinawa’s 
reversion movement, especially during the 1960s and the early 1970s. When OTSA was 
established, they enacted two goals: “self-governance (jichi)” and “restoration (fukkō)”. 87  
                                                 
87 Hideaki Tobe, “1950 Nen-dai Okinawa Kyōshokuin-kai No Chiiki ‘Shindan’”, Shikan 147 (2002): 1–16. 
72 
By mobilizing school teachers, who were also regarded as respected community 
organizers in that period, OTSA gradually became an influential force in Okinawa. Among 
school staff members, there were many young newly hired people who had just graduated 
from either high school or the teachers’ colleges. Although they were not experienced 
teachers, there was high demand for teachers in Okinawa after the war, because around six 
hundred school teachers had died during the war.88 These young teachers not only taught but 
also played crucial roles in terms of community service. They were often sent to participate 
in the farmers’ anti-base protest by their school principals, even when this required taking 
leave from teaching duty.89 Their importance in the local communities increased with 
Okinawa’s socio-economic transformation from a largely agrarian community to a base-
dependent economy from the late 1940s. One of the major roles that the young teachers 
played was to maintain public safety in the new cities and towns.90 The new cities flourished 
in the base economy because their income came from the US bases and new urban dwellers 
who chose not to return to their hometowns. Most base towns had “entertainment” districts. 
Local societies such as OYA, OWA and OTSA were concerned about the prevalence of the 
sex industry in the middle of the city as a potential cause of moral hazard and bad influence 
on young students. 
The local schools also played an important role linking early career teachers with 
other community members. Schools were not only places to study. They were also used for 
various community activities. Thus, it was common for people to use schools as places where 
adults gathered for drinks and to exchange recent updates about their community. Also, 
school buildings were used for stationing the local community members who were acting as 
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civilian police.91 Usually local young male teachers as well as other male community 
members were stationed in schools in case trouble occurred within their community. They 
had to cover various kinds of problems such as theft and other crimes. Sometimes they even 
had to deal with domestic problems such as marital disputes.92  
They were most concerned about the social problems caused by soldiers from US 
bases. It was not uncommon for locals to be victims of crimes and accidents caused by 
American soldiers in that period, including rape, theft, and car accidents and so forth. 
Approximately 1000 crimes were recorded as being committed by the US military personnel 
in 1964 alone in the Okinawa Islands.93 Although there was a police authority called the 
Ryūkyū Police on Okinawa and other remote islands, crimes by American military personnel 
were almost entirely outside their jurisdiction. In Okinawa under the US administration, US 
soldiers and other military personnel were protected under extraterritoriality. Therefore, 
Ryūkyū police did not have the power to arrest criminals except when they were caught in 
the act. Moreover, even if the local police officers could arrest US military personnel who 
were in the act of committing an offense, it was difficult to prosecute the criminals. All the 
criminals were supposed to be judged under the US court martial, which was regarded as 
superior in status to the local Ryūkyūan jurisdiction. Accordingly, civilian support was 
necessary for crime prevention. Standing not only on the frontline of the anti-base protest but 
also of civil life vis-à-vis possible threats from the US soldiers, young school teachers and 
their societies acquired trust from local communities. 
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2.6. Political Parties 
When we consider political activism as part of the Okinawa struggle, understanding the role 
of political parties under the American occupation is also important. The first political party 
in postwar Okinawa was the Okinawa Democratic Alliance or ODA (Okinawa Minshu 
Dōmei). It was established by local Okinawan leaders in June 1947 in Ishikawa, a city located 
in the middle region of Okinawa Island. One of the prominent leaders was Nakasone Genwa. 
Nakasone had been one of the earliest members of the Japanese Communist Party when it 
was established in 1921. However, after he was arrested in 1923 he gradually withdrew from 
the communist movement.94 Later, he restarted his political career as a Member of the 
Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, but now as an anti-communist. Nakasone and his colleagues 
such as Yamashiro Zenko and Miyazato Eiki established the ODA with the aims of 
“democratization of Okinawa”, “independence” and “restoration of Okinawa”. In particular, 
they insisted on the importance of “the liberation of Okinawa by the people of Okinawa”.95 
With this principle, the ultimate political goal of ODA was to create a republican state 
independent from Japan. The establishment of the ODA was problematic for the US military 
government, because this first home-grown political party in postwar Okinawa was critical of 
the Okinawan Civilian Government and the US authority, especially its way of choosing 
local leaders. In that period, the Governor and other senior members of the Okinawan 
Civilian Government were all appointed by the US military government. Also, political 
activism in public places, especially criticism of the Civilian Government, was not allowed in 
Okinawa. In such an environment, local leaders such as Nakasone conducted a political 
campaign calling for the election of their representative to the Okinawa Civilian Government. 
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 A month after the establishment of ODA, in July 1947, another political party, the 
Okinawa People’s Party or OPP (Okinawa Jinmin-tō), started in Ishikawa. The founders were 
a group of local journalists, including Senaga Kamejirō, Kaneshi Saichi and Ikemiyagi Shūi. 
Some key figures such as Senaga and Kaneshi were already known for their political careers 
as labor and community activists before 1945. Although the OPP was later identified as the 
political party most threatening to the US authorities, the situation was different during the 
late 1940s. Senaga and his OPP colleagues thanked the occupation forces for liberating the 
people of Okinawa from oppression under Japanese imperialism. The target of criticism for 
OPP was also the Okinawa Civilian Government. OPP criticized the Civilian Government as 
an authority that only represented the US military government but not the people of Okinawa. 
OPP also criticized the core leaders of the Civilian Government for their previous political 
careers supporting, and participating in the dominant political party during wartime, the 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan-kai). When OPP organised its first 
congress in July 1947, it presented a political manifesto that included a call to purge those 
wartime local political leaders as well as the establishment of an independent government by 
Okinawa’s people.96 
 The momentum of political movements such as the ODA and OPP increased to the 
point where the US military government could no longer ignore these parties. In December 
1947, ODA submitted a petition to the US military government with signatures of 10,000 
people calling for public elections. Also, the ODA, the OPP and even the pro-American party 
called the Okinawa Social Party (Okinawa Shakai-tō, established in September 1947) 
organized a joint campaign, calling for the positions of the Governor and the Members of the 
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Government to be elected by the Okinawan people, rather than appointed by the US 
authority.  
Despite the strength of these political movements, the US military government was 
reluctant to respond. The military government used the still undecided status of Okinawa as a 
reason to justify its direct control over Okinawa. Nevertheless, as the rise of political 
movements increased momentum, the US military government started considering the 
situation seriously. The US military government was particularly concerned about criticism 
of the American authorities. In this political environment, the US authorities decided to 
dissolve the Civilian Government and conduct a public election for the Governors and the 
Members of the Assemblies of the four newly established regional governments in Okinawa, 
Miyako, Yaeyama and Amami in September 1950. 
 However, the political parties mentioned above had little influence on the first 
election. As Higa Mikio has pointed out, the ODA, OPP and the Okinawa Social Party were 
all organized by social elites whose political and social philosophies were not important to 
the majority of the voters. Instead, Okinawan politics in that period was mostly affected by 
personal influence and connections rather than political ideology. Therefore, in the end many 
non-partisan figures entered the political world.97 Higa noted that this was shown in the 
establishment of the Okinawa Social Mass Party or OSMP (Okinawa Shakai Taishū-tō) led 
by the former mayor of Taira City, Taira Tatsuo. He was one of those who ran in the election 
campaign as an independent candidate, and he was elected as the Governor of the Okinawa 
Regional Government. After the election, Taira and his supporters decided to establish 
Okinawa Social Mass Party in October 1950. Participants from all political backgrounds 
joined OSMP. For example, Kaneshi Saichi, one of the founding members of OPP, joined 
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OSMP. Also, people such as Higa Shūhei, originally a high-school teacher of English, who 
became one of the main trusted counterparts of the US military government, joined the party. 
By incorporating other small parties which came in to power in other regional governments, 
OSMP became an all-Okinawan party which involved diverse political interests.  
With a clear majority position in local politics, this all-Okinawan party was influential 
when the four regional governments were brought together in order to establish the 
Government of the Ryukyu Islands. In late 1951, the Governors and the Members of 
Assemblies in four regional governments decided to establish a Government responsible for 
all regions. Based on this decision, the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands or 
USCAR issued Proclamation Number 13 in which the US authorities approved the 
establishment of the Ryukyu Government.98 It consisted of independent executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers, where the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Government was to be 
appointed by the Legislature. Although this was still defined as a “Provisional Central 
Government” under USCAR’s initiative, Okinawa’s political struggle came to have more 
effective influence over its territory compared to the previous status quo. 
Higa Shūhei was appointed the first Chief Executive. However, after this 
appointment, Higa and his supporters decided to leave the OSMP in order to start a more 
conservative and pro-America party called the Ryūkyū Democratic Party or RDP (Ryūkyū 
Minshu-tō) in August 1952. In addition to former members of the OSMP, the RDP also 
absorbed former members of the ODA, which was dissolved after the first election and 
became the Republican Party (Kyōwa-tō), and other non-partisan politicians. 
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Not only conservative political leaders but also progressive politicians, such as 
Kaneshi Saichi, left the OSMP. When Senaga Kamejirō, who was the leader of Okinawa 
People’s Party, was purged from his position as mayor of Naha City in November 1957,99 
Kaneshi planned to run in this election campaign as a candidate from OSMP.100 However, the 
Headquarters of his party had decided to endorse Taira Tatsuo as the official candidate. This 
conflict split the party. Kaneshi and his supporters left OSMP and Kaneshi ran the election 
without the official support from his party. However, the result was that Kaneshi won the 
majority of votes and he was elected as the new mayor of Naha in January 1958.101 After the 
victory, he and his supporters started the Okinawa Socialist Party (Okinawa Shakai-tō).102  
This is how major political parties in post-1945 Okinawa—the Okinawa Democratic Party 
(later, the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party or OLDP), the Okinawa Social Mass Party, the 
Okinawa People’s Party and the Okinawa Socialist Party—were created.  
 
2.7. Students 
Finally, I shall briefly discuss students and their significance in the Okinawa struggle. 
Students from the local universities, particularly the University of the Ryūkyūs, played a 
crucial role in the development of the Okinawa struggle. Some of them were actively 
involved with the protest campaign against land confiscation in places such as Isahama in 
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1955. In other cases, those who participated in the anti-base movement during college later 
became the organizers of workers’ unions in public and private sectors such as the Teachers’ 
Union and other public service unions. Also, some became politicians, journalists, writers 
and university scholars. In this sense, local Okinawan youth are essential subjects in 
understanding the creativity of Okinawa’s political culture. How did those young students 
participate in the anti-base movement? What were their motivations?  
 Considering students as crucial actors in the Okinawa struggle, one of the important 
events that we need to understand is the so-called Ryūdai Incident (Ryūdai jiken). In 1953 
and 1956 eleven students of the University of the Ryūkyūs were expelled from the university 
allegedly due to their subversive activism. In May 1953, the executive committee of the 
University of the Ryukyu decided to expel four students: Hamada Tomimasa, Uehara Seiji, 
Nakano Ken’ichi, and Miyagi Kurasuke. One of the reasons for the decision to expel these 
students was an event organised by the students in March. Around ten students from a club 
called “Seikei Club” (the Political Economy Club) organized an event called the Genbaku-
Ten in Naha City for six days. The Genbaku-ten, or the Atomic Bomb Exhibition, was held to 
show the impact of the A-bomb in Hiroshima through graphic images. The images displayed 
were from a photo journal, Asahi Graph, published in August 1952.  
During the occupation period in mainland Japan, SCAP strictly censored publicity 
about the bombing of mainland Japan, including photos of the effects of the A-bombs. After 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective and Japan’s sovereignty was restored in 
April 1952, however, the press code was deactivated and images of damage caused by the A-
bombs became public. In Okinawa, though, censorship of this subject was still maintained 
under USCAR, but some of the members of the Political Economy Club managed to obtain 
the journal from mainland Japan.  
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As the university was established and funded by the US authorities, this event was a 
crucial problem. USCAR told the executive board of the university that they would freeze 
funds unless the university took some action against the students.103 The four main students 
who organized the exhibition were expelled from the university on 9 May 1953, because of 
the exhibition and other acts of previous disobedience, such as organizing protest against 
night-time blackouts and publication of a journal called Jiyū (Freedom). 
 Three years later, in the middle of the first island-wide protest in June 1956, four 
hundred university students conducted a protest walk from Shuri to Naha. Responding to this 
event, USCAR notified the University of the Ryūkyūs that it might freeze financial assistance 
if the university did not take any action against the students. Despite this warning, the 
university executive committee, particularly the President of the University of the Ryūkyūs, 
Asato Genshū, was very reluctant to expel the students. This was based on their self-critical 
reflection on the harsh treatment of the students during the first Ryūdai incident. A few days 
later, Asato met a liaison officer from the Japanese government, Takashima Shōzō, and asked 
Takashima to bring this issue to the attention of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.104 
Asato hoped that the Japanese government would raise the issue with the US. Although 
Asato’s effort did not move either government on this issue, he did not immediately expel the 
students from the university. He first decided to suspend the students from the university. 
However, the Civil Administrator of USCAR, General Vonna F. Burger, insisted on the 
expulsion of the students from the university. The Director of Civil Information and 
Education Division, who was also responsible for the University of the Ryukyus Foundation, 
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Henry E. Diffenderfer, also insisted strongly on the expulsion of the students. In the end, six 
students were expelled and one student was suspended from the university in August 1956. 
 Although USCAR was suspicious about the involvement of Okinawa People’s Party 
in the students’ political activism, as Uehara Seiji says, the activism was not connected with 
the progressive political parties.105 These students were rather motivated by their own various 
experiences during and after the war. For example, Hamada Tomimasa, one of the students 
expelled in 1953, raised the fear of war, particularly of nuclear missiles as a crucial reason 
why the students were attracted to pacifism.106 Poverty after the war was also a crucial 
motivation for these students. Nakano Ken’ichi, another of the students expelled in 1953, said 
that seeing a young girl taken by the police on suspicion of prostitution was the crucial 
experience that motivated him to take protest actions against the occupation forces. Nakano 
also spoke of the discrimination experienced by Okinawan people in that period. For 
example, Okinawans had the lowest salaries, after Americans, Filipinos and Japanese. Under 
such miserable social conditions, the university students were deeply disappointed with 
Okinawa under US occupation and felt that Okinawa was in a period “without any hope in 
the future.”107 
 
2.8. The Island-wide Struggle 
During the period of widespread land confiscation on Okinawa and neighboring islands, six 
Okinawan delegates went to Washington D.C. in June 1955. They were representatives from 
the Ryukyu Legislature, the Government of the Ryukyu Island, the Okinawan Mayors’ 
Association, and the Association of the Okinawan Landlords. One of the primary missions of 
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these delegates was to negotiate directly with the US government on the newly planned land 
acquisition policy. Prior to their departure, in March 1954, USCAR had proposed a plan 
which enabled the US military government to pay lump-sum rental fees for the use of the 
privately owned land over sixteen and a half years. The Chief Executive of GRI, Higa 
Shūhei, and the majority party in the Legislature of the Ryukyu Islands, the Ryukyu 
Democratic Party (RDP), were both happy to follow this proposal. However, two opposition 
parties, the Okinawa People’s Party and the Okinawa Social Mass Party, were strongly 
opposed to this plan. On 30 April 1954 the proposal was rejected in the Legislature. 
Reflecting this decision, the local political leaders decided to visit the US House of 
Representatives in order to discuss the issue with the House Armed Services Committee. 
In response to the Okinawans’ visit to Washington D.C., delegates from the Armed 
Services Committee arrived at Kadena Airbase on 23 October 1955.  The team comprised 
over ten members including Charles Melvyn Price, a member of the US House of 
Representatives who was also appointed chairperson of the delegates. Their visit was 
organized to inspect the military bases on Okinawa Island. However, their stay in Okinawa 
lasted only a few days. After their short stay on mainland Okinawa, the American delegates 
submitted a report to the US House of Representatives. In this report (the so-called Price 
Report), the American delegates supported the proposal for lump-sum payments for land 
leases. Also, they affirmed USCAR’s need to continue land confiscation.  
These statements intensified the anger among the local islanders directed at the US 
government. Protesting Okinawan citizens thought that the US authorities had ignored their 
“four principles to protect local land” (tochi wo mamoru yon gensoku), which was fully 
endorsed by the member of the Ryūkyū Legislature. The four principles were: (1) refusal of 
lump-sum payment of rental fees; (2) decent compensation for the confiscated land; (3) 
decent compensation for the affected land owners who lost their lands; and (4) objection to 
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new land confiscation by the US government. As “an essential part of our worldwide 
defenses”, the report stated, “our base tenure is dependent upon the continued existence of 
friendly governments.” Noting “the absence of a belligerent nationalistic movement”, the 
delegates also insisted on the necessity of “long-term use of a forward military base in the 
offshore island chain of the Far East-Pacific area, subject, of course to our own national 
policy.”108 Furthermore, the report not only asserted the importance of the presence of its own 
troops in Okinawa but also it stated that Okinawa did not have any “restrictions imposed by a 
foreign government on our rights to store or to employ atomic weapons.”109 
The impact of the Price report was decisive in Okinawa not only for social elites but 
also for many of the local citizens. Cooperation with USCAR and the United States had been 
believed to be the best way in which Okinawans could obtain self-governance and socio-
economic recovery from the war. However, what historian Toriyama Atsushi calls “the 
decade of cooperation” resulted in disappointment for most of those who had put their faith 
in the US.110 The land acquisition policy and the Price report infuriated Okinawan locals. On 
top of these events, the rape and murder of a six year-old girl in Kadena in September 1955 
further angered the locals.111 All this frustration and anger against the American occupation 
forces invigorated the local aspiration for just treatment.  
This created a protest campaign throughout Okinawa. On 15 June 1956, the 
representatives of the four local authorities—the Ryukyu Legislature, the Government of the 
Ryukyu Island, the Okinawan Mayors’ Association, and the Association of the Okinawan 
Landlords—decided to dissolve the joint council. Dissolution of the local authorities was 
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seen as a way to prevent the policy from becoming effective. On 18 June, OTSA, OYA, 
political parties, and other major civic groups decided to organize a joint struggle in order to 
promote the four principles to protect the land, and to present a united front against USCAR. 
The organization they established was named the Council for the Promotion for Solution of 
the Military Land Problem (or gunyōchi mondai kaiketsu sokushin renraku kyōgikai or 
renkyo). On 20 June, there were large protest meetings in 56 towns, villages and cities in 
Okinawa, where over 300,000 people participated in total. Considering the fact that Okinawa 
had 64 different districts on the island, this was literally an island-wide protest against the 
foreign occupation in which people gathered regardless of their political beliefs.112 These 
protest meetings were possible because of the enormous numbers of individual participants as 
well as because of organizational mobilization. 
The mass protest campaign in Okinawa surprised the US local authorities who 
thought that Okinawa was characterized by “the absence of a belligerent nationalistic 
movement”. Nevertheless, USCAR did not show any signs of change in their land policy. On 
the contrary, they started implementing penalties on Okinawan citizens. First, as mentioned 
earlier, USCAR demanded punishment of the university students who attended the public 
protest campaign. Also, by threatening a possible suspension of financial support to the 
university, USCAR placed pressure on the executive committee of the university. Second, in 
August 1956, USCAR declared the central region of Okinawa Island off-limits to US military 
personnel for an indefinite period. In this region, a large part of the local economy depended 
on the bases. Therefore, withdrawal of the military personnel from this region meant critical 
damage for the local economy. Reflecting this policy by USCAR, the mayors of the central 
region who were concerned about economic damage decided to ban the political meetings in 
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many places in this region of Okinawa Island. In both cases, the main intention of the US 
authority was to split the opinion of Okinawan citizens.113 
 The historical verdict on the first island-wide struggle is ambiguous. It is true that this 
first mass protest campaign by Okinawan citizens became a landmark in the history of 
people’s struggles in Okinawa. This was because of concessions that the locals won from 
USCAR in relation to its land acquisition policy. In April 1957, High Commissioner Moore 
announced temporary suspension of the lump-sum payment system. A few days later, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that the US government was considering 
revision of the existing military land policy in Okinawa. In May, six Okinawan leaders, 
including the new Chief Executive of GRI, Tōma Jūgō, were invited to visit Washington DC 
to have a meeting with the government officials and politicians on the renewal of land 
compensation. On 7 July, the two sides issued a joint communique in which the leadership of 
the US government and the GRI undertook to make an effort to build a more harmonious 
relationship in relation to the US bases in Okinawa. Following their statement, on 13 
October, two proposals on the land problem were passed with support from the majority of 
the Ryukyu Legislature. With this new legislation, the land price for leases for the US 
military was increased six-fold compared with the level before the island-wide people’s 
protest occurred. Also, lump sum payments became optional rather than mandatory. From 
this perspective, the land struggle during the 1950s appeared to end in the Okinawan locals’ 
victory.114 However, some profound issues remained unsolved, including the possibility of 
new land acquisition.  
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2.9. The Reversion-to-Japan Movement 
The energy of the 1950s popular struggle created the basis for the struggle of the next decade, 
which witnessed the reversion-to-Japan movement or “the second wave” of the island-wide 
protest campaign against the US occupation regime. People’s fears, anxieties and the 
problems caused by US soldiers and the military bases generated an atmosphere for the 
reversion movement. Under the banner of “reversion to Japan”, what people hoped for was to 
recover their status as citizens under Japanese sovereignty. The second island-wide 
movement had two main characteristics. The first characteristic was that in the early period 
the reversion movement was primarily led by local groups such as the OTSA (Okinawa 
School Teachers and Staff Association). With influential leaders such as Nakasone Seizen 
(1907-1995) and Yara Chōbyō (1902-1997), the OTSA was the leading social force whose 
activity had great impact in terms of the mobilization of the other local groups such as Parent 
Teachers’ Associations and Okinawa Women’s Association. The second characteristic of the 
reversion movement was the strong sense of Japanese nationalism in Okinawa. While there 
were pro-US political parties, such as the Okinawa Democratic Party, the return to Japan 
became a bipartisan concern transcending conservative and progressive political ideologies 
during the 1960s. This was strongly reflected in the ideology of the OTSA, which gained 
hegemony in the reversion movement. For these reasons, the political activity of the OTSA is 
the key issue for understanding the reversion movement. 
In postwar Okinawa, the first reversion movement appeared in the early 1950s. In 
1951, the Association for the Return of Okinawa to Japan (or APRJ) was founded jointly by 
the Okinawa Communist Party and the Okinawa Social Mass Party.115 One of the founders of 
the OSMP, Taira Tatsuo, was a passionate advocate for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. A 
                                                 
115 The original name of this organization in Japanese is Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kisei-kai (日本復帰促進期成会). 
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local journalist and the former mayor of Shuri City, Nakayoshi Ryōkō, was another 
influential organizer who joined APRJ. Working together with the Association of Okinawan 
Residents in mainland Japan, APRJ petitioned for the revision of Article Three of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, under which Okinawa was controlled separately from the rest of 
Japan, but their campaign could not succeed in changing the Treaty. After the petition failed, 
in January 1953 APRJ was transformed into the Association for the Return of Okinawa 
Islands to the Home Country (or AROIHC) with new leadership.116 One of the prominent 
leaders of this second attempt of the reversion movement was a former high school chemistry 
teacher and then representative of the OTSA, Yara Chyōbyō. 
The increasing significance of Yara and the OTSA in Okinawan progressive society 
attracted USCAR’s attention. In February 1954, USCAR sent a letter to Yara and the OTSA 
in which it warned that teachers should not be involved with social activities other than 
education of students. When Yara planned to travel to Tokyo in order to receive donations for 
school building in April, USCAR would not give him travel permission. Furthermore, in 
May, the Deputy Governor of USCAR, Major General David A. D. Ogden, expressed his 
concerns about the OTSA and its political activism.117 The US authorities demanded Yara’s 
resignation as leader of the coalition force. A week later, Yara resigned, and subsequently the 
Association for Return of Okinawa Islands to Home Country was dissolved.118 However, 
Yara’s influence remained strong. Although he was no longer the representative of the 
reversion movement, he still remained the leader of the OTSA and an energetic participant in 
social activism.  
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Yara’s strong community-wide leadership was demonstrated in the following year. As 
mentioned earlier, in September 1955, a 6 year-old school girl, Nagayama Yumiko, was 
found dead on a rubbish dump in Kadena. A US serviceman was arrested for the rape and 
murder of the girl. This incident, the so-called “Yumiko-chan Incident”, was widely reported 
around Okinawa. A week after the tragic murder, another, 9 year-old girl was raped by a US 
military serviceman. The Ryūkyū Legislature expressed the strongest dismay in condemning 
the criminals. USCAR also mentioned the possibility of imposing severe punishment on the 
criminals. However, Okinawa’s local judiciary could not interfere in the rape and murder 
cases due to Section 10 of USCAR Proclamation Number 13, which guaranteed the superior 
status of the Governor and the Deputy Governor of USCAR over the local Okinawan 
jurisdiction.119 This extraterritoriality triggered wide anger against the US authority. 
Concerned parents and teachers belonging to PTA and also the Okinawa Women’s 
Association as well as OTSA established the Association for Protection of Okinawan 
Children (APOC), and Yara was chosen as the inaugural representative of the society. APOC 
organized a series of actions including petitions, protest and negotiations with USCAR for 
the just treatment of the victims and their families. Not long after these events, in June 1959, 
an American military plane crashed at a local school, Miyanomori Elementary School, killing 
17 people, including 11 school children, and injuring more than two hundred people within 
and without the school. The ineffective local jurisdiction over the base-related crimes 
generated a strong sentiment of distrust in the US and local authorities in Okinawa. 
On 28 April 1960, the Council for the Return of Okinawa to the Home Country 
(CROHC or Fukki-kyō) was founded.120  CROHC was organized as an umbrella society for a 
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bipartisan island-wide reversion movement. Although the Okinawa Liberal Democratic 
Party121 did not participate, the council still obtained a wide range of local support in 
Okinawa Island with the involvement of progressive political parties such as the OPP and 
OSMP, workers’ unions such as the Okinawa prefectural government employees union 
(Kenrōkyō), vocational societies such as the OTA, and local communities such as the OYA 
and Parents and Teachers Association (PTA) among many others. Supported by many 
organizations and groups, Okinawa’s reversion movement became an island-wide 
phenomenon. 
Towards the late 1960s, Okinawa’s return became a crucial issue not only in Okinawa 
but also between the Japanese and US governments. In 1965, Japanese Prime Minister Satō 
Eisaku had the first official meeting with the US President Lyndon Johnson on Okinawa’s 
status. Two years later in 1967, the two leaders presented a joint communique in which a 
possible plan for Okinawa’s return to Japan in the following three years was mentioned for 
the first time. Also in this year, the Satō government established the advisory council on the 
treatment of Okinawa. Directly accountable to the Prime Minister, it was led by the former 
President of Waseda University, Ōhama Nobumoto, and Suetsugu Ichirō, a political fixer. 
Ōhama originated from Ishigaki Island and had been a respected leader of the Okinawan 
community in Tokyo. The anti-Vietnam War movement in Japan also motivated the Japanese 
government to take action on the treatment of Okinawa’s reversion. Knowing that bombers 
were sent from Okinawa (and the Philippines) to Vietnam, Japanese citizens were concerned 
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about their involvement with the war in the future.122  Their concerns functioned to enhance 
public awareness in mainland Japan about the situation in Okinawa. In November 1969, 
Prime Minister Satō presented a joint communique with the new President of the US, Richard 
Nixon, in which it was announced that Okinawa’s return was to take place in 1972.  
Amid the growing movement for Okinawa’s return to Japan, on 31 October 1968, 
USCAR announced that Washington and the US President Lyndon Johnson had decided to 
hold a popular election of the chief executive of GRI. After this announcement, both 
conservative and progressive parties began to prepare for this first attempt to elect the chief 
executive of the GRI.123 The conservative coalition decided to put forward the President of 
the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP), Nishime Junji (1921-2001), while a 
progressive coalition joined by the Okinawa People’s Party, Okinawa Socialist Party, and 
Okinawa Social Mass Party chose Yara Chōbyō as their candidate. While Yara’s supporters 
were educational societies and workers’ unions, Nishime’s supporters were primarily 
business owners and members of economic elite. This ideological difference was expressed 
in slogans for the election campaign. While the conservative side appealed to voters by 
asking whether Okinawan people would choose “to eat potatoes by voting for Yara, or to be 
prosperous with young Nishime (Yara wo erande imo wo kūka, wakai Nishime de 
sakaeruka?)”, the progressive side questioned whether Okinawans would choose to become 
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perpetrators of war against (North) Vietnamese people despite their own experience of war 
during the Battle of Okinawa. The progressive coalition forces began to be even more 
radicalized in their demands against the U.S. bases. In contrast to the conservative claim for 
the gradual removal of the bases taking economic concerns into consideration, the 
progressive coalition insisted on complete clearance of the bases when Okinawa was returned 
to Japan.124 
The Japanese government did not welcome the Okinawan progressive coalition and 
their radicalization that unsettled the governmental negotiation over Okinawa’s return 
between Tokyo and Washington. Although Okinawa’s return had become one of the chief 
agendas for both governments, they had not yet made a roadmap with a clear schedule for the 
return of Okinawa. Therefore, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party supported Nishime and 
the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party by sending ministers of the cabinet and other 
executive members of the party. They also mobilised nationally popular people including the 
award-winning writer and MP, who later became the Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō, 
and the national female volleyball team, which won the gold medal at the Tokyo Olympics. 
These popular campaigns were successful in the beginning.  
Despite their high popularity, however, those mainlander supporters from the Liberal 
Democratic Party could not acquire sustainable endorsement from local Okinawan voters. 
This was partly because of the attitude among LDP’s executives toward the reversion 
movement. Politicians from the mainland LDP, such as the Secretary-General of the party, 
Fukuda Takeo, who later became Prime Minister during the 1970s, stated that reversion 
would be delayed if Yara won the election. This absence of sensitivity and basic 
understanding of the Okinawan political environment among the mainland LDP members 
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caused it to lose its popularity in Okinawa. In the end, the election resulted in Yara’s victory 
over Nishime. Although it was anticipated, this election result was considered as the climax 
of the Okinawan progressive movement before Okinawa’s return. Yara’s electoral triumph 
meant more than simply choosing their leader. It was understood as the victory of Okinawan 
people’s struggle which had started from the land struggle in the 1950s. 
 
2.10. The Anti-reversionists Movement 
Towards the end of the 60s, a counter movement against the reversion movement also gained 
momentum. The movement was called “the prevention of ratification struggle” (hijun soshi 
tōsō) or later “anti-reversion struggle” (hanfukki tōsō). One of the aims of the movement was 
to protest against the local leaders who worked for ratification of Okinawa’s immediate 
return to Japan. The protest campaign was conducted by diverse social forces. Students from 
the local universities and highschools, also workers from the local unions such as the All 
Base Workers Union (zengunrō), Okinawa Teachers and Staff Unions, public servants and 
many individuals participated in street marches and public forums.  
One of the concerns that induced some Okinawan people to participate in a protest 
campaign against the return to Japan was the fact that local communities had lost control of 
the reversion movement. Although the reversion movement originally emerged 
spontaneously from the local community, the issue became a governmental agenda when the 
Japanese and the US governments started taking initiatives in the mid-1960s. After the Satō– 
Nixon communique was released, promising the return of Okinawa in 1972, the whole 
discussion about Okinawa’s return to Japan revolved around the extent to which the Japanese 
government would regain its administrative rights over Okinawa. What the anti-reversion 
were particularly concerned about were nuclear weapons, which were rumored to be that it 
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was kept in the American military bases in Okinawa.125 The local anxiety about nuclear 
weapons became acute when a B-52 bomber exploded in Kadena Airbase on 19 November 
1968. The locals were horrified as they immediately thought that the war had started again.126 
Anti-reversion campaigners were particularly concerned whether nuclear weapons were 
contained in the bomber.  
In relation to the anxiety about the nuclear weapons, emerging anti-war sentiment 
towards America’s war in Vietnam was another force that fueled anti-reversion movement. A 
week prior to Okinawa’s return being approved by the National Diet of Japan on 17 
November 1971, union workers, students and other concerned Okinawan citizens conducted a 
protest campaign and general strike simultaneously, and held a protest march in the middle of 
Naha. On that day, nearly a hundred and fifty thousand people participated in the protest 
against the immediate return of Okinawa to Japan.  
Although the anti-reversion movement was a minority movement in that period, it 
contributed to creating a new kind of intellectual trend in the Okinawa struggle, which is 
called “the philosophy of anti-reversion” (han-fukki no shisō) by local intellectuals. One of 
the eminent intellectuals involved was Arakawa Akira, who published works such as 
“Okinawa: Antithesis to the Nation State” (Hankokka no Kyōku) in 1971. This contains 
various essays written during the 1960s and the early 1970s. In the book, he was particularly 
critical of the utopian image which local leaders held of the return to Japan and the postwar 
Japanese “peace constitution”, and of these local leaders’ role in promoting state-oriented 
Japanese nationalism in Okinawa. By combining ideas related to class conflict and the anti-
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Vietnam war movement, Arakawa became a pioneering postcolonial thinker in Okinawa. 
Arakawa’s friends such as Kawamitsu Shin’ichi, Okamoto Keitoku, Nakazato Yūgo, and Irei 
Takashi were also actively involved with anti-reversionism as local intellectuals. Although 
the anti-reversion thinkers did not refuse to become “Japanese nationals”, people such as Irei 
Takashi thought that solidarity between Japanese and Okinawan would only be possible if 
citizens from both regions collaboratively struggled against the expansion of Japanese 
capitalism in Okinawa.127 
 
2.11. Between Okinawa as Hometown and Japan as Homeland 
What we have discussed until now is the formation of the Okinawa struggle in its early 
period. By focusing on diverse social and political actors, this chapter has looked into the 
process by which the Okinawa struggle was created from different perspectives. Also, this 
diverse perspective enables us to consider the process by which the “Okinawan identity” of 
Okinawa’s anti-base movement was formed in the early period. While in recent years the 
notion of “Okinawa nationalism” is becoming more frequently used, “Okinawan identity” as 
the core cultural integrity for the anti-base movement was initially used as part of Japanese 
nationalism in Okinawa in the 1950s and 1960s.128 The leading activists of the reversion 
movement in its very early period such as Nakayoshi Ryōkō were surely Okinawan. 
However, they also considered that Japan is their “homeland” (sokoku). Nakayoshi was a 
journalist working for several different newspaper companies in Okinawa, mainland Japan 
and in the United States before the Pacific War broke out. After he experienced the end of the 
Pacific War in Tokyo, Nakayoshi moved back to Okinawa and became the mayor of Shuri 
City, the old capital during the Ryūkyū Kingdom. While Nakayoshi’s friend and fellow 
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reversion movement actvist, Taira Tatsuo, was a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance 
Association (Taisei Yokusan-kai) and an active supporter of Japan’s war-time totalitarian 
regime in Okinawa during the war, Nakayoshi was not necessarily a supporter of Japan’s pre-
war regime. Rather, his political view was closer to liberalism rather than totalitarianism. 
After he returned from the US, Nakayoshi became a member of Rikken Seiyūkai (Friends of 
the Constitutional Government), the first Japanese political party established in 1900. 
 With regard to Nakayoshi’s view on Japan, there are at least two different historical 
perspectives. While Nakayoshi’s motivation for the reversion movement had been considered 
in relation to his cultural nationalism by scholars such as Arasaki Moriteru, recently some 
historians such as Noutomi Kaoru highlight his social reformism.129 Criticizing Arasaki, 
Noutomi argues that Nakayoshi was a modernizer rather than a nationalist, who aimed to 
reform Okinawa’s underdeveloped culture and society. In her analysis, Nakayoshi’s 
reformism was created while he lived in the US and in Tokyo. She argues that from his point 
of view Okinawans in the US were considered as Japanese, while still being different from 
other Japanese in ways in which they behaved, talked and made community in the foreign 
country, which reminded Nakayoshi of Okinawa’s local characteristics.130 The critical 
moment for Nakayoshi to feel the imperative of Okinawa’ modernization was in the 1920s 
when Okinawa’s local economy collapsed after it was hit by the global economic recession. 
Facing the bankruptcy of the local banks and drastic fall in the price of sugar cane, local 
people were eventually driven to eating cycads, a widely available but potentially lethal wild 
plant, which caused the death of a number of the local residents.131 This famine or so-called 
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“the hell of cycads” (sotetsu jigoku) compelled him to act for Okinawa’s modernization in 
Tokyo.132 As a member of the Okinawa Association in Tokyo, Nakayoshi actively 
participated in relief activities and created his networks with the Japanese political and 
economic elites in Tokyo during this period. Meanwhile, he began to advocate the necessity 
of social and cultural reformation of Okinawa to be a modernized nation. From this 
perspective, Noutomi argues that Nakayoshi’s reversion movement needs to be understood in 
relation to his involvement with Okinawa in the 1920s, and  his patriotism or identity as 
Okinawan on which his Japanese nationalism was built. 
 Compared to Nakayoshi’s reformist view on Okinawan identity and Japan, Nakasone 
Seizen’s story provides us with a different perspective. Originally a local high school teacher, 
Nakasone was known especially for his career as the leader of himeyuri students, a group of 
local female students who participated in the Battle of Okinawa as a nurse unit, where a large 
number of them were either committed suicide or died during the war. This tragic experience 
made him anti-Japanese in the very early postwar period.133 Under the initiative of the 
American military administration, Nakasone participated in the promotion of non-Japanese 
school education by emphasizing Okinawan or Ryūkyūan ethnicity.  
However, through his involvement with activities for the restoration of education in 
Okianawa together with another influential educator, Yara Chōbyō, Nakasone’s view on 
Japan gradually changed. Their campaign was started in 1953, in which Nakasone and Yara 
travelled to mainland Japan. The aim was to collect donations to rebuild the public schools in 
Okinawa. Supported by his fellow Okinawans in Tokyo and other cities, Nakasone and Yara 
visited the major cities in mainland Japan and asked for financial assistance for Okinawan 
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school children and their teachers. There, they were introduced to the executives such as 
Shibusawa Keizō, former chairperson of the Bank of Japan and the Minister of Finance. 
Known also as an ethnologist studying the cultural life of rural areas, especially fishery 
villages, Shibusawa was sympathetic with the situation of Okinawa. Therefore, he readily 
accepted the offer to become the representative of the Society for the Promotion of 
Rebuilding Okinawan Schools Affected by Warfare (Okinawa Sensai Kōsha Fukkō Sokushin 
Kisei-kai) and contributed by collecting financial support, which became over sixty million 
yen (in 1953 values). Having been welcomed by these fellow Japanese, Nakasone became a 
pro-reversionist. In addition, Nakasone, as well as Yara, was also attracted by postwar Japan 
under the “peace constitution”. While his direct involvement in the Battle of Okinawa had 
overshadowed his view on Japan, the image of postwar Japan as democratic country, 
breaking away from its imperial past, made him consider the reversion of Okinawa as the 
best way to enable Okinawa to recover from the war devastation and occupation. 
Between Okinawa as hometown and Japan as homeland, the advocates of the 
reversion movement sought the best solution to achieve territorial sovereignty for Okinawa 
that was determined by Okinawan people. Social reform, economic modernization, 
abhorrence of warfare and anxiety about everyday life under the occupation were core themes 
for this generation. There were various motivations which drove the reversion movement, but 
the majority of Okinawans equally believed that “becoming Japanese” was the best solution 
to make their lives better. In other words, the rise of Japanese nationalism within the 
reversion movement was the means by which Okinawans tried to articulate Japaneseness 
within the framework of their own distinctive local experiences as a path to liberation from 
the existing political and social situation. As I argued earlier, those who conducted the “anti-
reversion” movement also did not disagree with this view. However, what made anti-
reversionists become significant was that some of them understood that Okinawans had lost 
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control of the debate about reversion, and so Okinawa’s situation would not be changed 
merely by becoming part of Japan. Although their campaign was not successful around the 
period of the reversion movement, as we will see in the next chapter, activists and 
intellectuals who joined the anti-reversion movement became central social actors in the 
reconstruction of the Okinawa struggle after the return to Japan.  
 
2.12. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the origins and formation of the Okinawa struggle under the US 
occupation by focusing on major actors and events during the 1950s and 1960s. I explored 
diverse local experiences of the American occupation. On the one hand, the cases of farmers 
and the OTSA reveal the socio-economic impact of the military government and people’s 
reactions through the stories of land confiscation and the emergence of the base towns. On 
the other hand, we also traced the motivation and aims of the formation of political parties. 
Also, the stories of the university students show us how educated youths perceived America’s 
surveillance and oppression of their subversive activism. The first island-wide struggle and 
the reversion movement were created through the interaction of these diverse socio-political 
groups. To understand the Okinawa struggle, we need to view it from two perspectives: first, 
from the perspective of the underlying concerns and issues that persisted throughout the 
struggle; and second, in terms of the diverse objectives and experiences that existed within 
the struggle. The former aspect is important to understand the emergence of a unified critical 
subject struggling for its autonomous status, whereas the latter is important to understand the 
diversity of the actors involved in the struggle and their contexts and motivations.  
In the next chapter, I discuss the formation of a range of new actions and identities 
within the Okinawa struggle after Okinawa’s return. The US military bases remained in 
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Okinawa even after its return to Japan in May 1972. The treaty between Tokyo and 
Washington confirmed that the continuing presence of the US bases in Okinawa remained 
important even after the return of Okinawa, which meant that the extraterritoriality of the 
bases and the military personnel in Okinawa remained unchanged. Meanwhile, the former 
progressive leaders such as Yara Chōbyō became part of the local establishment. These new 
local leaders became negotiators with the central government in Tokyo by limiting their 
involvement in grassroots political and social movements. In this context, I will discuss how 
Okinawan citizens developed the local struggle and what kind of local identity emerged from 
their activism. 
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Chapter Three 
Re-making the Okinawa Struggle:  
The Kin Bay Struggle and the Rise of “Okinawan Identity” 
in the Post-reversion Era 
 
  
The photo was taken by the author in Aka Island (Aka-jima) in April 2012. 
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3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the Okinawa struggle during the 1970s and 1980s. By highlighting 
the rise of a “civic movement” in Kin Town, a town located in the mid-eastern part of 
Okinawa Island, as a case study, I examine the context in which local civic activism was 
conducted.134 This civic activism (the so-called Kin Bay struggle or Kin-wan tōsō) is a crucial 
case illustrating new aspects of social movements in post-reversion Okinawa. First, the Kin 
Bay struggle was one of the first cases of social activism created by local citizens after 
Okinawa was returned to Japan. Secondly, the Kin Bay struggle contributed to strengthening 
the Okinawa struggle by incorporating environmental activism. In other words, the Kin Bay 
struggle is a significant case in which protection of the local ecology and community from 
the ravages of excessive land development and industrialization became a core identity of the 
social movement. Thirdly, related to the second point, the Kin Bay struggle is an important 
                                                 
134 The concept of “civic movement” in the context of the Okinawa struggle means a type of social movement 
that is started and developed by “individuals”. The notion of individuality, individual, or individuals (ko or kojin 
in Japanese) was one of the crucial topics of intellectual discussion in Okinawa during from the 1970s until the 
1980s. Some key local intellectuals such as Kawamitsu Shin’ichi, Okamoto Keitoku, Nakasone Isamu and 
Arasaki Moriteru used this concept to discuss an alternative social actor within the Okinawan struggle, which is 
different from mainstream political actors affiliated to political parties or other social forces such as workers’ 
unions. There is no clear definition of this concept among those intellectuals. Yet most of them (except for 
Arasaki) were those who participated in the anti-reversion movement (see Chapter 2). After the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan, these intellectuals felt it necessary to reconsider the Okinawa struggle in terms of social ac-
tors. It was important to reverse the co-option of Okinawan progressive politics by the national government in 
Tokyo. What they similarly considered was importance of “individuals” as social actors independent from 
party-led politics in Okinawa. However, their argument went beyond political analysis. Kawamitsu sought indi-
viduality in the Okinawan historical context and Arasaki defined individuality by referring to modern citizens. In 
particular, Okamoto Keitoku is one of the few intellectuals who tried to define what the individual is within the 
local cultural context in his long essay “Suiheijiku no Hassō” (The Philosophy of Horizontal Relationships). In 
the essay, Okamoto problematises the concepts of the self in the Okinawan cultural context. He argues that 
the self in Okinawa entails an “inferiority complex” towards mainland Japanese. Okamoto considers that this 
inferiority complex caused the historical tragedies during the Battle of Okinawa such as the collective suicide in 
places such as Tokashiki-jima Island and Zamami-jima Island in 1945. His discussion on the self and Okinawan 
culture was considered provocative in Okinawa when it was released in the 1980s, because the issue of collec-
tive suicide was still a taboo in Okinawa. But what made his essay more disputable was his comparison of col-
lective suicide with the reversion to Japan movement. Okamoto argues that the leaders of the reversion to Ja-
pan movement, most of them locally established social and political elites, also had an inferiority complex to-
wards the Japanese, and therefore, those leaders were eventually incorporated by Japanese politics. What 
Okamoto suggests in order to overcome this problem is to create “individuals” who would not be subsumed 
into the logic of the self in Okinawan culture. His conception of “horizontal relations” was an eye-opening con-
cept for Okinawan readers in that period, which enabled them to consider “relationship” and “distance” 
among individuals in understanding Okinawan culture. 
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case to understand the new political environment of the Okinawa struggle. The participants in 
the Kin Bay Protection Society (KBPS) needed to struggle not only with the Japanese and US 
governments but also with the political and economic establishment within Okinawa which 
designated Kin as one of the main sites for the building of an off-shore petrol storage system 
known as the Central Terminal Station (CTS).  
Although the local campaigners lost their court case against the Okinawan 
government, the Kin Bay struggle is considered as an historic movement in the context of 
post-reversion Okinawa. Raising the concept of “the right of existence” (seizon-ken), the 
actions of Kin Bay residents carved out a new space for Okinawan civic activism, attracting 
other Okinawan citizens from different locales. Among them were those who started a 
support network, the Residents’ Movement of the Arc of Ryūkyū or RMAR (Ryūkyū-ko no 
Jūmin Undō). One of the main aims of this group is to create linkages amongst various kinds 
of local civic activism struggling with similar environmental pollution problems in their 
localities. Organising activities such as study camps and publishing pamphlets, RMAR 
played a significant role in linking the Kin Bay struggle to localized environmental activism 
from Amami on the northern fringe of Ryūkyū Islands to the southernmost islands such as 
Yonaguni-jima Island. Most significantly, RMAR created a new sense of cultural identity 
based on the concept of a region called Ryūkyū-ko (the Arc of Ryūkyū). Starting from an 
examination of the political and economic situation in Okinawa during the 1970s and the 
1980s, through the analysis of the Kin Bay struggle, I discuss how the local citizens recreated 
the Okinawa struggle, including the local (re)articulation of “Okinawan identity” during 
those periods, and then go on to examine the nature and significance of the concept of 
Ryūkyū-ko. 
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3.2. Okinawa after “Reversion” 
In May 1972, the administration of Okinawa was handed over from the US to Japan. After 
twenty-seven years of American military government, Okinawa again became a Japanese 
prefecture. As we saw in the previous chapter, by mobilising large numbers of participants 
from all corners of Okinawa, the reversion movement of the 1960s had been a crucial 
historical event for Okinawan citizens. Okinawans became legitimate participants in selecting 
their leaders and determining the future of Okinawa for the first time in the post-WWII era.135 
Backed by strong popular support, the last Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu 
Island, Yara Chōbyō, who became the inaugural Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, defined 
five principles for the new Okinawa: (1) construction of peaceful Okinawa; (2) resolution of 
the US base problems; (3) redevelopment of the Okinawan economy; (4) improvement of 
social welfare; and (5) enhancement of self-governance of the cities, towns and villages. 
However, Yara’s administration of the new Okinawa was hampered by its external 
relationship with the Japanese government. First, the Liberal Democratic Party in Tokyo did 
not support Yara’s progressive manifesto because the central government regarded it as 
“unrealistic”. Also, the US military presence in the prefecture did not change. Instead of 
reclaiming the land used by the US bases, the Japanese government allowed the continuation 
of the US bases in Okinawa. The extraterritorial status of the US military and its personnel in 
Japan was continued under the Status of Forces Agreement, which was concluded in 1960 
when the former Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and the US President Dwight 
Eisenhower renewed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between United States 
and Japan. Although territorial sovereignty was restored and Okinawans became Japanese 
citizens, the Okinawan locals had to endure the continuing presence of the US military bases. 
                                                 
135 Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Sengo-Shi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976), 9. 
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Yara’s political choices were limited because of Okinawa’s weak economy. Although 
he sought progressive policies to assure the strong self-governance of Okinawa, the reality 
was that Okinawa Prefecture did not have any option but to ask the Japanese government for 
financial support. The Satō administration in Tokyo established the Okinawa Development 
Agency (Okinawa Kaihatsu-chō) and in December 1972 presented a plan for Okinawa’s 
socio-economic development for the next ten years (The First Promotion and Development 
Plan for Okinawa or so-called daiichiji Okinawa shinkei).136 In order to encourage Okinawa’s 
economic development, large subsidies were provided by the Japanese government to the 
Okinawan economy to modernize infrastructure. To promote rapid social and economic 
development, the Japanese government also invested in the Okinawan tourism industry. 
Highlighting Okinawa’s distinctive subtropical climate, the prefecture was designated as the 
host prefecture for national and international events. One of the earliest events that Okinawa 
hosted after its return to Japan was the International Oceanic Expo in 1975. In the lead-up to 
this event, the investment from mainland Japan gave strong momentum for the building of 
resort facilities on Okinawa Island, particularly in the northern region called Yanbaru, which 
had been less developed compared to the southern part of Okinawa Island. 
As Tada Osamu argues, this kind of economic stimulus caused the Okinawan 
economy to be dependent on government-led investment. Under the name of “promotion 
measures (shinkō-saku) for Okinawa prefecture”, Okinawa was gradually reintegrated into 
                                                 
136 As the motivation of this policy, the Japanese government cited the need for Okinawa’s rapid economic 
growth to fill the gap compared with the rest of Japan, which was caused by ravages of the hard-fought battles  
(karetsu na senka) with the US during the war and its long-term separation from Japan (naganen ni wataru 
hondo to no kakuzetsu). Based on this motivation, the official document of the plan reports that the Japanese 
government must make efforts to provide basic infrastructure to support the independent development 
(jiritsu-teki hatten) of Okinawa. However, Arasaki Moriteru harshly criticises this policy because he argues it 
was made to urge less developed Okinawa to catch up with the rest of Japan. (The Cabinet Office of Japan. 
“Dai Ichiji Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Keikaku” (Tokyo: The Cabinet Office of Japan, 1972), 1; Moriteru Arasaki, 
Okinawa Gendaishi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 51. 
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Japanese developmentalism.137 The Japanese government regarded this economic stimulus as 
“compensation” for the war and twenty-seven years of the US military occupation which the 
Okinawan people had experienced. However, as Arasaki Moriteru points out, the economic 
promotion plan was not only compensation for past suffering but also it functioned to ease 
internal frustration about the continued existence of the bases in Okinawa.138 Although the 
US bases in mainland Japan substantially decreased in size in the late 1960s to early 1970s, 
the area of the US bases in Okinawa showed only a small decrease. The size of the US bases 
in mainland Japan was reduced from approximately 30,000 hectares (as of 1960) to 20,000 
hectares by 1972, whereas the area in Okinawa only decreased from thirty thousand hectares 
to twenty-six thousand hectares, and then rose to around forty thousand hectares (See Figure 
below). The proportion of the US bases between Okinawa and Japan reversed in terms of 
land used, and this is how Okinawa Prefecture, which only accounts for less than 1 percent of 
the total Japanese land area, became the place to host about 74 percent of the entire US bases 
in the country (as of 2011, see Chart 3.2). 
Besides, Okinawa’s return to Japan also brought some critical changes in the political 
situation around the local anti-base struggle. Progressive political parties— the Okinawa 
People’s Party (OPP) and Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP)—joined the Japan Communist 
Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) respectively and became their local branches. 
This incorporation of the local political parties made them more inflexible when making 
                                                 
137 Osamu Tada, Okinawa Imēji no Tanjō: Aoi umi no karuchuraru sutadīzu (Tokyo: Tōyōkeizai Shinpō-sha, 
2004). 
138 Although the Yara administration campaigned for the removal of the US bases from Okinawa, it did not 
take any legal actions against the Japanese and US governments. Instead, Yara signed a memorandum under 
which Okinawa Prefecture received ‘compensation’ from the Japanese government. Following Yara’s decision, 
most of the provincial governments in Okinawa Prefecture also signed the memorandum. 
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decisions by themselves because these the local branches always need to consult with their 
headquarters in Tokyo when taking political actions.139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Sengoshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976).  
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Chart 3-1. The area used for the US military bases and other facilities. This chart is made by the 
author of the thesis based on the data from Okinawa Prefectural Government, available at 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/h24toukei-6.pdf. Note: the number 
on the left side is hectare (1 hectare is 10,000 square meters) 
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Chart 3-2. The composition of exclusive-use facilities of the US Forces (by prefecture). The chart is 
made by the author of the thesis based on the date from Okinawa Prefectural Government, 
available at http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/2011.6%20eng.pdf 
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3.3. “Aquapolis” and Developmentalism in Post-reversion Okinawa 
“My fellow Japanese citizens, we must learn the lesson of our valuable history, 
and reaffirm our determination for peace, and strive to build a peaceful and 
wealthy Okinawa as a bridge of friendship and cooperation with our neighbors in 
Asia and the Pacific.”140  
These words were uttered on 15 May 1972 by then Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in a 
speech at the ceremony to celebrate Okinawa’s return to Japan. Satō’s speech was eloquent 
and confident. Okinawa’s return to Japan was one of the initial policies which Satō 
emphasized when he became the Prime Minister of Japan in 1964. The fluency of his speech 
was backed by confidence and achievement. However, Okinawa was not easy to manage for 
anyone, even Satō. One of the major problems was the gap in economic development and 
social infrastructure between Okinawa and the rest of Japan. During the twenty-seven years 
of the US military administration, there had been little socio-economic investment in 
Okinawa. While some of the southern cities in Okinawa Island flourished, in many rural 
places, particularly the northern part of Okinawa Island, there was little investment in 
development. In those places, main drainage was uncommon, and roads and public transport 
also remained far less developed than in the southern areas of Okinawa Island. In such 
circumstances, the modernization of Okinawan infrastructure to catch up with the rest of 
Japan was an urgent matter.  
With this in mind, the Satō cabinet had decided to incorporate Okinawa into Japan’s 
New Master Plan for the National Land Development (Shin Zenkoku Sōgō Kaihatsu Keikaku 
or Dai-niji Shin Zensō). The first Master Plan of Land Development (Dai-ichiji Zensō) was 
                                                 
140 Takayoshi Egami, “Fukki-go no Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Keikaku,” Opinion 47 (August 2003), accessed No-
vember 18, 2014, http://www.waseda.jp/jp/opinion/2003/opinion47.html. 
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developed and implemented under the initiative of the former Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato 
during the 1960s, as part of his famous “Income-doubling Plan” (Shotoku Baizō Keikaku). 
Taking “the balanced development of the national land” as its slogan, this master plan 
provided a grand design for equitable social improvement in postwar Japan. In the earlier 
plan of the 1960s, the Ikeda administration had two aims: doubling annual income per capita; 
and creating regional industrial centres between major industrial cities to avoid further 
centralisation of population. Although average annual income per capita dramatically 
increased by up to four times compared with the previous decade, the high concentration of 
population and capital in urban areas was not solved. Therefore, in the new nation-wide land 
development plan, the Sato administration aimed to fill in the gap of socio-economic 
development between the major cities such as Tokyo and the regional areas by distributing 
social investment more extensively around the country.141 In the second master plan for land 
development under the Satō administration, one of the major tasks was to establish transport 
networks. This included not only constructing roads but also establishing ports and airports in 
order to connect regional areas and major cities.  
For land development, Okinawa was one of the frontiers for investment firms. The 
report on the second master plan (first published in 1967, and the revised version published in 
1969) stated that Okinawan society had been constrained in its development compared to the 
rest of Japan because of its “isolation from the mainland, vulnerable local economy, lag in the 
extent of social infrastructure, the bases that occupy massive areas of the land, small and 
scattered islands and the impact of typhoons.”142  However, the report also said “its location 
between Japan and Southeast Asia, unique nature as the only subtropical region in Japan, 
                                                 
141 Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, “Zōho Shin Zenkoku Sōgō Kaihatsu 
Keikaku” (Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 1969), 9-10. 
142 Ibid., 80. 
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abundant marine resources and many different kinds of resources for tourism make this 
region a culturally and naturally distinctive place.”143 Therefore, the report argued that “the 
whole of Okinawa needs to be developed to the standard of the mainland in order to depart 
from the base-dependent economy and transit to a peaceful economy.”144 In order to achieve 
Okinawa’s development, the Satō administration emphasized the importance of establishing 
communication infrastructure, particularly roads, ports and airports in Okinawa. In the report, 
the need to renovate airports in Naha and remote islands such as Miyako, Ishigaki, Kume, 
and Yonaguni are listed as crucial agenda items, as well as the need to repair roads and ports 
around the region. The report particularly emphasizes the need for urgent development of 
Naha as the centre of the regional network.145  
In order to attract investment to Okinawa Prefecture, the Japanese government 
decided to designate Okinawa as the host prefecture of the World Expo in 1975. The Tokyo 
Olympics of 1964 and the Osaka World Expo of 1970 had already proven the usefulness of 
such major events for the hosting cities in terms of the development of social infrastructure. 
Inspired by Okinawa’s unique oceanic culture, the event was called the Okinawa Oceanic 
Expo (Okinawa kaiyō haku). The Foundation for the Expo was established with Ōhama 
Nobumoto, who was a key political advisor of Prime Minister Satō on Okinawa’s reversion 
process, as the chairperson.  
With participation from thirty-six countries from around the world, the Expo was the 
largest international event that Okinawa had experienced in its modern history. It had a 
particularly great socio-economic impact in the development of the northern part of Okinawa 
Island, where investment from mainland Japan to Okinawa was small prior to 1972. To build 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 80. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 81. 
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and maintain the US military facilities, Japanese construction companies such as Shimizu 
Corporation and Taisei Corporation, together with local Okinawan firms, had played major 
roles when the US military bases were extended from the late 1940s until the early 1950s.146 
However, in the earlier period, the northern half of Okinawa Island drew less attention for 
investment compared to the southern and central regions of Okinawa Island such as Kadena 
and Naha (where most of the bases were located). In this sense, the Okinawa Oceanic Expo 
was welcomed by most locals with great enthusiasm. For this event, the world’s largest 
aquarium and a symbolic site called the “aquapolis” were built in Motobu town in the north-
west of Okinawa Island. Modern infrastructure was also rapidly established around the 
northern Yanbaru region. 
 While the development stimulated by the Expo helped modernize the socio-economic 
environment of the northern region, it also left some critical problems. Overdevelopment of 
the land caused the run-off of red soil into the ocean. The coastline was coloured red because 
of soil which leached from the mountains when there was heavy rain in the region because of 
deforestation of the mountains. This leached red soil caused critical environmental damage to 
the native sea habitat such as coral reefs.147 Also, the sudden rise in investment caused an 
economic bubble with a sharp rise in the land prices in the region. The local Ryūkyū Shimpō 
newspaper reported that the price of land per square meter in Motobu Town, which was 
twelve yen in the early 1970s, had reached ten-thousand yen by the mid-1970s.148 This drastic 
rise in land prices prompted the purchase of land primarily by mainland Japanese speculators. 
The sudden emergence of Okinawa’s bubble economy also created other changes in the local 
                                                 
146 According to Toriyama Atsushi, 88 percent of the construction market was taken by the mainland Japanese 
firms in 1950, which changed to 89 percent in 1951 and 79 percent in 1952. See Atsushi Toriyama, Okinawa: 
Kichi-shakai no kigen to sōkoku, 107. 
147 Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, 53. 
148 Anon,. “Tochi Kaishime, Chika Kōtō,” Ryukyu Shimpō (2 December 1972), accessed October 2, 2013, 
http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-150894-storytopic-9.html. 
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economy including wage rises and abandonment of farmland by farmers.149 This was later 
called “the Oceanic Expo Shock” (or, kaiyōhaku shokku). 
  
3.4. Anti-CTS Struggle: The origin of the Okinawan civic movement 
One of the major characteristics of the Okinawa struggle after 1972 is the emergence of rural 
residents, many of them not necessarily experienced activists, as the main actors of the 
movement. This grassroots activism led by local residents is often called the “residents’ 
movements” (or jūmin undō). In the postwar Japanese context, this type of social movement 
started from the 1960s as small groups of residents created anti-pollution and anti-
development movements in both regional and highly industrial areas such as Yokkaichi City 
in Mie prefecture.150 The history of residents’ movement in Japan, however, goes back to the 
late 19th century. One of the most famous examples is the protest campaign against the 
pollution of rice fields affected by the waste water from a local copper mine in Ashio, 
Tochigi prefecture.  
However, the term “residents’ movement” came to be widely used in Japan from the 
1960s. As Simon Avenell points out, the term implies social movements led by local 
“citizens”, a concept which was not applied to describe Japanese nationals before WWII, to 
protect their living space from ravages of environmental destruction.151 Also, another 
distinctive characteristic of the residents’ movement in the postwar Japanese context is that it 
                                                 
149 Osamu Tada, Okinawa Imēji no Tanjō: Aoi umi no karuchuraru sutadīzu (Tokyo: Tōyōkeizai Shinpō-sha, 
2004). 
150 In Yokkaichi City, sulphurous acid gas released from the petrochemical complex on the coast caused asthma 
among the locals, which is known as Yotsukaichi asthma. In the 1960s, the local residents in Yokkaichi City and 
surrounding regions decided to bring a court case against chemical firms in the complex, which resulted in the 
victory of the residents in the early 1970s. Yotsukaichi asthma is known as one of the four big diseases amid 
the high industrialization of Japan. 
151 Simon Avenell, “Regional egoism as the public good: residents' movements in Japan during the 1960s and 
1970s,” Japan Forum 18 (2006): 93; also, as an introduction to the study of the Japanese residents’ movement, 
see: Kamon Nikarai and Jiro Matsubara. Jūmin Undō no Ronri: Undō no tenkai katei, kadai to tenbō. (Tokyo: 
Gakuyō Shobō, 1976). 
114 
was driven by the spirit of self-help and autonomy of local regions against the institutional 
pressure of development imposed by the Japanese government and chemical industries. In the 
residents’ movements, the protest communities raised issues related to the effects of rapid 
economic growth on their living areas. In particular, issues surrounding the natural 
environment are often raised by campaigners. By involving not only the local residents but 
also concerned citizens from other parts of the country, including university scholars, the 
movement played a crucial role to advance civic movements in Japan.152 
In the Okinawan context, too, residents’ movements were initiated by local residents 
who were directly affected by the environmental problems and citizens concerned about the 
mass scale of land development in the early 1970s. As I discuss later, one of the strong 
concerns of the Japanese government with Okinawa prefecture was to ensure that the local 
economy and living standards caught up with the rest of Japan. In addition to the 1975 
Oceanic Expo, from the 1970s the Japanese government launched plans to reconstruct social 
infrastructure in various places around the prefecture. However, these development plans 
were often created with little consideration of their effects, particularly on the local lives 
including people. Therefore, from the mid-1970s, Okinawans organised protest campaigns 
against this development that was destructive to their everyday life. For example, in places 
such as Shiraho in Ishigaki Island, the local fishermen conducted a protest action against the 
renovation of the local Ishigaki Airport in 1979 because they were concerned with 
destruction of the natural environment around the coast inclusive of coral reef. In 1986, 
residents in Awase in Okinawa City started a campaign against the landfill of the local 
intertidal flat. Although the scale of these movements was far from the ‘mass’ protests of the 
1950s and 1960s, the type of social struggle that emerged in the 1970s played an essential 
                                                 
152 For involvement of university scholars in the Japanese anti-pollution movement, see e.g. Simon Avenell, 
The Borderless Archipelago: Toward a Transnational History of Japanese Environmentalism,” Environment and 
History 19 (2013): 397-425. 
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role in post-reversion Okinawan history in the sense that these movements created a basis for 
new forms of anti-base struggle mobilising environmental issues in places including Kadena 
from the 1980s onwards, Futenma and Henoko from the 1990s and Takae from the 2000s.153 
When we consider the historical origins of residents’ movements in postwar 
Okinawa, one of the earliest cases was that of a group of the local citizens who conducted a 
protest campaign in Kin Town during the 1970s and 1980s.154 Located in the central-eastern 
coastal area of Okinawa Island, Kin Town was designated as the site for construction of a 
petroleum storage plant by the Okinawan Prefectural Government. At a time of rapid growth, 
central terminal storage (CTS) sites became important for the Japanese government to secure 
safe energy supplies throughout the country. Some major foreign gas firms such as Esso and 
Caltex showed their interest in investing in this project. Aiming to extend their business in 
the Asian region, these transnational petroleum firms saw the return of Okinawa to Japan as 
an important opportunity for investment.155  
However, it was the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) which initiated this 
idea. In 1967, then Chief Executive Matsuoka Seiho decided to attract foreign investors to 
build the CTS in Okinawa. After being refused by the local residents in other places such as 
Yonagusuku, Matsuoka designated his hometown Kin Town as the site for this project.156 
Construction started in 1970. The CTS was built on reclaimed land around neighboring 
islands such as Heianza Island. However, soon after the CTS started operation, the sea water 
around the coast of Kin Town became polluted due to leaked oil, bad odors from the petrol 
                                                 
153 In terms of the US military bases, in 1982 around nine hundred local residents in Kadena Town brought a 
lawsuit against the Japanese and US governments due to the noise pollution from the jets from Kadena Air-
base. Inspired by the citizens in Kadena, in 2002, concerned residents in Futenma Town also started taking le-
gal action against the US military in relation to the loud noise from Futenma Airbase. 
154 The local pronunciation of Kin puts strength on ‘n’ sound. Therefore, in Okinawa, the English name is writ-
ten as “Kinn” instead of “Kin”. However, for the sake of convenience, this thesis uses “Kin”. 
155 Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Sengoshi, 205-206. 
156 Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi, 54.  
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storage tanks and a change in the sea current caused by land reclamation, which damaged the 
local fishing industry.  
Prior to the start of the CTS operation, concerned local residents and environmental 
activists launched the Kin Bay Protection Society (KBPS: Kin-wan o Mamoru-kai) in 
September 1973.157 One of the leaders of KBPS was a former high- school principal, Asato 
Seishin. Born in Okinawa, Asato returned after the war from Korea, where he had taught as a 
local high- school teacher during the Japanese colonial period. After his return, he was a 
senior regional organiser for the Okinawa Teachers and Staff Association (OTSA) in the 
central region of Okinawa Island while continuing his teaching career. The local residents of 
Kin Town, mostly fishermen, were also active members of this newly established protest 
community. By inviting environmental experts and civic activists, they voluntarily organised 
a study group on damage related to CTS. Also, Asato and the local residents conducted 
protest campaigns by collaborating with other Okinawan civic groups from different regions. 
Their campaigns were successful in gaining support from workers’ unions such as the 
prefectural government workers union (kenrōkyō) and the school teachers’ union, which 
occupied influential roles as the major supporting bodies for the Governor Yara Chōbyō 
during the reversion movement. As a result of their lobbying and petitions, Yara decided to 
withdraw approval to start operating CTS in Kin in January 1974. 
However, the Japanese government authority (Okinawa Development Agency), and 
investing firms disagreed with Yara’s decision.158 As construction of the facilities had been 
started, cancellation of the approval would cause a huge loss for investors. Referring to the 
                                                 
 157 Among recent studies, a researcher, Uehara Kozue, writes an introductory essay on anti-CTS struggle. (Ko-
zue Uehara, “Minshū no ‘Seizon’ Shisō kara ‘Kenri’ wo Tou: Shiseiken Henkan-go no Kinn Wan, Han CTS Tōsō 
Saiban wo Megutte,” Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū 39 (2013): 128.) 
158 The Okinawa Development Agency (or Okinawa Kaihatsu-chō: 沖縄開発庁) was started in May 1972 with 
the aim of overseeing economic promotion in Okinawa. As its mission, this government agency was responsi-
ble for creating Okinawa’s economic development plan and the supervision of Okinawa Development Finance 
Corporation (Okinawa Shinyō Kaihatsu Kinyū Kinkō: 沖縄信用開発金融金庫). 
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oil shock in 1973 and Japan’s poor domestic energy resources, the major stakeholders such as 
Okinawa Mitsubishi Development and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) strongly urged Yara to sign the form to approve the operation of the CTS in Kin 
Town. In that period, Yara was not able to handle the politics of CTS operation by himself. 
Minister of MITI, Nakasone Yasuhiro, who became the Japanese Prime Minister from 1982-
1987, dismissed Yara’s decision, emphasizing that the Japanese government aimed to boost 
the stockpiles of petrol in the country, and also that the government was prepared to negotiate 
with the local residents.159 Okinawa Mitsubishi Development also disagreed with Yara, and it 
proposed no other options but building CTS.160 Despite the petition movement and 
negotiations conducted by KBPS with ruling progressive parties such as Okinawa People’s 
Party, Okinawa Socialist Party and OKMS, Yara decided to rescind his decision, and 
approved the operation of the facility in October 1975.  
After its voice was dismissed by the local political leaders, KBPS brought a lawsuit in 
the Naha District Court against Yara and Okinawa Mitsubishi Development. This court case 
created a split between Yara and his former right-hand man, Asato, who had worked together 
during the reversion movement. Yara was elected on the basis of his promises to introduce 
“peaceful industry” (heiwa sangyō), which he promised to create “peaceful Okinawa” and 
“independent Okinawa” not by relying on the base-related economy but by promoting 
industrialization of the local economy. The KBPS lawsuit against Okinawa prefecture 
expressed a strong critique of the potential consequences of the CTS and “peaceful industry” 
for Okinawa. By raising issues such as sea contamination from leaked petrol and construction 
of the storage tanks, the group’s activism was crucial in enhancing public awareness of the 
environmental problems and their impact on people’s everyday lives. Moreover, the protest 
                                                 
159 Nakasone quoted in Kozue Uehara, “Minshū no ‘Seizon’ Shisō kara ‘Kenri’ wo Tou: Shiseiken Henkan-go no 
Kinn Wan, Han CTS Tōsō Saiban wo Megutte” Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū 39 (2013): 29-30. 
160 Ibid., 29. 
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movement contributed to a reconsideration of the meanings of “wealth”, “development”, and 
“rationalization” (which was equated with modernization, or more specifically 
industrialization) imposed by the Japanese government. In this context, Yara’s political 
vacillation and his final decision to allow the operation of the CTS were regarded not only by 
KBPS but also other concerned Okinawan citizens as subservience to the central 
government.161 While Yara played a crucial role in emancipating Okinawa from the US 
military occupation through Okinawa’s return to Japan, this political vacillation enhanced an 
atmosphere in which the locals were forced to reconsider the meaning of “progress” 
(kakushin) and of Okinawa’s true emancipation or independence (jiritsu) from Japan as well 
as the US. 
The court battle between KBPS and Okinawa Prefecture lasted for nearly ten years. In 
the end, the request for a provisional injunction to stop the operation of the CTS was 
dismissed with no further appeal from KBPS in October 1982. The court case ended in 
victory for those who promoted the construction and later operation of the CTS. However, 
the protestors’ defeat in court did not mean the end of this new direction in the Okinawan 
people’s struggle. On the contrary, the anti-CTS struggle contributed to the development of 
the people’s movement because it attained an historical position as the pioneer of the 
residents’ movements in Okinawa. Highlighting the protection of the natural environment 
and of people’s existing ways of life, Asato and KBPS were the first groups in Japan touse 
the concept of “the right to existence” (seizonken) in order to justify their struggle. Also, 
another new aspect of this movement was active networking with mainland Japanese activists 
over environmental pollution, destruction of natural landscape and erosion of livelihood 
space. Lawyers, researchers, students and individuals in the mainland were involved with the 
                                                 
161 Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1973-1977: Yogawari no uzu no nakade, Jiritsu e no shikōsakugo 
(Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 37. 
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anti-CTS struggles in Okinawa. Documents, information and experiences were brought to 
Okinawa in order to combat corporate interests and the prefectural government. Those 
interactions with activists in other locales played an important part in the course of the 
development of the anti-CTS struggle.162 By succeeding to the spirit of the anti-US base 
movement from the previous decades, the anti-CTS struggle also brought the Okinawa 
struggle into a new phase and extended its meaning.  
 
3.5. The Arc of the Ryūkyūs 
Kin Bay Protection Society (KBPS) involved participants from not only the local Kin Town 
but also from places such as Naha, which is about one hour away by car from Kin Bay. 
Among them were young intellectuals such as Arasaki Moriteru, who later became an 
eminent Okinawan historian, and Arakawa Akira, who had already been known for his anti-
reversion campaign. Together with other concerned intellectuals such as literary critics 
Okamoto Keitoku and Irei Takashi and Yamakado Ken’ichi (an environmental expert) these 
intellectuals based in Naha started a campaign to promote the Kin Bay struggle widely 
around Okinawa prefecture. This group, called the Society to Promote Anti-CTS Struggle 
(CTS Soshi Tōsō wo Hirogeru-kai or Hirogeru-kai), was formed in September 1974. One of 
the founding members of this society, Arasaki Moriteru, became the coordinator of the 
group.163 Arasaki says that he and other founding members including Arakawa decided to 
organise the group in order to spread information about the anti-CTS struggle among people 
living in different areas of Okinawa.164 Although the Kin Bay struggle was initially started by 
a small group of the local residents as an isolated movement, the networks with other 
                                                 
162 Kozue Uehara, “Minshū no ‘Seizon’ Shisō kara ‘Kenri’ wo Tou: Shiseiken Henkan-go no Kinn Wan, Han CTS 
Tōsō Saiban wo Megutte,” 140. 
163 For Arasaki’s biographical information, see Chapter Eight. 
164 Moriteru Arasaki, interview by Shinnosuke Takahashi, December 3, 2011. 
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communities gradually spread around Okinawa Prefecture through the Hirogeru-kai. Based 
in Naha, Arasaki and others regularly reported the ongoing situation of this social movement 
in the local newspapers, sending financial donations, and organising study groups in order to 
share information with people who were unable to participate in the protest movement in Kin 
Town.165 
In 1976, building upon the activity of Hirogeru-kai, Arasaki and others re-formed the 
group under the new name Residents’ Movement in the Arc of the Ryukyus or RMAR 
(Ryūkyū-ko no Jūminundō). The Arc of the Ryukyu is a geographical term referring to the 
chain of small islands from southern Kagoshima Prefecture to Sakishima, the island nearest 
to Taiwan. As the name signifies, one of the major purposes of this group was to become a 
platform for residents’ movements throughout the Ryukyu Islands. Eventually, over ten civic 
groups created a network within the arc of Ryukyu Islands. Arasaki and his colleagues of 
RMAR played a crucial role to connect these different regional societies.166 As one of its 
main activities, for example, RMAR organised an annual study camp beginning in 1979. 
Staying on various islands in the Okinawa region, activists exchanged their experiences and 
information. This camp lasted for ten years until 1989. Also, RMAR published a regular 
pamphlet, and organised symposiums, and other social events from time to time in different 
places.167 
                                                 
165 Hirogeru-kai was started by participants with diverse objectives, and therefore it is not easy to generalize 
the personal motivations that run underneath. Nonetheless, we could identify some similarities among the 
founding members’ careers. For example, people such as Arakawa Akira, Irei Takashi and Okamoto Keitoku 
were originally students from Ryūkyū University who joined the literary circle Ryūdai Bungaku during the mid-
1950s. Later, they supported anti-reversion campaign. Those critical local intellectuals were not only critical of 
Okinawan political elites who led the reversion movement but also considered that the CTS project was a 
product of Japanese economic incorporation of Okinawa backed by American expansionism in Asia. Therefore, 
the Kin Bay struggle was not only an environmental movement but also entailed the meaning as struggle 
against Okinawa’s social integration by Japan and America. 
166 Moriteru Arasaki, “Amami, Okinawa, Ryukyu-ko: Gendai-shi kara no shiten," Shin Okinawa Bungaku 41 
(1979): 94-95. 
167 Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1978-1982: Ryukyu-ko no shiten kara (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 193, 
222. 
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3.6. The Southern Perspective 
In adopting the notion of “the Arc of the Ryukyus” or “Ryukyu-ko”, the founding members 
such as Arasaki were inspired by the idea of Yaponesia (or Japonesia), which offered an 
alternative perspective for viewing the Japanese archipelago and its connections to the Pacific 
region.168 By exploring the “underlying Japanese cultural stratum in the South Pacific”, the 
novelist Shimao Toshio (1917-1986), who coined the concept, tried to re-conceptualize the 
Ryūkyū Islands as the key region for understanding Japanese culture and history.169 Shimao’s 
concept of Yaponesia was based on personal experience. After finishing his university 
degree, Shimao was recruited towards the end of the Asia-Pacific War to head a suicide-
attack squadron of motor boats called shinyō (or marure as the code name; see Image 3.1 
below).170 Shimao was sent to the island Kakeroma-jima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture to 
await the order to conduct his suicide mission. Located in the northern fringe of the Ryūkyū 
Kingdom until the early 17th century, Kakeroma Island had also been annexed by the 
Shimazu clan of the Satsuma domain. After the Meiji Restoration, Satsuma’s territory 
became Kagoshima prefecture. Therefore, the local life on Kakeroma Island was created 
under the two different cultural influences.  
The war ended before Shimao received the order to carry out his mission. After living 
in various places in Japan, Shimao and his wife, who was a native of Kakeroma Island, 
returned to Kagoshima Prefecture. They settled in Naze District in Amami Ōshima Island. 
Like Kakeroma-jima Island, Amami Ōshima Island was also part of the Ryūkyū Islands. 
However, like other northern parts of the Ryūkyū Islands, Amami was incorporated into 
                                                 
168 Ibid., 68-69. 
169 Phillip Gabriel, “Rethinking the margins: Shimao Toshio and Yaponesia,” Japan Forum 8 (1996): 205-220. 
170 Under the command of the Japanese Imperial Army, this Kamikaze boats project was launched in 1944. Be-
cause of the lack of iron, the boats were made of plywood. The ports were located along the Pacific coastline 
of the Japanese archipelago. Many of them were concentrated in the southern part of Japan such as Kago-
shima Prefecture and Okinawa. 
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Satsuma during the 17th century. In this place, Shimao wrote his seminal work The Spike of 
Death (Shi no Toge) in 1960, which is a novel based on Shimao’s personal story of his 
relationship with his wife who was suffering from a severe mental illness. Also, in Naze, 
Shimao wrote many short essays about this area. His experiences and curiosity about the 
history and culture of these islands contributed to Shimao’s vision of Japan from the 
perspective of the Arc of the Ryūkyūs. 
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Image 3-1: Marure, or the boat used to conduct the suicide attack during the Battle of Okinawa. 
The image was taken by the author in April 2012 at Kerama Marine Cultural Museum in Zamami 
Island in Okinawa. 
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Shimao used the terms Yaponesia and Ryūkyū-ko for the first time in his essay, 
“Yaponesia no Nekko” (The Roots of Yaponesia) in 1961. The concept was a mixture of two 
terms, Japan and nesia derived from the ancient Greek nesos (which means ‘islands’). 
According to Philip Gabriel, Shimao used the idea of Yaponesia in order to signify “a 
plurality of cultures within the confines of the nation we call Japan” by re-situating its 
location as an extension of the Pacific region from the perspective of the Ryūkyūs or 
Okinawa.171 Viewing Japan from the perspective of Amami Ōshima, Shimao saw the country 
to be culturally similar to Pacific archipelagos such as Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia 
as well as Indonesia. Shimao’s positive images of the islands in the southern Pacific not only 
as utopian, but also as a crucial cultural reference for understanding modern Japanese urban 
life has been criticised because of its exoticization of the Ryukyuan or Okinawan region and 
its people.172  
However, this does not mean that the concept of Yaponesia was not accepted by the 
local Okinawans. Rather the local Okinawan intellectuals, especially those who were 
involved with the anti-reversion movement, considered it a key concept by which Okinawans 
were liberated from the national boundaries and re-imagined their cultural identity in a wider 
regional and historical context beyond Japan. Inspired by Shimao, some local intellectuals 
such as poet Takara Ben discussed a similar concept called “Ryūkyū-nesia” (the word created 
by combining Ryūkyū and nesos), and a journalist Miki Takeshi proposed “Oki-nesia” 
(Okinawa with nesos). Also, Arakawa Akira wrote a book “Nantō Fudoki” (the Culture and 
Geography of Southern Islands) when he was working for a local newspaper company in 
Ishigaki-jima Island, which is one of the southern-most islands in Okinawa. Arakawa recalls 
                                                 
171 Phillip Gabriel, “Rethinking the margins: Shimao Toshio and Yaponesia,” 164. 
172 See, for example, Keitoku Okamoto, Gendai Okinawa no Bungaku to Shisō (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 
1981), 193-259. 
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that Shimao and his wife Miho strongly encouraged him to write this book, which later 
shaped his philosophy of the anti-reversion movement. In retrospect Arakawa said: 
 
…Ishigaki-jima was the place where I spent my childhood. So, (when he arrived) I 
became nostalgic. But I had in my mind mostly sorrow that I was miserably dispatched to 
this place which I had considered as my second hometown. I lost my motivation to work, 
and had spent a month without writing anything. One day the Headquarters (in Naha) 
suggested to write a report (about Ishigaki) once a week, one page. …I thought this would 
be a chance to rediscover the meaning of my existence, not by writing about Ishigaki in 
relation to Okinawa (Naha) and Japan (Tokyo), but by writing about Ishigaki and its 
relation to further remote islands in the South….The piles of report, which was titled 
“Nantō Fudoki”, became a book 13 after the first report was published. Meanwhile, the 
people who convinced me when I hesitated to publish my works were Shimao (Toshio) 
and Miho.173 
 
 The impact of the idea of Yaponesia on Arakawa and other young Okinawan people 
was extraordinary. Although some senior local intellectuals such as a novelist Ōshiro 
Tatsuhiro was critical of the junior local intellectuals because he thought they merely used a 
new idea proposed by the mainland Japanese, Arakawa and his fellow young Okinawan 
intellectuals believed in the potentiality within Yaponesia to reconstruct Okinawa’s critical 
regional imagination against the state-bounded, Tokyo-centered perspective on Japan. 
Arakawa argues that the criticality of this regional imagination enabled them to consider the 
Japanese archipelago from a “de-nationalised” (datsu kokka) perspective and understand it as 
                                                 
173 Akira Arakwa, Tōgō to Hangyaku (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2000), 94-95. 
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a creation of “three different cultural domains—‘Ezo’ (eastern and northern part of the 
archipelago), ‘Wa’ (the central part), and ‘the Arc of the Ryūkyūs’ (western and southern 
part)” by highlighting their affinities to the Pacific region.174 For Arakawa as well as many 
other Okinawans who “internalized” (naimen-ka) the Tokyo-centered perspective and 
regarded themselves as marginalized people, Shimao and his geographical and cultural 
imagination were significant to not only decentralize the view on modern Japan but to enact 
diverse historical, cultural and social contexts on which the architecture of modern Japan was 
built. 
 
3.7. Ryūkyū-ko as “Okinawan Identity” 
The members of the Residents’ Movement of the Arc of the Ryūkyūs articulated Shimao’s 
idea of Ryūkyū-ko as a concept that represents the social identity of those who were 
struggling against ravages of their lives by development and pollution in various parts of 
Ryūkyū Islands. In other words, Ryūkyū-ko was a central concept for considering the 
meaning and context of the Okinawa struggle and “Okinawan identity” during the 1970s and 
the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, RMAR was actively involved to connect the residents’ 
movements from the northern islands such as Amami to southern islands such as Yaeyama. 
In retrospect, one of the key members, Arasaki Moriteru says: 
 
We started using the concept of “the Residents’ Movement in the Arc of the Ryūkyūs” at 
a meeting in January 1976. At that time, we intended to make a network of residents’ 
movement within the cultural area of the Arc of Ryūkyū, which includes Edaku in Amami 
and Yaeyama…Around that period, some members such as Mr. Kinjō Asao proposed that 
                                                 
174 Ibid., 117. 
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the Okinawan agriculture, particularly that of Yaeyama, should learn not from Hawaii or 
Japan but from the South, such as the model of Taiwan, so they went to Taiwan.175 
 
Arasaki’s account indicates that the meaning of “Okinawan identity” for RMAR was 
something different from a homogenous discourse of cultural distinctiveness or ethnic unity 
of Okinawa. Instead, their notion of Ryūkyū-ko represents the regionality of Okinawa 
struggle. It means that “Okinawan identity” is considered as a product of diverse social 
practices and networks of civic activism emerging from different locales within the Ryūkyū 
Islands. Also, the notion of regionality represents a form of “Okinawan identity” that is 
decentralized and network-based. By including local struggles in different parts of Okinawa, 
the concept of regionality introduced a new spatial sense to the notion of “Okinawan 
identity”. This new concept of “Okinawan identity” was inspiring especially for those who 
conducted anti-pollution or anti-development campaigns in remote islands which had been 
regarded as periphery within Okinawa.176 
 In 1993, the RMAR was transformed into a new society called the New Okinawa 
Forum (NOF, Shin Okinawa Fōramu). Built on the group’s various activities over fifteen 
years, the founding members felt it imperative to start NOF with the aim to become not only 
the hub of the residents’ movement but also a public forum for sharing and discussing issues 
related to the independence and self-determination of Okinawa, including possible 
collaboration with similar cultural and social movements around the globe.177 Since then, 
their various public events and activities have been introduced through a journal called Keishi 
                                                 
175 Arasaki et al., “Okinawa, Heiwa, Komonzu,” in Tamanoi Yoshiō Chosaku-shu Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi karano 
Shuppatsu, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1990), 294. 
176 Ibid., 295. 
177 For more detail of NOF, see: Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1988-1990: Yawarakai Shakai wo Mo-
tomete (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 175-176. 
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Kaji in which Okinawans and other citizens report on residents’ movements from many 
different places inside and outside Okinawa including overseas countries.178  
The idea of Ryūkyū-ko also influenced the local intellectuals to support Okinawa’s 
residents’ movements. In 1988, celebrating thirty years since its establishment, one of 
Okinawa’s earliest private universities, Okinawa University, founded the Institute of 
Regional Studies (IRS). For the university, whose motto is “rooted in, learning from, and 
living with the region”, this institute was envisaged as the centre of research on the Okinawa 
region in terms of culture, history, and society. By using the word “regional”, however, IRS 
did not intend to limit its research to the narrowly defined Okinawa Prefecture. The first 
Director of IRS, Ui Jun, an eminent scientist who is well-known as a founder of the study of 
pollution in the 1970s, defined two basic dimensions of the region that IRS would research: 
the Arc of the Ryukyus, and the broader Asia and Pacific Region.179 Although KBPS and its 
activism were not able to stop the ravages caused by the government-led land development, 
the spirit of KBPS greatly influenced Okinawa’s popular movements in which the activists 
started questioning what it means to be Okinawan within Japan. 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the development of the Okinawa struggle during the 1970s and 
1980s. By highlighting the Kin Bay struggle, I analyzed the context of Okinawan residents’ 
movement and its characteristics. As one of the earliest residents’ struggle in post-reversion 
Okinawa, the Kin Bay struggle became a crucial event to consider the history of the Okinawa 
                                                 
178 The name, Keishi Kaji, means “the wind blows backward after typhoon has passed” in the Okinawan lan-
guage. The name also implies the spirit of this journal that it will always sends a critical perspectives (the wind) 
to the existing situation. 
179 Moriteru Arasaki, “Chiiki Kenkyūjo no Kanōsei wo Saguru,” Okinawa Daigaku Chiiki Kenkyūjo Nenpō 18 
(2004): 195. 
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struggle. Yet the significance of the Kin Bay struggle lay not only in its timing but also in its 
form of social activism. This movement was carried mainly by people who did not represent 
conventional activist organizations such as political parties and labor unions. Instead, 
distancing themselves from political organizations, these people joined the movement as 
individuals. As mentioned in the Introduction of this chapter, some local intellectuals 
interpreted the appearance of individuals as the beginning of civic activism in Okinawa.  
Also, it is crucial that the Kin Bay struggle was rooted activism in a specific locale. 
Motivated by the protection of their living environment, concerned local residents and 
citizens from other parts of Okinawa raised the issues which were related to the destruction of 
a particular ecosystem. In this context, “the right to existence” was claimed by the activists, 
who questioned the legitimacy of the notions of developmentalism and industrialisation 
widely prevalent in formal political debate about Okinawa. In doing so, the participants in the 
Kin Bay struggle confronted a complex politics not only of the Japanese government, the 
mainland construction firms and multinational petroleum companies but also local Okinawan 
government and business. In such a complex political and social environment, the Kin Bay 
struggle carved out a space for civic activism which was independent from the local and 
national establishment. The importance of the Kin Bay struggle in the history of the Okinawa 
struggle is therefore the fact that it revealed the structure of the political and economic 
subordination of Okinawa under the influence of the major local, national and international 
political and economic powers, and created a basic form of civic activism to combat this 
structure.  
In the latter part of this chapter, I discussed another aspect of the importance of the 
Kin Bay struggle by considering how the movement contributed to forming “Okinawan 
identity” in a post-reversion context. I examined the activity of the Residents’ Movement of 
the Arc of Ryūkyū, which was originally a group to promote external support for the Kin Bay 
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struggle. Founded by a group of scholars, journalists and other types of local intellectuals, 
RMAR played a crucial role to create the network between Kin Bay Protection Society and 
the residents’ movements in other parts of Okinawa and Kagoshima prefectures which were 
similarly committed to anti-pollution campaigns. They were not only acting to connect 
different places but also framing those different local struggles with the notion of the region 
as the Arc of the Ryūkyūs. The idea of region that RMAR proposed by Arasaki and his 
colleagues was critical of notions of “Okinawan identity” in which the representation of 
Okinawa ignored peripheral societies (and places which are no longer considered part of 
Okinawa prefecture such as Amami) within the Ryūkyū Islands. It brought different 
dynamics when considering the meaning of “Okinawa”, which was often considered in 
relation to mainland Japan. 
Overall, the Kin Bay struggle and RMAR are crucial movements which contributed to 
building the basis of the Okinawa struggle in the post-reversion context. Although it became 
more difficult to mobilize a significant number of people to make the island-wide struggle 
post-reversion, the experience of the Kin Bay struggle is crucial for understanding more 
recent developments in the Okinawa struggle. Places such as Henoko and Takae which are 
central to the struggle today have taken up and further developed key concepts that emerged 
from the residents’ movements of the 1970s. Also, the legacy of RMAR is still reflected in its 
successor organization, the New Okinawa Forum, and its publications such as Keishi Kaji. 
While discussing development of the Okinawa struggle in the 1990s, the next chapter will 
examine how Okinawa’s base problems and the local anti-base movement became crucially 
connected to global issues. I will discuss this phenomenon by examining the intellectual and 
social involvement of three overseas scholars with the Okinawa struggle.  
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Chapter Four 
Writing the “Okinawa struggle” 
 
 
  
With two Australian visitors at Henoko Beach. 
The photo was taken by the author in February 2012. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Triggered by the rape of a twelve-year old schoolgirl by three US military personnel, the 
mass protest in 1995, which was joined by over 80,000 local citizens, not only swayed 
opinion in domestic Okinawan society, but also strongly reminded the rest of Japan about the 
fact that the Okinawan people’s struggle against base politics and “structural discrimination” 
by Japanese and American governments had yet to end.180 In this sense, as Abe Kosuzu 
argues, there was practically no “post WWII in Okinawa”, but rather “Okinawa exists in 
continuation of the war.”181 Following this protest, or “the third wave of the island-wide 
struggle”, former progressive Governor of Okinawa, Ōta Masahide, announced that he had 
decided to refuse to sign the temporary land lease contract for the US bases in September 
1995.182 The whole train of events expressed Okinawa’s anger through explicitly adversarial 
action against the two national governments.  
In response to the recurrence of the mass anti-base campaign in Okinawa, Japanese 
and US Governments established a joint committee called the Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa (SACO) to discuss the future relocation of the American bases in Okinawa. In the 
final report, released in December 1996, Japanese and American leaders decided on the 
return of land and facilities currently used by the US military in Okinawa, including the 
return of half of the Northern Training Centre in the northeastern part of Okinawa Island, and 
the relocation of Futenma Airbase in Ginowan City.  
                                                 
180 Moriteru Arasaki, Arasaki Moriteru ga Toku Kōzōteki Okinawa Sabetsu (Tokyo: Kobunken, 2012). 
181 Kosuzu Abe, “’Sengo’” ga Mitsukaranai,” Shunju, 521 (August 2010): 12–14. 
182 Based on Special Measures Law for US Military Bases enacted in 1952, the Japanese government leased the 
private lands to the US military in Okinawa without agreement of the land owners. This special measure al-
lowed the Governor of Okinawa to sign the contract instead of each owner. However, the contract was sup-
posed to be renewed first every ten years. In 1996, when the contract needed to be renewed, then Governor 
Ōta Masahide refused to sign the contract with Japanese government.  
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However, this final decision was a new beginning of the Okinawa struggle. In the 
final SACO report, the Japanese and US governments identified the eastern offshore of Nago 
City, Okinawa Island, as the place to build an aircraft landing zone to offset the closure of 
Futenma Airbase. In response to this announcement, in September 1997, Nago citizens, 
together with anti-base citizen groups outside the city, conducted a petition demanding the 
holding of a referendum by which Nago citizens would make their voices heard. As a result 
of this petition, a referendum was held, which ended with victory going to the opponents to 
the base relocation. However, in 1998, ignoring the result of the Nago city referendum, the 
new Governor of Okinawa, Inamine Keiichi, selected Henoko Village in Nago City, a small 
fishing village in the middle-eastern part of Okinawa, as the site of the new base. In this 
village, there was already a US Marine Base, Camp Schwab, established in 1959. Japanese 
and the US defense authorities came to an agreement to build the aircraft landing zone by 
extending Camp Schwab towards Oura Bay. This was supposed to be part of a policy to 
“reduce Okinawa’s burden.” (Okinawa no futan keigen no tame)   
Inspired by these historical incidents, a new generation of scholars began to conduct 
creative research on the contemporary nature of the Okinawa struggle. These scholars were 
influenced by senior academics inside and outside Japan who similarly attempted to 
deconstruct the dominant discourse of Japaneseness and its monolithic ideological narratives 
on its culture and history. Moreover, these younger scholars developed a critical approach to 
Japan’s past and present by articulating the histories and social practices of marginalized 
subjects such as Okinawans. In this way their research on Okinawa opened up new ways to 
reveal plural social identities within the Okinawan anti-base movement.183  
                                                 
183 The following references are limited but cover the essential works to consider critical engagement with Jap-
anese studies in which the research on Okinawa was to become one of the crucial topics: Carol Gluck, Japan’s 
Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Gavan 
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In this chapter I will discuss several different intellectual discourses that emerged 
around this period, and will go on to consider how these researchers articulated diverse social 
identities within the local anti-base struggle. Highlighting the impact of New Social 
Movements Theory (NSMT) as their primary contribution to the development of the field, I 
argue that by synthesizing research on Okinawan anti-base movement with NSMT, they re-
situated the research on the movement in the context of so-called late modernity. In this 
chapter, I will examine three scholars and their discussion of the Okinawan anti-base 
movement in order to clarify changes as well as continuities in Okinawan studies 
internationally. 
The three scholars whose work I will examine are: Japanese American anthropologist, 
Masamichi S. Inoue based in Kentucky, Australian-based scholar on gender and International 
Relations, Miyume Tanji, and American scholar on critical international and comparative 
studies, Kelly Dietz in Ithaca, NY. Based in different disciplines, locations, and personal 
contexts, their research makes distinctive and also path-breaking contributions to 
understanding the dynamic political culture of the Okinawan anti-base movement. Prior to 
the emergence of this research, the major approaches among overseas scholars to Okinawa’s 
base politics largely relied upon analyses of established politics in fields such as diplomacy, 
defence and military. For example, one of the earliest responses to the rise of the third wave 
from outside Okinawa and Japan was a book edited by Chalmers Johnson and entitled 
Okinawa: Cold War Island published in 1999.184 In this volume, eminent scholars from both 
inside and outside Okinawa such as former governor Ōta Masahide, US-based Ryūkyūan-
Okinawan scholar, Kōji Taira, along with historian of Japan Gavan McCormack and others 
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provide comprehensive structural analyses of Okinawa facing Japan and the US in the late 
1990s.  
This is one of the earliest collections of non-Japanese language essays on the 
contemporary Okinawan struggle vis-à-vis its surrounding major powers. Also, this book was 
important in the way in which it emphasizes not only how the US–Japan alliance dominates 
Okinawa and subordinates local life, but also how Okinawans resist the dominant structure. 
However, the book does not focus directly on the cultural dynamics of the grassroots politics. 
The Okinawan anti-base struggle is presented in terms of the dichotomous narrative of the 
US–Japan alliance as subordinating subject and Okinawa as subordinated object This 
approach overlooks some complex strands within Okinawa’s resistance against its structural 
subordination.185 In other words, we need to look more closely at questions such as “who” 
represents “‘what aspect” of “Okinawa” as a “community of protest”.  
By contrast, the new generation of scholars sought to introduce concepts such as 
social identities within the local protest movement. This enabled them to develop insights on 
the Okinawa struggle by highlighting more complex and subtle aspects of the movement. In 
order to examine subjective voices from Okinawa, these younger scholars addressed 
Okinawa’s cultural politics, not by taking Okinawan identity as a given, but rather by seeking 
how that identity is formed in the process of the anti-base struggle.  
This new methodology, which I call the New Social Movement Theory based 
(NSMT-based) approach, is crucial not only because it unveiled the complexity of cultural 
politics within the anti-base movement, but also because it elucidated how system, structure 
and power operate in complex ways to subordinate Okinawa. Gender, civic and ethnic 
identities are central to these complex power-relations in everyday life. The notion of NSMT 
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encompasses a diverse range of approaches. In its early stages, scholars such as Alain 
Touraine and his disciples such as Alberto Melucci highlighted the necessity to change our 
view in order to understand social movements, which were then facing diversification of 
social structure and changing mode of production since the 1960s, and particularly during the 
first half of the 1970s. The advocates of NSMT presented the dissolution of class conflict in 
the classical sense as the major driving force of social dynamics. Instead, they emphasized 
the significance of individualized forms of identity and a diverse range of social practices in 
order to re-formulate understandings of collectivity. A series of significant new social 
movements arose during the 1960s, including ecological movements, peace movements, anti-
colonialism, anti-racism and feminism: all sorts of social activism that could not be 
reductively understood using the existing interpretation of social movements as class 
struggle.186  
NSMT has become a major paradigm for understanding the contemporary nature of 
social movements by focusing on actors and their identity and social practices.  Particularly, 
the concept of experience has come to be one of the crucial concepts for understanding the 
ways in which individuals organize collective action. This is discussed recently by theorists 
such as François Dubet and Kevin McDonald. Dubet, for example, emphasizes the emerging 
sense of collective identity which is derived from one’s embedded experience. Dubet argues 
that the society can no longer be imagined on the basis of a pre-existing collective identity, 
and therefore we need to analyze how collective identity is the outcome of diverse individual 
experiences.187 Thus, for Dubet, experience is the central issue of his methodology. From this 
perspective, social movements are created by the dynamics of individuality and culture. 
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McDonald casts light on the same issue from a different viewpoint, putting more emphasis on 
the significance of the body. The body, in his theory, is not only the site of experience of a 
single person, but is the site of experience shared with others through communicative action. 
188 Therefore, from the perspective of NSMT, the concept of experience emerges from the 
interactions of embodied individual and collectivity. 
Similar approaches to identity are evident in the work of Inoue, Tanji and Dietz, who 
conducted a close examination of social activism in relation to everyday local life. The 
generation of Okinawa researchers to be discussed here depicted how a diverse range of key 
issues such as gender, ethnicity, citizenship, community, natural environment, and the diverse 
experiences of individual participants, are crucial aspects to understanding the cultural 
politics of Okinawan activism.189 While the classical notion of the Okinawa struggle tends to 
reconfirm the “myth of a unified struggle of ‘Okinawans’”, the scholars I discuss here shed 
light on the subjecthood and agency of the actors involved based on an ethnography of 
people’s grassroots struggles.190 In other words, these scholars attempt to explore the 
construction of the generic notion of the Okinawa struggle by highlighting micro politics, 
addressing multiple identities, rather than simply identity as “Okinawan”. When the third 
wave arose in the mid-1990s, it was that complex agency and identity that galvanised a new 
chapter of the Okinawan anti-base struggle. What are the common characteristics of this 
NSMT-based approach among the four scholars? What are the crucial achievements of the 
NSMT-based approach? Also, what are the limits of this approach, and what implications can 
we draw from the achievements and limits of the NSMT-approach?  
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In order to answer these questions, first of all, I will review discussions by Japanese-
American scholar, Masamichi S. Inoue. By illuminating the role of citizens (shimin) as key 
actors, Inoue analyzes what he calls “a different kind” of Okinawa struggle in contemporary 
grassroots movements. Secondly, I will analyze the work of Japanese-Australian researcher, 
Miyume Tanji, who discusses the rise of feminism. While Inoue is partially inspired by the 
idea of the public sphere, drawing on the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, Tanji’s work on 
feminism highlights how women have been playing a key role in the recent development of 
the people’s movement in Okinawa. Although she does not refer to Nancy Fraser’s criticism 
of Habermas’ conceptualization of the public sphere, Tanji’s pioneering works on feminism 
can be interpreted as critique of Inoue’s concept of citizen.191 Her work entrenches different 
meanings in the discourse of Okinawa struggle. Thirdly, I will refer to American scholar on 
critical international and comparative studies, Kelly Dietz and her discussion on indigenism 
in the Okinawan anti-base movement. Having worked with local civic activist groups both in 
Okinawa and in mainland Japan, Dietz explores the discursive limits of the concept of citizen 
in analyzing the contemporary anti-base movement. She focuses on discourse and people’s 
practice of collective identity and autonomism/self-determination within the Okinawan anti-
base movement. Based on an understanding of Okinawa as an “internal colony” of Japan, she 
finds that the concept of citizen is not necessarily an empowering one in the Okinawan 
context; it can create difficulties for the movement. She argues that the concept of citizen 
constrains Okinawans’ political position within Japanese constitutionalism. Instead, Dietz 
raises the significance of indigenous identity as an alternative element in “Okinawan 
autonomism”.  
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4.2. Masamichi S. Inoue and the Okinawa Struggle as a Civic Movement 
4.2.1: Questions of “Japaneseness” in Japanese Studies at the Turn of the Century 
Masamichi S. Inoue graduated from Tōhoku University in Sendai, in the late 1980s. Having 
worked in the public sector in Japan for several years, he went to the United States to study at 
the University of Pennsylvania in the early 1990s. After he finished his master program, he 
went on to study anthropology at Duke University.192 He studied with scholars such as Anne 
Allison, who is known for her works on the anthropology of Japanese post-industrial society, 
particularly on youth culture, and Arif Dirlik, historian of modern China who is also widely 
known for his involvement with postcolonial historiography. He regards his cross-cultural 
experience as an essential starting point of his later academic career. Like many who study 
outside their countries of birth, Inoue often found that he was asked to perform his own 
national cultural characteristics as “Japanese” in front of an “American” audience. In other 
words, he “learnt” how to be and perform as a “Japanese”.193 However, he also felt the 
awkwardness of his representation as a Japanese fulfilling the stereotypes possessed by his 
American interlocutors: something he had not been conscious of prior to his overseas 
experience. This feeling of awkwardness between calling subject and responding subject as 
“a native Japanese” should not be dismissed in understanding Inoue’s perspective and 
analysis of the Okinawan struggle.194  
This experience was a crucial starting point of Inoue’s critical engagement with his 
academic disciplines—anthropology and Japanese studies—where, he argues, “native” 
intellectuals tended to create “domesticated” and “neutralised” representations of “Japanese” 
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that “exaggerate the familiar aspects of the text and thereby disperse its discreteness in the 
hegemonic sphere” of the United States, thus becoming complicit with Japan’s institutional 
promotion of particular national characteristics in those periods, as Masao Miyoshi argues.195   
The late 1980s and 1990s constituted the first significant period in which a series of 
self-critical examinations took place within Japanese studies. There were already researchers 
conducting critical inquiries of Japan in the post-World War II and emphasizing the Japanese 
continuing imperialistic legacy.196 But the rise of this new stream of critical reflection was 
inspired by a different intellectual context. Scholars working in Japanese studies began to 
introduce the semiotic approach developed in disciplines such as literary criticism and later 
influenced by anthropology and history studies, in order to conduct discourse analysis of 
texts. Discourse analysis was also applied to examining symbolic representations of social 
and cultural realities of Japan. Incorporating concepts such as Hayden White’s “meta-
history”, the semiotic approach to Japanese historical and social studies not only elevated the 
significance of cultural inquiry and interpretation of local material culture but transformed 
notions of Japanese “culture” into a problematic topic that required further examination.197 
The result was an intellectual movement in which researchers challenged cultural discourses 
of Japan, presenting material and cultural discourse as symbols and signs imbued with power 
relationships. This was the intellectual milieu in which Inoue began his academic career. 
Experiencing methodological changes and challenges in Japanese studies at the turn of the 
century, Inoue visited Okinawa, which he regards as “somewhere neither inside nor 
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outside”.198 For him, far from Tokyo and the rest of mainland Japan, Okinawa was a crucial 
place to consider what it means to study Japan and to be a Japanese in a globalized world.  
 
4.2.2. The Okinawa Struggle as “Civic” Movement 
Ever since his first visit to Okinawa in 1996, Inoue visited the Okinawa Island every summer 
until 2002. When he first arrived, Okinawa was still in the middle of escalated political 
antagonism against Tokyo and Washington over the issues of the rape case a year before and 
the revision of lease contracts on privately own lands used by US bases. The next summer in 
1997, Inoue began to conduct an ethnography of the anti-base movement based in Henoko, 
which emerged as the designated site for the relocation of Futenma Airbase. According to the 
final report of Special Action Committee of Okinawa released by Tokyo and Washington in 
1996, both governments agreed with construction of off-shore bases in Ōura Bay in Henoko 
district. This was the beginning of the Okinawan people’s long-term struggle against the 
relocation of the base which continues today, and also of Inoue’s involvement with the local 
community as a researcher.  
Like other “base towns” in Okinawa and elsewhere, the small fishing village of Henoko 
had experienced a prosperous period. However, by the time Inoue arrived in 1997, this had 
passed. He writes: 
 
…I drove into the Henoko district for the first time on a hot summer day in July 1997. 
Slowly moving forward, I saw bars and restaurants, run-down and long deserted, whose 
faded and peeling signs identified them in English as: “ALL THE WAY,” “LIBERTY,” 
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“QUEEN” and so forth. Along the street, storefronts that had once contained a photo 
studio, an electric shop, a pawnshop, a barbershop, and a tailor shop stood shuttered; 
apparently they had gone out of business some time ago. These were the remnants of what 
had been the time of Henoko’s prosperity—during the Vietnam War period, this 
community had been a bustling and lively venue providing “recreation” and 
“entertainment” to the U.S. servicemen of Camp Schwab.199 
 
By describing the past prosperity of Henoko as a base town, he also illustrates scenes and 
sites where everyday conversation took place among the residents. Inoue also describes a 
“prefabricated structure just off the Henoko beach”. This was the building for the protest 
community organised mainly by “relatively affluent” residents of this district.200 His narrative 
shows how the protest community is embedded in the life of the locals. In contrast with 
images and discourses circulating in the media that depict Okinawa as a “community of 
protest”, Inoue illustrates many different facets of this small community that are not merely 
reduced to social activism. In other words, his depiction of the protest community in relation 
to everyday life complicates the subject of the protest movement called the Henoko struggle 
(or Henoko Tōsō in Japanese). This complication relates to a major theme of his argument—
the recognition of the existence of “Okinawans... of a different kind”.201 
Originally, the expression, “we are Okinawans but of a different kind”,  was used by 
local Henoko residents who supported accepting the construction plan of the military base—
later called Camp Schwab—by the US Civil Administration of Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) in 
the 1950s. To be more precise, this expression was used in order to express opposition to 
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those who criticized Henoko residents for their decision to accept the military base. Henoko 
residents were regarded as “traitors” by other Okinawans who were involved with resistance 
against the base construction. The anti-base protesters expressed their identity in terms of 
resistance by claiming “we are Okinawan.” However, the fishing town of Henoko was 
devastated by the war and postwar land appropriation. In this isolated environment, like many 
other base towns, the majority of the local residents chose to accept the base construction to 
improve the living standard in their town. “We are Okinawan but of a different kind” was the 
retort addressed to protesters and their slogan “we are Okinawans”. In other words, this 
statement reflects the historical context of a local marginal community of Okinawa. 
However, Inoue’s notion of a “different kind of Okinawans” explains not merely the mind-
set of residents who struggle with economic problems. Rather, in Inoue’s approach, this 
complication of Henoko’s identity by articulating a “different kind” of Okinawan-ness 
highlights the complex realities interweaving political, social and economic concerns 
including issues such as generation and gender. Based on this idea of the complex nature of 
the local anti-base movement, Inoue considers it important to explore the “micro-political 
practices” of Okinawan people “who actively and unexpectedly borrow, engage, and 
redefine—in short, ‘appropriate’—the national and global power (the base, money, and U.S. 
servicemen) to produce specific local cultural forms and social practices.”202  
This is the central point of Inoue’s approach, which tries to avoid the classical 
adversarial formula of “subordinated” Okinawan and “subordinating” Japan and US. By 
regarding the conventional academic approach to the anti-base movement as a dialectic 
“game” of “Self and Other”, Inoue argues that researchers tend to oversimplify narratives of 
people’s local struggles against such global mechanisms as the US military bases. Inoue 
argues that this dialectic relationship of “Self” and “Other” is a perspective at “a level of 
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generality at which historical, geographical, class, race, and other specificities and differences 
tend to disappear.”203 His complication of Okinawan identities in the anti-base struggle seeks 
to escape from the dominant form of dichotomous narrative.   
Based on this mixed consciousness, Inoue raises the notion of “the third person” who 
does not belong to the “game”. Quoting Immanuel Levinas and his critique of love as “the 
negation of [plural] society” when it is employed in relation to a bilateral relationship,204 
Inoue considers his conception of the third person as an alternative way to describe the 
hybridized political consciousness of Henoko residents—and also Okinawans as a whole. As 
an example of this notion of the third person, Inoue proposes the notion of citizen, or shimin 
in Japanese, as a new kind of identity of the Okinawan anti-base movement. Differentiated 
from older notions such as people or minshu, the citizen or shimin (as the term is deployed by 
Inoue), is characterized as “affluent, confident, and planetary yet grounded”. Inoue uses this 
term to describe new social actors during and after the 1990s or “the post-cold-war era of 
globalization”.205 These new actors, the shimin, create a public sphere, which is “an open, 
inclusive, and nonviolent realm of solidarity that emerges from among diverse perspectives 
of the third persons, a realm characterized by unrestrictedness with respect to who can 
participate, who can speak, and who can be heard”.206 This does not mean, however, that 
Inoue merely intends to disavow the legacy of the previous form of the Okinawa struggle. 
Rather, he suggests an extensive perspective on “Okinawans” to include nonconventional 
social actors and issues in the light of socio-economic concerns which tended to be less 
visible within the mainstream narrative.  
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This conception of citizens as “confident and affluent” subjects from “diverse 
backgrounds” who “awakened to globally disseminated ideas about democracy, human 
rights, ecology, women’s issues, and peace”, helps us to understand the significance of the 
Okinawa struggle as civil activism, such as the mass protest in 1995 and the Nago 
Referendum (or so-called Nago Shimin Tōhyō ) in September 1997.207 In the wake of the 
protest against the rape incident, the Nago Referendum was the first referendum by citizens 
in recent years in Nago City, to which Henoko district belongs, over the issue of off-shore 
base construction. As a result of the political campaign for the Nago city referendum, 
opposition to the new base construction acquired a majority.208 By raising and articulating 
agendas such as environmental damage, and also by incorporating new actors such as youths 
and women who were excluded from the mainstream of the anti-base movement, the Nago 
Referendum symbolically opened a new page in the contemporary history of Okinawan 
people’s anti-base movements. In Inoue’s understanding, collaboration by citizens from 
diverse backgrounds in terms of generation, gender, and occupation, was possible due to “the 
desire for a life and a world without the military.”209 
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4.2.3. Beyond “Here” and “There” or Citizen as Positionality 
How can we understand Inoue’s complication of contemporary Okinawan identity? This is 
not a simple question. As an ethnographer of Okinawa’s anti-base movement, Inoue was 
conducting participatory observation in Henoko. He was involved with the anti-base 
movement as an interpreter from Japanese to English and vice-versa. However, he also went 
to talk with diverse residents including those who supported the base construction, Filipino 
hostesses working at local bars, and US soldiers in Camp Schwab. These activities made 
local Okinawan protesters suspicious about Inoue. Thus, he was confronted with “ethical” 
questions from the local residents such as “who are you?” and “aren’t you a spy for 
supporters of base construction?” Also, he was criticised by participants of the protest 
campaign who told him “you are cheating us because you don’t come with us when we are 
busy.”210 Recalling the days in Henoko, he says that the place “imposes tension” onto the 
fieldworker to feel that “it is a very difficult place to be.” He also says when he approached 
pro-base people, he himself doubted whether this “betrays protesting people or not” and 
whether he had “collected convenient information from protesters and supporters of the base 
construction for his own sake.”211 
Another factor which made Inoue feel uncomfortable when he approached the local 
Henoko community was his identity as “mainlander” Japanese. Despite the fact that the 
locals are in most cases friendly and supportive towards an outsider such as Inoue, this 
historical category created an unavoidable situation of incongruence between Inoue and the 
locals in Henoko. Recalling a conversation with elderly women, he writes: 
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They talked about their worsening health, their children and grandchildren, and about 
me—urging me to find a wife in Henoko. Our conversation turned to Henoko’s past, then 
eventually to the battle of Okinawa…Another woman talked about how Japanese soldiers 
had treated her family members as spies of the U.S. military. In the middle of this, one of 
the women turned to me and asked, “Do you know what kinds of things your fathers [the 
Japanese] did in and to Okinawa?” The sense of intimacy the conversation had built 
disappeared at once, and was replaced by an unbridgeable distance between the women—
Okinawans—and me—a Japanese. I even felt like I should apologize on behalf of the 
Japanese state. Yet at the same time, I resented this woman’s construction of me simply as 
“the Japanese,” the outsider.212 
 
This conversation with local elderly women explicitly shows the discomfort that Inoue 
experienced. He writes: 
 
…I had to be silent in the fragmented and dismayed feeling that I felt: on the one hand “I 
am not the same as such horrible Japanese. Don’t mix me up with such Japanese” but on 
the other hand “I was raised to be a Japanese in such postwar Japanese society.”213 
 
In my own interpretation, however, this conversation implicitly shows more complicated 
aspects of Inoue’s positionality in his ethnography of the social life of Henoko (or of 
Okinawa in general) as not only “a Japanese” and “outsider” but also as “young” “male” 
person who came to the small rural community of Henoko from the United States. Such 
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categories surely pose ethical questions to not only Inoue but also to most ethnographers of 
various races, ethnicities, and nationalities in the highly sensitive (and extremely dense) 
atmosphere of the anti-base movement. In this sense, Inoue was right to say the place 
imposes tension onto him and thus, it is a difficult place to be. While communicating with 
both sides of politics, Inoue increasingly finds it difficult to move between the two camps of 
“pro” and “anti” base construction. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight that he later realizes that this 
“difficulty” is what many of Henoko’s residents experience in their everyday life. He 
describes how, as an “outsider” he came to understand the “depth of Okinawa’s ‘domestic’ 
difficulty torn by opposition and endorsement, and integrity and diversity”.214 In other words, 
the challenges of two adversarial identities which he experienced made him understand the 
complex identity that Okinawa residents, in particular, Henoko residents, face in everyday 
life. Through this realization of the complex nature of the local reality, Inoue departs from the 
conventional approach of Okinawan studies by un-placing Okinawa and re-placing it in 
relation to wider social processes that are embedded in the global context. This is what he 
calls a “position in neither inside nor outside (naibu demo gaibu demo nai yō na ichi)”, or the 
perspective of “the third person” which is not merely constrained by the game of self and 
other but goes further by finding more plural social spaces within the local anti-base 
struggle.”215 By raising this perspective, Inoue discusses the importance of questioning the 
“position(s)” of the researcher in the Okinawan anti-base movement. Through this discourse 
of “position(s)”—teasing out complex identities of anti-base movement—Inoue himself and 
Okinawa as a place come to find a point of connection with the broader public sphere. 
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Inoue’s theoretical elaboration can be criticised in relation to its practicality in the 
actual field of the Okinawan anti-base movement. This is not the kind of research which 
reveals previously unknown details of the US policy towards Okinawa or Japan. Nor is his 
discourse giving us a radical voice from within Okinawa. On the contrary, what it reveals is 
the uncomfortable position of a peripheral community in Okinawa where financial issues and 
the desire for a better life tear the community apart. However, his work illuminates the 
experiences of many people who have been involved in the anti-base movement from the 
1990s onwards with lesser degrees of traditional activist mentality. Those are the “silent 
majority” of base politics.  
As a Japanese-born American scholar who was trained “within the critical tradition of 
cultural anthropology” of his home university, in which his mentors were “radically 
problematizing nation-bound research paradigms that ignored transnational movements of 
people, goods, capital, and information,” Inoue chose to engage with the U.S. base problems 
in Okinawa for his topic. He never rejects anthropology as his academic discipline. However, 
he is involved not only in understanding the other, “but also negotiating and re-crafting the 
anthropologist’s own identity in the contexts of changing relations of power and history that 
produce this Other.”216 In this sense, he used the disciplinary theory of anthropology to 
explore a form of agency that is neither “Japanese”, “Okinawan”, nor “native”, but a 
“citizen” agency in the context of a globalized Okinawa. This inter-play of Inoue and 
anthropology (or Japanese native and university discipline) as one axis and Okinawa and US–
Japan as another axis forged a new pathway to consider how and where we can engage with 
Okinawa in everyday life. 
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4.2.4. Between Local and Global: A regional perspective  
Inoue’s methodological contribution was path-breaking for those who study Okinawa from 
“outside”. While Okinawa’s politics and political culture tend to be discussed in relation to 
Japan and the United States, the researcher’s positionality and his or her perspective also tend 
to be considered in the power relations between Okinawa and Japanese and American. 
Inoue’s positionality as a Japanese who is also culturally minoritized in the US made him 
critical of homogenous notions of culture and identity in the globalized world. Based on this 
context, he studied the Okinawa struggle by highlighting differences within Okinawa’s anti-
base struggle by which he showed the citizens as possessing agency to create the Okinawa 
struggle. However, his concept of citizens pays little attention to the spatial aspect of 
globalization and the Okinawa struggle. As I discuss in detail later in Chapters 7 and 8, if we 
consider Okinawa’s issue from this perspective, it is evident that the Okinawa struggle is 
becoming a regional issue, as well as local and global one, from the late 1990s. There is an 
emerging sense of regional identity that became prevalent among some local Okinawans. 
Although Inoue’s concept of “the third person” is useful to discuss the agency of the 
Okinawa struggle, the regional perspective may help us understand the creativity of the 
human agents and their activities from the spatial perspective. 
 As a researcher whose ethnic background originated from Korean and mainland 
Japanese, I had a different positionality from Inoue who situated himself among Okinawa, 
Japan and the US. Although I share much in common with Inoue in terms of experience as a 
Japanese scholar coming from mainland Japan, I was perceived as a “mixed” one whose 
maternal side also experienced the crucible of Japan’s colonialism like Okinawans. In this 
realm of identity politics, my presence confused my interviewees because I was “a mainland 
Japanese but of a different kind”. When someone introduced me to his or her friends, they 
mostly add “his mother is Korean” after they mentioned my very Japanese-style name. 
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Sometimes, they asked me about my mother’s original surname and started calling me “Mr 
Yang” instead of Takahashi. This unfamiliar name strongly reminds me of two different 
historical experiences of Japanese colonialism embodied in my flesh. But what struck me 
most was the agency that enables the Okinawa struggle to situate itself within historical 
relationships not only between the Japan–Okinawa and the US–Okinawa relationships but 
also between Okinawa–East Asia, which share many similar historical experiences with each 
other under Japanese influence before 1945. The eminent local historian, Higa Shunchō, 
famously called Okinawa “as the eldest, Taiwan as the second, and Korea as the third son of 
the Japanese Empire.” 
 As I elaborate in Chapter 7, Okinawans’ perspectives on their historical relationships 
with East Asian countries are not simple. Rather, the ambiguity of the local historical 
consciousness reflects a deep sense of Japanese colonialism within Okinawa towards their 
regional neighbors. As Okinawans, it is true that they were inhabitants of one of the earliest 
territories which was forcefully incorporated by mainland modern Japan in the late 19th 
century. However, Okinawans were not quite the same as the locals in other territories which 
were annexed by Japan in later periods. Administratively, Okinawa was not considered as 
Japan’s colony, and Okinawans were not the colonized subjects but they were “Japanese”. 
Therefore, it is not always the case that Okinawans’ regional perspective is shared with their 
interlocutors in the region. Nevertheless, as Heonik Kwon argues, if “the analytical 
integration of issues in international politics with forms of local politics interaction is an issue 
that is widely discussed today in international studies circles”, and the local communal life 
can be considered “as important and instructive as the newly discovered archival sources on 
diplomatic history”, the historical consciousness of the local Okinawan activists on their 
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regional relationship also provides us with a clue to illustrate a different identity of the 
Okinawa struggle to what is revealed in Inoue’s analysis.217 
 What my “mixed” presence and the local historical consciousness towards East Asian 
neighbors made me realize was the concept of region as critical reflection towards the self-
image of Okinawanness. Indeed, the historical narrative of Okinawa’s modern experience and 
its historical relationships with Japan and the US can be critical towards the orthodox 
international politics led by state elites. However, by referring to the unfilled gap between 
postcolonial critique and the Cold War, Kwon argues that this “native’s point of view” can 
also be a weakness because it tends to be oblivious when the issues come to the political 
economy of representation of “the natives”.218  In the case of Okinawan activists, the critical 
point about the region or East Asia in relation to Okinawan identity is that it not only reveals 
the ambiguous identity of the locals as Okinawan and Japanese but it also reminds them of 
the direct or indirect involvement with the politics that determine hierarchical relationships 
between Okinawans as Japanese and the regional neighbors as the colonial subjects. This 
critical historical consciousness towards East Asia is a matter that local Okinawans deal with 
as their own past. As I discuss in more detail later, this also became a crucial engine for local 
activism in order to create the transnational anti-base struggle between Okinawa and South 
Korea from the 1990s. In this context, the concept of the region highlights agency or citizens 
and their creative activities within the Okinawa struggle. 
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4.3. Miyume Tanji and the Rise of Feminism 
4.3.1. Feminism, Individuality, and Social Practice 
Around the same period when Inoue conducted his fieldwork in Henoko, another scholar also 
visited Okinawa from overseas to conduct a study on grassroots movements. Miyume Tanji is 
a Japanese-Australian researcher who was based in Murdoch University in Western 
Australia. Born and raised at the other end of the Japanese Archipelago, in Hokkaido, Tanji 
studied International Law and Politics at Sophia University in Tokyo. After graduating from 
Sophia, she moved to Australia for postgraduate study. Her PhD thesis was later turned into a 
book titled Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa published by Routledge in 2006. 
Just as Inoue examines Okinawan identity in terms of diversity of actors, Tanji also 
raises questions about the prevailing notion of Okinawans as a community collectively 
protesting against US bases. She writes: 
 
On my first visit to Okinawa, I could not find an umbrella organization encompassing the 
whole of the locals’ anti-US military protest… it was also difficult to trace evidence of an 
“Okinawans’ movement” committed to political action to demand secession from Japan. 
Rather, my impression was that the local activists tended to accept, and even appeared 
proud of, the chaotic complexion of organizations engaged in protest.219 
 
This complexity of Okinawan activism in everyday life led her to re-examine existing studies 
of “the US, Japan and Okinawa relationships”, because she argues that they tend to overlook 
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“differences within the Okinawan protest community”.220 Citing a document from JPRI 
(Japan Policy Research Institute) in San Francisco, which is one of the most highly regarded 
academic institutes over Japan politics and economy, she critically points out that some 
notable scholars within the field employ a homogeneous notion of Okinawan protesters as if 
this represents all Okinawan’s political opinions without examining its internal complexity.221 
Referring to Australian anthropologist of Okinawa Mathew Allen, who also investigated the 
complexity of domestic cultural contexts,222 Tanji seeks to distinguish the way in which the 
local Okinawans use the term “Okinawa” in a generic sense from the way in which scholars 
use “Okinawa” in their academic work, and to point out Okinawa’s diversity of subjects.223 
Nevertheless, while both Inoue and Tanji agree in complicating the notion of 
Okinawans as critical subjects of the anti-base movement, their approaches take different 
directions. Compared with Inoue’s study, which proposes “citizen” as a new concept that 
encapsulates Okinawan critical subjects, Tanji tries to find individualized or individualizing 
factors within diversity. In her research this individualizing element was the rise of feminism 
in the Okinawan anti-base movement. Through ethnographic research, talking one-to-one 
with those involved in the movement, Tanji gradually comes to identify the so-called 
“Okinawa struggle” as a mythical form of collective identity, which is constructed by the 
participation of diverse individual social actors. Based on this assumption, Tanji tries to 
differentiate the elements of feminism in the movement from the conventional narrative of 
the Okinawan people’s history of struggle. In other words, she seeks to illuminate the role of 
women not merely as participating in but as a spearheading the contemporary context of the 
Okinawan anti-base movement. She finds the significance of feminism in the context of the 
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mass protests of the 1990s. When the rape incident occurred, it was Okinawan female 
activists who made an immediate response to the US, Japan and the rest of the world. A 
number of them had just returned from the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 in 
Beijing. Like many other scholars of similar generations studying the Okinawan anti-base 
movement, Tanji was also one of those who were inspired by this historical moment. 
Notwithstanding the differences of Inoue and Tanji’s approaches to the Okinawan anti-
base movement, key notions in Tanji’s work, such as diversity and individuality, are also 
based on New Social Movement Theory. Highlighting the fact that Okinawan society has an 
increasingly ‘new middle class’ culture, she argues: 
 
 In Okinawa, during the first—and second—“wave” of postwar mass protest, major 
concerns driving collective action were directly connected to ‘materialist’ demands, such 
as land repatriation and base workers’ working conditions. American rule was easily 
identified as the source of Okinawa’s impoverishment. However, reversion to Japan 
changed this. Since reversion, the Japanese government has provided material benefits to 
supporters of US military presence in Okinawa. On the other hand, the focus of protest 
against structural economic dependence today relates to fears of pollution, hazards such as 
noise and militarism…224 
 
Her writings suggests the applicability of NSMT as a useful theory to analyze the Okinawan 
struggle after Okinawa’s return to Japan by raising new kinds of social issues. Nevertheless, 
her argument does not merely address the change of Okinawa’s social economy. Also, she 
does not dismiss the older notion of the Okinawa struggle as myth. More importantly, she 
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demonstrates the theoretical usefulness of NSMT in shedding light on how identity is formed 
through social movements. While Inoue uses the NSMT-based approach in order to propose 
the emergence of the “citizen” as an alternative category of actors not necessarily associated 
with the older form of social movement, Tanji employed the NSMT-based approach in order 
to shift our perspective to considering the process of formation of more individualized social 
identities. Referring to one of the pioneers of NSMT, Alberto Melucci, Tanji argues: 
 
…invisible and shared definitions of “we” that give a sense of unity among multiple actors 
do not exist from the start in a fixed and visible form. It is, rather, the end result of mutual 
interactions among protest actors in the process of collective actions…Focusing on 
collective identity draws attention to the ideas shared collectively among the subject 
(“we”) of social movements, to the purpose of their activities, and to what is at stake, by 
what means, and in what external (political, social, and cultural) context. The concept of 
collective identity helps to illuminate the fact that “Okinawa” as a subject of protest is 
constantly constructed, redefined, changed, and sustained. Constructed collective identity 
for the Okinawan protesters is about defining who “Okinawans” are and what their 
“struggle” is about.225 
 
In order to understand the micro-politics within the social activism called “the Okinawa 
struggle”, Tanji highlights mutual interactions and the creation of collectivity. In employing 
such concepts, one of Tanji’s arguments is that individuality should be the basic entity or 
premise when we consider people’s activism in Okinawa. This is one of the few studies that 
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highlights individual actors and their different social practices as the constitutive power of the 
historical narrative of Okinawa’s anti-base movement.  
 
4.3.2. A View from Australia 
In order to explore the intellectual background to Tanji’s approach, another issue that needs 
to be considered is the development of Japanese Studies in Australia during 1990s. I do not 
intend to essentialize Australian Japanese Studies. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 
Japanese Studies in Australia experienced a distinctive moment which produced a different 
type of critical discourse from that developed in the US. While the so-called Cultural Turn in 
the US helped to create crucial interventions by scholars based in the University of Chicago 
such as Harry Harootunian, Tetsuo Najita, Victor Koschmann, Norma Field and Masao 
Miyoshi226 during the 1980s and 1990s, Australian Japanese Studies also forged a critical 
context by scholars based in Melbourne, Western Australia and Canberra such as Yoshio 
Sugimoto, Vera Mackie, Gavan McCormack, Kōichi Iwabuchi and Tessa Morris-Suzuki. 
Their works are widely shared not only in Australia but also in Japan and elsewhere.227 In 
such a milieu, Tanji experienced this wave of Australian Japanese Studies. Therefore, we 
probably need to take a quick glimpse at this period in which she cultivated her critical 
awareness of Okinawa. 
So far, there are few studies in which scholars have tried to map the trends of 
Japanese Studies in Australia. One of the earliest works that covers the general historical 
development of Japanese Studies was written by Morris Low in 1997. Discussing the outset 
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of Japanese Studies in Australia in the late 19th century, Low points out that social science 
started playing a significant role in Australian Japanese Studies in a relatively earlier period 
compared with the influence of humanities subjects, such as literature. One reason is that 
after World War II, from the perspective of Australian strategy, it became particularly urgent 
to develop analysis of Japan’s political role in the region. Low also argues that this tradition 
has provided the seedbed for what he calls “Australian style Japanese Studies” (ASJS) as an 
alternative to the modernization theory-based approach to Japan, which was the major 
epistemological context for Japanese Studies in countries such as the US during the 1950s 
and 1960s.228 While eminent economist Peter Drysdale and the Australia-Japan Research 
Centre in the Australian National University undoubtedly played a leading role in 
strengthening the two countries’ ties in both policy and academic aspects, those who are 
included in ASJS scholars served to produce academic works of socio-cultural 
understandings of Japanese society by questioning monolithic discourses of Japaneseness (or 
nihonjinron).229  
Sociologist Kawabata Kōhei’s summary of Australian Japanese Studies explains the 
further detailed contextual background and additional meanings to Low’s conception of 
ASJS. He argues that the critical trend of Japanese Studies in Australia which started in the 
late 1970s was not only a critique of modernization theory. Rather, its works should be 
understood as analyses of a particular historical moment in Japan.230 Japan during this period 
was experiencing not only a dramatically expanding economy, but also a structural 
transformation of the economy, with the hollowing out of domestic industry as factories 
relocated to developing countries in East and Southeast Asian regions, and as neoliberal 
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policy became increasingly dominant. Likewise, other socio-economic problems such as 
social welfare and employment of young people were coming to the fore. Kawabata argues 
that Japan from the late 1970s was gradually entering into late modernity, and that the 
contribution of ASJS in its early days needs to be understood in this context. In other words, 
the critique of nihonjinron and monolithic representations of Japanese culture can be 
interpreted as a critique of Japanese late modernity at its outset.231 In this context, Australian 
critical scholars deployed cultural concepts such as identity, diversity, and the margins to 
rethink Japanese studies. Kawabata also highlights the influence of the local Australian 
context, in which multiculturalism was formalised as the national policy in the 1970s, as a 
factor that gave momentum to the expansion of Asian studies in Australia and thus also to 
this intellectual movement.  
In this intellectual context Okinawa, together with some other marginalized areas in 
the historical course of Japanese modernization, became one of the crucial reference points in 
Japanese Studies. Having been influenced by preceding scholars whom I mentioned earlier, 
scholars such as Julia Yonetani and Matthew Allen conducted anthropological research on 
historical memory, experience and cultural identity in the Okinawan context, using 
ethnography as methodology.232 Tanji, who moved to the Australian National University to 
undertake her MA program in the late 1990s, was also a member of that emerging generation 
in the context of Australian Japanese Studies. Although there are many differences in detail, 
one of the similarities among these scholars was the impact of cultural studies, especially of 
its critical inquiry into cultural identity and ethnicity. Regardless of discipline, such analytical 
concepts were widely shared among those young scholars. For example, Yonetani argues that 
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the notion of “ambiguity” is “at the foundation of the endeavor to conceive and empower a 
collective Okinawa subject, just as Okinawa’s historical and political incorporation within 
hegemonic structures forms a core philosophical and political dilemma in the very attempt to 
conceive of an Okinawan autonomous subjectivity.”233 In other words, she did not take ethnic 
identity merely as a generalized marginal voice in order to build a binary with its Japanese 
counterpart. Rather, these scholars attempt to understand ambiguous aspects of Okinawan 
identity and its history of “resistance” and “compliance”. Yonetani also highlighted the 
important roles of many unnamed people in producing political and cultural practices which 
contest dominant power structures.234 Through communicating with her contemporaries such 
as Yonetani and Allen, Tanji formed her approaches to the Okinawa struggle. 
 
4.3.3. Locating Feminism in Okinawa as Mediation between the Local and Global 
Tanji, like Inoue, examines the intersection of the local and the global. For her, feminism is a 
social movement in which two different layers—local and global—are deeply connected. 
Focusing on a women’s anti-base activist group called Okinawan Women Act against 
Military and Violence (OWAAMV)—a primary initiator of “the third wave” of island-wide 
struggle in 1995—Tanji recognizes this group as part of the network of global feminism. For 
instance, by tracing activities of the group, particularly of Takazato Suzuyo, a leading 
Okinawan feminist, she explores the group’s participation in the Third International 
Women’s Conference in Nairobi in 1985, a decade before the rape incident occurred, and in 
the Fourth Conference in Beijing in 1995.235  Like Inoue’s methodology, Tanji’s research on 
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feminism in the anti-base movement locates the Okinawan struggle in international politics. 
She argues: 
 
As part of their standard activity, the Okinawan women were accustomed to integrating 
with global civil society. The strategy used during Shiraho struggle to appeal for coral 
conservation to the global environmental movements has been taken by Okinawan women 
to an even greater extent, addressing the international feminist community.236 
 
Through ethnographic analysis along with text analysis, and also in their use of a 
methodology based on the NSMT approach, Inoue and Tanji share some key aspects of their 
research method as both ethnographer and narrator of marginalized people’s critical social 
practices. Nevertheless, one of the distinctive aspects of Tanji’s research is that her work 
helped to entrench the autonomous space of feminism in the discourse of the contemporary 
Okinawan anti-base movement. By articulating feminists’ active involvement both in the 
local and global public arena, she also situates Okinawan feminists as protagonists whose 
practice of struggle in the Okinawa struggle plays a crucial role in the global arena.237 
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4.4. Kelly Dietz and the Rise of Indigenism 
4.4.1. Practicing “Indigenous Identity” 
In this section, I will discuss the rise of indigenism in the contemporary Okinawan struggle, 
and then discuss the work of Kelly Dietz, US-based scholar of critical international and 
comparative studies who discusses this issue by referring to the global decolonisation 
movement. Indigenism is an emerging current in the contemporary context of the Okinawa 
struggle. It presents Okinawan/Ryūkyūans as indigenous people who have been discriminated 
against under Japanese-American structural subordination. Raising problems of Japanese 
colonialism and Okinawa’s distinct ethnicity is not a new approach in the history of the 
Okinawan anti-base struggle. The ethnic difference of Uchinaa (Okinawans/Ryūkyūans) and 
Yamatū (Japanese mainlanders) has been one of the most frequently employed ways of 
distinguishing Okinawans from other Japanese. But the current revival of 
Okinawan/Ryūkyūan identity, discourse and cultural practice is different from preceding 
discourses in that the new discourse not only emphasizes cultural and historical differences 
that separate Okinawa from the rest of Japan, but also aims to reconceptualize the Okinawa 
struggle as an indigenous people’s movement by claiming their own territorial sovereignty at 
international venues such as the United Nations.  
By employing the term “Ryūkyūans” instead of “Okinawans” or “Okinawan people”, 
contemporary indigenism tries to re-establish an autonomous cultural terrain distinct from 
Japan and Japanese nationals. Moreover, the indigenous movement in Okinawa not only 
emphasizes cultural autonomy but also stresses differences in economic and political 
administration from the rest of Japan. One of the most recent examples of an indigenist group 
is the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans 
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(ACSILs), established in March 2013.238 ACSILs is founded by scholars such as Matsushima 
Yasukatsu, a scholar and a long-term activist and expert on the indigenous rights of 
Ryūkyūans in the international political arena. Before he founded ACSILs together with other 
Ryūkyūan colleagues, he had also created an organization called the Association of 
Indigenous People in the Ryūkyūs (AIPR) with fellow activist Miyasato Gosamaru and 
others in the late 1990s. Matsushima and Miyasato were both born in the mid-1960s and 
another key figure, mathematical sociologist Tomochi Masaki was born in the mid-1970s. 
Sociologist Nomura Kōya (who later became widely known for his strong criticism of Japan 
and the Japanese internal colonization of Okinawa in his book: Unconscious Colonization) 
was also born in the late 1960s.239 These activists belong to the post-reversion generation 
(fukkigo sedai), who spent their formative periods around the time of Okinawa’s return to 
Japan. Although these new indigenists have not gained wide support from ordinary 
Okinawans, they actively conduct lobbying and other political activism within and beyond 
Okinawa through which they are slowly gaining support.  
By insisting on autonomy or independence of both people and territory, contemporary 
indigenous activists in the Okinawan anti-base movement try to use the international, as well 
as the Japanese, political arena effectively. They aim to acquire the rights of self-
determination over the land of Ryūkyū based on the principles of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People.240 As Matsushima discusses, the international experience of the 
indigenous rights movement widens their understandings on the location and progress of 
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Okinawan’s campaign for self-determination by comparing it with other areas where local 
residents are engaged in similar kinds of direct action. Especially, the Ryūkyūan indigenous 
movement is strongly connected to places such as Guam, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, with 
whom they share historical experience of colonialism and US occupation of their lands. Also, 
they refer to countries in the Pacific region which gained independence from US rule, such as 
the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. At the same time, they also consider the 
experiences of more distant countries such as Malta, which was administered under the 
British military regime until the 1960s, the Basque country and Catalonia, in which 
distinctive local cultures underpin local residents’ autonomous identity, and Scotland, which 
has a relatively high level of administrative autonomy from the central British government.241 
This awareness of other societies, countries and regions where indigenous or ethnic 
minorities strive for their autonomy or independence is expressed in Matsushima’s view of 
colonial history in Okinawa/Ryūkyū.242 
 
4.4.2. “Take the Bases Back to Japan” 
Chinin Ushii is one of the most vocal activists advocating indigenous identity in the 
contemporary Okinawan anti-base movement. She was born in Naha City, Okinawa, in 1966, 
and graduated from Tsuda Women’s University and the University of Tokyo. According to 
Chinin’s recollections, that was the time when she began to question her identity.243 After 
returning to Okinawa, she started teaching at Okinawa International University as a lecturer. 
It was then she started using her Ryūkyūan style name, Ushii, rather than her Japanese name, 
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Yukino. Around the same time, Chinin also started her career as a commentator on current 
affairs by contributing articles regularly to a local newspaper. Like letters written to close 
friends, her essays are characterized by their plain style of writing, which attracts many 
readers. She discusses current Okinawan people, society and culture and her messages are 
always conveyed straightforwardly to the readers. Her career as a public intellectual in 
Okinawa is not only limited to being a writer. She has been an active organizer of the anti-
base movement. She started her career in anti-base activism by joining a group called 
Kamadūgwa-tachi no Tsudoi (Gathering of Little Girls) in 2002. In Ryūkyūan language, 
kamadūgwa means “beloved people”. This is a group consisting of local women mainly 
living in Ginowan City, where Futenma Airbase is situated. 
Although Chinin’s writing style is simple, as she considers her audience to be not 
only academia but the general public, much of her inspiration comes from earlier generations 
of activists and intellectuals involved with the decolonization movement around the globe, 
such as Malcom X and Frantz Fanon.244 Chinin quotes these thinkers within the Okinawan 
context, accusing Japan of internal colonialism over Okinawa. Like her colleagues such as 
Nomura Kōya, Chinin also makes this accusation not only against the Japanese government 
but also against Japanese nationals, separating them from Okinawans/Ryūkyūans in terms of 
identity. Calling this critical attitude to Japan “decolonization of consciousness” she argues 
 
…it is mainland Japan – the government, the bureaucrats, the mass media, and the people 
who keep saying “no” to the Okinawa that is demanding kengai isetsu (moving the bases 
outside Okinawa prefecture)…Then I felt uncomfortable with the adjective “Japanese” 
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being attached to our islands. “Japanese” reverberates with the meanings “Japan occupies” 
and “Japan colonizes” Okinawa.245 
 
Her perspective is primarily underpinned by a critique of the continuing relationship of 
colonizer and colonized between Japan and Okinawa. In her critiques, she often writes that 
Japanese people should take the US bases back to Japan for their own national security 
without imposing the burden on Okinawa.246  However, one of the distinguishing aspects of 
her critique, as compared with those of her colleagues such as Nomura, is that her practice as 
indigenous Okinawan is directed not only towards Japanese nationals but also towards 
Okinawans, to convey the need for a restoration of an indigenous sense of history, voice, 
culture, and territory: in other words, a reappropriation of the indigenous place and identity of 
Okinawa.  
 
4.4.3. Beyond Nationalism: Internal Colony and Okinawan Autonomism 
One of the researchers overseas who focuses on this emergence of a cultural movement of 
indigenous identity in the context of the Okinawa struggle is American political scientist 
Kelly Dietz, professor of the Department of Politics at Ithaca College in New York. Dietz 
obtained her MA and PhD from Cornell University. Dietz is also one of those who conducted 
fieldwork in Okinawa during much the same period as Inoue and Tanji. She has had a long-
term career not only as an academic but also as a social activist on the base problems and 
environmental issues primarily in Okinawa. In the midst of the Henoko struggle, Dietz 
became one of the co-founders of a transnational NGO called Futenma-Henoko Action 
                                                 
245 Ibid., 237-238. 
246 Ushii Chinin, et al. Tōsōsuru Kyōkai: Fukkigo sedai no Okinawa kara no Hōkoku (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2012: 25-
26). 
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Network (FHAN) together with her colleagues from Japan, Okinawa, US, UK and elsewhere. 
She was also a visiting researcher at the University of Ryūkyūs from 2004-2005 while 
engaged with the anti-base movement. 
One of the characteristics of Dietz’s analysis of the Okinawan anti-base movement is 
that she highlights the ethnic movement as a new current in the Okinawan struggle. She 
describes activists who are involved with this cultural movement as “autonomist” and their 
campaign as “Okinawan autonomism". Although I will discuss the meaning of autonomism 
later, I would like to note here that Dietz focuses on Okinawan autonomism as part of the 
global decolonization movement. Thus, while she acknowledges the Okinawan domestic 
context of the anti-base struggle, Dietz also views the Okinawan indigenous movement in 
parallel with the global decolonization movement.  
The politicization of Okinawan indigenous identity aims to reactivate a collective 
identity as an ethnic minority who are “politically and socially displaced within Japan; as a 
nation/people”.247 This way of re-establishing the Okinawan subject is not simply a 
reinforcement of the “myth” of Okinawan identity to keep the historical narrative of the 
Okinawa struggle alive as a discourse of mobilization. Rather, Okinawan cultural 
autonomism branches out of the traditional narrative of the Okinawa struggle by adopting 
more progressive views of anti-colonialism against Japan and the US. The notion of 
“practicing indigenous Okinawa” also means that the movement is part of the wider global 
movements by indigenous people, where other ethnic minorities also insist on their cultural 
and territorial sovereignty. Therefore, like the work of the other two researchers discussed 
above, Dietz’s analysis provides us with a perspective not only for understanding a new 
                                                 
247 Kelly Dietz, “Demilitarizing Sovereignty: Self-Determination and Anti-Military Base Activism in Okinawa, Ja-
pan,” in Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change, ed. Philip McMichael (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 195. 
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current in the Okinawan anti-base movement, but also for capturing this local movement in a 
wider context. She argues: 
 
While they can only emerge out of a strong attachment between a particular people and 
place, they rest fundamentally on an ability to locate Okinawa’s particular history and 
circumstances within a world-historical context that exposes the imperial dimensions of 
the state system.248 
 
Dietz’s reflexive perspective avoids particularizing the Okinawan indigenous movement, for 
she embeds the movement in a global political framework with specific historical experience 
with Japan and the US. Her analysis is combined with the presentation of actual voices from 
local Okinawan activism. The Association of Indigenous People in the Ryūkyūs (AIPR) is 
one example of organizations that have been involved with the global indigenous people’s 
movement for self-determination in the context of Okinawa. Dietz argues that this resilient 
struggle of the Okinawan anti-base movement has generated a situation where “an increasing 
number of Okinawans articulate a desire for greater freedom from Japan’s control”.249 She 
also argues that 
 
…the politicization of Okinawan identity comes at a time when demands for greater ethnic 
autonomy are increasing around the world. Despite the apparent success of anti-imperialist 
movements and postwar decolonization, contemporary movements for self-determination 
are on the rise and span the globe: from Ogoniland in Nigeria to Nagaland in India; from 
                                                 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid., 183. 
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Scotland and the Basque region of Spain to the Kurdish region that transverses Turkey and 
Iraq. Within Japan itself the ethnically distinct Ainu began making indigenous rights 
claims against the Japanese government in the 1980s.250 
 
By employing the notion of the decolonization movement to describe Okinawa’s ethnic 
movement, Dietz seeks to distinguish what she calls the socio-cultural movement for local 
autonomy after the “ethnic turn” from another frequently employed concept in the context of 
anti-US base movement: nationalism. She argues: 
 
…the politicization of Okinawan identity in the Okinawan de-militarization movement 
implies a different story and outcome from the nationalist sentiments animating anti-US 
military movements in for example, South Korea, the Philippines, and even mainland 
Japan. In these places, nationalist sentiment is rooted in a notion of citizens’ popular 
sovereignty and a desire to strengthen state capacities vis-à-vis the United States. In 
contrast, claims and efforts aimed at securing greater autonomy in Okinawa implicate 
Japanese practices of rule in ways far beyond a critique of particular administrations that 
bow to US pressure, or to pressures from domestic forces benefiting from the presence of 
US forces. Okinawan rights claims against US military presence increasingly challenge 
the legitimacy of the Japanese state itself: they call into question its very meaning within 
Okinawa’s territorial and socio-political context.251 
 
This notion of internal colony is re-emphasized later in her argument. Dietz points out that 
the post-colonial era in which former colonized countries could acquire their independent 
                                                 
250 Ibid., 183-184. 
251 Ibid., 185. 
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status and sovereignty as nation-states left the issue of indigenous people unresolved. What 
happened to indigenous culture such as the Ryūkyūs was incorporation as an internal colony 
as part of the colonizing process that was conducted around the globe. Therefore, while Dietz 
recognizes that decolonization in former colonies and the establishment of new nation-states 
was crucial, she is also critical of the rise of nationalism, arguing that it dismisses “histories 
of invasion, colonization, and systematic discrimination of peoples within emerging and 
established nations.”252 Therefore, in her discussion of Okinawan autonomism, politicising 
Okinawan identity is intended to raise the autonomous subject as Okinawan without being 
reduced to the logic of nationalism.253 
As in Tanji’s discussion, it is important to recognize Dietz’s argument as a critique of 
the citizen model proposed by Inoue, although it is not entirely correct to envision an 
antagonistic relationship between the indigenous identity and citizen identity because they 
both are contemporary movements that are being developed in parallel. However, as a matter 
of fact, it is also important to acknowledge that the notion of citizen does not provide a 
satisfactory account for this emerging local consciousness. Dietz’s concept of Okinawan 
autonomism is, therefore, important in the sense that she draws attention to aspects that the 
discourse of citizen overlooks in the Okinawa struggle. Like Inoue and Tanji, Dietz also 
connects the Okinawan local context by articulating it with similar external contexts. This 
helps us connect ethnic practices in the Okinawa anti-base movement with other indigenous 
movements around the globe. 
 
                                                 
252 Ibid., 187. 
253 Dietz argues that articulation of indigenous identity as political identity means there is a proactive shift of 
Okinawan status from “second-class citizens” to “Okinawan subjects”. See, Kelly Dietz, “Demilitarizing Sover-
eignty,” 195. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed some approaches to the contemporary modes of the 
Okinawan anti-base struggle. I called these new approaches the NSMT-based approaches 
because the three researchers discussed here similarly developed critiques of the conventional 
notion of primordial notions of Okinawan identity by drawing on New Social Movement 
Theory. By examining actually practised identities in grassroots politics, Inoue, Tanji and 
Dietz have shown the complex agency involved in making Okinawan identity. Two main 
points emerge from this discussion. First, by reading these scholars’ works and their 
engagement with the Okinawa struggle, I sought a significance that enables us to re-situate 
the Okinawan anti-base movements in the current situation of political-economy and social 
relations. In the first place, this means that we are no longer able to return to the binary mode 
of thought based on the dichotomy between dominant and dominated. The three scholars’ 
works all emphasize the fact that, in studying Okinawan anti-base activism, it is crucial to 
discuss how local cultural politics shapes the struggle by processing the global issues and re-
producing vernacular forms of cosmopolitanism. This finding enables us to embed the 
Okinawan anti-base movement in an inter-referential system of knowledge about local 
struggles against militarism in many parts of the globe. The NSMT-based approach also 
emphasizes the production of Okinawan activism within the complicated entanglement of 
local socio-cultural-economic relations. Thus, we need to shift our attention from the struggle 
of the marginalized against the far distanced central powers such as Tokyo and Washington 
to their struggle for meaning within the world they live in.  
The second point is an extension of the first. The three scholars discussed here 
conducted analyzes of Okinawan people’s everyday life not merely as “observers” but also as 
“participants”. Although it is only Inoue who explicitly discusses his experiences and the 
issues regarding participatory research on the Okinawa struggle, other researchers also have 
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similar experiences to the extent that they were engaged in the Okinawa struggle both as 
researchers overseas and as participants of the local activism. Although I could not fully 
explore these experiences in this chapter, their pioneering work as ethnographers and 
participants in the local anti-base movement made a significant contribution in developing 
not only Okinawa studies but also more broadly methodology on the ethnography of social 
activism, which clarifies the actuality of the Okinawa struggle. The difference between the 
discourse and the experience of the Okinawa struggle is one of many examples which was 
revealed by those ethnographers. In my understanding, the works of Inoue, Tanji and Dietz 
lead us to consider Okinawa’s local experiences in the broader public sphere by connecting it 
with other local experiences and types of social movements in different parts of the globe 
such as feminism and the indigenous rights movement. In this sense, these scholars connect 
inside/outside Okinawan activism to show “the third space”. Overall, Inoue, Tanji and Dietz 
show new ways to understand and acknowledge the Okinawan anti-base movement. 
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Chapter Five 
Takae Anti-Helipad Movement:  
Making a Protest Community from Margin 
 
 
With Yamashiro Hiroji, Director of Okinawa Peace Movement Center (Left).  
The photo was taken by the author in Takae in February 2012. 
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5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed new aspects raised in research on the Okinawan 
anti-base movement by certain scholars. In particular, these scholars highlight the significant 
impact that New Social Movements Theory brought to research on Okinawa’s anti-base 
movement. My previous chapter concluded that the three studies by those scholars illuminate 
various aspects of the anti-base movement especially in relation to the politics of everyday 
life. By theorizing the complexity of the struggle, they help us to consider meanings and 
forms in Okinawa’s anti-base movement which had not previously been the focus of major 
attention. Therefore, I argued that these studies re-situate Okinawa not only as a site for 
examining the people’s anti-base struggle, but also for problematizing contemporary forms of 
social movements by exploring the deeper levels of local identity politics.  
If we connect the work of these three scholars to the dialogue between the two 
Okinawan critics Yakabi Osamu and Okamoto Keitoku (discussed in Chapter 1), we can see 
that collective “Okinawan identity” is not just a precondition for the anti-base struggle. 
Rather, it relates to the question: who makes the anti-base struggle? In their dialogue, 
Okamoto argues that the contemporary anti-base movement is sustained by the diverse 
participation of individuals regardless of their origins.254 He notes that these individuals are 
people who are strongly concerned with the history and ecology of Okinawa. Based on this 
perspective, Okamoto seeks to establish a new kind of social actor who develops Okinawa’s 
anti-base struggle. That is, he argues that the Okinawa struggle is carried out by the people 
who have “become” Okinawan people through the process of participation in direct actions. 
His intention is to identify who is in fact participating in the anti-base struggle, and this 
involves a provocative separation of this subject of the struggle from an identitarian 
                                                 
254 Keitoku Okamoto, “Okinawa” ni Ikiru: Okamoto Keitoku Hihyo-Shu (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2007), 211. 
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understanding of “Okinawan people” based on ancestry and ethnicity. Reflecting on the use 
of “Okinawan identity” by conservative political forces in the publication The Okinawa 
Initiative, Yakabi similarly insisted on the need to consider an alternative integrating concept 
other than ethnic identity (see Chapter 1).255  
In this chapter, I consider Okamoto and Yakabi’s discussion on the new subjects of 
the Okinawa struggle by analyzing the case of Takae, a hamlet in the northern Yanbaru 
region of Okinawa Island. This small hamlet in Okinawa Island has become one of the most 
active places of the anti-base struggle since 2007. Through analyzing the local protest 
community in terms of the formation of the collectivity, I shall seek an alternative view of 
social cooperation in the contemporary Okinawa struggle, which revisits notions of 
Okinawan identity by deploying the concept of “place”.  
 
5.2. Towards the North 
After leaving Naha at dawn, I was in my friend’s car driving north. My friend Kosuzu is a 
faculty member at a local university, teaching the history of American ethnic minorities. She 
is also an experienced activist who has been involved in the local anti-US military base 
movement for the last ten years. This trip was a result of her kind offer. When I started asking 
questions about recent events in the Okinawa struggle, she simply told me to come along 
with her to see the real circumstances. The place she was going to take me was one of the 
ongoing protest sites, a small hamlet located in the north-eastern part of Okinawa Island, 
called Takae. She drove her big Toyota Hilux from Naha up towards the north of Okinawa 
Island on Route 58. I found myself wondering why she had chosen such a large car. In 
                                                 
255 Osamu Yakabi, “Okinawa no Aidentitī wo Kataru-koto Soshite Katarinaosu-koto: ‘Okinawa Kenkyū’ no Gen-
zai ni Tsuite,” in Chiiki no Jiritsu, Shima no Chikara Gekan, ed. Moriteru Arasaki, et al. (Tokyo: Komonzu, 2006), 
143-144. 
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Okinawa, where there is no railway except for a short monorail in Naha city, the majority of 
the local population drive cars. The most popular type is a small lightweight van, called kei 
(which literally means “light”). Compared to this popular car, however, Kosuzu’s car looked 
extraordinarily large. Known not only for its size but also toughness, this brand of pick-up 
truck carried rocket launchers during the Chadian-Libyan Conflict in the late 1980s. When I 
asked her the reason why she drove such a gigantic car, her answer was very practical: “This 
size is convenient when we need to make barricades”. 
The southern part of Okinawa Island has historically been more populated and 
economically prosperous. The old and new capital cities, Shuri and Naha, are both located in 
the south. So the further we went towards the north, the fewer residential houses we saw. 
After passing Nago, the border city of south and north, a landscape different from the urban 
south unfurled before us: over 7,000 hectares of stunning mountains and forests. With diverse 
ranges of vegetation, this subtropical environment has fostered unique indigenous creatures 
such as Okinawa woodpecker (or noguchigera in Japanese) and Okinawa rail (or Yanbaru 
kuina). This is the reason why the northern half of Okinawa Island has been called Yanbaru, 
which is written by a combination of two Chinese characters of “mountain” and “field”. As it 
is located amid rich forest, access to Takae has not been easy for southern dwellers. By the 
time we arrive in Taira, one of the areas neighboring Takae, the sun had already risen and 
was blazing in the sky. 
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Image 5-1. A view of Yanbaru Forrest, taken by the author, November 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
5.3. Yanbaru, Higashi Village, Takae 
The Yanbaru region is not an administrative territory. It is the historical name of the northern 
half of Okinawa Island used by the local people. When people visit Yanbaru from the 
southern area of Okinawa, the gateway to the region is Nago City, the only local city. In 
addition to this, Yanbaru includes eight other towns and villages. But compared with Nago 
and the southern cities, many of these towns and villages in this northern area are not 
prosperous. Takae is a part of one of the villages, called Higashi, located in the north-eastern 
part of Yanbaru. Higashi Village was created as a result of the reorganization of six different 
hamlets (Takae, Kesaji, Arime, Taira, Kawata, and Miyagi) in 1924.256 This community has 
been considered to be one of the most peripheral areas in the whole of Okinawa Island. For 
example, there is a line in a Ryūkyūan classic poem about Takae which reads “Even places 
such as Takē and Arakā, if I was together with you, would be like a heaven of flowers.”257 
There are several factors that represent Takae’s peripheral status in Okinawa. The first 
factor is population. According to the latest census, the population of Higashi Village is 
estimated as 1707, in about 700 households. As Figure 8-1 below shows, Higashi Village is 
one of the smallest administrative units among all the cities, towns and villages in Okinawa 
Island. Although most communities in the Yanbaru region such as Kunigami, Ogimi, Nakijin, 
and Motobu are sparsely populated, Higashi Village is the least populous area even amongst 
these small communities. Figure 8-2 shows the population by different hamlets within 
Higashi Village. From this, we can see that Takae is the least populated area among the six 
hamlets. It is estimated that approximately 144 people, in 69 households, are currently 
                                                 
256 In terms of administration, Higashi and other communities have mayors and members of the local assem-
bly, who are democratically elected by the local residents. 
257 Higashi-son-shi Henshū Iinkai, ed. Higashi-son-shi, vol 1 (Higashi-son: Higashi-son Yakuba, 1987): 212. 
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registered as residents. Although there used to be over 300 in the late 1940s, the population 
decreased to almost half of its peak from the mid-1970s to 2010. 
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Figure 5-1. Population by Cities, Towns and Villages in Okinawa Island (as of April 2014). This chart is 
created by the author based on data provided by Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of 
Statistics, Okinawa Prefecture. (http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/estimates/estimates_suikei.html 
last accessed 1/6/2014, 1 June, 2014) 
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Figure 5-2. Population by districts in Higashi Village. This chart is created by author based on data 
provided by the Registered Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of Statistics, Okinawa 
Prefecture. (http://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/site/kikaku/shichoson/4343.html, 1 June, 2014) 
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          The second factor is the lack of strong industry. The main source of income for the 
residents of Takae has been agriculture. However, the population drain to industrialized 
areas, which has accelerated since the 1970s, caused the number of people engaged in 
agriculture in the community to decrease. Therefore, under the initiative of Higashi Village, 
farmers of Takae (and other hamlets) were encouraged to start pineapple farming in the mid-
1980s. Pineapple is one of a few kinds of agricultural products that were able to be grown in 
the soil of this area.258 However, the pineapple industry was not successful. The quantity of 
production has been declining since 1993. This was directly caused by the liberalization of 
imports of foreign pineapples in 1990. 259 Furthermore, the collapse of the Japanese bubble 
economy in the early 1990s derailed investment plans for a major resort facility in the village. 
As the latest attempt, the Higashi Village government began to promote ecotourism in recent 
years by advertising the untouched natural environment of Yanbaru Forest.260 But the new 
policy was not very effective in boosting the local economy. Higashi Village’s weak industry 
has been one of the major causes of the village’s low output per capita, which is ranked as the 
lowest compared with other communities in the island. Also, this low growth rate of 
productivity has been the reason for the low average annual income of the residents in the 
community (see Figure 8-4). An official report from Higashi Village Government 
demonstrates the concern that people’s annual income is lower than average income for 
Okinawa Prefecture.261  
                                                 
258 Unlike the southern region of Okinawa Island, northern Yambaru region, including Takae, is made of red 
clay soil, which is not an appropriate soil for agricultural products to grow due to the high percentage of min-
erals in the ground. 
259 Higashi Village, “Sangyō/Keizai (Higashi Village Directory),” accessed on June 1, 2014, http://www.vill.hi-
gashi.okinawa.jp/UserFiles/File/sonnnogaiyou/sonseiyouran/sangyoukeizai.pdf. 
260 Based on the Ecotourism Promotion Acts passed in 2007, the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport, and Tourism (MLIT) has been promoting the utilisation of the unique natural environment of each 
local region, mostly peripheral areas for its own local industry. Apart from Takae, the author had conducted 
research on similar cases in various places near Tokyo such as Kawaji Village in Tochigi Prefecture from 2007 to 
2008. 
261 From the Fourth Total Plan of Higashi Village released by Higashi Village Government in 2011, available at 
http://www.vill.higashi.okinawa.jp/UserFiles/File/kikakukannkouka/4ji_sogokeikaku_kouki.pdf. (2 June, 2014). 
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Figure 5-3. Changes of production quantity and agricultural area in Higashi Village. This chart is created by the 
author based on data provided by the Registered Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of 
Statistics, Okinawa Prefecture, accessed June 1, 2014, 
http://www.vill.higashi.okinawa.jp/UserFiles/File/sonnnogaiyou/sonseiyouran/sangyoukeizai.pdf. 
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Figure 5-4. Total annual income by cities, towns and villages in Okinawa Island. This chart is created by 
author based on data provided by the Registered Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of 
Statistics, Okinawa Prefecture, accessed June 1, 2014, 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/ctv/2013/2.H22_bunpai.pdf. 
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  Together with those factors, we also need to consider the impact of the US bases in 
the Yanbaru region. In October 1957, the US military government began to use a large part of 
the forest as a training centre. This area—the Northern Training Center (NTC) or Camp 
Gonsalves—has been used by soldiers from the US Marine Corps to conduct simulations of 
jungle battles. The training center played a particularly crucial role during the Vietnam War 
period. Local residents from surrounding suburbs including Takae were mobilized by the US 
for training purposes. In a simulated village called “the Third World Village”, the locals were 
required to play the roles of locals in Vietnam.262  In 2013, the size of the Northern Training 
Centre is estimated as 7824 hectares of Yanbaru Forest. This includes part of the territory of 
two northern villages—Kunigami and Higashi. According to one study, nearly 44 percent of 
the training center belongs to Higashi Village, while 56 percent belongs to Kunigami, where 
the local villagers prevented construction of the aircraft landing zone from taking place in the 
late 1980s.263 Although the size of the training center diminished after Okinawa’s return to 
Japan, the local residents are still not allowed to use most of Yanbaru forest as the territory is 
owned and administered by the Japanese government as a state forest.   
 
5.4. The Village Embraced by the US Military Helipads 
The small population and lack of industry made Higashi Village the most marginalized area 
in Okinawa Island; and the problems of the marginalized in Okinawa are not only economic. 
As the case of Henoko has explicitly shown, being an economically peripheral community in 
Okinawa means the area is likely to become a target for the site of the military bases. In this 
sense, Higashi Village—particularly Takae—is no exception. In the final report of the 
                                                 
262 Chuji Chinen, Taiga No Nagare to Tomoni (Minamihaebaru: Akebono Shuppan, 2008). 
263 Okinawa-ken Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi Taisaku-ka, “Okinawa no Beigun-kichi oyobi Jieitai-kichi,” (Okinawa: Oki-
nawa-ken, 2013), 12. 
. 
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Special Action Committee of Okinawa (SACO) released in 1996, the Japanese and US 
governments agreed “to lighten the burden (futan keigen)” of the US military bases for 
citizens in Okinawa. As I discussed in Chapter Four, SACO was established under former 
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and US President Bill Clinton following the 
rape incident of a school girl by three US military personnel and the island-wide mass protest 
movement in the mid-1990s strongly demanded revision of the Status of Forces Agreement.  
In the SACO report, one of the main decisions that the leaders of US and Japan made 
was the closure of Futenma Airbase. However, closure of the Futenma Airbase did not mean 
removal (tekkyo) of the bases. Rather, it was a plan to “‘transfer (isetsu)” American military 
functions to other locations in Okinawa. Thus, the Japanese government sought possible 
locations to build new military facilities. On the east coast of mainland Okinawa Henoko 
district was designated to be one of the alternative locations to construct an offshore aircraft 
landing zone. But it was not only Henoko. The other decision for the reduction of the 
American military facilities was the partial return of the Northern Training Centre in Yanbaru 
Region. Although the NTC occupies approximately 7,800 hectares (as of 2014), according to 
the SACO report, the United States agreed to return about 3,987 hectares, which is about half 
of the current area. Yet there was one condition, which was the relocation of seven helipads 
which existed in the area to be returned. At that time, there were in total twenty-two helipads 
scattered around the NTC. Many of them were located within Higashi Village and some of 
them were in Kunigami Village, located in the north of Higashi Village. After about ten years 
of “contemplation” at the governmental level, most of the training area in Kunigami Village 
was designated for return to Japan. However, it means that the military facilities including 
seven helipads were supposed to be transferred to Higashi Village.264 
                                                 
264 Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United 
States (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 167-168. 
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Since the US and Japanese leaderships decided on the reduction of the NTC, they 
started searching for the possible places to relocate the seven helipads. Although Higashi 
Village and Kunigami Village were the main stakeholders of this relocation plan, they were 
excluded from the discussion table. Instead, the plan was discussed within high-level 
leadership. Therefore, when the relocation plan was released in late 2006, the local residents 
and the provincial government of Higashi Village were surprised. The designated sites were 
located around Takae district, the least populated area within Higashi Village (see Image 5-
2). Although helipad construction sites were reduced from seven to six, it did not change 
anxiety among the local Takae residents. On the northern side of Takae, two helicopter 
landing zones (or so-called N-1A and N-1B by the Okinawa Defense Bureau265 as well as the 
local residents) were to be constructed; on the eastern side, another two helipads called G and 
H; and in the southern part of Takae, another two helipads (N-4A and N-4B) were to be 
constructed. Among them, two helipads in N-4 zone are located only 400 meters away from 
the residential area. In other words, the Takae residents were concerned with their future 
because their livelihood would be surrounded by these new helipads once the construction 
has been finished. 
 When this plan was made public by the Japanese government in late 2006, the local 
political assembly of Higashi Village decided to oppose this helipad construction plan. 
Politicians and residents organized a village-wide protest campaign. The campaign was led 
by a group called “the Association for Protection of Broccoli Forrest (Burokkorī no Mori wo 
Mamoru-kai)”. It was named after the landscape of Yanbaru Forrest, where trees seem like 
bunches of broccoli. However, as scholar Abe Kosuzu explains, the name has another 
implication, symbolizing the intention of the local residents to differentiate themselves from 
                                                 
265 Okinawa Defence Bureau is a regional division under the Japanese Ministry of Defence, which is in charge of 
providing facilities to the local US military including preparation of the helipad construction. For more histori-
cal detail, see Chapter Six. 
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major progressive social forces. Therefore, instead of using conventional terms such as “to 
fight (tatakau)” and “to prevent (soshisuru)” in their name, the local citizens used the term 
“protect” and referred to the broccoli forest, which evokes the unique natural environment of 
Yanbaru Forest.266 (See Image 5-4) When Higashi Village took up the protest campaign, the 
assembly of Higashi recognized certain local families as the civic representatives of this 
village-wide protest action. However, in May 2007, the mayor of the village, Ijū Morihisa, 
decided to withdraw from the protest. Although Ijū was criticized by the members of the 
local assembly for this sudden decision, his mind was not changed by these criticisms. This 
reflected the official announcement of the commencement of construction by Okinawa 
Defense Bureau in 2007. Following this decision, the campaign by the Broccoli Association 
also ceased. Since that moment, the local families who stood up to take direct action had to 
continue their protest without the official support of the local political body. The local 
residents were thrown into direct confrontation with the Japanese government and its base 
politics. This is how the Takae grassroots protest community called “No Helipad Takae 
Residents Society (Helipaddo Iranai Takae Jūmin-no-kai; hereafter the Takae Residents 
Society)” was born in August 2007. 
 The local protesters set up tents next to the N-4 zone in front of the gate for the 
construction site because they were informed that the construction would start from that area. 
However, the sit-in in this early period was very difficult to organize due to the permanent 
shortage of the participants to prevent the officials from ODB and the construction workers 
from entering the N-4 construction site. Also, the ODB came to Takae in the middle of the 
night or the very early morning. As the official agency of the Japanese government, one of 
the missions of the ODB is to supervise the construction workers. Also, the ODB officials 
                                                 
266 Kosuzu Abe, “Kurikaeshi Kawaru: Okinawa ni okeru Chokusetu Kōdō no Genzai Shinkōkei”, Seisaku Kagaku, 
Kokusai-kankeironshu, Vol. 13 (Okinawa: Ryūkyū Daigaku Hōbungakubu, 2011), 61-90. 
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were supposed to “help” them conduct the process smoothly. Although the protesters made a 
barricade with a net in front of the gate in order to prevent the workers from entering the 
construction zone easily, the ODB officials came to cut each thread of the net with large 
scissors before construction workers arrived. Although the sit-in by the local protesters was 
effective to delay the construction work, the absolute inferiority in numbers of the local 
protesters allowed the construction works to advance gradually. 
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Image 5-2: An aerial view of construction sites. On the bottom of the left is Arakawa Dam. The photo was 
retrieved from the website of the Okinawa Prefectural Government. 
(http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/1172.html, accessed, July 16, 2015) 
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Image 5-3: the map of the helipad construction sites. Four districts (G and H on the east side, N-4 on the 
south, and N-1 on the north) are located around the Takae district. (The map was retrieved from “Voice 
of Takae” (http://nohelipadtakae.org/files/VOT-english2013Oct.pdf, accessed July6 2015) 
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Image 5-4. The brochure “Voice of Takae” issued by the Takae Resident Society. Available from 
http://nohelipadtakae.org/files/VOT-english2013Oct.pdf. 
 
 
193 
5.5. Into the Protest Community 
Towards the end of our drive to Takae, I saw some flags beside the street, with protest 
messages such as “no helipads in Takae!” written on them. A while later, we saw a large 
white tent beside the narrow road, and in the distance I could see more of the same kind of 
tents. The nearest tent was decorated with signboards reading: “We Don’t Need A Helipad”. 
“Let’s Protect Our Peaceful Yanbaru Forest from Warfare”. “Rescue Takae”. Painted 
colorfully, these hand-made signboards also conveyed protest messages against the helipad 
construction in both Japanese and in English. In the tent, a middle-aged man with a tanned 
face was smoking a cigarette. When he recognized Kosuzu, he shouted to her:  
“We’ve got a hiijā, a wild one! Hurry to Arakawa! They just started slaughtering!” 
Arakawa is the creek that runs through the middle of Higashi Village to the Pacific Ocean. At 
the riverside, I saw a group of children who were playing in the creek, splashing water at 
each other and screeching. There was also a bunch of adults with them. As soon as I got out 
of the car, I was struck by an unfamiliar smell, something similar to the smell of sweat. On a 
rock in the beautifully clear creek, swinging a thick butcher knife downwards, a man with 
disheveled long hair was cutting the meat and bones of some animal. Every time he swung 
the butcher knife up and down, his greasy black hair followed the movement of the knife. 
Thick bones were splashing blood that made hundreds of red and brown dots on his t-shirt. 
On the riverside, some people were scraping the rest of the meat from the bones. At the other 
side of the creek, the rest of the adults were chopping up other parts of pink meat or washing 
it with water from the creek. 
“Hey, come and help us.”  
One of them summoned me, waving his hand. He gave me a knife and told me to help one of 
the people chopping meat beside the creek. The closer I approached to the creek, the stronger 
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the smell of flesh became. The chunk of pink meat on the chopping board was not the same 
as what is usually seen in the shops. The raw meat was slimy.  
“What’s this meat?” I asked a woman working on the same chopping board as mine.  
“This is hiijā. Goat,” she answered.  
“It’s very rare to catch such a big wild goat,” the man next to her said. 
According to his explanation, some villagers found this wild goat in the morning, with its 
legs stuck in a narrow ditch beside the road. The goat had broken its legs, so instead of 
rescuing it from the ditch, they decided to catch it to eat. 
“And we eat every single part of it. This is how we show our respect for it.” 
After butchering the goat, we went to a one-story prefabricated house with a flat tin 
roof. The local people called this house tūtan-ya (it meant “the tin roof house”). The house is 
used as the community centre for the members of the Takae Residents’ Society. The Tūtan-
ya was surrounded by three small houses. They were all one-story, flat tin roof pre-fabricated 
buildings. The smallest one was the jimusho (“the office”), while the other two were 
shukuhakujo (“accommodations”): one for male and the other for female visitors.  
In the evening, people gathered at tūtan-ya to eat the goat that they slaughtered during 
the day. People were visiting from all around the neighborhood. They chatted cheerfully 
while drinking a local spirit, maruta. I asked one older man sitting next to me whether such 
an event is held regularly. He said that in fact it is illegal to catch a wild goat. Then, he went 
on: 
“But very occasionally there are goats injured. They cannot live so long, so we catch and 
slaughter them. We consider it as a gift from Yanbaru Forest.”  
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Goat is one of the traditional local cuisines. Originally imported from mainland China in the 
15th century, the animal has been a crucial part of the local diet, providing valuable protein.267 
However, when goat was introduced to Okinawa from China, it was not simply for the locals 
to eat in everyday life. Rather, goat was one of the animals, together with pig and cow, 
slaughtered when the envoys from Chinese dynasties visited Ryūkyū Kingdom. The Chinese 
missions arrived twice a year (spring and autumn) to celebrate the spirit of Confucius.268 In 
people’s everyday life, too, goat was slaughtered mainly for festive events. Especially, when 
the local peasants held festivals where they prayed for fertility, goat was one of the animals 
offered to the spirit of fertility around Okinawa.269 After Okinawa entered the modern period, 
goat farming was commercialized and goat became a common food for the locals. With the 
passage of time, it gradually lost its spiritual meaning. The local Okinawans eat not only the 
meat but also other parts, including organs and blood in soup called hiijā jiru. Since goat was 
once believed to be effective to cure disease, its meat, blood and other organs were used for 
medical purposes. For the same reason, the locals thought it is effective to energize men’s 
sexual potency. This was one reason why women were traditionally not allowed to eat goat.  
In places like Takae where commercial farming of goats has little impact compared to 
the industrialised southern region, it is rare to find a place to eat this local animal. Also, 
because it is such a rare opportunity to catch a wild goat, it gave us a chance to see the 
distinctive Okinawan food culture and people’s practice that remains in Takae, which 
includes the Takae residents’ spirituality and their cultural relationships with the wild 
animals. Some of the village elders told me that it was a gift from Yanbaru Forest. What this 
means is that the overwhelming scale of Yanbaru Forest not only creates a sense of awe for 
                                                 
267 One of the earliest record of slaughtering goat in Okinawa is in 1579. (Okinawa-ken Kyōiku Iinkai, ed. Oki-
nawa Kenshi, Vol. 22 (Tokyo: Gen’nan-dō Shoten, 1974:  213-214.) 
268 Ibid., 213. 
269 Ibid. 
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the local natural environment among the residents, but is also seen as an abundant source of 
food that the locals eat. Wounded goats that are sometimes found are not simply considered 
the same as the dishes served in restaurants. The Takae locals rather understood them as 
fortune given by Yanbaru Forest. Therefore, in this context, the goat needs to be understood 
not only in its material aspect as food but also as representing spiritual relationships and 
interaction between the local residents and their place. 
We can also consider the Takae people and their spiritual relationship with their place 
by looking at the location in which they butchered the goat. In many parts of Okinawa Island, 
rivers, creeks or the sea were essential elements in spiritual sites. In the past, these sites were 
places to pray for fortune and were places to pour the first water on a newborn baby. 
Historically, Arakawa Creek was believed to be one of the sacred places for the local 
villagers. There were two regions along Arakawa Creek—upper creek and lower creek. In 
each region, there were sacred sites with a shrine. Takae is part of the upper creek region. 
According to the official history of Higashi Village, the local villagers held an annual festival 
in which people prayed for fertility for two days every September.270 Given the history of 
Okinawans and their relationship with the river, it is possible to perceive the importance of 
Arakawa Creek for the local life, which also explain why the local villagers chose this creek 
to slaughter the goat. Based on this contextual understanding, we can imagine how the 
natural environment of Takae contributes to shaping local identity. 
At the same time, this cultural activity has more practical meanings for the locals in 
Takae. People worked collaboratively in order to process the meat. From capturing the wild 
animal and slaughtering it to cooking, it required many different kinds of collaborative work. 
This experience of shared practice helped to build a sense of community among those who 
                                                 
270 Higashi-son-shi Henshū Iinkai, ed. Higashi-son-shi (Higashi-son, Okinawa: Higashi-son-shi Henshū Iinkai, 
1987: 212). 
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were involved with processing the goat. Although a number of people in the Takae protest 
community originated from outside Okinawa (as I discuss later), these collaborative works 
help them have a sense of community. Also, this work was conducted in an open 
environment regardless of age and gender. This was reflected during dinner time as well. 
While traditionally women were banned from joining in this particular cuisine, now everyone 
is involved with the work of preparing and eating the goat. In this sense, the goat became a 
figure that created another layer of shared experiences among the locals. This was my very 
first encounter with the most upfront protest community in Okinawa. 
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Image 5-5. The white tent in front of N-4 zone in Takae. The photo was taken by the author in November 
2011. 
 
Image 5-6. Arakawa Creek. The photo was retrieved from the official blog of the Takae Residents’ Society, 
Yanbaru Takae no Genjō (July 14, 2007), accessed September 3, 2015, http://takae.ti-
da.net/e1649662.html.  
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5.6. “We Need Everyone’s Attention!”: Social Networks of the Takae Residents’ Society 
When one refers to Okinawa’s anti-base movement, one is in fact speaking of various kinds 
of actors, philosophies, styles of social activism, and locations. This fact always reminds us 
of the difficulty of generalizing the characteristics of the Okinawa movement. However, it is 
still fair to divide local protest movements into two different categories. One is organizational 
participation and the other one is non-organizational civic participation. In the former case, 
there are groups affiliated with or derived from political parties, workers’ unions, and student 
unions. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) and Japan Social Democratic Party (JSDP) are the 
most notable examples. Besides, these parties have affiliated organizations, such as Okinawa 
Tōitsu-ren for JCP and The Centre for Okinawa Peace Movement for JSDP, that are 
committed to the Okinawa struggle. Workers’ unions such as the teachers’ union, and 
prefectural and regional government public servants unions, have also been active in showing 
their strong presence in protest rallies. Also, Trotskyist student groups from local universities 
have joined in street protests. 
In the case of the second category, the anti-base movement is created by individuals 
or grassroots activism which is often characterized by loosely connected individual 
participation. The individuals in non-institutional civic movements often take a distance from 
the hierarchical collective action led by political parties or unions because of the latter’s 
structural inflexibility. While they have difficulty in mobilizing participants, they implement 
a diverse range of anti-base activities that are not restricted by a top-down order.  
Issues raised by non-institutional movements are more attached to the everyday life of 
the locals. Prior to the 2000 Okinawa G8 Summit, the Okinawa Citizens’ Network for Peace 
(OCNP or Okinawa Heiwa Shimin Renrakukai) was established in August 1999 as the 
umbrella network that mediates the diverse interests of activist groups with the participation 
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of thirty-three activist groups in Okinawa. This network connects widely diverse social 
problems such as gender, ecology, local economy, and so forth. Its primary activities are 
organizing regular meetings and study groups to update participants on the latest situation of 
the base politics and also circulating information about protest action. 
The Takae Resident Society receives support and assistance from both organizational 
and non-institutional civic networks. The JCP has supported their activism since the Takae 
protest group was formed. Also, its affiliated organizations such as the Japan Peace 
Committee, Association of Democratic Medical Doctors, and Co-op are involved. Along with 
the JCP and affiliated groups, the JSDP and related groups such as Okinawa Teachers and 
School Staff Union, and Okinawa Peace Movement Centre are also involved with Takae’s 
struggle, sending supporters to join sittings-in. From the non-institutional side, OCNP 
regularly transports people who wish to join the sit-ins from Naha. Retired people and 
housewives who are concerned with Takae’s ongoing struggle provide free pick-up services 
for those who do not have cars.  
However, one of the distinctive characteristics of Takae’s struggle is the participation 
of individuals who have distinctive subcultural backgrounds and networks. People who come 
to Takae are often informed of the local protest movement through various channels other 
than traditional activist networks. One of the main social networks is that of organic farmers 
from all over Okinawa. As I will mention later in this chapter, there are quite a few members 
of Takae’s protest community who are running organic farms in Higashi Village. These 
farmers have their own networks inside and outside Okinawa. Together with the organic 
farmers’ network, social networks of local musicians contribute to making Takae’s protest 
distinct. This is also derived from the fact that some community members have careers as 
professional musicians. As there are quite a few musicians among local protest members, 
they even launched a band called Suwarokaazu. It has two meanings in Japanese: “let’s sit!” 
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and “sitting rock musicians”. By organizing and participating in music concerts inside and 
outside Takae, the musicians’ networks help to publicize Takae’s struggle to audiences who 
are not necessarily familiar with the local anti-base movement.271 Apart from the farmers’ and 
musicians’ networks, individual participants come to Takae through various channels. 
Concerned surfers’ and divers’ communities from coastal areas of Okinawa are an example. 
Along with them, backpackers and students coming from outside Okinawa also play an 
important part. Also, retired people come to participate in the sit-ins protest from the rest of 
Okinawa and Japan. 
These social networks are maintained by various kinds of effort to publicize Takae’s 
struggle to the outside world. Effective use of cyber space including websites, e-mail lists, 
online broadcasting and electronic pamphlets to publicize the latest situation of Takae is 
another distinctive feature of this protest campaign. The Takae Residents’ Society always 
updates the current situation on a weblog called “Yanbaru Takae Now (Yanbaru Takae no 
Genjō)”.272 This weblog has a subscription function for interested people to register their 
email accounts. Once registered, any information on updates of the weblog is delivered to the 
designated inbox. Also, with the help of external media such as the Independent Web Journal, 
actual confrontations with government officials and construction workers are streamed 
online. Furthermore, an electronic brochure called “Voice of Takae (VOT)” provides basic 
information in English and Japanese with respect to the helipad construction plan in Takae as 
well as related problems. Saying “We Need Everyone’s Attention!”, the brochure calls for 
further help: 
 
                                                 
271 For example, around the time when Takae’s protest movement was formed, a music festival called 
“Yanbaru Peace Music Festival in Takae” was organised in 2006. 
272 The official blog of the Takae Residents’ Society is: http://takae.ti-da.net/. The latest information of Takae 
and its anti-base movement are updated on this blog. Also, other advertisement of the local cultural events 
are informed through this blog.  
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Even today as you’re reading this, sit-in is taking place in Takae. This area of great nature has 
become the forefront for the nation heading towards warfare potential, Japan. This is not a 
particular issue of Takae; the same situation might occur at any time anywhere in Japan and in 
other parts of the world. The U.S. military and Japan's self-defense forces are steadily combining 
by wasting our taxes to realign the forces (budget of 3,000 billion yen). So, if only to enable us to 
guard the future of our children, and to ensure a peaceful future for all, we request your kind 
attention to this issue!273   
 
What is important here is that Takae’s protest is jointly made by both local and extra-local 
elements. This synchronisation of local and extra-local elements is expressed more explicitly 
than in other protest communities in Okinawa. In this regard, we may recall Arturo Escobar’s 
discussion on place in which he criticises the neglect of place in social and human sciences 
that pursue abstract theories. Based on a close reading of the philosopher Edward Casey, 
Escobar argues: 
 
… it is our inevitable immersion in place, and not the absoluteness of space, that has 
ontological priority in the generation of life and the real. It certainly does so in the 
accounts and practices of most cultures, echoed in the phenomenological assertion that, 
given the primacy of embodied perception, we always find ourselves in places. We are, in 
short, placelings. Place has “ontological priority in the generation of life and the real”.274  
 
 
Nevertheless, Escobar does not comfort himself with the notion of place in nostalgic ways 
that disciplines such as anthropology and Area Studies have sometimes done in the past. His 
                                                 
273 The Takae Residents’ Society, “Voice of Takae”: 4. 
274 Arturo Escobar, “Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern Strategies of Localization,” 
Political Geography 20 (2001): 143. 
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intention in highlighting place is to establish an alternative ontological plateau that can 
replace the problematiques associated with the notion of identity. He argues that: 
 
Place is, of course, constituted by sedimented social structures and cultural practices. 
Sensing and moving are not presocial; the lived body is the result of habitual cultural and 
social processes…This means recognizing that place, body, and environment integrate 
with each other; that places gather things, thoughts, and memories in particular 
configurations; and that place, more an event that a thing, is characterized by openness 
rather than by a unitary self-identity...This also means that people are not only “local”; we 
are all indissolubly linked to both local and extralocal places through what might be called 
networks.275  
 
This remark can be applied to consider the local and extra-local dimensions of Takae’s 
struggle. On the one hand, the abundant nature of Yanbaru Forest and the rich history of 
pacifism in the Okinawa struggle are important factors that shape the ‘local’ aspect of their 
struggle. One the other hand, it is noteworthy that Takae’s struggle is conducted openly by 
networking outside the community. In this sense, the local struggle uses extra-local elements 
as a useful means to serve its own purposes. Furthermore, the “local” residents who started 
Takae’s struggle include many residents with a “non-local” background: a point I will 
develop further below.  
 
 
                                                 
275 Ibid., 143-144. 
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5.7. Who Are the Locals? Rural Community and “Yosomono” 
“Who are the people in the Takae Residents’ Society?” After a few weeks of my stay in 
Takae, I found myself asking this question. One reason why I began to confront such a 
question was because the Takae Residents’ Society was such a different community in many 
respects from many other anti-base groups and communities in Okinawa. First of all, while 
ageing is a common problem for not just the Japanese population but also for anti-base 
activists in Okinawa, the Takae Residents’ Society has a high proportion of younger people. 
While many protest communities in Okinawa are led by people with grey hair who were born 
around the late 1940s, most of the people in the Takae Residents’ Society were younger than 
their mid-50s when I visited. Secondly, many of the community members do not have an 
accent influenced by the local dialect. Some speak a kind of pidgin language of the local 
dialect and the standard Japanese, and some speak with an Okinawan accent. Contrary to my 
previous encounters with other protest communities and my stereotypical image of 
Okinawa’s rural community, these elements made me intrigued about who these people were. 
 This demographic diversity within Takae’s protest community reflects the fact that 
the majority of them were born outside Okinawa. Although the actual number is still 
uncertain, a large number of residents who participated in the Takae struggle are from 
mainland Japan. To my knowledge, Miyagi Katsumi is the only person who was born and 
spent most of his life in Takae. The co-founders of the Takae Residents’ Society, Ashimine 
Gentatsu and Isa Masatsugu, are both native Okinawans, but their wives who also play 
crucial roles in the community are both from Tokyo. One of the residents in the community, 
Higa Masato, also has Okinawan parents but was born and raised in Nagoya in Aichi 
Prefecture as a second generation Okinawan migrant. Apart from them, most of the 
community members originally came from many different parts of mainland Japan. Some of 
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them migrated because of this untouched natural environment of Yanbaru Forest before or 
after 2007 and some came to participate in the anti-base struggle. 
The Takae Resident Society contains people from diverse backgrounds. In terms of 
occupation, they are farmers, teachers, public servants and artists. Most of them came from 
elsewhere to live in this rural place, attracted by Takae’s rich natural environment. One of the 
senior figures of the protest community, Ashimine Gentatsu, is one of the earliest people 
among the community members to move into Takae with his family in the early 2000s. 
Ashimine was born and raised in Naha in the early 1960s. After graduating from a local 
elementary school, he stopped going to classes in his early teenage years. With “only a 
graduate certificate from elementary school” (to use his own words) Ashimine started 
working as a carpenter in his hometown.276 As he became older, Ashimine moved to 
mainland Japan and lived in Tokyo for several years working as a house builder. After 
coming back to Okinawa, he lived in different parts of Okinawa including remote islands. It 
was in the early 2000s that he moved with his wife and their children to Takae, where they 
started organic farming. When they first visited Takae, Ashimine was mesmerized by the 
forest, which also used to exist in his hometown, Naha, before it was industrialized. 
Particularly, his favorite spot was near the headwaters of Arakawa Creek. Fortunately, he 
could buy an abandoned farm for an “extremely cheap price.” While living in a van, 
Ashimine built his house and café near the creek in the middle of the deep Yanbaru Forest. 
The café was named “Yamagame”, which means a “water jar in the mountain”. This name 
shows his attachment to the rich natural environment of Yanbaru Forest, which is one of the 
main water supplies for the rest of Okinawa. When the residents established No Helipad 
Takae Resident Society in 2007, Ashimine participated as a founding member. His 
participation was based on a very simple reason. He felt that this place of dreams embraced 
                                                 
276 Interview with Ashimine Gentsu, 28 Jan, 2012. 
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by Yanbaru Forest would disappear once construction started. Without any experience of 
social activism, this was how his life as a “protesting local resident” (jimoto hantai jyūmin) 
began. 
Another senior figure of the community, Morioka Kōji, is also running an organic 
farm. He was born and raised in downtown Tokyo in the late 1970s. While he lived in Tokyo, 
he was known as a guitarist in the indie music scene. After working in many different kinds 
of jobs while continuing his career as an indie musician, Morioka had some financial 
problems with what he describes as “troublesome people.” So he decided to quit all previous 
jobs including music, and left Tokyo. After travelling to various countries in Asia, he came 
back to Japan, and he met his future wife, who studied natural farming under a pioneer of the 
“natural farming method”, Fukuoka Masanobu.277 They moved together to Takae in the early 
2000s. Despite the great environment, living by natural farming in Takae was not easy. The 
problem was the poor quality of the soil for raising vegetables: “when I first started farming 
here, it was stony so almost no one expected that I could succeed in producing crops.”278 Yet, 
after years of experience, Moriooka’s farm land began to grow produce such as potatoes, 
cabbages, lettuce, radishes and so on. This story was well-known in the village, and 
impressed other community dwellers. They said Morita’s farm made tomatoes out of stones. 
Among the younger community members, Shimizu Akira is a unique character in the 
community. He was born in Tokyo to a family of medical doctors. His brothers were all 
educated in order to follow their father’s career. It was only Shimizu who refused to walk on 
                                                 
277 Fukuoka Masanobu (1913-2008) is one of the earliest advocates of “natural farming”, a type of organic 
farming method. Fukuoka’s natural farming is characterized by four principles, which are “no cultivation of 
farmland”, “no fertilisation”, “no pesticide”, and “no weeding”. One of the main inventions of Fukuoka is a ball 
of soil mixed with various different types of seeds and clay called nendo bōru or seed ball. In fact, this seed ball 
contains a small amount of non-chemical fertilizer. He planted this ball in designated areas and let some of the 
seeds grow. As his farming method relies largely on the power of the soil and minimum human intervention, it 
was called natural farming to distinguish it from other organic farming methods. Fukuoka’s seed ball was later 
adopted in various countries to restore natural environment in deforested areas. 
278 Interview with Morioka Kōji, January 28, 2012. 
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the same path as his other family members. Instead, he chose to study painting at an art 
college. His rejection of family tradition was so determined that he left the family house and 
chose to live as a homeless person in various places including by a riverside in Tokyo. One 
day, Shimizu learnt the story of Takae from his friend. So he took a trip to visit the 
community in the late 2000s, and he somehow began to settle in. He acts as a child carer in 
the community. While other members are working on farms, he takes care of their children. 
He is also the manager of tūtan-ya and the accommodation for the visitors. 
The director of the No Helipad Takae Resident Society, Takahashi Masahiro, is one 
of the younger members of the community. Although Takahashi is relatively young, he has 
been in this position as director since 2010. Born and raised in the northern part of Japan, 
Sendai City, Takahashi withdrew from high school after attending only a few months. When 
I asked him why he chose to leave school, he quietly said “I only aimed to pass the exam and 
enter that prestigious high school. I liked their school culture. But once I entered, I lost my 
interest in that school.”279 After working in his local town a few years, he travelled around 
China and mainland Southeast Asian countries. His encounter with the hamlet of Takae was 
accidental. He was travelling Okinawa to learn its traditional string-musical instrument called 
sanshin. With his modest and mature personality, he did not take long to become popular 
among other community members. When the protest movement heated up in the late 2000s, 
Takahashi was asked by Ashimine to stay in Takae longer and also to work for the Residents’ 
Society as the Director. However, he refused Ashimine’s offer at first. He felt that the job 
was too responsible for an outsider like him. So he left Takae with ambivalent feelings of 
affection with its community and embarrassment to be involved with internal communal 
matters. Takahashi came back to Takae a year later in 2009. However, Takahashi still does 
                                                 
279 Interview with Takahashi Masahiro, January 28, 2012. 
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not feel comfortable to act as director. Although he is clearly trusted by the community, he 
often describes himself as “yosomono (outsider)”. 
Takahashi’s self-recognition as “outsider” is not only his personal story but it is 
actually a key term which characterizes the unique membership of the Takae Residents’ 
Society. Many of the Takae’s protest community members in Takae are “‘yosomono”, in that 
they came from elsewhere in Japan. Individual and group participants who are called 
“supporters (shiensha)” are also outsiders who regularly or irregularly visit Takae to 
participate in sit-in. Although their level of commitment varies depending on the individual 
and their circumstances, some of those non-resident participants from  mainland Japan stay in 
Takae for several months. The notion of Okinawan ethnic identity cannot really encompass 
the nature of this movement in Takae. On the contrary, careless use of the discourse of 
ethnicity creates tension within the community (a point which we will discuss more fully in 
the following chapter). In order to re-examine the commonality that connects the diversity of 
Takae’s movement, we need to consider alternative frameworks based on the subtle balance 
of locality and extra-locality.280 
The discourse of “yosomono” or “outsider” is important not only to highlight the 
diversity of the membership. It also characterizes the Takae Residents’ Society in relation to 
other residents in Takae who do not participate in the protest movement. In fact, the term is 
often used by other local Takae residents to differentiate themselves from the protest 
community members. Although the demography of Higashi Village has been changing 
dynamically since the beginning of the modern period, there is a clear line between the local 
villagers who are involved with the protest movement and those who are not using the notion 
                                                 
280 Kosuzu Abe, “Kurikaeshi Kawaru: Okinawa ni okeru Chokusetu Kōdō no Genzai-shinkōkei”. 
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of “insider” and “outsider”.281 Locals who disagree with the protest community use the term 
“old residents” (furui jūmin) to refer to themselves and “new residents” (atarashii jūmin) for 
those who join the sit-in movement. Those “old” and “new” are not merely temporal 
classification but those terms also differentiate people who know the history of the difficult 
environment of Takae and those who are newly settled in the village. For “old residents”, 
newcomers are people who do not understand the experiences and the history of the village 
from the days when the locals still made their living mainly by forestry and by cultivating 
new fields.  
This is also related to the local experience under US influence. For many villagers, 
the US military had been perceived not only as enemy or threat but also as modernizer of 
Takae’s backward infrastructure, making roads and installing electricity. It is true that there 
were many tragic incidents which happened between the local residents and US military, 
such as an old woman who was shot by US soldiers when she walked in the Yanbaru Forest. 
Also, there was a case where a house was burnt without any apparent reason by Americans. 
The most notorious problem concerns the Vietnam War period, when some locals were 
required to play the role of Vietnamese guerrillas for the training purposes of the US Marine 
Corps. However, as journalist Mikami Chie notes, some villagers say that the relationship 
between the locals and Americans was one of “give-and-take”. Therefore, for many of those 
                                                 
281 According to the official history of the village, Higashi Village experienced mass mobility of people several 
times. The first mass settlement of people in this region occurred in the nineteenth century. After the Ryūkyū 
Disposal, the warriors who did not own their lands moved to Yanbaru to develop the area. This movement was 
encouraged by Okinawa Prefecture from the 1890s until the early twentieth century. Having an intention to 
increase the population of the region, the Okinawa government provided financial support for those who 
moved to the northern part of the island. These early settlers were mostly engaged in the forestry industry. 
The second mass movement of people to Yanbaru region occurred during the Battle of Okinawa. They were 
refugees who fled to the northern Yanbaru from south and central parts of Okinawa such as Naha and Yomitan 
Village. The exact number is still uncertain. However, the local official history introduced an episode by a war 
survivor who considered that nearly 100,000 people came from the South. During the final stages of the war, 
most of these refugees and the local residents were kept in the camps such as Taira by the Allied Powers. 
However, there was a number of people who experienced the end of the war in the forest. 
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who lived in Takae over decades, the Takae Residents’ Society does not represent all 
residents. However, the separation of “old residents” and “new residents” is not fixed. Even 
among “old residents”, there are people involved with the protest movement such as 
Miyazato Katsuya. Also, there are quite a few Takae residents who are sympathetic to the sit-
in community.282  
Through the lens of “yosomono” or “outsider”, we can understand what makes 
Takae’s protest community. It is not only made of Okinawans and Okinawan identity but also 
of attachment to a specific locale within Okinawa. As Masamichi Inoue reveals by examining 
the case of the local protest movement in Henoko, so too in Takae the notion of “Okinawan 
identity” alone has limits in effectively mobilizing people and resources. Therefore we need 
to consider alternative concepts which can be more appropriate to frame the identity of a 
local protest community. The notion of “outsider” becomes a key to understand this issue. 
While the term is often used to separate Okinawan from the mainland Japanese in the 
mainstream narrative of the Okinawa struggle, in the case of Takae the term also includes 
newly settled Okinawans who do not share the local history as their own experience. In this 
sense, new residents from Okinawa such as Ashimine and Isa and from mainland Japan such 
as Takahashi and Morioka are all “outsiders” for the majority of Takae residents who do not 
participate in the movement. Although lack of effective support from the majority of other 
villagers is a problem because of their nature as marginal within the peripheral village, it 
shows rather clearly why this small communal movement by Takae’s new residents attracts 
many participants from all over Japan and elsewhere and how their relatively inclusive and 
network-based community was created. Most of the shiensha or supporters who visit and stay 
in Takae are informed of the local protest community through their social and cultural 
networks. In other words, one of the key factors that develops Takae’s protest community is 
                                                 
282 Taku Morizumi and Chie Mikami, “Okinawa Takae Yanbaru de Ikiru,” (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2014): 127-128. 
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the pre-existing personal networks that those “outsiders” established before they moved into 
Takae. 
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Image 5-7. A farm in Takae. The photo was taken by the author in December 2011. 
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5.8. Affective Community 
If conventional explanations of the Okinawa struggle can only partially explain Takae’s 
struggle, what are the other elements that explain communal values in the struggle?  
Sociologist Abe Kosuzu recently presented an important analysis in this regard. Through 
long-term participation as an activist as well as researcher, she focuses upon subcultural 
elements as key components for making Takae’s struggle community. While Okinawan 
identity based on ethnicity and the historical narrative of colonial Okinawa emphasizes social 
cooperation, a focus on subcultures provides us with a microscope to see other layers of 
mutuality among community members. Abe raises the examples of shared subcultures in 
Takae such as music and naturalism (e.g. Do It Yourself, organic farming, and refusal of 
consumerism and chemical products in everyday life). Although these elements have not 
been much discussed in relation to the Okinawa struggle, they are surely important in 
understanding the intimacy of Takae’s protest community. Raising these affective elements, 
Abe emphasizes the intimate relationships of friendship.283 
In the earlier part of this chapter, I mentioned some examples of the local practices of 
intimacy. A senior community member, Ashimine, is one of the practitioners of DIY culture. 
With his skills as a house builder, he has built his house, motels and a café around Takae by 
himself. Morioka is another person who built his own house once he settled in. One of the co-
representatives of the Takae Residents’ Society, Isa Masatsugu, is a further good example. 
He is one of the few remaining artisans who professionally make traditional Okinawan 
spiritual tablets called tōtōme. But besides his work, Isa built his own studio near his house 
after he settled in this new environment. Nevertheless, I do not intend to merely introduce 
people who make their own living place. The important point is that their DIY culture is 
                                                 
283 Kosuzu Abe, “Kurikaeshi Kawaru: Okinawa ni okeru Chokusetu Kōdō no Genzai Shinkōkei,” 68. 
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closely associated with their naturalistic philosophy and avoidance of modern chemical 
products in everyday life. For example, most houses in Takae are not connected to a sewage 
system. They are designed to only store waste water underground or leak water through 
drains. In either case, the waste water is most likely to be absorbed to the ground. Therefore, 
it is harmful for the surrounding natural environment if the local residents use chemical 
products such as synthetic detergent or mass-produced shampoos. When I asked what they 
use for washing, for example, Ashimine said that he and his family use additive-free soap 
made of rice bran.  
Nevertheless, it is also important to remind us of the fact that the community is not 
totally removed from modern urban social life. The Takae community offers synthetic 
detergent and other popular daily products for visitors and use various kinds of electric 
products. However, the important point is to focus on their critical concerns with popular 
social life. As shown in some of the personal episodes earlier, most of the community 
members were previously city dwellers at some stage of their lives, but experienced 
discomfort with a highly industrialized way of life. From this perspective, it is fair to argue 
that their discomfort with urban life was derived from a sense of excessively fabricated state 
of production and consumption. Instead, what they wanted was immediate or intimate 
relationships with their life world including economic activity such as production, exchange 
and consumption. It is those affective aspects that connect Takae’s protest community 
members. 
In this sense, as Abe carefully discusses, Takae’s protest is characteristic of the 
contemporary wave of anti-base movements in the Okinawa struggle. Like the Henoko 
protest, Takae’s protest community can also be categorized as an environmental movement to 
protect nature (in this case the beautiful Yanbaru Forest). Yet, it is equally important to 
remind ourselves that Takae’s struggle is not separate from other anti-base struggles in 
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Okinawa. On the contrary, the Takae protestors learn from Okinawa’s past struggles through 
the experience of conducting their sit-in. Exchanges of ideas with experienced Okinawan 
activists are a crucial social practice in Takae. The participation in sit-in represents a 
conscious continuation of Okinawa’s conventional way of peaceful direct action. These 
social practices induce the protesters to imagine the voices of Okinawa’s past.284 From this 
perspective, it is evident that the conventional narrative of the Okinawa struggle still plays a 
vital role. In other words, the narratives and experiences of the Okinawan people in the past 
are embedded and actualised in the community members through their direct experiences of 
sit-in. 
 
5.9. “Flowers in A Dream”  
Lastly, I would like to introduce one further example of Takae’s communal practice. As I 
mentioned earlier, music plays a crucial role in making organic relationships among 
community members. There are quite a few local residents who are skilled performers of 
musical instruments of many kinds—guitars, sanshin, drums, and so forth. The genres of 
music they play cover a wide range including folk music, classic and contemporary 
Okinawan songs, and improvisation. Some of those whom I introduced above have been 
professional performers. Thus, in community building and developing social bonding among 
with each other, music often appears to work to strengthen local identity. Nevertheless, I also 
need to stress that music is not only working inwardly but also outwardly. That is, the local 
residents use music as a means to deliver the the message of the ongoing local struggle of 
Takae to people outside. In this sense, music plays a crucial role as a medium that connects 
the community and the outside world.  
                                                 
284 Ibid., 80-90. 
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The following song called “Yume no Hana” (Flowers in A Dream) is one which I 
heard during my stay in Takae—most often at drinking parties after meetings by seniors at 
tūtan-ya. The song is originally composed by Shimizu, who has never been professionally 
trained as a musician. Nevertheless, this unsophisticated song with an uncharacteristically 
plain rhythm performed on the sanshin soon became a popular song among other community 
members due to its easy melody and friendly lyrics. The song has become a favourite not 
only because of its peaceful aura but also because of the fact that it has a message that 
reflects the spiritual dimension of the locals in Takae towards destruction of their livelihood 
space. This song acknowledges the diverse natural habitat that the locals live with, and thus 
gives us an insight into the elements that motivate and unite the local residents to join the 
anti-base movement, and helps us to see how a local livelihood space has turned into a 
“protest community”. 
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“Yume no Hana” (Flowers in A Dream)  
If I see a dream, I would walk to it 
(Yume wo mitara soko e aruitetteshimau) 
So I want a dream 
(Dakara yume wa taisetsu) 
Once I thought the shape of a rainbow is semicircular 
(Niji wa hanbun to omotte itakedo) 
But I saw a circular one 
(Marui niji wo mitayo) 
If I see a dream, I would walk to it 
(Yume wo mitara soko e aruitetteshimau) 
We can do it, walk 
(Watashitachi wa dekiru, aruku koto ga) 
Don’t give up, let’s see a dream 
(Akiramenaide yume wo miyō) 
Don’t rush, let’s walk 
(Murishinaide arukō) 
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5.10. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined contemporary characteristics of Okinawa’s anti-base 
movement using the example of the protest community in Takae. As mentioned earlier, 
Takae, together with Henoko, is another “focal point” of the debates on the base relocation in 
Okinawa. Based on Yakabi and Okamoto’s approach, my question was how people organize 
a protest community without emphasising conventional Okinawan identity. In other words, 
the major concern of this chapter was how a protest community is made by people who 
redefine their membership between locality and extra-locality. In order to examine this issue, 
I employed social networks, local spirituality and affective relationships such as friendship as 
alternative useful concepts to analyze the case of Takae’s struggle. Through the lens of those 
concepts, this chapter demonstrates what form local communal identity is and how it is 
created and practised. In the next chapter, I shall consider the unique collectivity of Takae’s 
protest community in relation to local, national and global base politics. In doing so, I aim to 
identify both the vulnerability and resilience of this community, which has become a crucial 
node of transnational anti-base civic struggle. 
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Chapter Six 
Yanbaru and Recreating “Okinawan Identity” 
 
 
 
The photo was taken by the author at Henoko Beach in November 2011. 
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6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed some distinctive aspects of the current protest community 
in Takae. By analyzing the Takae Residents’ Society in terms of actors, lived experiences 
and their social practices, I discussed how the local movement is created by people across 
diverse social backgrounds, their social networks and their attachment to the place. Facing a 
crisis of their local livelihood due to the base construction how does the Takae Residents’ 
Society articulate the notion of “Okinawan identity” to promote their ongoing local struggle 
against state violence? What is “Okinawan identity” for the protest community in Takae? 
How does this discourse of cultural identity function for the local activists? Also, how do the 
local protesters use or differentiate themselves from the discourse of “Okinawan identity”? 
By illustrating the dynamics of the political and social environment around the local protest 
community, in this chapter I analyze the complicated relationship of the Takae Residents’ 
Society to “Okinawan identity”. 
 
6.2. “Authorized Entry Only”: ODB and Governing the Yanbaru Forest 
Takae is located in the highlands of the Yanbaru ranges, so mornings in Takae’s winter are 
colder than in the southern cities. It is also much quieter than the south. With few cars driving 
on the street, I could hear birdsong in the distance, including the endangered Okinawa 
woodpecker (or noguchigera in Japanese). However, one day in mid-November 2011, the 
heavy roar of cars broke the morning silence.  
“That must be Bōeikyoku. They’re heading to the tents,” said an elderly man with large 
glasses.  
This man was Tomihisa from Kanagawa, who is one of those who visit Takae regularly as a 
supporter (shiensha). We rushed to the tents of the sit-in in front of the construction site. 
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When we arrived at the N-4 tents, I saw a few small trucks and white vans parked on 
one side of the road, and protesters sitting quietly on the other side of the road. With their 
hand-made barricade with ropes, wires and cars, they were facing a group of men in white 
working clothes and helmets. These men in the working uniform were officers from Okinawa 
Defense Bureau (ODB). Today, the ODB (or Okinawa Bōeikyoku in Japanese) is one of the 
eight regional defense bureaus, which are in charge of administration with regard to the 
defense facilities under the Minister of Defense. These regional defense bureaus were 
originally established in 1947 under Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA). Its 
mission was to supply materials and build facilities for the US occupation forces around 
Japan. The local branch in Okinawa was established after Okinawa’s return to Japan in 1972. 
Following the establishment of the Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMD) in 2007, DFAA and 
the regional bureaus were incorporated as part of JMD and the ODB became the main 
administrative body that plans and implements the policy related to the US base facilities in 
Okinawa Prefecture. The ODB is not only working for the US bases in Okinawa. It also plays 
a central role to connect the local infrastructure companies and the JMD and the US bases in 
Okinawa. The ODB is the responsible government agency that organizes tenders for the 
construction works related to the US and Japanese Self-Defense Forces to the local 
construction firms and supervises construction processes. 
 “Authorized entry only in this area. Please leave this place,” a senior ODB officer 
pronounced through a loudspeaker to the protesters who were conducting the sit-in at the gate 
of the construction site.  
There were about fifteen ODB officers confronting the protesters. The protesters were 
looking down at the ground on which they were sitting. None of them replied to the call from 
the ODB officers. Following their leader’s statement, the younger officers repeated exactly 
the same words to the protesters. “This is a private area. Please remove your cars...” 
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“Authorized entry only in this area. Please leave this place…” Surprisingly, they repeated the 
same sentences over and over again. From early in the morning until noon, this endless 
chanting lasted for several hours. Another group of ODB officers held a small video camera, 
filming the protesters from the back of the trucks. 
 Behind the ODB officers were a group of men in blue jackets and baseball caps. 
Some were wearing blue vests saying “Police” in English. These officers were sent from the 
Okinawa Prefectural Police. Like the ODB officers, the police officers were also recording 
the protesters with video cameras. However, these two public authorities came to Takae for 
different purposes. While ODB came to open the gate to the construction site, the police 
officers’ main job was to monitor the protesters. Standing separated from the ODB and the 
protesters, they were monitoring whether the people’s protest action was practised without 
violating legal regulations. According to the Act called Keitokuhō,285 unauthorised entry to 
the local US military bases is strictly prohibited. In Takae’s case, the protesters are not 
allowed to go beyond the gate of the helipad construction site, which is recognized as state-
owned land by the Japanese government. Also, the people involved with the sit-in are not 
allowed to occupy public roads during the protest campaign. The space the protesters use for 
the sit-in is limited to the land between the gate and the driveways. Within those regulations, 
freedom of expression is one of the very few legal rights which they can mobilize in their 
direct protest action. However, those who conduct the sit-in are usually quiet. Senior 
protesters are worried about possible unexpected physical clashes between the protesters and 
                                                 
285 Keitokuhō is an abbreviation of Nihon-koku to Amerika-koku tono aida no Sōgo Kyōryoku oyobi Anzen Hoshō 
Jōyaku Dai-rokujō ni Motozuku Shisetsu oyobi Kuiki narabini Nihon-koku ni okeru Gasshūkoku no Chi-i ni Kan-
suru Kyōtei no Jisshi ni Tomonau Keiji Tokubetsu Hō. (Act to Provide for the Special Criminal Act pertaining to 
the Enforcement of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed 
Forces in Japan) 
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the ODB. Therefore, when Takahashi Masahiro, Director of the Takae Residents’ Society, 
saw me arrive at the tent, he told me strictly not to say anything and sit quietly.  
The protesters were all sitting silently. Some of them were looking up at the faces of 
the ODB officers, and some were looking down to the ground. Some of them were smoking 
cigarettes, and some were eating their breakfast. Yet, they were all equally silent. These silent 
people formed a human chain to barricade the entrance of the helipad construction sites. The 
major concern among senior members of the protest group is the possibility that some 
participants might violate a law or give some excuse for the ODB and the police to justify 
forceful dismantling of the protest. Therefore, sitting quietly is the safest. When the protesters 
are tired of listening to the ODB officers, or when they want to stretch their legs, people leave 
the barricade line and go to one of the nearby tents. Although the protesters usually do not 
have any physical contact with the ODB, their silent protest action required stamina and is 
stressful for the participants.  
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Image 6-1. Officers from Okinawa Defence Bureau facing the local residents and supporters. Two elderly 
women wearing straw hats are playing Okinawan traditional songs on sanshin in order to drown out the 
voices of the ODB officers. The photo was taken by the author in February 2012. 
 
 
Image 6-2. Okinawa Prefectural Police officers monitoring protestors. The photo was taken by the author 
in February 2012. 
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6.3. “Go Home Yamatū”: The Tanaka Incident and the Meaning of “Japaneseness” 
Being Director of the ODB is one of the most challenging positions for defense bureaucrats. 
However, it is also one of the best ways to climb the career ladder. Tanaka Satoshi took over 
this position in August 2011. This elite bureaucrat in his 50s was widely regarded as 
ambitious and self-confident. Graduating from Osaka University, one of the most prestigious 
Japanese universities, Tanaka carved out his career as an elite bureaucrat mainly in the 
management of the defense facilities in regional areas, including Okinawa. After the previous 
Director of the ODB, Manabe Rō, resigned earlier in the month due to his long service as the 
Head, the newly appointed regional director was sent not merely to oversee construction 
work in Henoko and Takae but also to resolve this difficult work that had been delayed for 
many years because of the local protest campaign. 
A few months after his appointment, on 28 November 2011, Tanaka organized an 
informal dinner session with journalists. As the local delegate from the JMD, his main 
mission was to help restart the building process of the off-shore landing zone in Ōura Bay in 
Henoko and Takae in Yanbaru, which was suspended in this transition period of the Head of 
the ODB.  The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government had gained wide support from 
Okinawan progressive camps during the national election campaign in December 2009 
because its manifesto included a promise to close Futenma Airbase without building 
substitute military facilities in Okinawa. But the leadership radically changed its national 
security policy after the Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio resigned, admitting that the DPJ’s 
manifesto had been unrealistic. Instead of pursuing its initial policy, the DPJ government 
shifted its policy and agreed to follow the SACO (Special Action Committee of Okinawa) 
agreement signed by the leaders of the previous LDP government with Washington back in 
1996. The Japanese Minister of Defense, Ichikawa Yasuo, was desperate to progress the base 
construction in Henoko and Takae. The Japanese government was planning to submit an 
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environmental assessment of Henoko in order to get approval to start construction from the 
Governor of Okinawa, Nakaima Hirokazu.286  
In this context, Tanaka was dispatched to Okinawa with expectations not only from 
the Japanese government, but also from the US. Tanaka’s informal drink session with invited 
journalists from approximately 10 different companies was designed as an opportunity to 
exchange frank conversation with them. During the conversation, some journalists asked 
Tanaka about the possible schedule for submitting an environmental assessment report to 
Governor Nakaima. The Defense Minister, Ichikawa, had said that the Japanese government 
planned to submit this by the end of the year. All the journalists who joined that evening were 
keen to know when the government planned to submit the report. However, Tanaka did not 
provide any more information than the official announcement. Thus, some of the participants 
asked why the information needed to be kept from the public. In response, Tanaka asked the 
journalists, “If you were planning to assault [or rape] someone, would you tell them in 
advance?” (Korekara okasu mae ni okasu to iimasuka?) As this was a statement at an 
“informal” drink session, most of the media did not publicise Tanaka’s comment, but the 
local Okinawan newspaper, the Ryūkyū Shimpō, did report his words. Its editorial board 
recognized that “this statement is a matter of public interest.”287 Soon after the editorial board 
decided to publicize this news, an extra edition was printed. Following the Ryūkyū Shimpō, 
another major local newspaper the Okinawa Times also covered Tanaka’s statement on the 
front page the next morning. (See Image 6-3) Reflecting on this statement, the Headquarters 
                                                 
286 The Environment Impact Assessment Act (Kankyō Eikyō Hyōka Hō) was passed in 1997 to define the legal 
process of the construction of the mass infrastructural facilities. Based on this law, the business operator is 
obliged to conduct an assessment of the possible environmental impact caused by the construction of mass 
infrastructure, to create the report on the result of the assessment and to submit the report to the govern-
ment and other related public agencies. This law has regulatory power to affect the ways of conducting con-
struction of mass public facilities such as dams, roads, power plants, airports etc. 
287 Anon, ‘’’Okasumae ni Iuka’Tanaka Bōeikyokuchō Henoko Hyōkasho Teishutsu meguri,’’ Ryūkyū Shimpō (29 
November 2011), accessed July 20, 2015, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-184598-storytopic-3.html. 
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of JMD in Tokyo decided to force Tanaka to step down from his position only a few months 
after his appointment.  
In Japanese, the term “okasu” has different meanings depending on the 
circumstances. Generally, it implies acts to violate laws and morals. Yet in more specific 
contexts, it can also mean to assault (including in the sense of sexual assault). In the context 
of the Okinawan anti-base movement, the word comes to have an even more particular 
meaning. The term evokes the rape incident committed by three US military personnel in 
1995, the memory of which is far from disappearing from people’s minds. Immediately after 
the news was reported, Tanaka’s statement was interpreted as a rapist’s threat. The Okinawa 
Times’ headline was “the abuse against women”. Along with people involved with 
environmental activist groups who opposed restarting off-shore base construction, Okinawan 
feminists came to the frontline of the protest campaign. There were a number of protest 
demonstrations and meetings around early December of 2012. University students and 
faculty members from local universities held several symposia on the issue. Workers’ unions, 
peace activist groups, and progressive political parties organized street demonstrations in 
front of the Prefectural Government building and the headquarters of ODB in Kadena City. 
Local political leaders such as the Governor of Okinawa, Nakaima Masahiro, also expressed 
deep disappointment with Tanaka’s statement.288 Although the number of participants was 
not great compared to the protest campaign in 1995, Tanaka’s careless statement triggered an 
island-wide protest campaign across political lines. 
“Take your bases back home, nihonjin (Japanese)!” 
“Die, yamatū (Japanese)!” 
                                                 
288 Ryūkyū Shimpō special edition (November 29, 2011), accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://ryukyushimpo.jp/uploads/img4ed4c0f19f4c7.pdf. 
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One of the senior activists who is also a famous Christian pastor, Shimada Zenji, shouted 
these words through an amplifier during the street demonstration in Naha. Not only Shima 
but also many Okinawan citizens were extremely frustrated with the DPJ, which they once 
voted for, hoping that this new ruling party would implement the base relocation to outside 
Okinawa as promised in its manifesto. Even after Tanaka’s dismissal, the people’s anger in 
Okinawa did not seem to calm. The sentiment of betrayal by the DPJ was expressed in 
aggressive words not only against the government but also against the Japanese people as a 
whole.  
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Image 6-3. Okinawa Taimusu (Okinawa Times), reporting Tanaka’s statement, 30 November 2011. 
 
          
Image 6-4. Protest in front of the Headquarters of the ODB in Kadena, 30 November 2011. 
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Image 6-5. A newspaper article reporting about a symposium held by concerned scholars, feminist 
activists and students on Tanaka’s statement, 8 December 2011.289 
 
                                                 
289 Okinawa Times, 9 Dec 2011. 
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6.4. “Bōeikyoku, Go Home!”: Takae and the Meaning of “Japaneseness” 
The Tanaka incident also changed the atmosphere of the Takae anti-helipad movement. As 
the base relocation plan was directly related to the future of Takae as well as Henoko, the 
Residents’ Society also raised their voices. With the help of experienced senior activists, the 
Director of the Residents’ Society, Takahashi, wrote a protest statement and disseminated it 
immediately to other protest communities in Okinawa. Beginning by saying that Tanaka’s 
forced resignation was “unavoidable”, the statement accused the Japanese government of 
appointing “a terribly barbaric bureaucrat” (osorubeki yaban na kanryō) as the person 
responsible for overseeing the base construction in Henoko and Takae amid the serious 
confrontation between the Japanese government and the people in Okinawa Prefecture.290  
Yet the release of the statement was not the end. In contrast to the silent sit-ins which 
had occurred until then, some senior activists in Takae started raising their voices. On the 
streets, they yelled directly at the ODB officers. One of these activists who lifted his voice 
using a loudspeaker was Yamashiro Hiroji. Yamashiro is originally the Director of a Naha-
based activist group called Okinawa Peace Movement Centre, which is affiliated with the 
Japanese Social Democratic Party. He is also one of the most well-regarded peace activists in 
Okinawa, and has run for the national parliamentary election. Since the Takae struggle started 
in 2007, Yamashiro became one of the most frequent visitors to the protest site. Moreover, he 
plays a role as a senior advisor for the protest campaign in Takae. He shouted at ODB 
officers that no one any longer trusts the ODB’s words about reducing “the burden of the 
bases” in Okinawa.  
                                                 
290 The content of the protest statement is available from Shun Medoruma, Uminari no Shima kara, 
http://blog.goo.ne.jp/awamori777/e/17b5782ba00668264bc38c75477b2e0b. 
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His shouts were so loud that the ODB officers started blocking their ears with their hands,but 
Yamashiro did not stop. He then shouted:  
“ODB, go home! Protect our Yanbaru Forest!” (Bōeikyoku wa kaere! Yanbaru no mori wo 
mamore!) 
Other protestors joined in, and, confronted by the chorus of voices, the ODB officers 
retreated to their vans and then left. After that, they did not come back for several weeks, 
returning only in late December. It was a small moment of victory for the protesters. 
The Tanaka incident not only intensified the tension between the protesters and their 
opponents but it also changed the methods of the protest. As I mentioned earlier, the protest 
around this period became more vocal, rather than only having people silently sitting on the 
ground. People such as Yamashiro did not choose their words randomly. These experienced 
activists were careful in their choice of expressions. For example, Yamashiro and his fellow 
protestors shouted “Okinawans will not be betrayed by Japanese government”, and 
“Okinawans are all angry with you [ODB and Japanese government]”. These words express 
the adversarial relationship between Okinawan people and Japanese. However, it is important 
to note a major difference between the words that Yamashiro used in Takae and those used 
by Shimada in Naha. In the Takae protests, the term “Japanese” was always used in 
combination with “government”, whereas people such as Shimada in Naha used the term to 
mean “Japanese people and government” during the demonstration in Naha. As Richard 
Siddle says, the meaning of “Okinawan identity” is complicated and used differently even 
among Okinawan anti-base activists.291 The differences between Yamashiro's and Shimada’s 
protest slogans exemplifies the complexity of the term “Japanese” in relation to “Okinawan”.  
                                                 
291 For contested understanding of the history of Okinawa, see, for example, Richard Siddle, “Colonialism and 
Identity in Okinawa before 1945,” Japanese Studies 18 (1998): 117–33. 
233 
Also, it is important to consider how the local protesters express not only anger with 
the Japanese government but also attachment to their local space. In this context, the Yanbaru 
Forest becomes a symbol of their local environment to protect from destruction. The words 
“protect our Yanbaru Forest” are a key expression of the reason or legitimation for 
conducting their protest in Takae. As Masamichi Inoue finds in the local struggle in Henoko, 
what we can understand from the Takae struggle is that the local protesters have a different 
communal identity that cannot be covered by any monolithic notion of “Okinawan identity”. 
Takae’s communal identity and Okinawan identity overlap in many respects. But Takae’s 
communal protest campaign is conducted by “the Takae residents” against the “ODB” and 
“Japanese government”, whereas in some other cases “Okinawan identity” is pitted against a 
unitary “Japan” (including government and people) to condemn Japan’s indifference and 
discriminatory policy on the base problems in Okinawa. Therefore, from this perspective, the 
divisive notion of “Japanese” and “Okinawans” are considered as highly sensitive words in 
Takae. 
It is true that when the local Okinawans shout a vulgar statement against “Japanese” 
to criticize the current political situation in Okinawa, they say that it clears their minds 
temporarily. Also, it is fair to argue that Okinawa’s subordinated situation under the Japan–
US security system has historical roots in the outset of Okinawa’s incorporation by the 
Japanese in 1879. From this perspective, we can understand the reason why such a divisive 
term is still effective among the local activists. However, what complicates our understanding 
of the local identity is that people like Shimada who shouted hostility against Japan are not 
necessarily supporters of Okinawa’s independence movement. Also, their communities are 
not always exclusive towards the mainland Japanese. In fact, Shimada has been the 
representative of a protest community, Futenma Bakuon Soshōdan (the Citizens against the 
Noise from Futenma Airbase), which consisted not only of Okinawans but also some 
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mainland Japanese. In this sense, although it tends to be simply considered as divisive and 
antagonistic statement against the rest of the Japanese outside Okinawa, this interpretation 
represents little of the actual intention of Shimada’s accusation. Rather, we always need to 
remind ourselves of the political context of Okinawa in which people like Shimada have to 
use the term “Japanese”. 
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Image 6-6. An elderly woman begging ODB officers to stop construction of the helipad. The photo was 
taken by the author in December 2011. 
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6.5. “We Uchinānchu”292 and Takae 
After the Tanaka incident ignited the island-wide protest campaign, the number of visitors to 
Takae increased. Many of these visitors came on one-day trips from the southern cities of 
Okinawa. After hearing or reading about Takae’s anti-helipad construction campaign, they 
came to visit, usually on weekends. One day in mid-December 2012, a middle aged couple 
from the Oroku district of Naha visited our tent. Yamashiro, Kosuzu, Takahashi and myself 
were there at the time. As always, Takahashi politely welcomed the visitors with tea. As he 
sipped his tea, the visitor from Naha started to talk about the Tanaka incident, saying “That 
was terrible statement”. He them went on to say that the Yamatū (Japanese) have never 
changed. 
Listening to this man speaking about his old days in which he often participated in 
demonstrations and a “zigzag rally”, Yamashiro, who is also middle-aged, just nodded 
quietly.293 Although Yamashiro spent his college life in Tokyo, he is one of the best-known 
activists in Okinawa and has participated in various different demonstrations first as a main 
organizer of the prefectural government union and then the Director of his NGO for almost 
three decades. Following Yamashiro, others also remained quiet.  
“By the way, are you uchinānchu (an Okinawa-origin person)?” the man asked, looking at 
Kosuzu. 
“No.” she responded. 
“Yeah, that’s what I thought. You don’t look like us.” 
                                                 
292 Uchinānchu is an Okinawan vernacular word, which means Okinawan people. This word is composed of two 
different words “Uchinā” (which means “Okinawa”), and “nchu” (which means person). It is often used among 
locals to call themselves or express their cultural identity. 
293 The zigzag Rally, or zigzag demo, is a type of protest demonstration which was popular among student ac-
tivists during the 1960s and 1970s. Occupying streets, participants proceed while marching from one corner of 
the street to the other. 
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Having been a core member since the Takae Residents’ Society was founded, she was 
obviously irritated by this comment. He then asked the same questions to Takahashi and 
myself. When he found out neither of us is from Okinawa, he sighed. It appeared that this 
middle-aged man lamented the fact that the Takae’s anti-helipad movement had been led by 
the mainlanders. After this man’s lament, silence enveloped us. Yamashiro still kept a warm 
smile but looked a little disappointed. Yet, the silence also made the man frown. This uneasy 
exchange reflected the fact that the man from Naha was an outsider in Takae, whereas a 
number of those active in this protest community (such as Kosuzu and Takahashi) are not 
uchinānchu.   
This might not be a particularly surprising episode. Nevertheless, the episode 
indicates the delicate balance which underlies the local struggle in Takae. As I have discuss 
in the previous chapter, the identity of the Takae Residents’ Society is primarily defined by 
the sense of belonging to this specific land and its nature. This identity, however, is not 
always compatible with “Okinawan identity”. It is true that Takae is part of Okinawa. Yet, 
“Okinawan identity” and the local identity of Takae’s protest community are not necessarily 
interchangeable. The difference is partially derived from the distinctive origins of the Takae 
struggle in terms of the members. More importantly, however, the distinction between 
“Okinawan identity” and “Takae identity” becomes significant if the former is assumed to be 
able to subsume the latter within its narrative. “Okinawan identity” cannot explain the 
delicate balance that runs through Takae’s local identity, because Takae’s communal identity 
is not only based on “Okinawan identity” but also it is made by both Okinawans and the 
locals who are not necessarily categorized as “Okinawans”. In the tent, the silence between 
the Takae locals and the visitors from Naha revealed such invisible elements of the Takae 
Residents’ Society within the Okinawa struggle. 
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6.6. “It’s Going to Be a Hard Time…” 
On a mild day in late January, I was wandering in the Heiwa Dori Market in Naha. All of a 
sudden, I encountered a large crowd gathered in the market. Some of them, wearing bright 
orange baseball jackets, were moving from one shop to the next. Surrounding them were 
people raising their mobile phones to take photos of the people in orange jackets. Initially I 
thought this could be a mainland TV crew with some popular reporters, who are often 
comedians. Yet the person who was in the middle of the crowd was not a TV personality but 
a Member of the National Diet, Shimoji Mikio, who was hurrying to shake hands with his 
supporters. The crowds were cheering him and shouting “we support you, Mr. Shimoji!” 
“Good luck, Sir!” From all corners of the market, his supporters flocked to swell the crowd, 
indicating his popularity amongst the citizens of Naha. Responding to their voices with a 
charming big smile, Shimoji and his team seemed to be walking through a sea of his 
supporters. 
Shimoji occupied an unusual position in the Japanese political scene during this 
period. Born in one of the remote islands of Okinawa, Miyako Island, as the second son of an 
influential business person who later became the mayor of his local city, Shimoji worked for 
his father’s company prior to embarking on his political career. He was then elected as a 
member of the national Lower House in the mid-1990s from a constituency based in Naha. 
Although he was supported by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the conservative ruling 
party then (and now) in power, his political views were not always the same as those of other 
conservatives in his party, but were sometimes closer to those of opposition groups such as 
the progressive Social Democratic Party. In particular, Shimoji was one of the few LDP 
politicians who opposed the base relocation from Futenma to Henoko. Instead, he proposed 
the merging of Futenma Airbase with the Kadena base. His proposal was not just dismissed 
but actively opposed by other local and national conservatives. Because of this, he resigned 
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from the LDP. Rather than expressing a political ideology, Shimoji was a politician who 
primarily represented the interests of Okinawa’s business circles. This was the reason why 
Shimoji could still maintain his popularity among Okinawan citizens even after he left the 
LDP. Despite his relatively young age and career, Shimoji earned local support by creating a 
bridge between the business elites of Okinawa and mainland Japan.  
Shimoji was one of the political figures to whom the local residents in the Takae 
Residents’ Society paid close attention. Their reasons for following Shimoji were not just 
related to his political views but also to his links to his family business, Daiyone 
Construction, which has grown to be one of the largest construction companies in 
Okinawa.294 Although the company is run by Shimoji’s elder brother, Yonezō, and Daiyone 
is not directly involved with Shimoji’s political activities, Shimoji played a distinctive role in 
the local base politics. While many Okinawa-elected MPs insisted on the removal of the 
bases from Okinawa, Shimoji was one of the rare politicians who advocated internal 
relocation of the bases within Okinawa. However, Shimoji strongly disagreed with the new 
base construction in Henoko, insisting that relocation from Futenma to Henoko is impossible 
as long as the local protest campaign continues. As an alternative, what Shimoji proposed 
was the internal relocation to a small district in Kunigami Village in Yanbaru region, called 
Aha. As in Takae, there was also a plan to construct a helipad for the US military in Aha. 
However, in 1981, the construction plan was withdrawn because of the local protest 
campaign. Shimoji was promoting not only reviving this plan but building a large airbase 
there in exchange for the closure of Futenma. Therefore, although Shimoji’s real intentions 
                                                 
294 The local construction companies in Okinawa play a crucial role in Okinawa not only in the economy but 
also in politics. For example, Kokuba Kōichi, President of Kokuba Gumi, a rival construction company for Dai-
yone Kensetsu, is the President of the Okinawa Defence Association, a local branch of the nation-wide lobbying 
group to promote public awareness and to contribute to strengthening the basis of the national defense. The 
Vice-President, Nakadomari Kōji is also the President of a local construction company in the northern Yanbaru 
region, Higashi Kaihatsu. (Jun Ōkubo and Jun Shinohara, Okinawa no futsugō na shinjitsu, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 
30-31; 39-41). 
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were yet to be made clear, people in Takae were carefully watching him. Their concern 
became a real problem when Daiyone made a bid for the construction contract for the 
helipads in Takae in May 2012.  
I visited Takae after this news was announced. Many of the protesters shared 
concerns about this news. Even senior activists such as Yamashiro sighed at the news, saying 
that the direct involvement of Daiyone would make the protest movement more difficult, 
since the company is closely connected with a person who is influential in national politics. 
Miyagi Katsumi, a local member, was concerned with a different issue. He assumed that 
Daiyone would bring many construction workers from its home base, Miyako Island. He 
went on to say that people from Miyako (Miyakonchu) are known amongst other Okinawans 
as being “rough personalities”. Although this is merely a stereotype of Miyako islanders, he 
was expressing an anxiety about the arrival of a new construction contractor from a distant 
part of the archipelago in Takae. Miyagi and other local protesters were concerned whether 
the small protest community in Takae could resist this major construction company of whom 
they had had no previous experience. For the members of the Takae Residents’ Society, this 
was not only a challenge brought by the local economic establishment but also it was a 
critical moment for their future struggle over the concept of being “Okinawan”. 
 
6.7. “It’s None of Your Business!” 
“The gate has been occupied by Bōeikyoku!” 
Takahashi’s mobile phone rang early one morning in July 2012. There had been no one from 
the Takae Residents Society monitoring the N-4 gate the previous night. Although there are 
usually people monitoring the gates at night-time, it is not possible to have someone on duty 
all the time, due to the lack of people. To make matters worse, vans and micro-buses, which 
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were usually parked in front of the gate as barricades in day and night, had all been returned 
to their original owners at that time, and thus there was no blockade when the ODB officers 
arrived. Once he heard the report, Takahashi started his car and went to N4 gate. There were 
a few trucks parked in front of the gate blocking access. Ironically, it appeared that the ODB 
officers adopted the strategy which the protesters had used. 
A few days later, a long line of cars arrived in front of the gate. The first few vehicles 
were vans carrying the ODB officers. After them came the ODB cars, several vans and dump 
trucks. They were carrying construction workers from Daiyone and its subcontractor 
Hokushō Construction.  Their trucks carried hundreds of sand bags. Along with the 
construction workers and the ODB, police officers also arrived. Within twenty minutes or so, 
nearly one hundred people in their white (ODB), black (construction worker), and blue 
(police) uniforms had gathered. Unlike the situation in the demonstration described earlier, 
the ODB officers were trying to reach the gate to open it, yelling at protesters to leave. They 
went into the bushes outside the road and, using knives and scissors, started cutting the ropes, 
steel wires and net that the protesters had spread extensively as an instant barricade. Although 
one of the protesters tried to prevent the ODB officers from cutting the barricades, some 
officers came from behind and pulled him away.  
“Mr. Taira, we must talk.” Ashimine Gentatsu said to the chief ODB officer, Taira, who was 
watching the progress quietly. Taira did not reply.  
Ashimine persistently tried to get Taira to talk, but Taira just said: “We have permission to 
use this site for our work. So please leave here.” 
While the protesters were clashing with the ODB officers, the construction workers 
started their mission. Instead of approaching the construction site from the gate, they went 
into the bush to reach the site. The supervisor of the project was giving them instructions. 
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There were more than ten protesters near the gate when the ODB and others arrived, but their 
number was overwhelmed by the hundred or so ODB officers, construction workers and 
police officers. The construction supervisor, who appeared to be in his mid-40s with a tanned 
face, shouted to bring one of the large dump trucks, which carried a crane lift, which was to 
be used to move sand bags into the construction site without unlocking the gate. The crane 
lift started working with a roar. Some construction workers on a dump truck with sand bags 
started carrying them into the crane lift container, and these were lifted and passed on to the 
fellow workers who were already inside the gate and waiting for the material to arrive. Sand 
bags were carried over protesters heads. The operation was conducted as if the workers were 
completely indifferent to the protesters who were trying to block the crane. When protesters 
pointed out to the supervisor that it could be dangerous if the bags were to fall onto protestors 
conducting the sit-in at the gate, his only response was “If you think it’s dangerous, leave 
here, otherwise we will kick you out!” 
As time went by, other protesters and Takae residents gathered little by little. They 
were all equally speechless at this unprecedented scene. Among the shocked and disheartened 
crowd was a thin tall man who approached the supervisor quietly but with a visibly angry 
expression. This was Shimizu. He stood in front of the supervisor and looked down on his 
face.  
“Please stop this.” He murmured. Some other construction workers surrounded him.  
“Who are you?” they asked. 
The supervisor looked up at this tall man. But Shimizu did not answer his question.  
“I am asking who you are and what’re you doing here?” 
“I’m a Takae resident (Takae jūmindesu).” Shimizu replied.  
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“You are a naichaa (Japanese mainlander), aren’t you?” The supervisor laughed mockingly.  
“I’m living here. I am a resident of Takae.” Shimizu repeated. 
“Go back home, you mainlander! It’s not your business!” 
At these harsh words, the workers standing around Shimizu seized his arms and body and 
pulled him down to the ground. Shimizu yelled something when he was pulled down. The 
police officers witnessed the scene but made no attempt to intervene in this situation. Soon 
after, the crane started working again, carrying sand bags over people’s heads. 
  Although this episode might sound similar to the story about the visitors from Naha 
in terms of “Okinawan identity”, there is a crucial difference between those two cases. While 
the previous episode shows a failure to recognise the subtlety of Takae’s protest community, 
this episode shows an attempt to use naichā and uchinā to divide the protest community. The 
statement “it’s none of your business” expresses division and exclusion from participation. In 
the case above, Shimizu was excluded by an Okinawan construction worker who considered 
that this is not the business of mainlanders. However, this phrase does not only exclude 
naichā. In fact, this exclusionary phrase has to do with something other than ethnicity. In this 
context, “It’s none of your business” is also a phrase used to exclude Takae’s protest 
community from involvement with the base construction. Here, naichaa such as Shimizu are 
just the easiest target. The intention of this message was to shut off the local involvement in 
the base construction because it is the business among the leadership in Japan, the US and 
Okinawa, not the local villagers. 
In April 2015, Shimajiri Aiko, a conservative Okinawan politician, described the 
protest movement in Henoko as an “irresponsible civic movement” (musekinin na shimin 
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undō).295 She meant that the protesters do not understand the political context of the base 
relocation to Henoko. The phrase which the construction supervisor shouted at Shimizu can 
be also understood from this perspective. “It’s none of your business” effectively functions to 
divide Okinawa society between “good” citizens who understand the importance of the base 
construction in Henoko and Takae and “irresponsible” people who are motivated merely by 
their national interest over local interests. In this logic, while the people in the former 
category are regarded as the “insiders” who understand what the benefit of the construction 
plan is for the Okinawan community, the people in the latter category are labelled as 
“outsiders” and “the Left-leaning” if not “communists”, both of which contain derogatory 
meanings to criticize the local protest activists. It is no doubt that the members of Residents’ 
Society are people affected by this project. Nevertheless, they are not included within this 
limited definition of “stakeholders” since the real meaning of this phrase entails only those 
who involved in planning and carrying out the construction project, which was decided by 
high-level politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo, designed by the Governor of Okinawa, and 
implemented by the construction companies. Under the guise of an “Okinawan identity” 
discourse, what really happens is exclusion of the local protesters who are not “stakeholders” 
from the perspective of those implementing the construction project in Takae. In other words, 
the exclusionary political discourse expressed in phrases like “it’s none of your business” 
shows the contested political and social process involved in creating the meaning of 
“locality” by two different camps, both of which involve people, resources and networks 
from many different places.296 
                                                 
295 Anon, “’Sekinin no Nai Shimin Undō’ Henoko Kōdō ni Shimajiri Giin,”Okinawa Times (April 5, 2015), ac-
cessed September 3, 2015, http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article.php?id=110372. 
296 In her study of Henoko anti-base struggle, Julia Yonetani points out the “predicament of locality” in which 
she demonstrates how local identity is a social product that involves global, regional, national as well as local 
political contexts and power-relations of the base construction in Okinawa. (See: Julia Yonetani,  
“Appropriation and Resistance in a ‘Globalised Village’: Reconfiguring Local and Global Dynamics from Oki-
nawa,” Asian Studies Review 28 (2004): 391-406.) 
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6.8. “Solidarity with Okinawa” 
In late November 2011, I visited Naha Civic Hall in order to attend the opening ceremony of 
the Japan Peace Assembly (JPA). JPA is one of the major events of the peace movement, 
joined by seven organizations. Some of the organizations are workers’ unions and some are 
civic groups affiliated with the Japan Communist Party. The executive committee is located 
in Tokyo. They organize an annual assembly in which affiliated groups and individuals from 
all over Japan participate. The venue changes every year but it is always held at a place 
where American military bases exist. In 2011, Okinawa was the host prefecture. In the large 
hall, there were hundreds of people. Some people were waving flags representing their local 
prefectures. Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Hokkaido, etc… All these prefectures have US bases, like 
Okinawa. 
 The event was well-organized. After the performance of a traditional Ryūkyūan dance 
by local school children, over 20 international delegates were introduced. The delegates were 
invited from many parts of the world where the local residents are struggling against the US 
bases such as Hawaii, Guam, Philippines, South Korea, mainland US and elsewhere. After 
introducing the guests, a few notable public figures came on to the stage, among them an 
influential politician from the Japan Communist Party, Ichida Yoshihiko, and an emeritus 
professor of the University of Tokyo, Wada Haruki. These guests and delegates all raised the 
same question—what has changed in Okinawa forty years after Okinawa’s return to Japan? 
Besides the presence of all these high-profile public figures, one of the other distinctive 
aspects of this peace conference is its mobilization of activists nation-wide and from 
overseas. Having activists and people involved with anti-base activism from many local 
areas, the conference appeared to be successful as a venue for the nation-wide and region-
wide campaign for anti-US militarism. As one Hawaiian delegate put it, “Okinawa is not 
alone. We are sharing the similar situation facing America, who regards the Pacific Ocean as 
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their playground since 19th century”.297 Similarly, Japanese delegates raised their voices in 
“solidarity with Okinawa”. 
The next day, participants of the Japan Peace Assembly visited Takae, traveling in 
several coaches. This half-day trip to Takae was one of the conference events. The tents at 
the construction gate suddenly became overpopulated with visitors. Led by a tour guide, the 
visitors walked around and looked at the gate of the construction site. Many were taking 
photos of the landscape of Yanbaru, the gate and the local neighborhood. It appeared as 
though they were a group of tourists sightseeing. One middle-aged man told me that it was 
his first trip to Okinawa. I asked where he is originally form. “Yamato City, Kanagawa,” he 
said. He looked satisfied with his first visit to Okinawa. He said that he had learnt so much 
about Okinawa’s experience by visiting Henoko and Takae. However, after staying for half 
an hour or so, the visitors including this man went back to the buses and left Takae. Waving  
to us from behind the windows they departed and the silence returned. I was wondering what 
they could learn about Takae by staying for only 30 munities. 
“We should be thankful to them for visiting us, even just for a short while.” Takahashi 
replied to me when I asked this question. 
This is one of the many episodes that demonstrates the difficulty for Takae in terms of its 
representation. Unlike the previous episodes, this story is important to consider how Takae 
people are represented as “Okinawan” through the eyes of people who aim to experience 
“solidarity with Okinawa”. As Takae is relatively open to outsiders of their protest 
community, there are many visitors coming to see the local protest movement. Nevertheless, 
among the visitors, it is difficult to find anyone who is sensitive to Takae’s unique local 
environment in terms of the ways in which the local protest community is conducted. In these 
                                                 
297 Kyle Kajihiro, Gunji-shugi to Shin Jiyūshugi ni Taikō Suru, Kēshi Kaji 73 (2011): 34-46. 
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circumstances, “Okinawan identity” is presupposed to replace Takae’s distinctive social 
environment. Over all, this is a small episode about Takae’s local struggle, the particularity of 
which becomes difficult to perceive due to monolithic representation under the banner of 
“solidarity with Okinawa”.  
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Image 6-7. A scene from Japan Peace Conference held in Naha, Okinawa in 2011. The conference was 
organised by Japan Peace Committee and its affiliated party, the JCP. It was attended by Peace 
Committees based in 47 Japanese prefectures and foreign delegates from Guam, The Philippines, South 
Korea, and so forth where anti-military base movements take place. In this photo, Ichida Tadayoshi, an 
executive board member of JCP who is also Member of Japanese National Diet, is giving a speech to the 
audience. 
 
 
 
 
 
249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 6-8. A scene from the bus tour of Takae by participants in the Japan Peace Conference.  A number 
of tourists visited Takae after the conference on this day. 
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6.9. Reclaiming “Okinawan identity” from the Margins 
In the midst of the Tanaka Incident, there was another parallel event that affected Takae’s sit-
in. This was the court case against representatives of the local sit-in for obstructing traffic.298 
Litigation was brought by the Okinawa Defense Bureau against fourteen local Takae 
residents in 2008. These fourteen residents were the founding members of the Takae 
Residents’ Society and their families, including one child, who was at that time eight years 
old. Responding to the sluggish progress of the construction, which he blamed on the local 
protest, the head of the ODB, Manabe Rō, decided to take civil litigation against the local 
residents. Manabe said “We have started construction in order to reduce Okinawa’s burden 
since last July (in 2007). Yet we could only make little progress so far. Therefore, we decided 
to bring civil litigation for the first time in our history. We had no other decent options except 
for this.”299  
Although it shocked the Takae Residents’ Society to hear that the Japanese 
government planned to take legal action, the members also decided to take their own action 
immediately against the ODB. They brought a protest letter to the headquarters of the ODB 
in Kadena, but the ODB refused to receive them. In 2009, a judgement in Naha Regional 
Court found in favour of the ODB, but out of fourteen residents indicted, only two residents 
were found guilty. They were Ashimine Gentatsu and Isa Masatsugu, co-representatives of 
the Takae Residents’ Society. The lawyers for the Residents’ Society labelled the litigation 
by Okinawa Defence Bureau a “SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation). 
Also, the Takae Residents’ Society decided to appeal to the judgement of Naha Regional 
                                                 
298 The Litigation on Prohibition of Traffic Disturbance (Tsūkō-bōgai Kinshi Kari-shobun Mōshitate Jiken), No. 
166, 2008. The statement of the verdict is available from 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20100201125634.pdf. 
299 Printed in Okinawa Times, 26 December 2008, evening edition (yūkan). 
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Court. This was the start of the so-called “Takae SLAPP Lawsuit Case (Takae surappu 
soshō)”. 
 Three months before the judgement was handed down, over 150 people gathered in 
front of Naha Regional Court from the early morning. They all came to attend the public 
examination of Ashimine and Isa. As time passed, the number of people increased, so the 
court conducted a lottery to select people to enter the court. Prior to that, there was a small 
gathering next to the court. This was organised by the Takae Residents’ Society and groups 
supporting Ashimine and Isa. Director of the Takae Residents Society Takahashi, Isa, and 
Ashimine all attended this gathering. Although Takahashi always modestly insisted that he 
was not the proper figure to stand at the front, on this occasion he was clearly acting as a 
representative of his community. Shimizu and the wives of Ashimine Gentatsu and Isa 
Masatsugu were also there. 
Ashimine spoke on behalf of the Takae Residents’ Society. He began his speech by 
acknowledging all the support for Takae. As usual, Ashimine spoke softly. Although he was 
using a microphone, it was sometimes difficult to hear his voice, which was drowned out by 
the background noise of traffic. His speech was also very simple, just telling the audience 
why he still wants to live in Takae with his family. However, his speech moved many of 
audience members. Some people were even wiping tears from their eyes. Unlike some 
professional activists, Ashimine did not express hostility and anger against the ODB and the 
Japanese government. His speech was filled with warm words, expressing his, his family’s 
and his friends’ affection for the bounteous Yanbaru Forest. This presented a strong message 
shared by the audience: a message of their wish to protect their livelihood in Yanbaru from 
destruction: “Although our village is very small,” said Ashimine, “We don’t want Yanbaru 
Forest to be involved with any warfare…” Ashimine’s warm words reached the hearts of 
audience members. He concluded his speech by asking for help from all corners of Okinawa. 
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In other words, Ashimine recreated a form of “Okinawan identity” based on his particular 
place consciousness. After this speech, they entered the court.300 
 
6-10. Conclusion 
Building on the previous chapter, in this chapter I have discussed in detail aspects of the 
formation of the protest community in Takae. In particular, I sought to elucidate how the 
local communal identity is created and practised by disentangling complicated relationships 
between Takae community and external societies and political institutes. By avoiding 
essentialistic understanding of communal identity or collectivity, I placed my emphasis on 
power-relations and human interactions that shape local identity in Takae. The examples 
cited here, for example, help us to see how ethnic and cultural discourses such as “uchinaa” 
and “yamatū” or “Okinawans” and “Japanese” are used differently during the protest 
demonstrations in Naha and Takae. This reflects different contexts in which various protest 
movements were formed. While a simple division between “Okinawans” and “Japanese” has 
been used in the context of the anti-base movement since the early 1970s, organizing a 
protest community in Takae requires a more subtle framing of who they are fighting against. 
While this issue tends to be considered within “centre and periphery” relations within the 
Okinawan anti-base movement, diverse participation in the Takae movement by people from 
many regions within Japan indicates the more complicated or translocal contexts which 
actually make up the communal identity of the Takae protest movement. 
                                                 
300 In March, the Naha Regional Court gave a verdict that Ashinmine had conducted a legitimate protest action. 
However, Isa was found guilty of obstructing traffic. Immediately they appealed to the Kyūshū Higher Court, 
but the final judgement given in 2013 was the same as the previous case. Later, they appealed to dispute the 
case at the Supreme Court. In June 2014, the Supreme Court rejected Isa’s appeal. 
253 
 In the latter part of the chapter, I discussed how the division between “Okinawans” 
and “Japanese” was mobilized by a construction worker to exclude non-Okinawan protesters 
as “outsiders”. This exclusionary discourse is a critical issue in places like Takae: an effort to 
split the community in terms of a generic discourse of Okinawan identity, which does not 
apply to the majority of community members. However, I argue that the discourse also can 
divide participants or stakeholders of the base politics in Takae into “those who benefit from 
the base construction” and “those who are irresponsibly protesting against government 
policy”. Therefore, this logic of “insider” and “outsider” in the context of Takae can be 
understood as a discourse that seeks to frame and restrict the legitimate right to participate in 
the base politics not only in terms of one’s ethnic or cultural background but also one’s 
political interests. When we include this dimension of political interests we can understand 
that the protest community in Takae strives to recapture the meaning of “locality” from the 
state-capitalism complex.  
In the last two episodes, I discussed how Takae’s protest community articulates 
Okinawan identity. Performing “Okinawaness” by situating itself within the broad historical 
trajectory of Okinawa struggle is crucial considering the peripheral nature of the Takae 
community. Despite significant differences from the mainstream narrative of the Okinawa 
struggle, representation as part of the “Okinawa struggle” by Japanese mainland visitors is 
still important to spread their struggle widely in Japan. From a similar perspective, 
Ashimine’s speech in Naha can also be considered as a practice of Okinawan identity by 
which he [Ashimine] asked for wider support from other anti-base communities. Overall, in 
this chapter I analyzed the dynamic social process by which the Takae protesters articulate 
locality as their distinctive political identity. This reveals the significant position of this 
peripheral protest community, which is important not only to understand the historical 
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development of the Okinawa struggle but also how a protest community can create its 
identity within the contemporary Okinawan anti-base movement. 
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Chapter Seven 
From Okinawa to Asia:  
Okinawa-Korea People’s Solidarity and Connecting Anti-base 
Struggles in Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A textile sent by South Korean activists who conduct anti-base construction campaigns in Jeju.  
The photo was taken by the author in Takae in November 2011. 
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7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will introduce another version of the dimension of identity which has 
developed within the Okinawa struggle particularly over the last two decades. In Chapters 
Five and Six I discussed trans-locality as an important element to examine Takae’s anti-
helipad movement from both local and extra-local perspectives. This chapter seeks to 
investigate flows of people, ideas, and experiences which create an identity for the Okinawan 
struggle based on “region” or “East Asia”. I look into the process by which the region is 
incorporated by Okinawa’s anti-base movement activists as their local identity. In other 
words, the challenge that this chapter tries to tackle is to analyze the concept of region which 
serves as an integral part of the Okinawa struggle, and to understand how Okinawan activists 
articulate and use it as part of their local identity. 
In order to examine this dimension of the Okinawa struggle, I will analyze a protest 
community called Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity (or OKPS). OKPS is one of many 
local protest communities in Okinawa. Founded in late 1998, this group is one of the earliest 
Okinawan activist groups to start a transnational anti-US base network with anti-US base 
movements in overseas countries. Ever since it started, OKPS has been working with South 
Korean anti-US base activists such as a group called the Headquarters for the National 
Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops, the earliest anti-US base activist group 
in South Korea. With over 30 members on its list, OKPS is a middle-sized group among 
Okinawan anti-base communities. However, this group is not well-known even among 
Okinawan activists. This is partly because of the nature of OKPS, especially its activities as 
“a protest community”. When compared to other local groups such as the leading local 
feminist group, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, OKPS does not have a 
strong guiding principle in its activism. Also, unlike the protest movement in Henoko and 
Takae, OKPS does not have a particular place to conduct its activism. It does not have any 
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flag to raise at the protest. Nor does OKPS conduct high-profile activities like organizing 
symposia, conducting law-suits against the national government, or declaring the 
independence of Ryūkyūs.  
However, this invisibility does not mean that OKPS is an insignificant group. On the 
contrary, I argue that this group has many important aspects that we need to consider when 
we study Okinawa’s anti-base movement. First, there was almost no precedent before OKPS 
for a group of Okinawan activists to engage in an international solidarity movement in 
overseas countries. The experience of OKPS over two decades is therefore crucial in 
considering the “internationalization” of the anti-base movement. Together with activists 
from various places such as South Korea, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines and Australia, the 
transnational network has become an important part of the local anti-base movements in Asia 
and the Pacific region. Second, it is important to understand the period in which OKPS was 
formed from the late 1980s until the 1990s. This decade was the period when the Philippines 
and South Korea were democratized. The rise of “people’s power” which overturned the 
dictatorships greatly inspired the Okinawan activists. Okinawans thought that the 
democratization of the Philippines and South Korea would change regional dynamics. 
Twenty years after the return of Okinawa to Japan, some local activists who would later 
became the founding members of OKPS felt they had reached an impasse with their local 
anti-base struggle. Therefore, they considered that international solidarity with people from 
those countries would contribute to galvanizing their movement. Third, OKPS also is a 
significant part of the Okinawa struggle which created a regional perspective to the local anti-
base movement. This involves not only the contemporary solidarity movement but also 
results in a reconsideration of Okinawa’s historical relations with Japan, the US and also with 
other regional countries. Especially, the founders of OKPS reflect on the historical position of 
Okinawans as “the first colonized subject” of the Japanese Empire, but also as a place which 
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whose inhabitants later turned into “colonizers/Japanese” in other Japanese colonial 
territories in Asia and the Pacific. In other words, their long-term commitment to the 
international solidarity movement revealed the entanglement of regional history as an 
indispensable aspect of Okinawa’s local identity. 
Based on interviews and archival data related to OKPS, I will examine the following 
questions: (1) How was OKPS initiated, and by whom? (2) What is the process by which its 
concept of region was articulated? (3) What new dimensions of the Okinawa struggle does it 
reveal? By considering the history and contemporary activities of OKPS, I discuss the 
formation of regional-local identity within Okinawa’s anti-base struggle. 
  
7.2. A Chapel beside Naha Port 
One early evening in late November, 2011, I was walking on Kokusai Dōri [International 
Street] towards the western part of Naha City. This main street of Naha is crowded with 
tourists and locals. Walking several blocks down to the west, I could feel the sea breeze on 
my face. The wind came from Naha Port, from where ferries, cruises and tankers take their 
passengers and cargos not only to the remote islands of Okinawa, Japan, and the US but also 
to other ports in Asia such as China and the Philippines. My destination, Uruma Chapel, was 
located near the port.  
It is rather difficult to believe that the place is a chapel. Its facade is not decorated 
with symbolic religious features. Like other residential and commercial buildings on the 
street, it is just a grey two-story concrete building. On the ground floor, there are sliding 
doors on which, when I visited, the schedule of bible study reading group information was 
displayed. I knocked on the door, and a tall elderly man appeared. He was Nishio Ichirō. This 
elderly man in his late seventies is a pastor of the United Church of Christ in Japan, a father 
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with one daughter, the owner of a local kindergarten and also one of the founding members 
of OKPS. 
          He told to me to wait for his friends to arrive for the interview I had scheduled. 
Meanwhile, he gave me plates of cucumbers and carrots, which, he said, came from his 
vegetable garden. Soon after, a middle-aged man with long black hair flecked with grey 
arrived: this was Tomiyama Masahiro, who is also one of the founding members of this 
protest community. Although Tomiyama said he came directly from his office, he looked 
rather relaxed, as though he had just come back from a local beach. While Nishio wore a 
white shirt with a pair of trousers, Tomiyama was more casual in shorts, thongs, and a t-shirt, 
even in the cool weather of late autumn. Shortly after Tomiyama’s arrival, they were joined 
by Ōta Kunio, another member of OKPS. Ōta and Tomiyama are more or less of a similar 
generation, in their late fifties. In the relaxed atmosphere, with food and drink on the table, 
the three men started chatting about their recent news. This was my first contact with this 
distinctive Okinawan protest community. 
 
7.3. Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity 
As discussed briefly in Chapter Five, the protest community in Okinawa is made of diverse 
types of civic activist groups. The largest umbrella organization is the Okinawa Citizens’ 
Peace Network (OCPN), an organization which links many different local communities from 
all over Okinawa including groups in Takae and Henoko. While the activists of Takae and 
Henoko have been engaged in the movement in their local communities, city dwellers who 
live far from these remote areas are also involved with various activities to study, promote, 
and help ongoing activism in those regional communities. Also, some urban civic groups near 
the US military bases such as Kadena and Futenma have been conducting activism based on 
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their local contexts. In this environment, OKPS plays a distinctive role. It is one of the most 
important of the groups that are primarily involved with internationalization of the Okinawan 
anti-base movement. OKPS thus works as one of the main links between overseas anti-US 
base activists and Okinawan activist communities.  
OKPS was founded in 1998 by five male activists from Okinawa and mainland Japan. 
Nishio and Tomiyama were both participants from the beginning of the group together with 
three other members: Takahashi Toshio, To Yusa, and Arasaki Moriteru. These founding 
members come from diverse backgrounds (to be discussed further in Chapter Eight). Arasaki 
is a senior academic known for his research on the history of the Okinawan people’s anti-
base struggle after World War II. Based in Okinawa University since 1974, Arasaki has been 
one of the front-runners of this research field. He was also the President of his university 
during the 1980s. Besides his commitment to the anti-base movement as an academic, 
Arasaki had been involved in founding many activist projects in Okinawa, most notably the 
Society of Hitotsubo Anti-war Land Owners.301 Tomiyama Masahiro has been an active 
participant of the anti-base movement since his teenage years. While Arasaki has devoted 
himself to the movement through intellectual work, Tomiyama has always been involved 
through anti-base activism in the frontline of physical confrontation.  
          While Arasaki and Tomiyama are both native Okinawans, Takahashi Toshio came 
originally from the mainland in the early 1980s. He had been known as the leader of a radical 
sect of student activism when he lived in the mainland, but when Takahashi became involved 
with the Okinawan anti-base movement, he hid his former career and changed his name. 
                                                 
301 Hitotsubo is a size of land which is equivalent to 3.3 square meters. The main activity of this society is to 
purchase the land from the original landlords who have their property within the US military bases. In doing 
so, the activists refuse to rent their land to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for offering 
the land to the local US military, and engage in a court battle with Japanese authority over the land. The partic-
ipants of this project are widely spread all over Japan, in places such as in Tokyo and Osaka as well as in Oki-
nawa. 
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Nishio also originated from the mainland, but has been involved in activism in Okinawa for 
the last four decades. As a radical pastor whose usual activities are missionary activity and 
running a kindergarten, Nishio is also known for his long-term involvement with peace and 
ecology activism. To Yusa is also one of those who became involved with OKPS from 
outside Okinawa. As an Osaka-based Korean activist, he has been involved with political 
activism including helping anti-war American GIs to desert during the Vietnam War and 
supporting the democratization movement in South Korea from Japan.302  
The founding members of OKPS all came from different backgrounds, but they came 
to know each other as they were all the members of Hitotsubo Anti-war Land Owner’s 
Association. As I explain further in the next chapter, these individuals gathered to establish 
OKPS with the aim of internationalizing Okinawa’s anti-base struggle, particularly by 
establishing links with South Korean anti-base activism. 
          Today, over thirty people are registered as members of OKPS. The members are 
widely dispersed. Many of them are residing in Okinawa Island, and some of them are living 
in mainland Japan and South Korea. In a strict sense, people who are registered as members 
are expected to pay 500 yen as a monthly membership fee to cover costs of group activities. 
But because of the nature of the membership, it is difficult to collect from all the members. 
Thus, in a practical sense, this rule is applied loosely and irregularly. Also, as another 
principle, the members are expected to attend a monthly meeting to discuss activity, policy 
and other administrative matters. However, this has never been made mandatory because it is 
hardly ever possible to bring all the members together because of their dispersed locations. 
Likewise, although OKPS has an annual assembly where all the members are supposed to 
gather, in fact the annual assembly is usually organized as one of the regular monthly 
                                                 
302 Moriteru Arasaki, Masahiro Tomiyama, Toshio Takahashi, Ichirō Nishio, and Yusa To. "Tomoni Manabi, 
Tomoni Kawaru, Okikan Minshu Rentai no Ayumi," Keishi Kaji 70 (July 2011): 6-25.  
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meetings. However, these loose aspects of the membership and organizational structure do 
not mean that the group is inactive. There are members who regularly attend the meetings 
every month from cities, towns and villages including Naha, Urazoe, Futenma, and even 
Yomitan, which is more than an hour away from Naha by public transport. These people 
serve as core members in implementing various group activities, corresponding with a widely 
dispersed network of individuals inside and outside Okinawa. 
  
7.4. Remembering the Other War-dead 
Although OKPS was founded in June 1998, its origins go back to the late 1980s. One 
of the crucial moments in this early period occurred when 5 South Korean men visited 
Okinawa in November 1986. They were survivors of a group of laborers who were forcibly 
taken to various places around Okinawa from colonial Korean during World War II. 
According to a historical study, about 350 Koreans, including the 5 men who visited 
Okinawa, were mobilized to work around the Kerama Islands, located forty kilometres away 
from the mainland of Okinawa in June 1944.303 They were part of a total of some 15,000 
Korean laborers who were collected to work in various places in Okinawa towards the end of 
the Pacific War.304 Most of the Koreans in Kerama Islands came from Gyeongsang County in 
North Gyeongsang Province. Arriving in Kerama, they were put to work building the secret 
shelters used to keep small boats to be used for suicide attacks against the Allied Powers. 
Conducted under the orders of the Japanese Imperial Army, this mission was called 
marure.305 During the Battle of Okinawa, about 80 Korean laborers in Kerama died, 
including some who were executed by the Japanese soldiers. Struggling with hunger, they 
                                                 
303 Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1983-1987: Shōkokushugi no tachiba de (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 107. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. 
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stole potatoes from the local farmland, but were found by the local villagers and reported to 
the Japanese military officers. In the end, 257 people survived and they were captured by the 
American soldiers. After the war, they returned to Korea. These survivors had been longing 
to take back the remains of their fellow Korean forced laborers to their homeland. They 
established an organization called the Pacific Fellows Association (Taiheiyō Dōshikai) 
together with other former Korean forced laborers engaged in different parts of Japan during 
wartime.306 This is how the five Koreans came to visit Kerama Islands, particularly Aka 
Island and Zamami-jima Island, in order to commemorate the spirits of those who could 
never return to their homeland.  
The visit of the five Korean survivors inspired not only Okinawans but also some 
descendants of colonial era Korean migrants living in Japan (so-called Zainichi Koreans). 
Among them was an independent documentary maker, Park Sunam. She filmed the Korean 
survivors’ journey to Kerama and made a film titled “Ariran no uta: Okinawa kara no 
shōgen” (The Song of Arirang: Testimony from Okinawa), which premiered in 1991. Born in 
Mie Prefecture as a second generation Korean resident in Japan, Park had established her 
career as a journalist and activist for her fellow Zainichi Koreans since the early 1960s, most 
famously for her book about the killing of two school girls in the so-called Komatsugawa 
Incidents (Komatsugawa-jiken).307 Park produced a number of films related to Koreans 
during wartime, including Koreans who were affected by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945. With the help of her Okinawan friends such as senior activist Fukuchi 
                                                 
306 Ibid.: 108. 
307 This was the rape and murder of two Japanese school girls by a young male zainichi Korean. Park exchanged 
a number of letters with this man, who was sentenced to capital punishment, and she edited a book based on 
those letters titled: “Tsumi to Ai to Shi to” (Guilt, Love and Death) in 1963. Some intellectuals such as Mich-
ihiko Suzuki publicly criticized the capital punishment imposed on Lee. For example, see: Suzuki Michihiko Ek-
kyō No Toki: 1960 Nen Dai to Zainichi (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2007). 
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Hiroaki and photographer Ishikawa Mao, Park embarked on her journey in the Kerama 
Islands at the time of the visit of the five Korean former forced laborers. 
The visit of the Korean survivors unveiled some crucial aspects of Okinawa’s 
wartime history. Although they had been mentioned in the work of some local historians such 
as Miyazato Kiyogorō, the founder of the Kerama Oceanic Culture Museum, the stories of 
Korean forced laborers in Kerama Islands were otherwise hardly remembered in Okinawa. 
Especially, memories of the execution of Koreans were preserved by only a limited number 
of the local residents. In this sense, unraveling the history of Koreans in Okinawa during 
wartime introduced a new perspective to the history of the war in Okinawa. But for locals, 
the forgotten history of the Korean forced laborers posed difficult questions for Okinawa’s 
historical narratives. In particular, the presence of Korean forced laborers complicated the 
view of Okinawan “victimhood” during the Battle of Okinawa. While the exact number of 
Korean laborers, which includes young Korean females who were forced to serve as so-called 
“comfort women”, is not known, the memory of Koreans in war-time Okinawa made it 
necessary to see local history from the perspective of “another victim” of the war.  
In other words, the five Koreans’ visit raised the question of Okinawa’s historical 
position in relation to East Asian neighbors who were formerly Japanese colonies or occupied 
territories. Like other ethnic groups from the territories of the former Japanese Empire, 
Okinawans were not considered as equal to mainland Japanese. However, despite all the 
discriminatory treatment, Okinawans were not the same as Koreans and Taiwanese. While 
people in these places, which had more recently been incorporated into the Japanese Empire, 
were categorized as people of “the external territories” (gaichi), Okinawans were regarded as 
people from the internal region of Japan proper (naichi). This was related to the political 
administration used to govern the empire. While Koreans and Taiwanese were administered 
by the Governor Generals who represented the authority of the Japanese government, 
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Okinawa was one of the Japanese prefectures. From this perspective, we can understand the 
complexity of Okinawa’s modern experience, in that it was not a colony but was treated in a 
discriminatory manner by some of those from mainland Japan. 
The re-appearance of Korean laborers in Okinawan history confronted Okinawans 
with ambiguous problems of self-recognition as (on the one hand) the victims of Japanese 
Imperial expansion who were incorporated into modern-nation state and located in a 
peripheral position, and (on the other) as people who were not the same as other colonized 
regional neighbors such as Koreans. However, this was a crucial moment in the history of 
OKPS. Some of the founding members such as Arasaki, Takahashi, and Tomiyama were 
involved in the visit of the Korean war-survivors. As the President of Okinawa University, 
Arasaki contacted the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and arranged the issue of visas 
for the visit. Although official relations between South Korea and Japan were normalized in 
1965, it was not easy for Korean and Japanese tourists to visit each other’s country until the 
Seoul Olympics were held in 1988. Takahashi and Tomiyama joined the film crew and 
travelled in Aka, Tokashiki and Zamami Islands with director Park Sunam.308 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
308 Interview with Takahashi Toshio, March 26, 2012. 
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Image 7-1. A former Korean military worker visited Aka-jima Island where he conducted a traditional 
Korean commemorative ceremony. The photo was retrieved from Sunam Park, Arirang no Uta: Okinawa 
kara no shōgen (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1991). 
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7.5. In Search of International Solidarity in Anti-US Base Activism 
The encounter with former Korean forced laborers was a crucial moment. It was the first 
experience for Okinawan activists to see Koreans who survived the war in Okinawa and hear 
their memories. As Arasaki notes, their visit cast light on a little-studied area of Okinawan 
history. Also, the significance of this period lies in the fact that this trip became the earliest 
occasion on which the some key members of OKPS gathered to work together. By joining the 
commemorative trip to Kerama, the founders of OKPS came to recognize another colonial 
history in Okinawa, which also influenced local activists to consider Okinawa’s historical 
present in relation to other Asian neighbors. But this encounter with former Korean laborers 
was not the direct trigger to start the international anti-base solidarity movement with South 
Koreans. Although it was undoubtedly an important moment for Okinawan activists to 
understand their colonial past in relation to Korea, Okinawans did not yet consider this 
history in relation to their contemporary activism. Although Okinawans were aware of anti-
authoritarian student movements in South Korea, they did not have the means or personal 
network to develop substantial links to Korean activism.  
This does not mean that there was no action during this period. In the early 1990s, 
some Okinawan activists, who later became the founders of OKPS, attempted solidarity with 
the Philippine activists. Tomiyama says that at that time he wondered if it was possible to win 
the struggle against the US bases just by the actions of Okinawan people only. Other activists 
too had similar concerns about the isolation of Okinawa’s anti-base movement. Knowing that 
there were other places where people took their anti-base struggle to the world, these 
concerned Okinawans began to feel the necessity to create an international solidarity 
campaign. One of the first countries Tomiyama and his colleagues contacted was the 
Philippines. They were greatly inspired by the rise of Philippine democratization, especially 
with its success in ending the long dictatorship of President Ferdinando Marcos in 1986 (the 
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so-called People Power Revolution). Tomiyama also had a friend, Arakaki Tokiko, who 
founded a citizens’ group called the Society for Friendship of Okinawa and Philippines. This 
group was started with the aim of creating cultural exchange between the two places on the 
grassroots level. So, through her introduction, Tomiyama first visited Manila in the late 
1980s. 
Following Tomiyama’s first visit, he and his fellow activists visited the Philippines 
almost every year until the early 1990s. Their main contact was a progressive activism 
network called Bayan (the Bagong Alyasang Makabayan or the New Nationalist Alliance). 
As an umbrella organization joined by many different leftist movement organizations, Bayan 
was founded in 1985 and conducted general strikes as a means of protest against Marcos’ 
dictatorial regime. Together with communist and other progressive organizations in 
provincial areas, Bayan was a core force of the People Power Revolution in 1986.309 The 
drastic change of the Philippine political landscape in the late 1980s was of strong interest to 
Okinawan activists. Yet what attracted Okinawans most was the 1991 agreement for the 
transfer of Clark Airbase from the US Air Force to the Philippine government, which was put 
into effect in the following year. Like Futenma and Kadena Airbases in Okinawa, the Clark 
Airbase had also played an important role for the US military during the Vietnam War. 
Therefore, the closure of this, one of the largest US airbases in the region, was perceived as a 
great achievement by the Philippine citizens. Therefore, when they heard the news, some 
Okinawans thought that they should learn from this neighboring country, and they started 
organizing a trip to the Philippines. 
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To strengthen Okinawa-Philippine solidarity, Tomiyama, Arasaki, Nishio and some 
other activists organized a group to study the history and current political and economic 
situation of the Philippines. The main aim of this study group was to study how the 
Philippines had been able to remove the American bases from the country. They also studied 
the relations between the Philippines and Japan, including the history of the Japanese 
wartime occupation of the Philippines, and contemporary issues such as the local impact of 
Japanese trade and investment.310 In the meantime, Tomiyama visited the Philippines several 
times. After Tomiyama’s visits over several years, the Okinawan side decided to organize a 
symposium to learn about the Philippine experience of anti-base movement activism. In this 
context, Nishio, Tomiyama, Takahashi, Arasaki and their friend To Yusa started a group 
called the Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia (ACSA or Ajia to Rentaisuru Shūkai 
Jikkō Iinkai) in 1994. 
However, the correspondence between Okinawa and the Philippines was not 
consistent and did not last long after 1994. Like many grassroots activist movements, ACSA 
faced problems such as insufficient membership, lack of language skills to communicate with 
the Philippine activists, and funding to support its activities. Those problems were overcome 
by volunteers and donations from the fellow activists. Also, even though the members of 
ACSA had some problems of communication, the language was not the real problem. Nishio 
retrospectively said that the Philippine and Okinawan activists were able to communicate 
adequately with each other, because the situations in those two places were very similar.311 
But one of the major reasons why this early period of Okinawa’s solidarity ended in failure 
was (ironically) because of the very fact of the closure of the US bases in the Philippines. 
After withdrawal of the US military from the Clark Airbase, American military bases were no 
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longer the major issue among the Philippine activists. After all, the anti-base movement had 
not been the main reason for the establishment of Bayan. The umbrella organization was 
created to tackle broad social and economic inequality in the country. American imperialistic 
involvement in the Philippine politics and society, including its support forthe Marcos 
regime, was an important agenda issue during the democratization period. Insofar as the 
American presence continued, the US bases were a symbol that represented its influence in 
the Philippines. But after 1992, this symbol was not a major issue any more for the local 
citizens. 
 
7.6. From ACSA to OKPS 
The turning point for the activity of ACSA came rather coincidentally in late 1996 when an 
activist named Kim Yong-han visited from South Korea. He was the leader of a group called 
the Headquarters of the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by US Troops 
(Juhan Migun Beomjoe Geunjeor Undong Bonbu, or Jumibun in Korean). Established in 
1993 after the rape and murder of a young local woman by a US soldier, “the Yun Geum-I 
case” of October 1992, this group has been playing the leading role in the anti-US military 
base movement in South Korea. The Yun Geum-I case was a brutal murder case that 
triggered a nation-wide protest campaign, seeking a fair criminal judgement against US 
military and the revision of Status of Forces Agreement between the US and South Korean 
governments. Prior to revision of the rules governing the criminal prosecution of US military 
personnel in 2001, the South Korean government did not have jurisdiction over the US 
servicemen who committed crimes in the country. Therefore, South Korean activists such as 
Kim Yong-han were impressed by reading a report of the 1995 island-wide protest triggered 
by a rape case in Okinawa, because this small provincial government in Japan became the 
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greatest concern for both Tokyo and Washington. Looking at the political events triggered by 
Okinawa’s mass protest campaign, Korean activists considered that they should learn from 
Okinawa’s experiences and local activism. Like Okinawans, activists from Jumibun also 
conducted a protest campaign against sexual assaults by US military personnel, and against 
the Status of Forces Agreement with the US. In such an intense political environment, Kim 
arrived in Naha with the help of his fellow Korean activists in August 1996. 
         This first encounter with Kim Yong-han also brought great benefit for Okinawan 
activists. As Arasaki recalls, although declaration of the end of military government and the 
political democratization of South Korea since 1988 had been reported in Okinawa, the 
knowledge that Okinawan activists had about Korean social activism was limited to media 
coverage, and thus the domestic situation of South Korean society was hardly visible to 
Okinawan activists.312  In this sense, Kim’s visit to Okinawa was one of the earliest 
opportunities for Okinawan activists to learn about the South Korean anti-US base struggles, 
including the unequal status of the security treaty with the US which guaranteed the 
extraterritoriality of the local US soldiers and personnel. This first encounter prompted the 
creation of a new channel of communication between activists from the two countries. Seven 
months later, in February 1997, forty-three South Koreans visited Okinawa to meet with 
Okinawan activists. One of the main reasons for the Koreans to visit Okinawa was to observe 
the public hearing at Naha Regional Court of a case between Hitotsubo Anti-war Landowners 
Association and the Japanese government about the issue of forced leases of privately owned 
land to the US military. This was the crucial moment that enhanced mutual awareness 
between South Korea and Okinawa.  
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After this second meeting, the interaction between Korea and Okinawa became 
increasingly active. Even though both Koreans and Okinawans were approaching each other 
without sufficient knowledge of the other, each side was inspired by their counterparts. It was 
indeed an unprecedented event in the histories of their respective anti-base movements that 
activists in two different regions came to meet with each other. Yet in a more pragmatic 
sense, what made the activists connected was the fact that deployment of the US military 
bases was a common social and political problem across national boundaries. In other words, 
through collaboration between Okinawa and Korea, activists in the two countries sought to 
reframe the anti-US base struggle as a Northeast Asian regional problem. According to 
Tomiyama and Nishio, activists in Okinawa felt that their struggle was not isolated any more 
when they came to know that Koreans were also struggling with similar problems.313 After 
hosting a meeting with the forty-three activists from Korea attended by over two hundred 
people, the founding members of ACSA decided to dissolve and re-form the group. This is 
how people who founded ACSA decided to start Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity (whose 
formal name is: the Association that Aims to Create People’s Solidarity through Anti-US 
Military Base Movement in Okinawa and South Korea, or Okikan or OKPS for short). The 
group was established in June 1998. 
          Like ACSA, OKPS was based in Nishio’s Uruma Chapel. What the members urgently 
needed to start collaborative works with Koreans was a basic knowledge of Korean social 
movements. While some members such as To, Takahashi, and Nishio had been individually 
involved with the Korean democratization movement while they were in mainland Japan, 
their basic knowledge of South Korean society was limited. With the help of Zainichi Korean 
such as Suh Sung, a Zainichi Korean activist who had been detained in South Korea for 
nineteen years due to his political involvement with the anti-authoritarian regime campaign, 
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the OKPS members organized social and cultural events from late 1997 until early 2002 to 
inform people about the base problems in South Korean politics. During this period, over 
twenty-five visits took place between the two regions. The reasons for the trips were diverse, 
including participation in academic conferences, and attendance at demonstrations in both 
Okinawa and various places in South Korea. Through the exchange of people, Okinawan 
activists and South Koreans learnt about each other. Also, from 1998, with the help of 
Korean students studying at the University of the Ryūkyūs and Japanese students who 
returned from South Korean universities, an evening Korean language class was opened. 
Although people such as Takahashi and Tomiyama were working during the daytime, at 
night they frequently went to study Korean. They could also recruit new members for OKPS 
through the class. In addition to language lessons, the members of OKPS held study groups. 
Initially they intended to focus on the base problems. However, according to Tomiyama, the 
issues that the members eventually needed to study covered a wide range of topics other than 
the anti-base movement, such as historical and territorial problems between Japan and South 
Korea.314 Tomiyama also states that OKPS succeeded in building a relationship of trust with 
Korean activists over the course of the first five years as a result of their frequent interaction 
across borders. 
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Image 7-2. The cover photo from the first annual activity report made by Action Committee for Solidarity 
with Asia in 1997. 
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Image 7-3. Clippings from local Okinawan and Korean newspaper articles reporting 43 Koreans’ visit in 
Okinawa to see the public hearing from Hitotsubo Anti-war landlords at the Naha local court. The photo 
was retrieved from the annual activity report made by the Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia in 
1997. 
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7.7. Mutual Preconceptions  
The visit of the Korean activists to Okinawa in 1997 was indeed the beginning of a process 
that opened a gateway for bilateral grassroots networks. However, there was also some 
ambivalence and scepticism in the feelings of each side towards each other. For Korean 
activists, their ambivalent feelings were primarily based on the history of Japanese 
colonialism in Korea. In the mid-1990s, there were still a large number of Korean anti-US 
base activists who thought that the presence of US military bases in Japan prevented Japan 
from rearming. They saw the US forces as a “jar lid”, containing any possible resurgence of 
Japanese militarism.315 From this perspective, many Korean activists were sceptical about the 
aims and philosophy of the Okinawan anti-US military base movement. Furthermore, there 
was a widespread perception in Korean society that US military bases helped South Koreans 
protect their country from the North Korean threat. Takahashi recalls that many South 
Korean journalists were interested in asking Okinawan activists why they were opposing the 
US military bases.316 
         At the same time, Okinawans were worried about developing a solidarity movement 
with South Korean activists. Although military dictatorship had formally come to an end 
when President Roh Tae-woo, a former General of the South Korean Army, declared the 
democratization of South Korea in 1987, Okinawan activists were still concerned about 
surviving elements from the former military regime, best represented by the issue of the 
National Security Act. As a second generation Zainichi Korean who also had a long-term 
involvement with the democratization movement of South Korea in Japan during the 1970s 
and 1980s, To Yusa knew only too well that many of his fellow Zainichi Korean activists 
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from Japan were imprisoned in Korea under the National Security Act.317 Tomiyama says 
that he and fellow Okinawan activists in the 1970s and 1980s had a preconception that there 
was no freedom of speech and no social activism in South Korea under dictatorship.318  
Hesitation to deepen the solidarity movement with Koreans was not only derived 
from the image of the South Korean military regime shared by the members but also from 
personal experiences. Some members had visited South Korea before 1987, where they had 
witnessed South Korean everyday life which was quite different from life in Japan at that 
time. Some of them were deeply shocked by their experiences in Korea, and had stopped his 
involvement with activism related to Korea until the late 1990s. Among them was Nishio 
Ichirō. Nishio, who was studying at a theological school in Okayama called Nōson Dendō 
Shingakkō (the Okayama Theological Seminary for Rural Mission), flew to South Korea 
with his Korean friend in early August 1974. Although this visit was part of their religious 
training at a rural chapel in Seoul, he was also involved with left-wing student activism at his 
previous theological college, Tokyo Union Theological Seminary (Tokyo Shingaku 
Daigaku). Because of this political background, Nishio was anxious about his first visit to 
South Korea. On his arrival he was greeted by the sight of Korean soldiers with machine guns 
at Seoul’s Gimpo International Airport. His anxiety reached its peak when he was about to 
leave South Korea in mid-August. At the immigration desk of Gimpo Airport, the officers 
confiscated his passport. Knowing little about his situation or the local language, Nishio was 
in a panic and only recalled what he was told by his friend: “Never lose your passport.” Later 
he found out that this was because of the assassination of Yuk Young-soo, the wife of the 
President Park Chung-hee, by a young Korean resident in Japan, Moon Se-gwang. When this 
so-called “Moon Se-gwang Incident” occurred, South Korean police suspected that the 
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perpetrator was Japanese. Therefore, all the Japanese who planned to leave the country 
around this period were blocked from departing. The only exception was fishermen.319  
 
7.8. Face-to-Face Relationship 
In the course of building trust with South Korean activists, the members of OKPS have kept 
one principle as the motto of their activity. That is to create and prioritise “face-to-face 
relationships” (kao no mieru kankei) with South Korean counterparts. The former 
representative of OKPS, Nishio Ichirō, said that, when he and his friends launched OKPS, 
they decided to build up a close relationship with South Koreans to the point at which they 
would be able to see their Korean counterparts as friends.320 Firstly, this meant an actual 
exchange of people between the two areas. As we have seen, the relationship between the two 
different groups of social actors started with suspicion and unfamiliarity towards each other. 
With such a beginning, the best way in which the members of OKPS could break the ice with 
South Korean activists was to establish a regular cycle of movement of people. During the 
first few years, the members of OKPS frequently flew to Korea and also invited Korean anti-
US base activists to visit Okinawa. Through the members’ participation in events such as 
study groups, symposiums, academic conferences, study tours and actual anti-base struggles, 
Okinawans increasingly learnt about South Korean anti-base struggles from firsthand 
experience.  
Secondly, the principle of face-to-face relationships also implies a type of solidarity 
based on inter-personal relationship rather than organizational connectivity. This approach 
enabled Okinawan activists to create flexible and wide-ranging individual relationships in 
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many different kinds of anti-US base activist groups in South Korea. Although this group’s 
first encounter with the Korean anti-base movement was through Kim Yong-han and his 
HNCECUST, the members of OKPS were involved with anti-US base campaigns in other 
places including Mae Hyang Ri, where local villagers and supporting activists demanded the 
closure of a military base used as a target practice site including depleted uranium shells, and 
also with a protest campaign against the extension of the military training facility in 
Pyeongtaek. In recent years, some members of OKPS began to be involved with the anti-
naval base construction movement in places like Gangjeon, Jeju Island. Their relationships 
with Korean activists have been growing through these shared experiences.321  
 
7.9. “Let’s Learn from Okinawa/Korea” 
Despite their initial unfamiliarity with ways in which to approach their South Korean 
counterparts, OKPS and their Korean counterparts have created mutual trust. This was 
achieved in part through frequent communication that ensured Okinawans understood 
people’s lived experiences and knowledge born out of the social contexts in South Korea. 
Through meetings at conference venues, at protest sites being exposed to freezing water from 
the water canon of riot police in Pyeongtaek’s cold winter, and at downtown bars where they 
drink together, OKPS has become the first Japanese anti-base group which could successfully 
build a solidarity movement with Koreans over the issue of the US military bases. Inspired by 
OKPS, civic groups in other areas of Japan with US bases, such as Yokosuka in Kanagawa 
Prefecture, began to follow OKPS in creating collaborative projects with Koreans.  
 
                                                 
321 Interview with Tomiyama Masahiro, November 21, 2011. 
280 
          Meanwhile, the Korean activists also found Okinawa to be an important “reference” 
for the anti-base movement. Here, the notion of “reference” means that the Koreans not only 
refer to their counterparts but also introduce ideas and strategies from Okinawa’s anti-base 
movement into their local activism. The anti-base struggle is indeed a translocal movement in 
which Okinawan and Korean participants are connected through people and ideas across 
different local contexts. In this sense, the forty-three Koreans’ visit to Okinawa in 1997 was 
profoundly important in that it was the one of the earliest moments in which Korean activists 
learned Okinawan ways of conducting anti-base campaigns. Through this event, Korean 
activists learnt the strategy developed by the Hitotsubo Anti-War Landlords. This strategy 
was introduced to the struggle in Korea. By purchasing a portion of privately owned land 
collectively, Korean citizens in Maehyang-ri started to initiate their local version of anti-war 
land owners from the late 1990s. Bringing a court case against the Korean government over 
the noise from the US bases is also another strategy that was introduced from Okinawa. 
Following examples from places such as Kadena and Futenma, where local citizens organize 
groups to take legal action against noise pollution (bakuon soshō dan), Korean activists in 
places such as Pyeongtaek sued their government over similar problems. 
However, it needs to be noted that “learning from Okinawa” is not a one-sided 
approach. OKPS was started to create a bilateral relationship through which mutual learning 
between Okinawans and their counterparts overseas could be developed. In this sense, while 
Korean activists say that they should learn from Okinawa, Okinawans also learn from Korean 
experiences. With regard to this point, Arasaki’s comment on Korean activism is helpful. 
Looking at the surge of Korean nationwide protest against the US military over an accident in 
which two local school-girls were killed by an American tank in 2002, Arasaki said: 
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When I was studying South Korean base problems, I saw a pamphlet which says “let’s 
learn from Okinawa” but I thought this was an overestimation. The point (of the 
pamphlet) was “Okinawa made the US apologize, but the US have never apologized to us 
(South Korea)”…Although they (South Koreans) are saying that they should learn from 
Okinawa, I am doubtful about the current situation of the Okinawan anti-base movement. I 
rather think that Okinawans are encouraged by Koreans… I keenly feel the importance of 
considering how we can learn from them.322 
 
In particular, Arasaki thinks that the active participation of young people in the anti-base 
movement is a characteristic that Okinawa needs to learn from South Korea. From a different 
perspective, Tomiyama says that he is always amazed by the number of people which South 
Korean activism mobilizes and by their creative strategy for the anti-base campaigns in 
Seoul. He said: 
 
South Korean activism is always sensational and exciting. When I was marching with 
other fellow activists in front of Seoul Mayoral Building, people suddenly spread a big 
American flag. It was a massive flag. You know what happened? A few young guys ran in 
the middle of the crowd to cut the flag into two. I was thrilled. I wished we could also do 
that performance in Okinawa.323 
 
Perhaps one of the most crucial things that Okinawa learned through interaction with the 
Korean anti-base movement was the significance of Okinawa’s geopolitical location in the 
region. Kadena Airbase in Okinawa was one of the main sites from which American B-29 
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bombers were sent to the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War. After half a century, 
while the US military command has changed globally since 2001, reflecting 9/11 and the 
subsequent attack on Afghanistan, Okinawa is still regarded as a crucial place for America’s 
regional strategy in the Asia-Pacific, especially in relation to Northeast Asian affairs. 
Although this fact has been widely known among local activists in Okinawa, the actual 
strategic connection between Okinawa and Korea was not known until OKPS learned about 
this through colleagues in South Korea. As To Yusa says, since the Korean War, the 
Headquarters of US Forces Korea, located in Yongsan near Seoul, has been a center for US 
military operations in the Northeast Asian region including Okinawa. He also says that when 
the Commander of the US Eighth Army is changed, it has been conventional that the newly 
appointed officer is always taken on a tour of inspection of the bases in not only Korea but 
also Japan, including the places such as Futenma and Kadena in Okinawa and Atsugi, 
Yokosuka, Hokkaido and Yamaguchi.324  
This intra-regional connectivity within Asia also raises ethical questions for the 
Okinawan anti-base movement. Tomiyama recalled that when Okinawan activists succeeded 
in stopping the import of America’s depleted uranium bombs in 1997, they did not even 
imagine that those bombs would instead be relocated to a base in South Korea. He said that 
until he learnt about these events in Korea he did not consider the impact of this “success”, 
from the Okinawan perspective, which in fact just shifted the burden to their regional 
neighbors.325 For the members of OKPS, acquiring this sort of knowledge through interaction 
with Korean activists helped Okinawans reconsider the meanings of their activism in relation 
to other places in the region.  
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          Five years of constant interaction with South Korean activists from 1998 until 2002 
have brought slight changes to the Okinawan anti-base movement. Compared to the early 
days, visits of Korean activists to Okinawa are no longer unusual, and have instead become 
important annual events for Okinawans. Although their activities are still not very well-
known, growing interest in the Okinawan anti-base movement amongst Korean activists and 
an increase in the number of visitors show that the activities that OKPS has organized for the 
last two decades have had some impact. This has encouraged further collaboration between 
Okinawans and Koreans in fields such as the environmental movement. Citizens from 
Okinawa and Korea started undertaking a collaborative survey of land contamination on the 
sites of former US military camps from the mid-2000s. This was indeed positive progress of 
the transnational solidarity movement. 
 
 
       
284 
 
Image 7-4. A local Okinawan newspaper article reporting about Korean anti-US base activists starting a 
hitotsubo anti-war landlords’ movement. 
 
 
 
Image 7-5. A local Okinawan newspaper article reporting Korean activists who participated in the annual 
anti-war campaign on 15 May in Okinawa. 
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Image 7-6. A report on the visit of Korean activists in Okinawa written by Arasaki Moriteru. He wrote that 
Okinawans were impressed by Korean activism which was organised by the much younger generations 
than the Okinawan movement, which was led by mainly senior generations. 
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7.10. Okikan Style: “5.15” and the Emergence of the Younger Generations 
15 May is an important day for Okinawa’s post-World War history. Every year, there are 
prefecture-wide ceremonies and events that take place around this date, which marks the 
anniversary of the day when Okinawa was “returned” to Japan in 1972. When “Go Ichi Go” 
(15 May in Japanese) is approaching, there have always been public events around Okinawa. 
One of the main ceremonies is usually organized by the Okinawa Prefectural Government. 
The governor of Okinawa and high-profile political figures come to give speeches to 
celebrate this historical day. However, anti-base activists and scholars also organize events 
with quite different motivations. Organizing public fora such as symposia, panel discussions 
and lectures, they question what “reversion” actually meant for Okinawa and its people. 
Also, during the week, there has been a tradition of making a human chain that surrounds the 
US Futenma Airbase. 
 In 2012, this historic day was to have its fortieth anniversary. For this memorable 
year, both the prefectural government and civic groups had been working to organize events 
on a greater scale than previous years. There were numerous posters and flyers displayed at 
corners of streets and on billboards. In this environment of excitement, the members of 
OKPS had also been working on their events. Ever since 2003, OKPS have been inviting 
Koreans to participate in the series of events around 15 May. With guests from diverse 
organizations, they have organized public events in different places in Okinawa. Also, the 
members of OKPS become tour-guides, and take Korean visitors to Henoko and Takae to 
show them the ongoing protest campaigns.  
The members of OKPS usually start working on this project from the previous year. 
For the events of May 2012, they started planning the Koreans’ visit from late September 
2011. The agenda items for the monthly regular meeting, which are not so numerous at other 
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times of the year, gradually increase as the anniversary approaches. With senior figures such 
as Takahashi and Nishio as coordinators, the members discuss issues related to this week-
long event. The agenda is extensive. Jobs such as booking accommodation, organizing a 
pick-up service for Korean guests from the airport, interpretation at formal and informal 
venues, stage setting, and preparation of lunches are all conducted by OKPS.  
In addition to the tour-guide role, OKPS has been working on a musical event. Since 
2009, OKPS has invited cultural performance groups such as Deoneum and Kkottaji. 
Deoneum performs traditional farmers’ music called pungmur nori. Playing the drums and 
dancing in a circle, the performers not only showcase classic folk culture but also express 
protests against the political establishment. Based in Incheon, one of the centers of South 
Korean industrialization, they have been collaborating closely with industrial workers. The 
group Kkottachi is also known for its use of music performance as a means of social protest. 
While Tŏnŭm plays traditional music, Kkottachi sings in a contemporary pop music style. In 
Okinawa as in Korea, music plays a crucial role in the culture of the peace movement 
including the anti-base movement. Indie artists such as rappers Kakumakushaka and Chibana 
Tatsumi are among the singers whose works have been popular in Okinawa, particularly 
among youths. OKPS approached several local musicians, and was able to book an Okinawan 
traditional music singer, Ayumu Yonaha, for the coming event. 
The annual music event for 15 May had been organized by new members of OKPS 
rather than the senior founding members. People in their thirties or forties were  particularly 
active. Among them is Ishikawa Takashi, who proposed the idea of inviting Kkottachi. 
Originally born and raised in Chiba Prefecture, Ishikawa used to work in Tokyo as a medical 
doctor, particularly for manual laborers. He moved to Okinawa in the early 2000s at the 
invitation of a senior pulmonologist in Naha. While working in the local Daidō Hospital, 
Ishikawa has been involved with OKPS ever since he arrived. He is one of the main 
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contributors to OKPS in terms of financial assistance. Yet his career as an activist started 
when he was a university student. When he was a medical student in Chiba University, 
Ishikawa started becoming involved with social activism to support workers affected by 
industrial accidents, particularly those suffering from respiratory disease. During that period, 
he met concerned medical students in South Korea who also worked for the laborers. It was 
then that Ishikawa was introduced to Kkottachi, and OKPS was able to invite the group 
because of his connections. Participation of the young generations is not only helpful for the 
seniors but is also playing a vital role in introducing new kinds of activities to OKPS. The 
young participants do not necessarily share the contexts and experiences of their elders. But 
OKPS has gradually become better known among local activists and other local citizens 
through cultural events such as music concerts during the events of 15 May, which embodies 
the distinctive cross-border reach of this group. In this sense, the spirit of OKPS is developed 
not only by its senior members but also by the younger members who are creating new styles 
of collaboration between Okinawa and South Korea. 
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Image 7-7. Deoneum performs traditional farmers’ music called p'ung-mur nori at the 50th anniversary of 
Okinawa’s return to Japan. The photo was taken by Takahashi Toshio, May 2012. 
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7.11. Imposed Boundaries 
Ever since the day that the five Okinawan citizens started OKPS, it has been remarkably 
successful in building a transnational solidarity against US military bases with South Korean 
activists. Its experiences provide us with a crucial reference for understanding the emergence 
of a type of Northeast Asian regionalism. This transnational solidarity movement challenges 
boundaries that are not merely drawn on the map of the region but are also deeply embedded 
in historical experiences. It is fair to say that OKPS and its 30 years of activities have helped 
to re-discover and connect localities, and in so doing have enabled Okinawan activists to 
rearticulate their distinctive local experiences of the anti-base movement within regional 
contexts. The participants in this transnational solidarity movement are thus carving out a 
space for shared histories and identities in order to create more inclusive relationships with 
their regional neighbors.  
This rich international experience sometimes made OKPS become a cause of conflict 
with other local activists in Okinawa. In particular, OKPS was one of the few voices which 
opposed Okinawa’s base relocation outside the prefecture. In 2009, then mayor of Ginowan 
City, Iha Yōichi, insisted on the closure of the Futenma Airbase to relocate it to Guam. 
Known as one of the most vocal activists in Okinawa, his opinion was supported by many of 
the senior activists. Although the founding members of OKPS, including Tomiyama, were 
also Iha’s long-term friends and colleagues, they disagreed with the relocation plan advocated 
by Iha and other senior leaders. Through the interaction with Korean activists, they became 
concerned with the idea of relocation because it risked creating other victims of the base 
problem. What they insisted instead was the closure of all the US bases in Okinawa to return 
them to the US. However, few people supported OKPS. Rather, the local leaders criticized 
Tomiyama and other members. There, OKPS was “very isolated”, said Tomiyama, because 
they were regarded as people who stopped the momentum for the closure of the Futenma 
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Airbase. In this sense, OKPS plays a vital role to extend the horizon of pacifism that 
Okinawa’s anti-base movement created. However, their transnational activism is not easily 
understood even within Okinawa.  
Also, there were some other difficulties for OKPS to build the anti-base network with 
South Korean activists. Particularly when OKPS is confronted by the regulatory actions of 
the state, their transnational activism become vulnerable. On the 5th of September in 2012 at 
around 12:45 in the afternoon, three activists from OKPS—Takahashi Toshio, Tomiyama 
Masahiro, and Tomita Eiji—arrived at Incheon International Airport in South Korea. Their 
plan was to visit Jeju Island via Seoul in order to attend a conference organised by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). This conference has been run 
annually since 1948 and brings together national governments and non-government 
organizations (NGOs) for the purpose of discussing the protection and promotion of natural 
heritage around the globe. With an official letter from a member of the South Korean 
National Assembly, Takahashi, Tomiyama and Tomita were invited guests of the conference. 
However, after they disembarked at Incheon Airport, an immigration officer asked them to go 
to the administration desk. At the desk, another immigration official required the three men to 
submit their passports and took their finger prints. Showing the letter of invitation, Takahashi 
asked for an explanation for their treatment, but the official did not respond to his inquiry and 
told them to wait for a superior official to come. In the meantime, Takahashi called the 
Japanese Embassy in Seoul. He told the Japanese official that they had been detained in the 
airport. However, this Japanese official told him to contact the Japanese Embassy again if 
they were refused entry.  
After they had waited for about two hours, two Korean immigration officers told 
Takahashi and the others that their entry into South Korea had been denied, and they were to 
leave the country on the same day. A return ticket had already been prepared by Asiana 
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Airlines. When Takahashi and the others were told they would be deported, they responded 
by arguing that this order from the Korean authorities without any reasonable explanations 
was not acceptable. Takahashi demanded that the Korean Ministry of Justice should write a 
letter explaining the reason to decline their entry into the country, but all of his requests were 
dismissed by the officials. Around 4.00pm, Takahashi called the Japanese Embassy in Seoul 
again, and explained what had occurred. He asked a Japanese official to negotiate with the 
Korean Government, saying that this decision for the visitors to be deported without any clear 
reason was a violation of human rights. However, the official at the Japanese Embassy said to 
Takahashi that the decision was made by the Korean Government, and therefore there was 
nothing the Japanese Embassy could do to help. In the end, the three men were sent back to 
Fukuoka in Japan late the same afternoon. 
          Later, it was revealed that a number of other people from Okinawa, Japan and 
elsewhere had been refused entry when they arrived at the airport. As with Takahashi, 
Tomiyama and Tomita, the other people were all planning to participate in the conference of 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature in Jeju. Some Korean NGOs and activist 
groups released protest statements about these refusals. Okinawan activists also held a press 
conference at the Okinawa Prefectural Government building. The news was released in a 
local newspaper next day. The South Korean government kept silent on this issue, but 
activists speculated that the Korean government was concerned about the escalation of the 
anti-base movement in Gangjeong Village on Jeju Island, located in the southern part of Jeju 
Island in South Korea, the South Korean government announced the plan to create a naval 
base in Jeju for the first time in 1993. After 15 years to search for the possible location for the 
naval base, the government eventually appointed Gangjeong Village in 2007. Since then, the 
concerned villagers and activists from Korea and the rest of the world have been conducting 
an anti-base construction campaign. Six months before Okinawas’ visit to Jeju, the then 
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President of South Korea Lee Myung-bak and his government had decided to destroy the 
rocky shoreline in preparation for the construction of a new naval base. The rocky shore, 
which was listed as a world heritage site harboring rare local species, was designated as the 
central site of the base construction. The incident in September 2012 involving the OKPS 
members and others could be seen as a somewhat draconian response by President Lee to the 
risk of an escalation of political activism in Gangjeong. 
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Image 7-7. A photo of three men from Okinawa taken to the departure lobby. The photo was taken by 
Takahashi Toshio September 2012. 
 
 
Image 7-8. Three men (from left: Tomiyama Masahiro, Tomita Eiji and Takahashi Toshio) at the departure 
lobby waiting for the return flight to Fukuoka.  
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Image 7-9: A local Okinawan newspaper reporting that Takahashi and others were refused entry into 
South Korea. 
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7.12. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the process by which one group of Okinawan anti-base activists 
gained a regional perspective on the meaning of their local activism. The project of building a 
transnational network was initiated by five local activists who felt a common imperative to 
seek new ways to develop Okinawan anti-base activism. But the founders of OKPS were not 
only motivated by anti-base politics. By reflecting upon the historical relationships between 
Okinawa and South Korea, they questioned the dominant historical narrative of Okinawa’s 
victimhood at the hands of Japanese imperialism. In other words, the OKPS was founded by 
the local citizens who realized the necessity of reconsidering their local histories by including 
regional neighbors whose colonial past and experiences were hardly remembered in the 
popular accounts of Okinawa’s modern history. In this sense, it is important to highlight the 
significance of historical consciousness with regard to Okinawa’s postwar (or, arguably 
Okinawa’s postcolonial) conditions that motivated people to start the transnational solidarity 
movement. 
While based on such historical awareness, the actual transnational cooperation 
became possible through a series of relatively fortuitous events in the late 1990s. Although 
the group was founded by concerned local Okinawan citizens in the mid-1990s, its existence 
would not have been possible without the visit of Korean activists who became interested in 
Okinawa’s mass protest campaign in 1995. After the failure of their first attempt at 
transnational cooperation with Philippine activists, Okinawan activists faced difficulties in 
starting a new international solidarity movement. In such circumstances, the first visit of a 
Korean activist in 1996 and the following visit by forty-three Koreans to learn about the 
Okinawan anti-base struggle gave a hope for Okinawans to restart their project. Thus the 
transnational anti-base movement between Okinawa and South Korea was made possible by 
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a coming together of people who similarly sought new visions to develop their struggles in 
two different locations.  
The effort that OKPS has made to develop relationships with South Korean activists 
over the last twenty years has created solidarity based on trust between different activist 
groups across national borders. Through exchanges of people, ideas and experiences, they 
could establish a type of mutual reference system by which the activists in different locales 
could compare and learn about the anti-base movement in two different locales. At the same 
time, this solidarity movement also generated a regional perspective in which Okinawan and 
Korean activists could reflect upon the impact and the meanings of their local activism on 
their counterparts. For OKPS, this means that the notion of region has widened the scope of 
their activism by extending it in relation to regional neighbors. In this sense, one of the 
significant outcomes that OKPS has brought to the Okinawan anti-base movement has been 
the idea of “region”, through which the local anti-base activists can consider the implications 
of their movement beyond their own local situation. In the next chapter, I will look in further 
detail at the origins of OKPS. I will emphasize the diversity of historical contexts that are 
involved in the creation of OKPS. By analyzing the personal histories of some key figures, I 
will examine how the notion of region became a crucial part of the communal identity of 
OKPS and what region means to key members. 
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Chapter Eight 
Regionalising Locality:  
Making Regional-Local Identity in Okinawa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OKPS members with South Korean activists in May 15, 2012.  
The photo was taken and provided by Takahashi Toshio. 
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8.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the general history of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity 
(OKPS). I looked at the historical background of the group, and considered what OKPS has 
achieved, the problems that it has overcome, and the lessons that it has learned in the process 
of building collaborative anti-base activism with South Korean activists. Although it is a 
small activist group, what makes OKPS crucial among the local protest communities is its 
distinctive activism by which Okinawa’s anti-base movement became a key instance of 
transnational civic activism. However, it is also important to consider another aspect of 
OKPS: that is, the identity that it formed based on Okinawa’s distinctive locality and on the 
historical context of a wider East Asian region. I call this distinctive form of community 
identity “regional-local identity”. This concept shows the extensive sense of place of 
Okinawan anti-base activists which lies both in local and regional contexts. Also, it highlights 
the entanglement of the local anti-base movement in Okinawa with regional neighbors in 
space and history. This entanglement provides us with a new perspective to consider the 
meaning of the Okinawa struggle in relation to not only Japan and the US but also East Asian 
societies (i.e. the Koreas, China, Taiwan and the Philippines). 
 The main aim of this chapter is to look in further detail at the formation of this local-
regional identity by examining the life histories of three key members of OKPS, who 
originate from different cultural backgrounds and have diverse life experiences. The stories 
of these activists—Arasaki Moriteru, Takahashi Toshio, and Yu Yeongja—provide us with 
important perspectives which elucidate the complexity of “locality”. They reveal not only 
individual stories but diverse social contexts and forms of historical awareness of OKPS 
embedded within their personalized narratives. By looking at these stories, this chapter aims 
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to consider “local identity” as a multi-leveled concept and explore the contexts which create 
“local-regional identity”.  
The life history of Arasaki, who was born as the second generation of Okinawan 
migrants in Tokyo, helps us to understand the forces that moulded one of the most prominent 
Okinawan historians, and also highlights the historical process by which this local anti-base 
activist came to incorporate a regional perspective through his interaction with South Korean 
citizens. Takahashi’s story tells us about the involvement of former new left activists in 
shaping local-regional identity in Okinawa. While we tend to think of the notion of Okinawan 
people under the rubric of ethnicity or cultural identity, Takahashi’s life history complicates 
this assumption and reveals the role of the Japanese new left movement and the sense of 
internationalism which emerged in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s in the Okinawan anti-base 
movement. Finally, Yu’s story shows the involvement of ethnic Koreans living in Japan (or 
so-called Zainichi Koreans), which provides us with yet another perspective on making local-
regional identity. The story of Yu, as a non-Japanese and non-Okinawan, is important to 
critically examine the problems of the fixity of Okinawa’s local identity, which is built on 
dichotomous views of “local Okinawan” and “the mainland Japanese”. Also, her life 
experience before and after joining OKPS extends our view to the historical context of OKPS 
that is deeply rooted in Japan’s past with Korea. From these three perspectives, this chapter 
examines how this multi-faceted process of identity formation takes place in Okinawa. 
Together with written documents, I rely on oral history as a useful method to 
highlight the lives of these activists. Oral history is an approach which has increasingly been 
mobilized in recent scholarship on the history of social movements. One of the useful aspects 
of oral history is that it helps us understand collective consciousness through a prism of 
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individual perspective.326 Also oral history can reveal the relationship of one form of activism 
to various other social movements. It is not only helpful in understanding historical details 
but is also a critical method that is “disruptive” and unsettles collective history by 
introducing diverse perspectives on a major historical narrative.327 By focusing on the diverse 
historical experiences and the processes of identity formation of these three activists, this 
chapter analyses multiple levels of place consciousness in OKPS. 
 
8.2. Arasaki Moriteru 
A scholar, educator, university manager, critic, and activist, Arasaki Moriteru has been a 
prominent figure in the contemporary Okinawa anti-base movement. As professor of 
contemporary Okinawa history, Arasaki’s works including his seminal books on the subject 
such as Okinawa Sengoshi (Postwar Okinawa History) and Okinawa Gendaishi 
(Contemporary Okinawa History) are among the most important texts for understanding the 
development of the anti-base movement and Okinawa’s political environment after the end of 
World War II. In recent years, Arasaki’s texts have been published in other languages such as 
Korean and Chinese, and a translation into English is under way. Also, Arasaki is one of the 
founding members of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity in 1997, and has been an important 
Okinawan counterpart for Korean visitors since the late 1980s.  
Despite his significance in the anti-base movement, Arasaki’s life history is little 
known even among the local Okinawan citizens. While his public image as one of the most 
vocal speakers on the Okinawa problem is widely known, and a number of students, scholars 
                                                 
326 Bret Eynon, “Cast upon the Shore: Oral History and New and New Scholarship on the Movements of 
the1960s,” The Journal of American History 83 (1996): 560-561. 
327 Kim Lacy Rogers, “Oral History and the History of the Civil Rights Movement,” The Journal of American His-
tory 75 (1988): 567-568. 
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and others read his texts as an introduction to the Okinawa struggle, it does not necessarily 
mean that his life experiences are well-known. However, in order to conduct in-depth reading 
of his text, understanding the life history of this kamajisaa is important.328 In particular, his 
life history becomes crucial for understanding the meanings of “locality” and “region” in the 
context of the Okinawa struggle, and for grasping how these two concepts are connected to 
the wider East Asia. How was this high-profile commentator on contemporary Okinawa 
history created? What was the motivation for him to engage with Korea? What does his 
involvement with OKPS reveal about his perspective on region and locality? By focusing on 
these aspects, I will analyze Arasaki’s local-regional identity. 
 
8.2.1. Early Life 
Arasaki Moriteru was born in Suginami, a western suburb of Tokyo in 1936. Living far from 
Okinawa, Arasaki spent most of his formative period in various districts of Tokyo. He was 
the eldest son of Arasaki Seichū and Arasaki Tawo.329 Both of his parents were first 
generation migrants from Okinawa. Although his parents were not members of the social 
elite, they were both well educated people. Tawo was a poet, writing traditional Okinawan 
poems, ryūka. Born in Tokunoshima Island, which currently belongs to Kagoshima 
Prefecture, Tawo finished her education at one of the most prestigious women’s high-schools 
in Okinawa. After working as a school teacher for several years, she married Arasaki Seichū, 
who also worked at a local public school in Okinawa as an English teacher. Seichū’s family, 
the Arasaki clan, had been part of the former aristocracy before Okinawa was annexed by 
Japan. However, when Seichū grew up his family did not hold any prestigious title. Rather, 
                                                 
328 Kamajisā means “a man who is an ungenial, serious, and sulky in appearance” in local Okinawan language. I 
heard some people using this term to describe Arasaki with endearment. 
329 Interview with Arasaki Moriteru December 20, 2011. 
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the family was struggling financially. Yet this family was still different from the majority of 
the local population. Some of Seichū’s relatives and siblings had high educational 
backgrounds. For example, one of Seichū’s elder siblings, Arasaki Seibin (1912-n.d.), studied 
natural science at the Tokyo Imperial University, where he later became the first Okinawan-
born Professor of Phycology, studying algae.330 Seichū also graduated from the local teachers 
college and became an English teacher. However, he was not given any chance to study 
further at university. Priority in education was given according to seniority for financial 
reasons. Seichū, who was the second son, could not receive the opportunities his elder brother 
did.  
Nevertheless, Seichū did not give up his plan to receive tertiary education. He decided 
to leave his home and job in Okinawa and go to Tokyo with his wife. Working during the day 
time as a national government bureaucrat, Seichū became a night-class student at Nihon 
University in Tokyo. Seichū was interested in British novelists and playwrights, particularly 
in George Bernard Shaw, and had a collection of Shaw’s works on his shelf. Born in 
Okinawa after annexation and living in the imperial capital, Seichū’s life coincided with that 
of the Irish play writer and critic. Having been inspired by Shaw, Seichū also wanted to 
become a writer.331 However, he had to give up his dream because of the difficulty of 
managing work and study at the same time. He withdrew from university and decided to live 
the rest of his life as a public servant. Seichū’s son, Moriteru (hearafter Arasaki), nurtured his 
intellectual curiosity in such a family environment. 
Arasaki’s childhood was not easy. First, he was not physically strong, and suffered 
from tuberculosis and a heart problem which became an ongoing health problem. He had to 
take one year’s leave from school to undergo medical treatment. Even after he returned from 
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hospital, Arasaki’s vulnerable health prevented him from participating in hard physical 
activities. Also, the air raids on Tokyo by the Allied Forces towards the end of World War II 
made his life difficult. Although Arasaki and his family were not directly affected by 
bombing, Seichū and Tawo decided to evacuate from Tokyo. The destination to which the 
whole family moved was Kumamoto Prefecture in western Kyūshū Island.332 While Tokyo 
was suffering air raids, the Arasaki family’s home island, Okinawa, was also reduced to ashes 
due to the Battle of Okinawa. Although Arasaki’s parents wished to return to Okinawa, they 
did not have any option but to live outside Okinawa. The main reason why Seibin and Tawo 
decided to move to Kumamoto was because Kyūshū Island was one of the closest places to 
Okinawa. Unlike some other prominent anti-base Okinawan activists of the same generation, 
such as Ōta Masahide, Arasaki thus did not experience wartime life in Okinawa.  
 
8.2.2. A Patriotic Boy 
One of the key terms to understand Arasaki’s early postwar experiences was “patriotism” 
(aikokushin). As happened to most of the “war-time generation” (or senchū-ha), who were 
born around the 1930s, Arasaki grew up with a strong spirit of Japanese patriotism. Such 
children were later called “patriotic boys” (aikoku shōnen). Despite his health condition, his 
dream was to become a soldier and fight the Americans on the battlefield.333 
However, after the end of WWII, like many patriotic boys, Arasaki also had to face 
drastic changes in his living environment. Under the Allied occupation, Arasaki was 
confused by the sudden changes in society. For Arasaki in his early teenage years, the most 
symbolic representation of this social change was his school teachers. He simply despised the 
sudden change in his teachers who had once supported the advancement of the Japanese 
                                                 
332 Moriteru Arasaki, “Watashi ga Ikita Okinawa-shi, soshite Sekai-shi 2.” Keishikaji 76 (October, 2012): 56-65. 
333 Ibid. 
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Imperial Army and then suddenly started to denounce the previous regime and became 
advocates of American-style democracy. Although the concept of “kichiku beiei” (Barbaric 
Britons and Americans like devils and animals) was no longer taught in his classroom, it was 
still significant in his mind. Therefore, the experience of postwar democracy education 
embedded a deep scepticism in his mind about Americans as well as Japanese leaders.334 
The young Arasaki’s suspicion towards postwar Japanese democracy became explicit 
by the time he was a high- school student. When the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into 
force on 28 April 1952, the school principal of Tokyo Koyamadai High-school, where 
Arasaki had recently enrolled, called all the students to the school grounds. In front of all the 
students, the principal celebrated Japan’s restoration of independence from the allied 
occupation with shouts of banzai.335 Hearing the school principal’s words, many of the 
Koyamadai students shouted criticism at their principal. The left-leaning students criticized 
their school principal since they considered Japan’s “independence” was in fact nothing more 
than incorporation into the American capitalist order, whereas the conservative nationalist 
students, including Arasaki, criticized the school principal because they considered that 
independence had only been achieved through the strong support of the US, which had been 
Japan’s biggest enemy during the Pacific War.336 
Although many politically concerned students of his high- school belonged to left-
leaning student clubs such as the Social Science Club, Arasaki was not a member of any of 
these groups. Instead, he chose to join the Debating Club because of its “neutral political 
views”.337 There he trained his skills of oratory and became one of the most outstanding 
debaters in his school. During his first year, Arasaki became a finalist in the debating 
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competition. The title that he chose was: The True Way to Japan’s Independence. There, 
Arasaki insisted that the recovery of lost territories, including Okinawa, was necessary for 
restoration of Japan’s territorial sovereignty in its true sense. 
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Photo 8-1. Arasaki in his first year of Koyamadai High school, at the venue of the school-wide debate 
competition. (Arasaki in the centre of the back row) 
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8.2.3. Identity Loss 
Although Arasaki had been a patriotic boy, it did not take long for him to realize the presence 
of a “borderline between Okinawa and Japan, and between yamatonchū (Japanese people) 
and uchinanchū (Okinawan people)”.338 The turning point came in 1952, during his first 
summer holiday after becoming a Koyamadai high-school student. While reading a 
newspaper, Arasaki found Douglas MacArthur’s comment on Okinawans, in which 
MacArthur described the obedient people of Okinawa as ethnically different from 
Japanese.339 Arasaki was stunned by MacArthur’s statement. It was the first time that the 
young Arasaki had heard Okinawans described as ethnically different from Japanese. 
Following this, Arasaki read another newspaper article written by an American journalist 
which increased his unease. It reported how the locals in Okinawa had happily welcomed the 
US occupation. Until that moment, Arasaki had strongly believed that Okinawans were the 
same as Japanese. With this idea of sameness, Arasaki’s Japanese patriotism could co-exist 
with his Okinawan identity. However, his belief was undermined after he read those 
newspaper articles. What if Okinawa was not part of Japan but had been occupied by Japan, 
just as Americans had occupied Japan? What if Okinawan people were different from 
Japanese people? Were the Okinawa locals really pleased to have Americans? These 
concerns emerged in his first year of high school, and slowly made his intellectual interests 
shift from Japan to Okinawa and its local history.  
In this year, there was another crucial experience that shaped Arasaki’s thought. 
During the summer holidays in August, one of his friends gave him the latest issue of Asahi 
Gurafu, one of the earliest Japanese photo journals. As Arasaki read the journal, some of its 
photos attracted his attention. They were images of the victims of the atomic bombing of 
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Hiroshima. During the occupation, the Press Code for Japan strictly prohibited the 
publication of information which could “directly or indirectly, disturb the public tranquility”, 
and or which contained “destructive criticism of the Allied Powers and anything which might 
invite mistrust or resentment of those troops”.340 Photos showing the effects of the atomic 
bombings were also heavily censored, and therefore, it had not been possible to show the 
catastrophic images of the victims during the occupation period. Arasaki was shocked not 
only by the visual images of the victims but also by the fact that so many civilians had been 
killed during World War II. Not long after, Arasaki had a chance to read a novel about the 
Battle of Okinawa. The book was about the tragedy of the Himeyuri Nursing Unit at the end 
of the war. Many of this group of female students who were mobilised as a nursing unit 
during the Battle of Okinawa committed suicide towards the end of the war. Reading about 
these experiences made a significant impact on the young Arasaki, and as a result he became 
determined to study further about the history of Okinawa. 
 
8.2.4. Becoming “an Expert on the Okinawa Problem” 
After graduating from high school and taking a year off, Arasaki entered the University of 
Tokyo in 1956. Aiming to become a journalist, he chose sociology for his major. With his 
mentor, Hidaka Rokurō, who was known as one of the most influential advocates of the 
postwar Japanese peace movement in that period, Arasaki began to conduct academic 
research on Okinawa. The topic he chose to study was the early US occupation period in 
Okinawa. In particular, he was strongly intrigued by the first island-wide struggle that 
occurred a year before Arasaki became a university student. For Arasaki, this first mass 
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protest uprising of Okinawan people against the US occupation was an historical event as 
significant as the Hungarian Uprising against the occupation by Soviet Russia, which 
occurred in the same year. He considered the people’s uprising as an expression of 
Okinawa’s dynamic political culture: contrary to media images of Okinawans as “obedient” 
people, local people had raised voices against foreign occupation. Based on the principle of 
self-determination, Arasaki discussed this as a grassroots demand for the reunification of 
Japan. Although his choice of research was not appealing to some senior sociologists in the 
faculty such as Odaka Kunio (1908-1993), his main supervisor, Hidaka Rokurō (1917-), was 
supportive of Arasaki’s project. Arasaki’s undergraduate thesis was entitled “An Inquiry into 
the Reversion Movement to Japan: Notes on understanding Okinawa Problems” (Nihon 
Fukki Undō no Kenkyū: Okinawa Mondai Rikai no Tameno Oboegaki).341 
When Arasaki was approaching the end of his student life, he was introduced to one 
of Hidaka’s colleagues, Nakano Yoshio (1903-1985). Nakano was originally Professor of 
English Literature at the University of Tokyo. However, ever since he read the collection of 
essays written by Okinawan students in Tokyo, “Okinawa without Homeland” (Sokoku Naki 
Okinawa), Nakano had been actively participating in the campaign for Okinawa’s return to 
Japan.342 When Nakano met Arasaki for the first time in 1958, he was planning to establish a 
research centre on Okinawa in Tokyo. Nakano’s project, the Okinawa Resource Centre, 
attracted attention from his friends and colleagues such as the chief editor of a current affairs 
journal Sekai (the World) and the organiser of the Council of Peace Studies (heiwa mondai 
danwakai), Yoshino Genzaburō (1899-1981); Professor of Law who became the President of 
the University of Tokyo, Kato Ichirō (1922-2008); the Professor of European History at 
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Hitotsubashi University, Uehara Senroku (1899-1975); and a lawyer, Umino Shinkichi. 
Nakano offered Arasaki a job at this newly established civic think-tank. His office was a 
small room in Umino’s office. Arasaki started his career as a part-time researcher at this 
institute, while also working as a public servant of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 
Based on his undergraduate thesis, Arasaki published one of his earliest works on Okinawan 
society, “20 years of the Okinawan Problem” (Okinawa Mondai Nijū-nen), co-authored with 
Nakano Yoshio in 1965. 
In 1974, two years after Okinawa was reincorporated as part of Japan, Arasaki and his 
family settled in Naha. He was offered a position teaching modern Japanese and Okinawan 
history at Okinawa University. Established in 1961, Okinawa University was one of the first 
private universities in the prefecture. However, after Okinawa’s return to Japan, the 
university was facing closure because the Japanese government planned to implement a “one 
national and one private university” policy in Okinawa. The Japanese Ministry of Education 
planned to integrate it with other local private colleges and universities such as the 
International University. Facing this difficult period, the local staff members of the university 
asked for help from concerned people in mainland Japan as well as in Okinawa.343 In such 
circumstances, Arasaki was one of those who responded to the voices from Okinawa by 
joining the campaign to maintain the university. He not only joined the campaign from the 
mainland but also accepted the invitation to become a lecturer at this university. In that 
period, Okinawa University was suffering severely from a lack of teaching staff members. 
Although he had already established his career as an expert on Okinawa in mainland Japan, 
Arasaki hoped to live in Okinawa, and felt that this was an opportunity to fulfil this wish. 
Therefore, despite the risk to his career, Arasaki moved to Okinawa with his wife and son.  
                                                 
343 For more detail, see Okinawa Daigaku 50 Nen Shi Henshū Iinkai, ed. Chiisana Daigaku no Ōkina Chōsen: Oki-
nawa Daigaku 50 Nen no Kiseki (Tokyo: Kōbunken Shuppan, 2008). 
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 Shortly after he moved, Arasaki began to be involved with not only the university 
continuation campaign but also with the various activities related to the local anti-base 
movement. Together with his friends, Arasaki founded a support network for the 
environmental protection movement against construction of an oil storage terminal in Kin 
Bay. Also, in 1982 Arasaki organised another movement called the Association of Anti-war 
Land Owners (see Chapter 3). While Arasaki was known as an expert on Okinawan history, 
his activist career was little recognised compared to his writings in those days. After he 
became involved in these new projects, his vigorous attitude gradually elevated Arasaki 
within Okinawa’s local activist community. 
 
8.2.5. Thinking Okinawa as “Region” 
Although Arasaki had many different commitments after he moved to Okinawa, he also kept 
publishing his works in the mainland Japanese media. Some of his works written during this 
period, including “Nihon ni Natta Okinawa” (Okinawa that became Japan) published in 
1987, and “Okinawa: Tennōsei e no Gyakkō” (Okinawa: The Backlight of the Imperial 
System) published in 1988, reflect his changes in thought after he moved to Okinawa. A key 
aspect of his writing during the 1980s was that he tended to highlight the historical 
differences of Okinawa from the rest of Japan. However, this was a new turning point for 
Arasaki and his perspective on Okinawa. While known for his critical stance towards the 
Okinawa reversion process which was largely led by political elites in Tokyo and 
Washington, Arasaki was also critical of those who promoted the anti-reversion movement 
when he was in Tokyo. He positively valued the rise of Japanese nationalism in the occupied 
Okinawa as a means of liberating the oppressed Okinawans from the American military 
regime. In this sense, compared to his Okinawan friends who were active anti-reversionists 
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such as Arakawa Akira and Kawamitsu Shin’ichi, Arasaki’s political stance on Okinawa’s 
reversion to Japan was close to the local leaders of the reversion movement. Yet in the course 
of his direct involvement with the Okinawa struggle, Arasaki’s frustration with Okinawa after 
reversion increased, and as a result he became increasingly critical towards mainland Japan. 
Yet even after he became more critical of Okinawa-Japan relations, Arasaki was still 
different from those who had been involved with the anti-reversion movement. While some 
of them started arguing in favour of the possibility of the independence (dokuritsu) of 
Okinawa (or the Ryūkyūs) as a modern state, Arasaki was reluctant to follow that argument. 
Instead, what he adopted as his central motif was the concept of high autonomous status or 
self-reliance (jiritsu) of Okinawa based on its distinctive “region” (chiiki) in Japan. He argues  
 
I think self-reliance is the state in which people’s voices are reflected to the fullest extent 
to decide political, economic, social and cultural activities in one regional society. 
Therefore, this could ultimately mean independence as a state. At any rate, I think that the 
basis of self-reliance is [an autonomous] self-governance (jichi), and it means all levels 
from the limited sense of self-governance to independence… The reason why self-reliance 
became a key issue in Okinawa today is because it is obstructed. It is obstructed by the 
centralized state power which rejects the regional characteristics (chiiki-teki dokujisei), 
those who indulge themselves by enjoying benefits from the state, and those who accept 
[the status quo] without criticism.344 
 
                                                 
344 Moriteru Arasaki, Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1988-1990: Yawarakai Shakai wo Motomete (Tokyo: Gaifū-sha, 2004), 
116-117. 
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What we can see in his argument is not merely a cautious approach to the independence of 
Okinawa. It is also an analytical perspective which Arasaki had developed in order to pursue 
a high level of autonomy for Okinawa. In developing this perspective, Arasaki sought to 
reconsider Japanese discourses of homogeneity. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, Shimao 
Toshio’s idea of the Arc of the Ryūkyūs had a profound influence on Arasaki when he 
organised a supporting network of various kinds of residents’ movements in Okinawa. The 
so-called Ryūkyū-ko was a crucial concept by which Okinawa and other Ryūkyū Islands were 
considered as a region related to the Pacific rather than simply to Japanese culture. Arasaki 
articulated this concept with his activism and tried to reconceptualize the Kin Bay struggle 
and other residents’ movements as a struggle for Okinawa’s regional autonomy.  
Yet to understand the importance of Arasaki’s thought and activity in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, we need to consider another figure who also profoundly influenced Arasaki’s 
concept of region: that is, Tamanoi Yoshirō (1918-1985). Tamanoi was former Professor of 
Economics when he taught at the University of Tokyo. After he retired from Tokyo 
University in 1978, he came to teach at Okinawa International University, where he wrote 
many essays on region and regionalism before leaving Okinawa in 1988. Like Shimao in his 
notion of Yaponesia, Tamanoi conceptualized the Ryūkyū Islands as a region with its own 
culture, which cannot be subsumed into Japan. Like Shimao too, Tamanoi’s concept of 
region emphasizes Okinawa’s geographical significance and transnationality embedded in its 
local historical experiences of connections, especially with Asian countries.345  
However, one distinctive aspect of Tamanoi‘s concept of region is its emphasis on 
ecology, which he considered as a profound basis to constitute the local economy, culture and 
                                                 
345 Yoshirō Tamanoi, “Ajia wo Miru Me,” in Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shup-
patsu, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 175-198. 
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society of Okinawa. He also considers that local residents who inhabit that environment 
(seikatsusha) should be the people who decide the direction of their local community.346 
Tamanoi argues that economists have long neglected the importance of ecology as a living 
system and how it serves as the basis of growth.347 Humans are also part of this ecological 
system, and therefore he emphasizes the need to reconsider the meaning of growth.348 From 
this perspective, Tamanoi considers Okinawa—with its distinctive location, ecology, and 
society—as a model for considering how to create sustainable social and economic 
development. As Arasaki notes, Tamanoi’s notion of region contributed to developing the 
Okinawa struggle in both theory and practice. In particular, his ideas highlighted Okinawa’s 
local struggles for natural conservation, including the Kin Bay Struggle.349 Arasaki says that 
Tamanoi “showed a direction for the movement, encouraged the participants, and enhanced 
public awareness.”350  
Furthermore, Tamanoi’s regionalism did not only draw attention to the importance of 
restoring local autonomy but also it showed the possibility of considering local issues within 
a wider Asian region. Based in the Institute of Southern Islands at Okinawa International 
University, he sought to rediscover Okinawa’s indigenous connectitivity with overseas 
countries. By adopting the concept of reciprocity from economic anthropology, especially 
from the writings of Karl Polanyi,  Tamanoi sought to reinterpret the maritime networks 
between the Ryūkyū Kingdom and other Asian neighbors as having a dynamic different from 
that of commercial trade in the modern period.351 By doing so, he tried to lay out an extensive 
                                                 
346 Yoshirō Tamanoi, “Okinawa wo Omou,” in Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no 
Shuppatsu, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 202. 
347 Ibid., 202-203. 
348 In contrast to the economic profit-oriented growth model, Tamanoi calls it economy that is based on “hu-
man scale”. (Yoshirō Tamanoi, “Chiiki-shugi no Fukamari no Nakade,” in Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 
3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shuppatsu, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 158. 
349 Moriteru Arasaki, “Foreward,” in Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shuppatsu, 
ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 1. 
350  Ibid. 
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view of Okinawa’s ecological world which goes beyond local and national domains. 
Tamanoi’s concept of region was thus crucial and enlightening for Okinawan activists in that 
it provides their local struggle with new historical and spatial meanings. Overall, his 
regionalism introduced an alternative perspective on the Okinawa struggle which went 
beyond the national-local dichotomy, and redefined it within a space built across three 
different domains—locality (Okinawa), nation (Japan) and region (Asia). 
 
8.2.6. Finding Colonial Korea in Okinawa, Feeling Okinawa’s “Pain” in Korea 
In the mid-1980s, when Arasaki was the President of Okinawa University, one of his 
colleagues, Shirato Shin’ichi, then Professor of Commerce at the university, asked if he was 
interested in inviting delegates of the Pacific Fellows Association, a civic group of surviving 
former Korean forced labourers, to Okinawa. Shirato told Arasaki that these delegates were 
particularly interested in visiting Okinawa in commemorating the spirits of fellow Koreans 
who died at the end of World War II on some of remote islands in Okinawa (see Chapter 7). 
However, travel between South Korea and Japan was not still easy for ordinary citizens in 
that period. This was a few years before the declaration of South Korea’s democratisation in 
1987, and visas were not issued easily to South Korean citizens by the Japanese government. 
Hearing this story, Arasaki played a central role in organizing the visit of the five Korean 
survivors and put forward a plan to invite these war survivors as special guest speakers for 
one of his classes. Arasaki contacted the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and managed 
to obtain visas for the guests.352  
This first interaction with Korean survivors inspired Arasaki to consider the history of 
Koreans during the Battle of Okinawa. Although there were several books on Koreans in 
                                                 
352 Keiko Itokazu, Okinawasen to Heiwa Gaido (Tokyo: Shiryō Sentā Hogō, 2008), 31-32. 
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wartime Okinawa such as “The House of the Red Tiles” (Akara no Ie), there were no works 
that provided an overall picture on this issue.353 The number of Koreans forcibly taken to 
Okinawa as manual labourers and “comfort women”—who were forced to serve as sexual 
slaves for Japanese soldiers—was estimated at approximately 15,000 people, though this 
number is based on a rough calculation, and cannot be verified.354 Arasaki considered that the 
Koreans’ visit and their memories of World War II would shed light on a crucial aspect of 
history little known to Okinawans. 
It was not the first time for Arasaki to “find Korea” in Okinawa’s modern 
experiences. To be sure, the visit of the war survivors from South Korea was an 
unprecedented event. But he had already been aware of the relevance of Korea’s modern 
experiences to Okinawa. For instance, from very early on, Arasaki’s talks and writings 
mention the significance of the Korean War for post-World War II Japan. In particular, his 
critical perspective on Japan’s relations with Okinawa and Korea became explicit in the 
lecture he gave at an event called “the Christian Youth Peace Seminar” organised by 
Takahashi Saburō, a minister and peace activist, in 1969. There, Arasaki argues that both 
Okinawa and Korea are the places upon which Japan’s postwar economic prosperity was 
built. According to Arasaki, post-WWII Japan’s economic prosperity was obtained through 
“the blood that was shed in the Korean Peninsula” during the Korean War.355 While the 
economic boost due to “special procurements” (tokuju) by the American occupation forces 
for Korean War purposes was commonly seen as “a gift from heaven” (tenkei) in Japan in 
those days, Arasaki saw it as the other side of the war in Korea. He also discussed the impact 
that the Korean War had on Okinawa by arguing that Okinawa’s incorporation into 
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America’s military regime and separation from Japan were decided by the American 
occupation forces when the war in Korea broke out because of the local airbases where 
bombers departed for the Korean Peninsula.356 
In 1987, a year after the five Koreans visited Okinawa, the members of the Pacific 
Fellows Association invited Arasaki and another six Japanese citizens to participate in the 
commemoration ceremony including unveiling event of a monument to the spirits of former 
forced labourers in Gyeongsang Province in South Korea in 1987. Although Arasaki had 
visited the People’s Republic of China in the late 1970s, and Taiwan and Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) in the early 1980s, this was his first visit to South 
Korea. During the trip, he was taken to museums and historical sites which were related to 
Japan and the Japanese colonization of Korea. Arasaki, who had also visited the 
Revolutionary Museum in North Korea, witnessed the unresolved divisions in the memories 
of North and South Koreans. However, according to his report, some mainland Japanese 
tourists could not stand images of Japanese torturing Koreans in these museums, and 
expressed concern about the negative implications that those grotesque images conveyed for 
Japan-South Korea relations in the future. Hearing this criticism, Arasaki riposted that 
“…after all, a man who steps on other people’s feet does not feel their pain.”357 
This early interaction between Arasaki and the Pacific Fellows Association did not 
last long. This was mainly because the project to commemorate their fellow Koreans finished 
when the members of the Pacific Fellows Association completed the monument in their local 
region, but it was also related to the fact that Arasaki and Okinawan activists later found out 
that this Korean civic group was closely linked to the South Korean government which was 
still headed by the then President and former military general Roh Tae-woo. However, as I 
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discussed in Chapter Seven, this early encounter gave a strong momentum for Okinawan 
activists to create an international anti-US base solidarity movement with Korea soon after.  
Born into an Okinawan migrant family and educated around the transition period of 
Japan from the imperialistic and nationalistic country to post-WWII liberal democratic 
country, Arasaki underwent a series of struggles to define himself as an “Okinawan in 
Japan”. While Okinawa was still separated even after the Japan’s independence, Arasaki 
invested his youth in bringing Okinawa back to Japan’s discursive space. His early works 
were greatly inspired by the rise of Japanese nationalism in Okinawa, as expressed in the first 
island-wide struggle in 1956. However, his career at Okinawa University and a variety of 
civic activism in Okinawa after Okinawa’s return to Japan led him in an opposite direction to 
his earlier works. Instead of being in favour of Japanese nationalism in Okinawa, he became 
one of the most outspoken critics of the Japanese government. This reflects his deep 
disappointment with the continuing subordinated situation of Okinawa under the US–Japan 
security treaty. Yet this period can also be considered as the beginning of Arasaki’s concept 
of region as an alternative space of subjectivity created by the Okinawa struggle. Defining 
Okinawa’s cultural and historical contexts as social space, he and his colleagues 
conceptualized region as a space of dwellers [seikatsusha], rather than of the nation. This 
concept of region as social space extended to include East Asia. Finding a common ground 
with Korean history as formerly occupied territory by the Japanese Empire, Arasaki 
incorporated Korean history within the local historical narrative. Arasaki provides an 
example of a notable Okinawan activist whose involvement with the anti-base movement led 
him to create another meaning of “the local”, which is considered not only in combination 
with “the national” but also in combination with the alternative and more open-ended concept 
of “region”.  
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Image 8-2. Unveiling ceremony of a memorial to the victims of former Korean forced labourers who died 
during the Battle of Okinawa in 1987. Arasaki is standing in front of the microphone. This monument was 
built in North Gyeongsang Province. (The photo is retrieved from Keiko Itokazu. Okinawa-sen to Heiwa 
Gaido (Tokyo: Shiryō Sentā Hogō, 2008), 29). 
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8-3. Arasaki (the second from the right) presented the recent situation of anti-base struggle in Okinawa at 
the Shanghai Biennale in Shanghai. The photo was taken by the author in October 2012.  
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8.3. Takahashi Toshio 
Although Takahashi Toshio originates from mainland Japan, he has become a prominent and 
highly regarded activist in the Okinawa struggle. He is one of the founding members of 
OKPS, and has also been acting as the main coordinator of the group. Whenever people 
receive notices of the next meeting and minutes of the previous meeting, it is always 
Takahashi who sends those emails. Also, his role as coordinator includes collecting many 
different ideas from the members during the monthly regular meeting. While other members 
tend to bring many different opinions and agendas, including seemingly irrelevant topics, this 
calm leader has always been the one who hears and summarises the diverse opinions. 
However, what made him known as an activist is not his job at OKPS. On the contrary, there 
are perhaps few people who know of his work in OKPS. Takahashi is rather known as one of 
the main organizers of a protest community called “the Citizens against the Noise from 
Futenma Airbase” (Futenma Bakuon Soshōdan). Based in a main office in Futenma in 
Ginowan City, Takahashi and other members are working to bring a lawsuit against the local 
US military and Japanese government over the loud noise from the airbase in Futenma Town 
by collecting signatures from the local residents of the town.  
Takahashi’s life history is important in that it highlights how and why some mainland 
Japanese who do not have familial or cultural ties and affinities to Okinawa are involved with 
the Okinawa struggle. The participation of non-Okinawan Japanese in Okinawa’s anti-base 
struggle was not always welcomed by local activists.358 Nonetheless, if we look closely into 
the membership of the local protest communities, it is not difficult to find non-Okinawans, 
including people who used to be student activists in mainland Japan. In particular, 
considering the size of the group, OKPS has a significant number of former new left activists 
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from mainland Japan. In this context, I highlight Takahashi’s life history to consider how this 
former student activist decided to live as a “local” Okinawan and to participate in OKPS.  
 
8.3.1. Early Life 
Takahashi was born in Nangoku City, Kōchi Prefecture, in 1953. As in many other parts of 
Japan, there was a large Korean community in Nangoku City. The community was built in 
the early 1940s by Korean workers who had been mobilized by the Japanese during the war 
to build the local infrastructure, such as dams and the airports, and their families. Takahashi’s 
house was located near this local Korean community. He lived in Kōchi until he graduated 
from high school. In 1971, Takahashi became a university student of Tōhoku University in 
Sendai, the northeastern part of the Japanese mainland. He chose to major in mechanical 
engineering.  
When he was a first-year student, Takahashi began to be involved with social 
activism. For Japanese university and high-school students and young labourers, it was not 
unusual to participate in the progressive movement in the 1960s and the 1970s. Organising 
student groups and workers’ unions, young Japanese citizens in those periods were actively 
involved with social activism inside and outside their schools and work-places. In particular, 
the university students who were concerned with issues related to social justice such as war, 
discrimination against cultural minorities, poverty and hard labour conditions became the 
main actors in the movement. In this context, Takahashi joined one of the student activist 
groups, the Revolutionary Workers Association (RWA or Kakurōkyō), which played the 
leading role among many student groups at Tōhoku University in the 1970s.359 As a member 
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different types. The first type is the movements led by nation-wide political parties, the Japan Communist 
 
324 
of this group, he participated in protest campaigns in many different places including 
Onagawa Town in Miyagi Prefecture against nuclear power plant construction and Narita 
City in Chiba to prevent construction of Narita Airport (in a protest also known as Sanrizuka 
Struggle—Sanrizuka tōsō). 
Although it was common to be part of the progressive student movement in those 
periods, Takahashi’s experience was uncommon compared with those of his fellow activists. 
While his friends gradually quit their involvement with activism, Takahashi’s involvement 
became so serious that he could not continue his study of mechanical engineering. Takahashi 
left Tōhoku University without graduating in the early 1980s and moved to Kanagawa 
Prefecture with his wife. One of the reasons for this move was because his wife was 
appointed to a teaching position at a local primary school in Kanagawa. However, this was 
not the only reason why he left Sendai. The other reason was that there was a base of his 
group, called Revolutionary Workers Association, at Kanagawa University in Yokohama 
City in that period. There, Takahashi spent a short period as the leader of this group. 
 
 
 
                                                 
Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The second type is the movements led by other groups which 
did not belong to those national parties. The former type usually meant student activism led by two major stu-
dent bodies, the Democratic Youth League of Japan (DYLJ or Minsei) and the Socialist Youth Alliance (SYA or 
Shaseidō). These movements were conducted under the two progressive national parties, JCP and JSP. DYLJ 
was founded originally in 1923 by then university students who belonged to the JCP. Having experienced the 
political purge of communism under the Japanese government from the 1920s until 1945, the student organi-
zation was restarted in the late 1940s after World War II. Under the leadership of JCP, student activists orga-
nized branches in major national and private universities. The Socialist Youth Alliance was initiated at the first 
national congress of the Japan Socialist Party, which was also held in 1960. The Liberation Faction or kaihō-ha 
was founded by Takiguchi Hiroto and his colleagues who belonged to the most progressive yet minority group 
within SYA in 1969. They left JSP and called for the dissolution of the existing left politics and its reorganization 
as a force separate from JCP and JSP. For more detail, see, for example, Keinosuke Higuchi, 60 Nen-dai 
Shaseidō (Kaihō-ha) Shi-shi (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōron-sha, 2012). 
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8.3.2. A Militant Activist 
Takahashi joined the student movement in the early 1970s. In the history of Japanese new left 
student activism, this was after the climax of the movement. The first climax of Japan’s new 
left movement was from 1959 until 1960 when the Bund, together but not in cooperation with 
other much larger progressive forces including groups such as one of the nation-wide the 
workers’ unions, Sōhyō, and progressive political parties and their student groups gathered in 
the centre of Tokyo. To prevent then Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke from 
renewing the Japan-US Security Treaty, over 300,000 people gathered in front of the 
National Diet in Tokyo to conduct a protest campaign in June 1960. This is called the 1960 
struggle against the Japan-US Security Treaty (or the 1960 Ampo struggle or Rokujū-nen 
Ampo Tōsō). Originating in the late 1950s, when former youth members of the Japan 
Communist Party including Shima Shigeo started the Communist Alliance or the Bund (or 
Bunto in Japanese) in 1958360, Japan’s new left movement was led by the university students 
and young workers.361 Although the security treaty was renewed, Kishi and his cabinet were 
forced to resign. After the mass protest campaign, the Bund was dissolved, and a non-partisan 
progressive movement was continued by former members of the Bund and Trotskyists who 
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as Tokuda Kyūichi and Nosaka Sanzō had pursued social change through armed revolution by workers and 
peasants in urban and rural areas. (busō tōsō rosen) Following the strategy conducted by the Chinese Com-
munist Party, the JCP also intended to start revolution from rural provinces. To do so, JCP mobilised university 
students and other educated young party members to send them to provincial parts of Japan. This strategy 
continued until the mid-1950s. Their mission was to ‘enlighten’ workers and farmers to become revolutionary 
subjects. Although Shima and his friends were not directly involved with armed struggle, they were strongly 
against the decision of the leadership of the JCP to adopt parliamentary politics for social change. Therefore, 
they split the party and started their own communist movement. See e.g. Eiji Oguma, 1968 Vol.2. 
361 Shima Shigeo was a medical student at the University of Tokyo when he organised the Communist Alliance 
with his colleagues. Shima is regarded as an important New Left figure who, as we shall see, was also to de-
velop significant connections to Okinawa and Takahashi’s life after he moved to Okinawa. 
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did not belong to the Japan Communist Party or Japan Socialist Party. These non-party 
leftists joined groups such as the Revolutionary Communist Alliance (RCA or kakukyōdō), 
founded in 1957.362 One of their aims was to stop renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 
1970.  
The second climax occurred in late 1968-1969, when the University of Tokyo and 
other universities were occupied by the new left student activists. The occupation of the 
University of Tokyo by student activists continued for 6 months until January 1969. In the 
teeth of fierce criticism, the then Provost of the University of Tokyo, Katō Ichirō, eventually 
decided to allow the riot police to enter the university, leading to the arrest of many student 
activists who had barricaded themselves inside the Yasuda Auditorium, which they used as 
their headquarters. Similar student rebellions and campus occupation movements (or gakuen 
tōsō) occurred in many university campuses in Tokyo and neighboring prefectures. Other 
than the occupation of the university campuses, the new left movement conducted various 
protest campaigns including protests against the normalization of Japan-South Korea 
relations in 1965, the struggle against the entry of the US Navy nuclear-engine carrier the 
Enterprise into the port of Sasebo, and the protest against Prime Minister Satō Eisaku’s 1969 
visit to the United States to discuss the issue of Okinawa’s return to Japan. These student 
uprisings were also connected to the protest against the renewal of the Japan-US Security 
Treaty in 1970.  Besides these new left groups, the nation-wide peace activism led by citizens 
such as the Citizens League for Peace in Vietnam (or Beheiren) also emerged from the late 
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based on Trotskyism. The leaders such as Kuroda Kan’ichi and Ōta Ryū criticized the JCP for its authoritarian-
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1960s. However, while sharing the same aim of conducting anti-war and anti-imperialism 
campaigns, the individual groups were not always working together. Rather, after the failure 
of the occupation of the University of Tokyo in 1969, the new left movements started to lose 
their influence in society and began a violent struggle among themselves for the leadership 
over students and workers unions.  
In this context, Takahashi also participated in this violent struggle as a leader of the 
Revolutionary Workers Association. Although he did not tell me much of his past, during 
that period Takahashi changed his name and was known as Izumi Masaaki among the activist 
community. Also, in order to increase the support for his group (and to avoid arrest), 
Takahashi kept moving from one place to another. After he left Sendai, Takashi moved to 
Kanagawa, and from Kanagawa he moved to Okinawa in the early 1980s. The specific 
purpose of his visit to Okinawa was to create a local branch of his group in this historically 
highly contested place. By collaborating with local counterparts, mainly with the Okinawan 
branch of the Central Core Faction (Chūkaku-ha), Takahashi aimed to gain hegemony over 
the local anti-base movement. Initially, his stay in Okinawa appeared to go well. He joined 
hitotsubo anti-war land owners association and developed his personal connections with 
fellow Okinawan activists. 
 
8.3.3. “Walking on Broken Glass with Bare Feet” 
However, it did not take long for Okinawan anti-base activists to realize Takahashi’s hidden 
intentions. After his political agenda was revealed, some local activists began a campaign to 
attack Takahashi as an infiltrator who disguised his career and name in order to use 
Okinawans and the Okinawan struggle for his organization. These campaigners ultimately 
tried to get Takahashi removed from Okinawa. New Left activists from mainland Japan were 
not always welcomed by Okinawan citizens. On the contrary, some Okinawans had strong 
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suspicion and distrust of the mainland New Left activists. They considered that these student 
activists were harmful because they would try to split the local anti-base movement for their 
own purposes. In particular, Arasaki was a harsh critic of the mainland New Left activists. He 
and other activists had a strong philosophy that the Okinawa struggle should be led by 
Okinawan citizens, not by political parties. 
In this environment, Takahashi could not remain engaged in local Okinawan activism. 
However, to return to the mainland was not an easy option because his family, including two 
sons, had already settled in Okinawa. Also, his group RWA was no longer able to support 
Takahashi’s life because of lack of resources. RWA was targeted by the police as one of the 
most subversive “far left violent groups” (kyokusa bōryoku shūdan). Takahashi’s former 
colleagues were gradually leaving the group. Takahashi’s life as a revolutionary activist, 
which had taken half of his life from his late teenage years until his early thirties, had reached 
a dead end.  
 In such a critical situation, Takahashi turned to several people for help. The first 
person was Nishio Ichirō, a pastor and a long-term activist who is also one of the mainland 
Japanese in Okinawa. In the midst of the anti-Takahashi campaign, Nishio offered his chapel 
as a shelter to Takahashi. Meanwhile, this senior activist asked around and consulted with his 
fellow Okinawan colleagues to allow Takahashi to stay with them. One of those he consulted 
was his long-term friend of similar age and an influential figure, Arasaki Moriteru, while a 
second was Takahashi’s friend Tomiyama Masahiro. As the head of the student union and the 
Central Core Faction based at Okinawa University, Tomiyama already knew of Takahashi. 
He was also well connected with influential figures including Chibana Shōichi, who was 
Tomiyama’s senior student at his university and later became publicly well-known by 
burning the Japanese national flag at the National Sports Festival in 1987. Through the efforts 
of these people, Takahashi was pardoned by fellow Okinawan activists. But there was one 
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condition required by local activists for Takahashi to be allowed to remain, which was that he 
withdraw from his previous career and live as an Okinawan local. For Takahashi, this meant 
abandoning his beliefs and work for the last fifteen years. Recalling his feeling in those days, 
Takahashi described it as though he were walking on broken glass with bare feet. 
 
8.3.4. Becoming an “Okinawan” 
Besides his two colleagues mentioned above, there was a third person with whom Takahashi 
consulted. That was Shima Shigeo, the founder of the Bund. While he was regarded as the 
champion of the New Left by his followers among student activists, including Takahashi, this 
legendary figure had already withdrawn himself from social activism after the end of the 
1960s Ampo movement and returned to the University of Tokyo to finish his medical degree. 
In the mid-1980s when Takahashi met him, Shima lived in Okinawa and worked as a 
psychiatrist at a local hospital in Ginowan City. Shima advised Takahashi to leave student 
activism. Yet Shima did not tell him to stop participating in social activism. Instead, he told 
him to find a different path to be involved with society by living in Okinawa as a local, not as 
a New Left activist. 
 Shima’s advice to Takahashi reflected the course of his own life. When he withdrew 
from activism, Shima was exhausted not only in terms of finances but also in terms of his 
career as an activist. Therefore, Shima disappeared from the world of activism and hardly 
spoke about his previous career in public. However, he did not withdraw from committing 
himself to social movements. He chose different ways to be involved with society as a 
psychiatrist in a rural community. Shima arrived in Okinawa a year prior to the return to 
Japan in 1971 when local society was in the middle of transition from American occupation 
period to Japanese administration. Because he had been brought up in the nation’s capital and 
educated in the most elite school in the country, the place he was first assigned showed him a 
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different reality that he had not experienced before. He was particularly shocked by the harsh 
living environment of patients with mental illness. There were few mental hospitals, and the 
costs were very high as mental illness was not categorised during the American occupation as 
an illness covered by public health. Also, patients were segregated from local 
communities.363 The situation of these patients in Okinawa did not change even after the 
return to Japan. Although the number of hospitals showed an increase and national health 
insurance became available to cover medical fees, Shima felt that the patients were being 
incarcerated in the name of ‘social welfare’.364 He thought that one of the best treatments was 
to include patients as local community members. Yet the reality was that many rural 
communities suffered from rapid urbanization and population drain. Visiting various 
communities such as Kume-jima Island and the northern Yanbaru region in Okinawa Island, 
his work in rural areas over fifteen years was an alternative approach to society after he 
retired from social activism.  
 Meeting his New Left predecessor, Takahashi learnt of Shima’s life philosophy, 
which most student activists would have not known. Shima’s story was compelling enough 
for Takahashi to decide how to live his second life as an Okinawan local. Being local meant, 
not merely living in Okinawa, but being rooted in the soil of this place, which was contrasted 
with his past in which he kept moving from one place to another. Following in Shima’s 
footsteps, Takahashi became a qualified social worker, specializing in mental illness. In 
1988, he became the founding Director of the semi-prefectural organization called Okinawa 
Mental Health Welfare Association. 
 
                                                 
363 While contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases and leprosy were treated by 
hospitals under the US occupation, mental illness was excluded from public treatment. Instead, the local US 
administration allowed the families of patients to keep patients in private confinement in which many patients 
were treated inhumanly. Shigeo Shima, Bunto Shi-shi: Seishun no Gyōshuku Sareta Hibi Tomoni Tatakatta 
Yūjin-tachi e (Tokyo: Hihyō-sha, 1999), 48. 
364 Ibid. 53-54. 
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8.3.5. Visiting Korea 
Takahashi’s first visit to Korea took place in his undergraduate days. He visited Seoul in May 
1974. Takahashi was involved with a petition campaign to release his friend who was in jail 
in South Korea. His friend was an ethnic Korean in Japan (or Zainichi Korean) who had also 
studied at the medical school of Tōhoku University. When this friend was a visiting student 
at Seoul National University, he was arrested in Seoul on suspicion of involvement with anti-
government activism in South Korea. In those days, the political situation in South Korea was 
extremely tense. After the coup d’état in May 1961, the then President of South Korea, Park 
Chung-hee, had been strictly policing pro-communists, socialists, student activists in South 
Korea. Park’s regime also targeted educated Zainichi Koreans who came to visit South 
Korea, particularly those suspected of having relations with the General Association of 
Korean Residents in Japan (GAKR, Chongryon or Chōsen Sōren) which is closely connected 
to North Korea. After execution of Cho Young-soo, an executive member of the Korean 
Residents Union in Japan (KPUJ or Mindan), because of his active role in establishing the 
newspaper The People’s Times (Minzoku Jihō) in December 1961, a number of Zainichi 
Koreans were arrested under Park’s government.365 
Park’s regime became even more oppressive towards dissidents after he won the 
presidential election over Kim Dae-jung, an influential opposition leader. After this narrow 
victory over his rival, Park declared martial law and amended the constitution by which the 
South Korean President was given greater powers to himself (Restoration System or Yushin 
System). To protest against the new system which reinforced governmental control, South 
Korean university students from the Democratic Youth Student Association (DYSA) started 
taking political action, and nearly two hundred students were arrested, including Takahashi’s 
                                                 
365 KPUJ or Mindan is one of two major organizations joined by ethnic Koreans in Japan together with GAKR. In 
contrast to GAKR, KPUJ is known for its support of the South Korean government. 
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friend.366 So, the purpose of Takahashi’s visit was to submit a petition to the Japanese 
Embassy in Seoul on behalf of civic groups working to release this Korean student. 
Takahashi was chosen to visit Seoul as a delegate of his group because many senior activists 
had arrest records due to their involvement with activism, while Takahashi was one of the 
few with no record of being arrested. 
 
8.3.6. Japan-Korea Early Solidarity Movement 
In the mid-1970s, many Japanese socialists and other progressive activists and intellectuals, 
including new left student activists, were already reasonably well informed about political 
problems in South Korea. Although information was limited, the early solidarity movement 
with South Korean radicals was emerging in Japan. One important event to take place was 
the protest campaign against the treaty of normalisation between South Korea and Japan. 
Park Chung-hee’s repressive regime in South Korea as the America’s liberal capitalist front 
in East Asia and Park’s positive attitude towards the normalisation treaty with Japan triggered 
a nation-wide protest campaign in South Korea. Meanwhile, Japanese citizens and political 
parties such as Japan Communist Party and Japan Socialist Party also conducted a protest 
campaign opposing the conclusion of a separate treaty with South Korea alone.367 The 
Japanese protesters demanded that North Korea should have a seat at the discussion table. 
 The actual beginning of the solidarity movement between Japan and South Korean 
activists took place in the early 1970s. In August 1973, the leader of the South Korean 
opposition party, Kim Dae-jung, was abducted from his hotel in Tokyo. After Park Chung-
hee launched his yushin regime and reinforced his dictatorial leadership, Kim Dae-jung fled 
overseas to North America, Europe and Japan. His kidnapping by South Korean agents in 
                                                 
366 See e.g. Myeonggwan Chi, Kankoku Minshuka e no Michi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 89-90. 
367 See e.g. Jung-jin Park, “Nikkan-kaidan Hantai-undō,” in Jongwong Lee et al. Rekishi toshite no Nikkan Kokkō 
Seijōka (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppan, 2011), 259-290. 
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Tokyo evoked shock not only amongst activists but also amongst ordinary Japanese citizens. 
In the context of the early solidarity movement, the abduction of Kim Dae-jung was a critical 
moment in which various joint actions took place between Japan and South Korea.  
For instance, influential scholars and activists such as Wada Haruki, a prominent 
historian of Korea, and Oda Makoto, one of the founders of a famous anti-Vietnam War 
group called Peace for Vietnam (also known as Beheiren), released a joint statement which 
criticised the Japanese and South Korean governments for their secrecy over this incident and 
demanded the truth. In 1974, these intellectuals and activists started a group called Japan-
South Korea Solidarity Assembly (Nikkan Rentai Kaigi) in support of South Korean 
democratisation movement from Japan.368 Also, Christian organizations started to conduct 
protest actions by collaborating with church groups in South Korea and the western world. 
The issues of concern were not only the actions of the two governments but also the presence 
of Japanese capitalism working in collaboration with the Park Chung-hee government. 
Furthermore, Japanese and Zainichi Korean feminists problematized Japanese male tourists 
visiting Korea for sex tours (or so-called kīsen kankō) in the early 1970s. The early 1970s 
was also the moment in which Japanese, South Koreans and Zainichi Koreans began to seek 
a common ground to consider their political situation. It was in this international context that 
Takahashi arrived in Seoul. 
 Arriving in Seoul with the petition, Takahashi considered himself as the delegate of 
all concerned citizens in Japan. In spirit, he saw himself as one of the closest friends of South 
Korean activists. However, when he visited the officials in the Japanese Embassy, 
Takahashi’s naïve sense of heroism collapsed when he was confronted by the unpopularity of 
his government in South Korea, which was symbolised by the large number of eggs which 
                                                 
368 See e.g. Naoki Mizuno and Gyung-su Moon, Zainichi Chōsen-jin: Rekishi to Genzai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten: 
2015). 
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had been thrown at the wall of the embassy. It was deeply shocking for this young student 
activist to realize the depth of Korean anger towards Japan. Also, his first experience to be 
exposed to life under martial law, such as night time curfew, made Takahashi anxious and 
exacerbated his sense of unease. He was well-informed of the harsh political oppression 
under Park’s dictatorial regime and anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean nationals. 
However, the actual experience of life in South Korea in the early 1970s became an 
unforgettable memory. After this first visit to South Korea, he had avoided being involved 
with the Korean political movement until he joined OKPS. 
 
8.3.7. Becoming a Korean Expert 
A turning point came about ten years later, when Takahashi had a chance to re-engage with 
Korea. He was introduced to Park Sunam, the Zainichi Korean film director who was 
interviewing Okinawan local islanders about the memories of Korean forced labourers and 
Korean “comfort women” in Okinawa. (see Chapter 7) It was a rare chance for Takahashi to 
discover the entangled histories of Koreans in Okinawa and Japan at the end of World War II. 
Visiting various places around Okinawa, he and his friend Tomiyama helped Park’s project. 
This experience changed Takahashi’s perspective on Okinawa in that he found historical 
links with Korea in Okinawa’s local history. Finding this new and ambiguous dimension of 
the history of Okinawa, Takahashi’s interest in Korea gradually increased.  
Together with other friends who helped Park’s film making, Takahashi participated in 
starting the project Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia (ACSA), which became 
Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity in 1997. Also, feeling the necessity to learn the Korean 
language, Takahashi and other members started going to the Korean language class organised 
first by a Korean student studying at the University of Ryukyus, and then by Japanese 
students who came back from studying in South Korea. He recalls that this was the only 
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Korean class which was held in Okinawa in those days. While many other learners gave up, 
Takahashi was one of the few students who became fluent in both writing and speaking 
Korean to the extent that he could translate from Korean into Japanese without problems. 
With his language skill and a wide network of South Korean activism, Takahashi eventually 
became not only an experienced translator but also one of the few civic experts on current 
Korean affairs in Okinawa. 
Takahashi’s life as a former new left activist of Japan who later settled in Okinawa 
gives us a different perspective to reconsider the static meaning of locality in the context of 
the Okinawa struggle. To be sure, Takahashi was an outsider to most of the Okinawan 
activists when he arrived in Okinawa. However, his long-term involvement, despite the early 
criticism of his mainland Japanese identity among Okinawan activists, changed Takahashi’s 
identity to become “local”. But equally importantly, Okinawan activism was in some small 
way also changed by the influence of Takahashi’s involvement. While working for a local 
medical institute for people with mental disorders, Takahashi became a founding member of 
one of the most well recognised local anti-base groups in Futenma. Moreover, his 
involvement with OKPS clearly demonstrates his influence on the local anti-base movement. 
What his story shows is thus not merely a story of man who overcame a Japanese identity to 
become one of the local Okinawan activists. Rather, Takahashi’s story highlights how 
Okinawa’s locality is constructed through the interaction of local and national historical 
experiences of social activism against the Japanese government, and how this interaction 
created a movement like OKPS. 
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Image 8-4. Takahashi in Seoul in 1974. The photo was provided by Takahashi Toshio. 
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Image 8-5. Takahashi in Jeju 2013 with his Korean friend. The photo was provided by Takahashi Toshio. 
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8.4. Yu Yeongja 
The last person that I introduce in this chapter is Yu Yeongja. Yu is one of the few Korean 
participants in OKPS. Unlike Arasaki and Takahashi, Yu was not the founding member of 
OKPS but one of those who joined in the group in the mid-2000s. Yet because of her likeable 
character and contribution, she soon became a trusted member in the group. Yu was one of 
the few fluent Korean speakers in the group until other members such as Takahashi became 
fluent in Korean. Wherever other members went in Korea, she always followed other senior 
members as an interpreter. Yu is also a Buddhist nun who preaches at her school in Yomitan 
Village, in which she serves the local community by organizing religious study groups and 
through personal consultations with the villagers. However, the importance of Yu is not only 
the fact she is one of the few Korean speakers but also her identity, life and experience as an 
ethnic Korean. These have made major contributions to OKPS in its process of creating 
regional-local identity within Okinawa’s protest community.  
So far I have looked at the formation of regional-local identity from two different 
perspectives. On the one hand, Arasaki’s case demonstrates the production of this distinctive 
form of identity from an Okinawan perspective. On the other hand, the story of Takahashi 
highlighted the regional-local identity in from the perspective of a person originating in 
mainland Japan. Takahashi’s story not only complicates our views of the participants in the 
“Okinawa struggle” but also enriches the meaning of the Okinawa struggle by extending the 
notion of “local activists” and by showing the historical context of the early Japan-South 
Korea solidarity movement. Yu’s perspective—which is neither Japanese nor Okinawan—
adds an indispensable further dimension. In order to delineate regional-local identity, we 
need to consider the details of Yu’s commitment and contribution, and also examine the 
challenges that she has experienced in the course of her involvement. Through the lens of her 
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life, we see the even more complicated process by which this ambiguous yet inclusive form 
of identity was formed. 
  
8.4.1. Early Life 
Yu Yeongja was born in Hiroshima in 1951. She was the youngest child of nine siblings of 
an ethnic Korean family who migrated to Japan during Korea’s colonial period under the 
Japanese Empire from Jeolla Province, in the southwestern part of Korean peninsula.369 The 
family including Yeongja moved to Kobe, Hyōgo Prefecture when she was little. She spent 
most of her life in Kobe before she moved to Okinawa. Hyōgo Prefecture, known as an 
industrial area along the coast, was also known for its multicultural city environment with 
Koreans as well as Japanese. As the most populated city in the prefecture, Kobe had one of 
the largest Korean communities in the western part of Japan. In such conditions, there was 
already the social basis for a civil rights movement by the ethnic Koreans in this city. One of 
the earliest and the most well-known examples was the Hanshin Education Struggle in the 
late 1940s. The Korean League (Chōsenjin Renmei) took direct action to protest against the 
local Japanese police and American Occupation Forces over the right to ethnic education in 
Osaka and Kobe, and this eventually resulted in physical clashes with police and occupation 
forces.370 In Kobe, Yu went to the local ethnic Korean school run by the General Association 
                                                 
369 Jeolla Province, as well as Jeju Island and South Gyeongsan Province, the southern-most region of Korea, 
were the major provinces from which Koreans migrated to mainland Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. It was 
traditionally known for its rich soil, and the Japanese government conducted land reform specifically in this 
province to increase the production of rice during those periods. Affected by this land reform, a substantial 
number of peasants lost their lands and fled to Seoul to become wage labourers. In the same manner, a large 
number of former peasants also migrated to Japan to work in industrialised areas such as Hiroshima, Kobe, 
Akashi and Osaka (See, e.g. Gyung-su Moon, Gendai Kankoku-shi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005). 
370 The Korean League was founded in October 1945 as the society for ethnic Koreans living in Japan in that 
period. One of the founders of the Korean League was a notable communist and workers union organizer, Kim 
Chon-hae. The Korean League was established to protect the rights of ethnic Koreans who became a liberated 
nation in postwar Japan, and to support building the independent state for Korean nationals in their home-
land. Like the Okinawan League (Okinawa-jin Renmei) that existed in the same period, some leaders of the Ko-
rean League such as Kim Chon-hae were members of the Japan Communist Party, and therefore the group was 
also affiliated to the JCP. The Korean League was ordered to dissolve by the occupation forces in 1949, but the 
activities were continued by other groups, particularly by GAKR from 1955 onward. 
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of Korean Residents in Japan (GAKR or Chōsen Sōren) until high school. Although her 
family originated from the southern part of Korea, which was by then Republic of Korea, 
Yu’s parents (like many others in the same situation) sent their daughter to a school closely 
affiliated to North Korea. However, political ideology was not such a major issue for her 
parents. Rather, they wanted Yu to be educated in a way that would maintain her Korean 
identity. Yu said: 
 
Neither of my parents was literate. But they wanted their children to be educated. So, they 
sent us to school. But it was not Japanese school but a Korean ethnic school (minzoku 
gakkō).371 
 
According to a study, 20 to 25 percent of Korean families sent their children to the ethnic 
Korean schools whereas the rest of the ethnic Korean children went to the local Japanese 
schools during the 1960s.372 As Mizuno Naoki and Moon Gyongsu write, the majority of 
ethnic Koreans who went to Japanese local schools were already losing their close connection 
to Sōren or Mindan in that period.373 In this context, the case of Yu’s parents indicates how 
passionate they were to pass on Korean identity to their children. In restrospect, Yu said: 
 
Tuition fees (of ethnic Korean school) were not cheap, but they [her parents] worked very 
hard. My mother often told me “you did nothing wrong, so you should be proud of being 
Korean.” I think she told us this because they suffered a lot…374 
                                                 
371 Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012. 
372 Naoki Mizuno and Gyung-su Moon, Zainichi Chōsen-jin: Rekishi to Genzai, 117. 
373 Ibid., 176. 
374 Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012. 
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At school, she learnt Korean language and became “ethnic Korean in Japan” or what she 
calls Chōsen-jin.375 Also, she met her future husband who was a leader of Korean civil rights 
activism at the school. Although Yu was never involved in the student activism, she was still 
interested in political affairs around the Korean minority in Japan. Instead of becoming a 
social activist, she had a dream to become a wife of a famous Korean activist whom she 
thought of as a revolutionary figure. She met her husband at the same high school. Her future 
husband was a leading student activist. They married after graduating from high school. Yu’s 
husband later became an art teacher at a local Japanese high school, and Yu began to run a 
Korean-style barbeque restaurant in Kobe while raising three children. 
 
8.4.2. Anti-finger Printing Struggle 
The first big turning point for Yu’s activist career was in 1988. She started being involved 
with the protest campaign against the compulsory finger printing of foreign residents in 
Japan.376 Zainichi Koreans, who are categorized as “special permanent residents”, were the 
people most affected by this system. In 1980, an anti-finger printing movement was started 
by a Tokyo-based male Zainichi Korean, Han Jong-sok. Although he was risking a penalty, 
either one year in prison or paying 200,000 yen (which is nearly equivalent to 2,000 US 
dollars), Han chose to refuse to be finger printed, insisting that this system was against the 
InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Japan became a signatory in 
                                                 
375 After the normalization treaty was signed between South Korea and Japan, ethnic Koreans could choose to 
become South Korean or remain as Korean. In the former case, the passport and nationality were granted. Yet 
because Japan did not have diplomatic relations with North Korean government, those who did not choose 
South Korean nationality had their place with origin registered as Korea or Chōsen, as in the national registra-
tion system under the Japanese Empire. 
376 The finger printing system was introduced in 1955 as a part of the Alien Registration Act, which was en-
acted three years prior in 1952, with the aim to control and surveillance of non-Japanese residents within Ja-
pan. When foreign nationals need to live in Japan more than 90 days, they are obliged to be issued with an of-
ficial certificate of registration, the alien registration card, by the municipal governments in the area where 
they live. Until 2000, foreign nationals were supposed to have their finger prints taken at the time of submit-
ting the application for and of renewing the certificate. 
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1978. When Yu looked at fellow Koreans who struggled for their rights, particularly similar 
generations to her, she was strongly inspired by them.  
From the 1970s, there were a number of civil rights movements taking place around 
Japan. One of the key issues to be tackled was Japan’s discriminatory system towards foreign 
residents, in particular the requirement of Japanese nationality for jobs in public sector areas 
such as teaching in national and other public universities, or working for the national 
telecommunication company, or as lawyers, nurses, and public servants in municipal 
governments. Both at national and local levels, Zainichi Koreans and concerned Japanese 
citizens denounced the illegitimacy of the nationality requirement and demanded that jobs in 
the public sectors should be opened to foreign residents like ethnic Koreans. Their protests 
were directed not only at the public sector but also at private firms. At job interviews, many 
companies required the submission of the family registration documents (known as koseki), 
which contain personal family details. While regarded as residents, those who have South 
Korean nationality or affiliation to North Korea do not have their registration documents in 
Japan. Therefore, for many Zainichi Koreans who live with Japanese names, the requirement 
to family registration documents is critical since it shows information including nationality 
and place of the ancestral origins.377 Based on the information in the family record, many 
ethnic Koreans were not hired regardless of their ability and qualifications.378 
What inspired Yu most was the fact that these movements were not started by GAKR 
or KPUJ but by individuals who were actually affected by Japan’s discriminatory system and 
by Japanese supporters concerned with these problems. However, when she decided to refuse 
finger printing, Yu’s husband was not supportive of his wife’s decision. Although he had 
                                                 
377 See e.g. David Chapman, Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity (Routledge, 2007). 
378 For example, one of the most famous examples is the law-suit made by then 19 year-old Zainichi Korean, 
Park Chong-sok, against Hitachi, Ltd. Under his Japanese name, Arai Shōji, Park passed the entrance examina-
tion and was employed by Hitachi. However, after he submitted his family registration, Hitachi revoked Park’s 
employment and decided not to hire him. After four years of court battle, Park won his case and became an 
employee of Hitachi until his retirement in 2011.  
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been a leader of Korean student activism in his younger days, he was no longer involved with 
activism. While teaching art at a local Japanese school in Kobe, he came to believe that 
ethnic Koreans should not be involved with Japanese civic activism because it is “their” 
problem, not “ours”. Other family members and her Zainichi friends also gave a similar kind 
of advice to Yu: “the finger printing system is Japan’s problem therefore it should be 
Japanese people who participate in this political campaign.” Yet the opposition from her 
family members did not change Yu’s mind. Her husband finally said that he would divorce if 
she still insisted on this issue. Remembering those days, Yu smiled at me and said: 
 
My husband thought that I would change my mind if he said he would divorce. But my 
answer was “yes”. I told him “let’s divorce and I won’t bother your life.” I was confident 
with myself at that time and thought I would live freely without him. Until that moment, I 
was pretty quiet and followed my husband’s opinion, not like now. So, it must’ve been a 
big surprise for him to see me saying that. He said that he didn’t know that I was that sort 
of person.379 
 
In the end, she and her husband did not divorce. Instead, her family turned out to be 
supportive of her. With strong back-up from her family, Yu’s career as an activist started. 
Together with her Korean and Japanese friends, she started publishing a community journal 
called Peace People. As a principal organizer, she wrote many articles sitting at the table of 
her barbeque restaurant after business hours. However, her name suddenly became known 
nationally because of a long essay published in the Mainichi Shinbun, a nation-wide 
newspaper, in 1991. At that time, the Mainichi Shinbun was calling for applicants for the 
Twenty First Century Award. Founded in 1872 as one of the earliest modern Japanese 
                                                 
379 Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012. 
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newspaper companies, the Mainichi Shinbun established this award to be granted to those 
who wrote the best essays on urgent issues for humanities including human rights in 1981. 
Yu wrote her essay on the topic of humans and their affinity to their nations. Her essay was 
awarded one of the top prizes of the year. 
 
8.4.3. Becoming A Buddhist Nun and Visiting South Korea 
The second turning period came soon after she started participating in the anti-finger printing 
campaign in the late 1980s. One of her friends asked her to attend a local study group on 
World War II and colonialism in Himeji, a city not far from Kobe. The event was organized 
by a local Buddhist group from the Jōdo Shinshū School. At first Yu was not interested in the 
event, because she was a strong atheist. But the name of Kinjō Minoru, a prominent 
Okinawan sculptor, writer and activist, as a guest speaker on a flyer for the event attracted 
her interest. This event was part of a whole series on the thought of the Japanese Buddhist 
monk Shinran—the 12th-13th century founder of Jōdo Shinshū. Participants not only read 
Shinran’s texts but also learnt his way of thinking by discussing historical and contemporary 
problems of Japanese society. The event was enlightening for Yu not only because of Kinjō 
but also because of the thought of this school. Until that moment, she had considered that 
religion dealt with morals based on a strict rule in order to have a good life after death. Also, 
Yu’s impression of the Jōdo Shinshū school had been negatively affected by the events of 
history. While known as one of the largest Buddhist Schools, Jōdo Shinshū was also deeply 
involved in Japanese colonialism in Korea. Promoting a mixture of syncretic Buddhism with 
the national Shintoism, this school had played a crucial role in establishing Japanese 
Buddhism around Korea. In this context, many local Korean temples were either transformed 
into Japanese style or abolished.  
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However, what Yu learnt from one of the monks at the venue changed her views. 
Yu’s skepticism about Buddhism was shaken particularly when she learnt about the school’s 
idea of the past, present and future. In Shinran’s text, the monk told her, Buddha does not 
give any answer to the question of whether there is life after death. Instead, the monk 
continued, Shinran’s Buddhism respects the present moment, which can be found when one 
realizes the calls from both past and future. Based on this view and on remorse about their 
politico-religious activities during the colonial period, the monks and believers participating 
in the study group were all very critical of Japan’s colonial history. This experience changed 
her life. Yu was increasingly fascinated by Jōdo Shinshū and its thought. She started 
attending the study group as a regular member. Yet it did not satisfy her intellectual interests. 
Therefore, in order to know more of Shinran’s thought, she decided to study at Otani 
University, one of the Buddhist universities founded by Jōdo Shinshū, where she was granted 
a qualification to become a nun when she was 52 years old. 
 At Otani University, she also had another encounter. Yu met a Zainichi Korean 
scholar, Chung Cho-myo (also known as Chung Sanae). She was Professor of International 
Studies, teaching ancient Korean history. It was Chung who introduced the world of South 
Korea to Yu. Like many Zainichi Koreans of her generation who were educated strictly to 
become “a local delegate of the General Kim Il-sun” at the ethnic Korean school, Yu did not 
have a positive image about South Korea. Despite the fact that it was her parents’ home 
country, Yu knew almost nothing about that country. Understanding Yu’s suspicion towards 
South Korea, Chung thought that she needed to take Yu to South Korea in order for Yu to 
understand their origins more deeply. Therefore, in 1999, Yu went to South Korea with 
Chung. It was the first experience for Yu to visit the country where her parents were born. In 
retrospect Yu recalls this trip and says: 
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Because of my education at Chōsen Gakkō, I didn’t have any positive image about South 
Korea before I visited. But as in the old saying, seeing is believing. I was really grateful to 
Prof Chung who convinced me to visit there. She and I visited many different places, 
including my parents’ hometown. Of course I’d never been there before. But I became 
very nostalgic, like thinking “Ah, this is where they’re from…380 
 
For Yu, feeling the air, and seeing the landscape on her visit to South Korea was an important 
experience for her and made this trip an opportunity torediscover herself as a Korean. Born in 
Japan as a member of an ethnic minority and educated under socialist ideology, Yu found 
that her visit to South Korea was a moment where she could finally feel her ancestral roots, 
which filled in the space that had long been a blank space in her Korean identity.  
 
8.4.4. Moving to Okinawa 
Yu and her daughter moved to Okinawa in the early 2000s. Forty years after she had married, 
Yu decided to leave her home in Kobe. She was asked to open a local study group on Shinran 
and Jōdo Shinshū by Kinjō Minoru, who was already her close friend by then. However, 
there was another reason that she decided to move. As she got closer to sixty, Yu began 
wanting to have some new challenge in her life. There was no better chance for her than the 
invitation from her friends in Okinawa. Her husband also supported her suggestion that they 
live separately for some time each year. Yu thus started living in Yomitan Village and Kobe 
for part of the year. 
 Yomitan Village has been traditionally known as one of the most progressive local 
communities in Okinawa. This is the village where many locally and nationally well-known 
activists who led Japan’s peace movement originated. Yu’s close friend, Kinjō Minoru, is a 
                                                 
380 Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012. 
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good example. Apart from his career as a sculptor, Kinjō is famous for his activist career as 
one of the leaders of a local group which opposed the enshrining of Okinawan soldiers who 
died during WWII at Yasukuni Shrine (Okinawa Yasukuni Soshō-dan).381 Also, Chibana 
Shōichi, who burnt the Japanese flag at the National Sports Festival in 1987, was a resident 
of Yomitan. He was originally the owner of a local supermarket before becoming a local 
politician as a member of the village council. In national politics, Yomitan has produced 
some important Okinawan politicians who are also peace activists such as Itokazu Keiko, 
who first introduced the peace bus tour in Okinawa, and Yamauchi Tokushin, who was a 
former high school teacher. Both of them later became members of the Japanese House of 
Councilors. The first Governor of Okinawa, Yara Chōbyō, was also from Yomitan Village. 
Yu started living in this community from 2004. 
 Yu started organising a study group upon her arrival in Yomitan Village. The venue 
was in a corner of Kinjō’s studio. Because of her likeable character and welcoming manner 
regardless of religious background, the class soon became popular among the locals. As she 
experienced in her first class in Himeji, Yu did not only read and discuss the texts with 
people but she tried to associate those works with Japanese historical contexts. In doing so, 
however, she created her own manner of critical religious practice using her Korean 
background. This is demonstrated by the clothes she would wear for the class. When 
preaching in front of people, she usually wears a black Buddhist gown called kesa. But 
occasionally she also comes to the class wearing chima jeogori, the traditional Korean 
women’s dress. This way of presenting herself reflects her particular social and cultural 
background as a nun and Korean. She considered that her experience as a Zainichi can be 
                                                 
381 The Yasukuni Shrine is one of the major Shinto shrines located near Kudanshita Station, Chiyoda Ward in 
Tokyo. It was founded in 1869 the souls of soldiers who died in service of the Japanese Empire until 1945. It 
also includes and commemorates those who died during the Japanese civil war before the establishment of 
Meiji Japan, which is also known as the Boshin War. The Yasukuni Shrine became problematic within Japan and 
with East Asian neighbors, particularly because of the fact that A-class war criminals of the Asia and the Pacific 
War are enshrined as war victims.  
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shared with the Okinawan locals in that they both represent cultural minorities in Japan, 
living under cultural and political subjugation that originated from the history of Japan’s 
colonial aggression in the region. 
 After moving to Okinawa and while organising a school to preach Shinran’s idea of 
Buddhism in Yomitan Village, Yu also started participating in the sit-in struggle in Henoko. 
By participating in the sit-in campaign in Henoko, her network with activists in Okinawa was 
extended. In Henoko, Yu was introduced to some senior local activists including Tomiyama 
Masahiro who later became Yu’s good friend in Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity. 
Participating in the sit-in not only enabled her to make friends among the Okinawan locals 
but also made her realize that many participants in Okinawa’s sit-in were mainland Japanese 
and there were also a few Zainichi Koreans. 
 
8.4.5 Complex Boundaries 
Although Yu’s active involvement with the Okinawan anti-base movement was welcomed by 
many fellow activists, this was not always the case. In fact, her presence as an ethnic Korean 
sometimes caused problems with some local activists. One incident happened in 2010 when 
Yu joined protest in front of Okinawa Prefectural Government. Prior to this gathering, she 
was informed by her friends that the next protest aimed to pressure Okinawa Prefecture by 
representing “the voices of all Okinawan residents” who disagreed with the base relocation 
from Futenma to Henoko. Therefore, she thought that she should attend the event in her 
favourite chima jeogori. Preparing herself from early morning, Yu drove down to Naha from 
Yomitan Village. However, during the protest, she was surrounded by a group of local 
women who also participated in the meeting. One of them asked her why she came with 
“such a strange dress”. Yu replied that it was her dress which represented her cultural origin 
and also said that it is a formal dress to wear at a public event. Yet the woman told her that it 
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was inappropriate to have an “outsider” like Yu because the protest should be a gathering by 
Okinawans. Moreover, some other group members told her harshly to “go back home”.  
This was a distressing experience for Yu, who had been acting to connect Okinawans 
and Zainichi Koreans in the anti-base movement. Although she understood that she was a 
new resident in Okinawa and her participation with the local activism has a different origin 
and context from most of the activists, the welcoming environment of her local friends in 
Yomitan Village gradually made her think that she was a local Okinawan who wore chima 
jeogori. Yet, after this event, she seriously started considering returning to Kobe. However, 
many of her close Okinawan friends tried to dissuade her. They were frustrated that such a 
divisive view was prevalent within certain groups of fellow Okinawan activists.  
Of those friends, what Yu recalls was a warm comment from Miyagi Setsuko, who is 
one of the most highly respected senior activists because of her long-term involvement from 
the 1970s. Miyagi told Yu that Okinawans needed a person like Yu who brought fresh air to 
the local protest movement. Yu’s strong supporter Kinjō Minoru, who is a community leader 
in Yomitan Village, also said that Okinawans should work together with ethnic Koreans in 
Japan as they both share unresolved historical wounds caused by Japan. Hearing this 
encouragement, Yu was reassured that her decision to move to Okinawa was not the wrong 
choice. Yet, through this experience, she also learnt about complex boundaries between 
Okinawa and Zainichi that she needs to overcome. 
 
8.4.6. Living as Zainichi Korean in Okinawa 
Yu’s life in Okinawa was not always easy. Cases like the one I mentioned above still 
“occasionally happen”, she said. But after living in Okinawa for nearly ten years, Yu also 
found many reasons to stay. In Yomitan Village, Henoko and elsewhere, she has good 
friends. Inspired by Yu’s life and religious views, some of her friends including influential 
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activists such as Chibana Shōichi started studying Jōdo Shinshū. Chibana indeed became a 
Buddhist monk. It is not only friends that keep attracting her in Okinawa but also many other 
ordinary people she meets at some venue or on the street. She introduced me to one of 
episodes with an elderly woman at an outdoor market. 
 
She [the elderly woman] asked me where I come from. I told her that I’m originally from 
Kobe but I’m Korean. Then, this woman, smiling as always, said “Korean, Okinawan, we 
are the same.” I felt a real warmth from her but at the same time it’s a sad thing isn’t it if 
we imagine the history she had to live…382 
 
She said that the woman she talked with at the market strongly reminded her of her mother 
who would have been a similar age to her. So, it made her think what her mother would say if 
she know of Yu’s life in Okinawa. 
 As a nun, mother, wife, social activist and Zainichi Korean, Yu’s life informs us of 
many different experiences which she has lived through, and these cannot easily be subsumed 
into a single identity. Instead of summarising her rich experiences, it might be more 
meaningful to think what kind of influence she has with the Okinawan protest community. 
The population of Korean or Zainichi Korean residents in Okinawa is small. In this sense, as 
a minority within Okinawa, her presence is hardly visible if we view the Okinawa struggle at 
a distance. Yet, if we closely look into the local protest community, her influence is clearly 
visible. Like Takahashi’s story, Yu’s life in Okinawa deepens our understanding of “the 
locals”. The representation of the “protest community” and “Okinawan protesters” contain 
such “non-Okinawan” elements. What we learn from Yu’s story is that it is not only Yu who 
approached Okinawans but also it is Okinawans who approached Yu and learnt from her 
                                                 
382 Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012. 
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experiences as an ethnic Korean in Japan, and these “non-local” aspects of the Okinawa 
struggle eventually created a perspective for seeing the local within the regional, and the 
regional within the local.  
 
8.5. Conclusion 
By looking into the details of the lives of three key activists, this chapter has shed further 
light on the historical background of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity. As I mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, oral history is an effective research method which unsettles the major 
historical narrative by investigating diverse views and practices of individual agents. By 
highlighting different dimensions of OKPS and its form of regional-local identity, the chapter 
helps to elucidate how the unique characteristics and identity of this protest community were 
created. What this chapter reveals is the multilayered historical contexts that run under the 
surface of OKPS and its actions to internationalise Okinawa’s local anti-protest movement. 
The life histories of three main figures demonstrated that OKPS is the creation of diverse 
historical contexts and diverse forms of historical consciousness. Therefore, I argue that the 
life histories of these individuals enable us to consider not only OKPS but also the Okinawa 
struggle in a wider web of meanings in Japan and Korea beyond local Okinawan history. In 
other words, what this chapter suggests is the possibility of shifting our perspective on the 
Okinawa struggle from a strictly “local” to a “local and regional” perspective. Ultimately, 
these life histories suggest a possible way to revisit the local history of the Okinawa struggle 
in a way that locates it in a chain of social struggles within a wider East Asian history. 
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Okinawan activists visited Darwin in February 2013. 
The photo was taken and provided by Justin Tutty. 
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9.1. Introduction 
This thesis has examined the diverse concepts and manifestations of Okinawan identity 
underlying the Okinawan anti-base movement. While the notion of “Okinawan identity” is 
often regarded as homogenous based on culture, ethnicity, and historical experience, this 
understanding obscures the complexity, creativity and dynamism of identity and community 
within the anti-base movement. In particular, I problematized such images of identity as a 
fixed entity. Through case studies of two recent anti-base movements, I showed how 
concepts of place can add a new dimension to existing discourses and practices of Okinawan 
identity. One case study illuminated the importance of a localized sense of place, while the 
other drew particular attention to an emerging regionalized sense of place across national 
boundaries. Applying recent theories on space, place and identity to these case studies, I thus 
highlighted the need to recognize multi-leveled forms of identity—local, archipelagic and 
regional—which interact within the Okinawa struggle. This thesis has thereby sought to 
deepen our understanding of the long and ongoing Okinawa struggle, and contribute to wider 
debates about identity and protest movements in the contemporary world. 
While my thesis examines Okinawa’s anti-base movement, this research is built on 
my general interest in the production of social space and the role of cultural identity in 
modern Japan. In particular, I have long been interested in the process by which local 
community is created in a multicultural environment, especially highlighting the significance 
of non-Japanese contexts. My curiosity is a product of my own personal experience. While 
the homogenous cultural discourses of “Japan” or “Japaneseness” were, and perhaps still are, 
prevalent in many aspects of cultural and social life in Japan, this monolithic discourse does 
not explain the reality that I lived. Born to a migrant family, and growing up in Kawasaki, a 
city which is one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse communities in Japan, I found 
that the “Japanese” discourses never entirely represented my living environment. Instead, 
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cultural differences, conflict and identity negotiation were part of everyday life in my family 
and neighborhood. Understanding our experience as “deviant”, I started my research during 
my undergraduate degree to consider how my local experience in contemporary Japanese 
society has its own dynamism; and how it is connected to a wider web of meanings than 
“Japanese”. Although this thesis is about contemporary Okinawan history, this basic theme 
underlies my research. Here, I would like to share snapshot of the origin of this research with 
reference to my personal background. This will help the reader understand the perspective 
from which I have examined the local identity of the Okinawan anti-base movement in this 
thesis. 
 
9.2. Identity, Locality, and Region: A Personal Story 
My mother, Yang Kuy-young or Takahashi Clara, was born in Seoul a few months after the 
Korean War “ended”. From her childhood, drawing was her favorite activity, which led her to 
Tokyo where she studied at an art college in the mid-1970s. In that period, people’s exchange 
was still strictly regulated between South Korea and Japan. It was thus not surprising that she 
was the only Korean student in her school. She was able to go to Japan because of her 
father’s connection. My grandfather, Yang Chun-suk, studied engineering in Tokyo during 
the Japanese colonial period. So he had some close Japanese friends, one of whom became 
her guarantor.  
This young student from South Korea soon made a name for herself in the art salon in 
Tokyo for her talent and also for her rarity as a student from South Korea. Her works 
including oil and acrylic paintings as well as prints received awards at exhibitions. Backed by 
the rise of the Japanese economy in the 1980s, her Japanese patrons bought her works and in 
this way she could earn enough income to live. As she became a well-known artist, she 
started using her Christian name, Clara, in her professional and private lives. Although her 
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father was reluctant to support her artistic career initially (because of its low status in 
Confucius social hierarchy), her success changed his attitude. Chun-suk was waiting for her 
to return to Seoul. He even bought a flat for his daughter to use as an atelier. But his dream 
was not realized. She decided to stay in Japan.  
Her student life in Tokyo in the late 1970s and early 1980s was “totally different” 
from her previous life in Seoul. She thought that life in Korea was “gloomy and backward” 
compared to her lively city life in Tokyo. Also, she had a fiancé whom she met at her school. 
When she told her parents that she would marry this Japanese man, her father did not oppose 
her decision. Yet he was not happy either. He asked my mother “why are you marrying ilbon-
nom” (which means “Japanese bloke” and has a disrespectful tone). This is how my mother’s 
life as a migrant started. 
After she married, my mother stopped her artistic career for the next fifteen years. 
The main concern of her life was not art any more but her newly born son. She decided to 
focus on raising me. Meanwhile, she worked at various places, including a language school, a 
trading company, nursing home, insurance company and so on. In her workplaces, no one 
knew or cared about her previous career. She was regarded only as a woman and a Korean, a 
person from the “gloomy and backward” country. Wherever she worked, the result was 
always the same. She ended up quitting her jobs due to prejudice, discrimination and 
harassment from her colleagues. These hardships were more than enough to change her views 
of Japan and Japanese. From a country of chance, hope and prosperity, Japan became a 
gloomy, discriminatory, and backward place. Yet having a family in Japan, she had no place 
to “return” to any more. Although her strong character generally kept her from making 
complaints in front of her family, there were some times in a year in which her accumulated 
anger, frustration, loneliness, and disappointment were expressed with tears and screams, 
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followed by her collapsing on the floor. Those extreme memories have never left and will 
never leave me. 
While my mother’s story had a great impact on my perception of culture and identity, 
my father, Takahashi Ichirō, and his family also illuminate another strand that underlies my 
perspective. Although my father was a Japanese who was born in downtown Asaka City in 
Saitama Prefecture, he was also a son of a migrant family. His father, Takahashi “Carlos” 
Chūshirō, was a second generation Japanese migrant in Peru. Born in Trujillo, a coastal city 
located northwest of Peru, my grandfather moved with his family to the capital city, Lima, 
where Chūshirō attended a local school with children from many other ethnic backgrounds. 
His father, my great-grandfather, Sadae, originated from Fukushima Prefecture. He was 
running a Japanese grocery store in Lima. Although Sadae’s store became a target when anti-
Japanese riots occurred in 1940, Chūshirō’s childhood was just the same as many other 
children.  
However, Chūshirō’s life suddenly changed when Sadae went missing in 1942. About 
a week after Sadae’s disappearance, local police officers came to Chūshirō’s home, and told 
the family to get on a train with minimum necessities. With little time to prepare, Chūshirō’s 
family rushed to the train without knowing where they were going. Their destination was not 
in Peru but Crystal City, Texas, where the US government founded one of 12 Japanese 
internment camps during the Pacific War. Manuel Prado, then President of Peru, was a 
supporter of the United States, and started persecuting Japanese migrants as “enemy 
nationals” when the war broke out. This included the forceful relocation of about 2000 
Japanese to the United States. In the foreign land of Texas, the family could meet my great-
grandfather again. 
After the war, Japanese internees were all released from the camps. Sadae and his 
family wished to return to Peru. He had two grown up children who were living in different 
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parts of Peru and thus they were not directly affected when the rest of family was taken to the 
US. However, the Peruvian government rejected the return of his family (like many other 
Japanese internees) to its country. Also, they were not American citizens, and thus were not 
allowed to remain in the US. The only option for Sadae and his family was to return to Japan. 
With many other Japanese, the Takahashi family started a long trip to Japan via Seattle, 
leaving some of their children in Peru. For Chūshirō, this was his first experience of his 
“homeland”.  
This family’s hardship still continued even after they arrived in Japan. Sadae found 
that his name had been removed from his family register in Fukushima. They had no place to 
“return” to. Living in the outskirts of Tokyo, the parents and grown-up children had to find 
jobs to survive. Chūshirō, who was 15 years old, was no exception. However, he had some 
difficulties to start with. One of them was his language skills. Spanish was his first language, 
and he could speak only a few words in Japanese when he arrived in Japan. In fact, he studied 
English in the internment camp to communicate with Americans and descendants of Japanese 
Americans who also lived in the same internment camp. With such language skills, he 
struggled to get a job. Yet there was one place he was treated better than other Japanese, 
which was an American military base. He was employed as a warehouse worker at the US 
military base in Asaka City, Saitama Prefecture, which was also known as Camp Drake. 
There, he learnt English from the American soldiers and Japanese from other colleagues. His 
eldest son, my father, spent his childhood in an environment in which American, Peruvian 
and Japanese cultures were all mixed. 
Growing up with this family background, my childhood was “different” from most of 
my classmates at school in terms of cultural experience. It is true that I was raised as a 
“Japanese”. Going to a Shinto shrine near our house on New Year’s Day was one of my 
favorite moments throughout the year. Japanese was the language of communication with my 
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family. I was educated and socialized in the local Japanese public school in which I was the 
best at Japanese history. Furthermore, my name, Shinnosuke, represents undoubtedly my 
Japanese origin. However, “Japaneseness” was not of all of me. While we celebrated New 
Year’s Day in the beginning of January like most Japanese, my mother respected the first day 
in the lunar calendar. As many Japanese visit their ancestral graves to pray for the ancestral 
spirits in August, we celebrated Chuseok, the period for the Korean harvest festival and for 
the ancestral worship in September. We returned to Seoul at least once a year until my 
grandfather’s death in 2001. In my childhood, my mother often took me to visit her good 
Korean friends whom she met at her church. When we celebrated my paternal grandfather’s 
birthday, he always cooked at least several different Peruvian dishes with my grandmother. 
Even when we had sashimi, my grandfather often used a tomato sauce to dip it in instead of 
using soy sauce. Furthermore, he was my private English teacher when I was a middle school 
student. Though he said his English was broken because he never received formal language 
education, I enjoyed the weekly Saturday class, often with stories of his old days. Therefore, 
while discourses such as “Japan”, “Japanese” or “Japaneseness” explain some aspects of my 
life experience, it was part of our multicultural family life. 
Nevertheless, my cultural experience was not so uncommon in my neighborhood. In 
fact, I was privileged to have some friends who also had non-Japanese ethnic backgrounds. 
This was perhaps because of the nature of my hometown, Kawasaki, which is a major port 
city and also known as one of the most ethnically diverse places in Japan. I always had 
friends whose parents were culturally different from most Japanese. They were from 
countries including Brazil, Argentina, Germany, India, the Philippines, China and Korea. 
Although we did not always talk about our family to each other, “we”—the sons and 
daughters who had newly migrated parent(s)—were similarly conscious of our differences 
from other Japanese students. We also shared some similar experiences of being teased or 
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bullied because of our appearance, name, or parents who told their children that “we” are 
different from “them”.  
This “minority experience” in my local town, however, not only sharpened my 
cultural sensitivity but also enriched my perspective on the relations between my local town 
and the wider regional and global communities. Hearing, talking and reading histories from 
my family, friends and neighborhood were the moments in which I could set myself free 
from suffocating “Japanese” cultural discourses, which were not reflective of the actuality of 
diverse local lives. In other words, these were moments when I could be someone closer to 
what I really am by re-situating myself and my local community in a wider context. 
This perspective underlies my thesis. Although my curiosity about Okinawa’s local 
history started relatively recently, after I first visited Okinawa for a week in 2008 as part of a 
week-long “peace study tour” sponsored by my university in Tokyo, I was also struck by a 
strong sense of community and identity from the local people that I met during that trip, 
including some who were involved with the anti-base construction movement in Henoko. 
These local Okinawans not only maintained their own historical past and memory of war but 
were also very well-informed and sympathetic towards their regional neighbors. This local 
attitude was remarkably represented on the commemorative monument for the war dead on 
the Hill of Mabuni (Mabuni no Oka). The top of the hill from which I could see the horizon 
of the East China Sea was the place where the last brutal battle took place between the 
Japanese military and the Allied Powers at the end of the Battle of Okinawa. On the black 
walls of the Cornerstone of Peace (Heiwa no Ishiji), there are numerous names of people who 
died in this war. Regardless of occupation (civilians, soldiers, and other military workers), 
nationality, and gender, the names of the war dead are inscribed, and the number is still 
continuing to grow. There, I learnt that the Battle of Okinawa involved not only Okinawans, 
Japanese and Americans but also Koreans, Chinese, and people from other parts of Asia. 
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Through this experience, I became interested in exploring more about Okinawa and its 
historical relations with other parts of the region.  
 
9.3. Main Findings of the Thesis 
My PhD thesis illuminates the role that the concept of place plays in making the political 
identity in Okinawa by examining the historical development of the Okinawa struggle and 
current protest movement. While this thesis showed the complexity of identity within the 
Okinawa struggle, it also highlighted the interconnectedness of various forms of protest 
movements. Through two case studies, of the Takae Residents’ Society and Okinawa Korea 
People’s Solidarity, I demonstrated that the concept of place is central to understanding how 
various discrete individual, social, intellectual and historical contexts are interconnected to 
each other to produce a particular community. In other words, the concept of place—whether 
it is local or regional—enables us to understand that the Okinawan protest community and its 
identity are sustained and developed based on diverse political and social identities. While 
maintaining discrete senses of community, the local protest communities also share the 
meaning of the Okinawa struggle. In this sense, what I discovered through Takae and OKPS 
is the importance of Okinawan identities rather than Okinawan identity. With this concept, 
we can consider the dynamism, resilience and creativity of the Okinawa struggle. This plural 
form of Okinawan identity is based on my observation of the Okinawan anti-base movement. 
At the same time, my life experience and involvement with the anti-base movement also 
shaped my perspective on interactive relations between identity and the local protest 
community.  
In order to illuminate the multiplicity of identities within the Okinawa struggle, this 
thesis started with chapters devoted to explaining the historical development of the Okinawan 
anti-base movement. Chapters Two and Three showed the complexity and plurality of the 
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local political identities from a historical point of view. There, I revealed the complex history 
of the formation of “Okinawan identity” by highlighting the involvement of different social 
and political actors, their cooperation and conflict. Chapter Two looked at the origins and 
early period of the local anti-base struggle under the US occupation, which was started by 
evicted farmers, politicians, other concerned residents and progressive university students. 
Chapter Three illuminated the emergence of ordinary citizens as major political actors of the 
anti-base struggle, their achievements and challenges in post-reversion Okinawa. In Chapter 
Four, I introduced some recent perspectives on the anti-base movement, including 
perspectives mobilizing the framework of the indigenous movement, of civic movements and 
of feminism, by examining three key researchers and their works. In so doing, I discussed 
how these scholars sought to theorize the Okinawa struggle and to illuminate it as a crucial 
political movement not only for Okinawa or Japan but also for all people involved in peace 
activism globally. 
While building on the existing scholarship, I argued that there was scope for further 
study of the issues of space and place and their complex relations to the formation of the local 
identity in the anti-base movement. Therefore, in Chapters Five and Six, I explored the case 
of the Takae Residents’ Society in which activists mobilize the sense of place (i.e. the 
attachment to the local natural environment and feeling of “dwelling” or “rootedness”) and 
their dynamic social networks in making their communal identity. These two chapters 
showed the process by which a particular local identity was created, and how the local 
identity negotiates with and contradicts “Okinawan identity”. In Chapters Seven and Eight, I 
discussed how the Okinawa struggle has begun to embrace a regional perspective. The story 
of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity demonstrated another form of place-based identity, 
which extends its vision to the East Asian region. By examining the historical context of the 
group and life histories of three key members, I revealed that the historical origins of 
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Okinawa Korean People’s Solidarity movement were deeply related to the histories and 
personal experiences of the members in Okinawa, mainland Japan and East Asia in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. 
Overall, my research suggests the significance of multi-leveled identity created by 
diverse social actors, their political interests and various contexts of interaction with 
Okinawa’s anti-base movement. By understanding that Okinawan identity is plural and multi-
leveled, we can understand the reasons for intermittent clashes between differing perceptions 
of identity, but can also appreciate why different identities are able to co-exist within the 
Okinawa struggle in an inclusive, dialogical and multidirectional way. 
The understanding of multi-leveled identity also enables us to see the fluidity of 
identity, which is created through multiple flows of people, ideas and information across 
boundaries. In this sense, one of the similarities of the two case studies in this thesis is that 
they both highlight translocality as a key concept to understand the forms of communities. 
While the Takae Residents’ Society is a localized protest community based in a remote area 
of the northern part of Okinawa Island, this community includes people who originated from 
various parts of Okinawa and Japan. The translocal experiences that underlie the Takae 
Residents’ Society enable the local community to be connected to wider social networks 
around Okinawa and other parts of the Japanese archipelago. While the case of Takae shows 
that the people, their activities, and various experiences contribute to enriching the sense of 
locality, the case of OKPS reveals an emerging sense of communal identity or extensive 
understanding of “we-ness” in a wider East Asian regional context. In other words, these two 
cases illustrate how activists articulate the notion of place in making their local communal 
identities, and remind us that we need to be conscious of the translocality which enables these 
people to create such senses of space. 
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However, there are differences between these two cases. While the first case 
illuminates the physical aspects of place (i.e. the landscape of and the natural environment in 
Yanbaru Forest), the second case highlights the conceptual aspect of place (i.e. region or East 
Asia). This difference between locality and region clarifies the meaning of multi-leveled 
identity, and allows us to see two principal ways of understanding consciousness toward 
place among the activists. Namely, the first case shows the material relationship between 
people and their living environment, or “dwelling”, as a way to make the identity of the 
Takae Residents’ Society. The second case shows that an ideological relationship across the 
boundaries, or “connectivity”, is a way to create a regional solidarity in the anti-base 
movement. Overall, by examining the fixed notion of Okinawan identity critically, my PhD 
thesis showed two different creative dimensions of the Okinawa struggle—localization and 
regionalization. 
 
9.4. Connecting the Pacific: A New Journey Just Begun 
While this research illuminated diverse human activities that connect the Okinawan anti-base 
struggle with mainland Japan and South Korea, I was also keenly aware of the issues that I 
could not address in this research because of lack of time and space. One of these issues is the 
networks that Okinawa’s anti-base movement is creating with activists from many different 
parts of the Asia and Pacific region. While I illuminated the solidarity movement between 
Okinawa and South Korea, there are also emerging networks between Okinawa and places 
including Guam, Hawaii, mainland United States, the Philippines, and Australia. Among 
these emerging networks is a group of activists from Darwin in the Northern Territory of 
Australia who I had a chance to be involved with. Since January 2012, I have been working 
with local citizens in Darwin who initiated a campaign to oppose the installation of American 
military bases in their territory.  
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In November 2011, US President Barack Obama announced that the United Sates 
would deploy marines in Australia. Welcoming this announcement, the former Prime 
Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard, endorsed the strategic expansion of the US troops in the 
southern part of the Pacific. This reinforcement of the US military forces was part of 
“rebalancing” the power-relations in Asia and the Pacific, particularly with regard to the rise 
of the Chinese influence over other countries in the region. Situating Darwin under the same 
chain of command as Guam and Okinawa, the United States government planned to deploy 
US Marine Corps in these three places on six-month rotations from 2012. 
This news concerned many local residents in Darwin, especially because it was a 
sudden announcement that they had not been given any hint of earlier. Knowing the fact that 
US military personnel had committed a number of crimes in other host countries of US 
military bases, the concerned citizens started a grassroots NGO called Base Watch. While 
some members originated from Darwin, most of the members were people who had come to 
live in this place from Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and other parts of Australia, attracted by 
Darwin’s tropical natural environment that has shaped a distinctive culture. The demography 
of the members is diverse and includes lawyers, former union workers, housewives, IT 
workers, and veterans of the Australian Defence Force. They are all experienced activists in 
environmental conservation including those who have been involved in the anti-mining 
campaign, indigenous land rights, feminism and the labor movement. Collaborating with the 
nation-wide peace movement, IPAN (Independent and Peaceful Australia Network), the 
members of Base Watch started organizing study groups and symposiums to publicize their 
activities and to enhance public awareness. 
I met two members, Justin Tutty and Cat Beaton for the first time in Yokohama in 
January 2012. I was introduced to these two activists by our mutual friend at the venue of 
Nuclear Free Now, a world congress of the anti-nuclear campaign. In the wake of Japan’s 
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triple disaster in March 2011, some Australian environmental activists started a solidarity 
movement with Japanese NGOs on the problems of nuclear energy. For Australian activists, 
the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was not someone else’s 
problem. Rather, they considered that it was a disaster in which the Australian mining 
industry was implicated. In fact, most of the uranium used in Fukushima power plants was 
imported from South Australia. Darwin was one of the major ports for shipping the uranium 
to Japan. Therefore, the Fukushima disaster was considered as not only an environmental 
crisis but also a moral crisis for many of the Australian activists. 
Yokohama was not the only place on Justin’s and Cat’s itinerary. They also planned 
to travel to Okinawa. Coincidentally, I had just booked my flight ticket to visit Okinawa 
around the same period. My friend, Abe Kosuzu, rang me and asked if I was interested in 
interpreting for two Australian activists visiting Okinawa. Since I was keen to explore the 
history of the Australian peace movement, I saw no reason why I should not accept her offer. 
These “Australian activists” were Justin and Cat. 
Since this first meeting with the activists from Base Watch, I have become aware of 
new dimensions of the connection between Japan and Australia. The Pacific no longer seems 
like a space that separates these two places; rather, it links them through the movement of 
people and common concerns across boundaries. This regional perspective allowed me to 
have an interesting experience when I visited Darwin in February 2013. For some reason, I 
had a false sense that I was in Okinawa. It was partly because of the local climate including 
the humid air, squalls in the late afternoon, and the mangroves in the forest. But there were 
also other reasons for this illusion. The view of the long walls of wire fences of the military 
camps alongside roads also strongly reminded me of Camp Foster and Route 58 in Okinawa. 
It was not only I who had this illusion. Other visitors from Okinawa with whom I traveled 
also felt the same. Although we had never traveled to Darwin before, we all saw this place as 
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very familiar. In fact, Justin and Cat, too, were surprised by the fact that there was so much in 
common between Okinawa and Darwin including the climate, calm beaches, history as a 
frontier, and the military bases. With these similarities of Okinawa and Darwin, we could not 
help but compare the two different places.  
The development of connectivity between Australia and Japan has been deepened not 
only at the grassroots level but also at the state political level. Although the ongoing debates 
and cooperation on regional security between the two countries are not headline news, the 
institutional cooperation of the two countries has been rapidly progressing in recent years, 
especially since 2012. In 2014, the Japanese Ministry of Defense established a division to 
promote security cooperation between Australia and Japan. In 2015, the first joint exercises 
by the Japanese Self Defense Forces and Australian Defence Force together with the US 
Army were held in Townsville in Queensland, and these three countries have been the main 
participants of RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) in the South China Sea (with the 
Philippines and South Korean naval fleets).  
In the period when the northern and southern edges of the Pacific Rim are becoming 
closer than ever before, institutionally and socially, how should we consider the significance 
and relationship of anti-base struggles in Darwin and Okinawa? How can we consider their 
solidarity movement in terms of the critical region making? Is it possible to create wider 
regional networks by involving anti-base movements in societies across different identities 
and localities? If so, what would be the forms of critical regional identity that might 
“reclaim” the Pacific not as a ground for military exercises nor a place of tension and 
competition among the nations of the region, but as a place to pursue cooperation for social 
justice beyond national interests? This thesis has laid the foundations of my future work to 
explore these questions by illuminating Okinawans’ historical endeavors and the dynamics of 
Okinawan identities. Building on this basis, I hope in the future to conduct more extensive 
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research on the anti-base movement in the Pacific region from historical, comparative and 
transnational perspectives. My journey has just begun. 
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